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LO DIL
ABSTRACT
By the end of the Second World War there were nearly
a quarter of a million Poles in the Polish Armed Forces
serving under British command. Whereas the other Allied
armies eagerly anticipated their demobilisation, the
future for the Poles seemed far from certain.
On the 20th March, 1946, British Foreign Secretary,
Ernest Bevin, issued a note to the Polish forces
recommending, in the strongest possible terms, that the
Poles should return to Poland to help in the country's
reconstruction. Indeed some 105,000 took him up on the
offer. Some 123,000 did not - a further 21,000 were
recruited from Polish communities around the world and
they returned home after demobilisation. The key question
is why did so many Poles feel unable to return to Poland
after the war?
Chapter 1 examines the origins of the "Polish Armed
Forces Question" and the legacy of bitterness the war has
left, even in present day Poland. Chapter 2 looks at the
British reactions to the Poles, particularly the important
attitude of the Foreign Office. Chapter 3 deals with some
of the decisions made by the troops caught in this
dilemma. Chapter 4 examines conditions in post-war Poland,
and is linked to Chapter 5 which looks at Warsaw's
questionably welcoming attitude to the returning troops.
Chapter 6 considers British public reaction to the Poles
while Chapter 7 deals with the moves of the British
Government to support the demobilised Polish forces and
the birth of the Polish Resettlement Corps.
The aim of this thesis is to establish how the troops
of the Polish Armed Forces came to the decisions they did
and what were the consequences of returning or not
returning to Poland.
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FOREWORD
For Lance-Corporal Franciszek Ostrowski it had been a long
war. The German invasion of Poland in September, 1939, had
left him and his family largely unscathed as they lived in
the east, in the area known as the 'Kresy' - the
borderland with the Soviet Union. For the Ostrowski family
the threat at that time did not come from Hitler but from
Stalin and the Red Army. As they occupied eastern Poland
the Soviet secret police, the NKVD, began a campaign of
deporting Polish citizens to the Soviet Union.
Intellectuals, military and police officers and local
officials were executed en masse and other Poles were
imprisoned across the breadth of the USSR from Kamchatka
on the Russian Pacific shore to the deserts of Soviet
Central Asia and to the permafrost of Arctic Siberia.
Franciszek Ostrowski was arrested by the NKVD and
sent to a Soviet camp near Archangel where he stayed
until 1941. The German invasion of the Soviet Union
created a need in Moscow to establish friendly relations
with the West so Stalin issued an "amnesty" for the Poles
and allowed for the recruitment of a Polish Army under
General Wladys7aw Anders. For many of the deportees and
their families, Stalin's gesture came too late. Of the
nearly two million people sent to the east, about half
died. The long railway convoys of prisoners, the cold, the
heavy work and the starvation rations all effected a slow
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and lingering death. Along the way Franciszek Ostrowski
buried his two daughters but his two sons were stronger
and they, along with their mother, survived the ordeal.
After the "amnesty" he and his family made their way south
to the Polish Army recruitment centre in Soviet Central
Asia. In March, 1942, he was transported across the
Caspian Sea to Pahievi in Persia where the newly formed
Polish Army was being equipped by the British. In Persia
the women and children were removed to a network of War
Office dependants' camps world-wide - his family went to
Tanganyika - while the men prepared for war. The long
journeys that many Poles had to undertake to enlist in the
Polish Armed Forces earned them the disparaging German
title of "General Sikorski's tourists" [1] but when the
rearmed Poles met the Germans again in Italy and France
the Germans stopped laughing.
In January, 1943, the No. 5 (Polish) Casualty
Clearing Station was formed as part of the 2nd Polish
Corps and it was here that Franciszek Ostrowski worked. In
October the unit was moved to Palestine and the men went
to Syria for mountain warfare training in anticipation of
their joining the Italian campaign.
No. 5 (Polish) Casualty Clearing Station served at
Cassino, the River Rapido, the advance on the Adriatic
Coast, the assault on the "Gothic Line", the River Senio
and the liberation of Bologna and finally ending the war
in Loreto, near Ancona, after having been upgraded to
- 11 -
No. 5 (Polish) Field Hospital.
The Poles in the hospital followed the war closely as
the BBC and their own Polish broadcasts kept them aware of
the news from home - news that brought little joy to
them as they heard about one national disaster
after another. The names of Katyti and Yalta became
synonymous with the fears that the Polish Army felt for
the future. After the hostilities had ended, the Poles
were offered the option to return to Poland but only a few
availed themselves of the chance immediately. To move
things along Franciszek Ostrowski and all the men of the
Field Hospital were paraded on the 20th March, 1946, and
were handed a note from the British Foreign Secretary,
Ernest Bevin, recommending that they should return to
Poland. In fact the note went beyond a recommendation in
that Bevin seemed to suggest that it was every soldier's
patriotic duty to return to Poland rather than seek help
from the British Government.
After the war many Poles returned to Poland - many
did not. The decision "to return or not to return" was a
personal one made by every Pole and the factors that
affected these decisions are the subject of the work that
follows.
The choices made by men like Franciszek Ostrowski
from 1945 to 1949 affected the rest of their lives and the
lives of their families. This is their story.
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INTRODUCTION
By 1945, the British Government widely regarded the Polish
Armed Forces under its command as an embarrassment and a
liability. Shortly before the 1945 general election,
Churchill had promised the Poles that they would be able
to stay in Britain after the war if they felt unable to
return to Poland. Churchill went on to lose the election
but he had committed the new Labour administration that
replaced the government to a policy that would lead to a
whole string of British foreign policy problems.
The British Government tried to reassure the Poles
that they had nothing to fear by returning to Poland. The
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, issued a declaration to
the Polish Armed Forces in March 1946 that they should
return to Poland to help in the country's reconstruction.
While publicly maintaining that repatriation would be safe
for the Polish forces, Bevin's officials were far from
convinced. Despite talk of 'safeguards', the Poles, and
many officials in the Foreign Office, knew there was
little the British Government could do to protect the
Poles from repression by Warsaw's secret police.
Matters were further complicated by the fact that
there existed two Polish Governments to deal with.
Steering a course between the Scylla of the Moscow-
backed regime in Warsaw and the Charybdis of the exiled
Polish Government in London, with its ever—decreasing
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circle of friends, the British did their best, at first,
to be even-handed, but managed to please neither. Despite
a perceived moral obligation to the London Poles, policy
dictated that the future was with Warsaw and the
Communists. Everything possible was done so as not to
offend Warsaw and the Foreign Office was forced into all
manner of contortions to keep the Communist authorities
happy. Even given mass British Government disinformation
about the true state of affairs in Poland and the
promise of "free and unfettered" elections, many of the
Poles steadfastly refused to return.
The British Government recognised that if the Poles
refused to return to Poland, then it would have to act to
ensure the Poles integrated smoothly into British society
and, in particular, into the British labour market. These
are the roots of the Polish Resettlement Corps and the
origins of the post-war Polish community in Britain.
Amid the clamour that greeted the 50th Anniversary of
the Victory in Europe, the voice of Poland was strangely
silent in the proceedings. The Polish forces who were such
a public controversy in 1945 have melted away from public
consciousness and now remain a largely forgotten footnote
in the history of the Second World War.
Poland s s contribution to the Allied victory has been
extensively recorded by the Poles, both in Poland and in
exile, yet the English language bibliography is
fragmentary, to say the least, and the British public
- 14 -
remains largely ignorant of the true facts. Military
historians, as a rule, tend to concentrate more on battles
and campaigns than on the demobilisation of armies. The
role of the Polish soldiers in Italy and France has been
documented in many excellent histories, yet few ever look
at what became of the men who fought at Monte Cassino and
Falaise. For the Polish forces the story did not stop in
1945 - a fact that is, all too often, overlooked.
The memoirs of the players involved in the story are
limited by the same shortcomings that beset the works of
the professional historian. The works of former Polish
soldiers that have been published in the West invariably
pass over the painful post-war years while the works
published in Poland over the last forty years have done
much the same but for reasons of avoiding political
controversy. The collapse of the Communist regime has
opened the doors for the soldiers who did return to Poland
after the war to record their feelings but, sadly, the
passage of time has limited their numbers. To date there
are few of these memoirs to be studied and fewer still
that chose to discuss the repatriation issue.
The settlement of Poles in Great Britain is also an
area that has seen little study in depth. Jerzy
Zubrzycki's Polish Immigrants In Britain - A Study of
Adjustment (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1956) was the
first major work on Polish settlement in Britain. There
is also Czajkowski and	 Sulik's Polacy W W.Britanii
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(Instytut Literacki, Paris, 1961, and more recently
Sword, Davies and Ciechanowski's The Formation Of The
Polish Community in Great Britain (School of Slavonic and
East European Studies, University of London, 1989), the
latter being the best on the Polish Armed Forces question.
These are three islands in an otherwise barren seascape.
Among the primary sources used in this study, the
Foreign Office General Correspondence (F0371) held at the
Public Record Office [PRO] has formed the back-bone of the
material used. The internal memoranda between the various
departments of state show a policy aimed at convincing the
demobilised Polish troops to return to Poland despite
knowledge of the serious security situation that existed
there. The files at the PRO reveal cover-ups and
conspiracies at the highest level and a campaign of
misinformation aimed at keeping the Poles from settling in
Britain. For the cynical historian this provides
confirmation that there is no place for honour or morality
in realpolitik.
The archives in Warsaw, on the other hand, do not
yield the same results as the PRO. The Archiwum Akt
Nowych, the main repository for the modern day state
papers, is helpful only in what it omits to reveal about
the Polish Government's attitude to the repatriation of
Polish troops from the West. The papers of the State
Directorate for Repatriation [PUR] do not answer the
fundamental question of whether the Polish Government in
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Warsaw wanted the Polish troops under British command to
return to Poland, yet by its actions, it reveals that it
probably did not. The correspondence of Major SaXkowski,
PUR's man in Italy, clearly reveal his own misgivings
about his government's policy and the reports of the
representatives of the Ministry of Information and
Propaganda show a clear disregard for the welfare of
returnees. This only confirms Sakowski's impression that
he was working contrary to someone's hidden agenda. It may
be that documents detailing Warsaw's actual position
regarding repatriation indeed do exist, they have, to
date, still to be discovered.
Another archive providing material is the General
Sikorski Historical Institute in Kensington which holds
the papers of the exiled Polish Government and the records
of the Polish Armed Forces under British command. Since
British policy towards the Polish forces was carried out
without the exile Government's consent and often without
its knowledge, the Polish Government-in-Exile's official
state papers are of little use. The war diaries of the
various military units, on the other hand, are the best
indication of which soldiers returned to Poland and which
did not. Many of the diaries, often beautifully bound and
illustrated, also give some of the most accurate
breakdowns of the number of repatriations after the war
and which units had the greatest levels of return. This
material has yet to be adequately studied and the diaries
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are a valuable historical record, many of which would be
worthy of publication.
The public debate that raged in Britain after the war
regarding the settlement of the Poles is highlighted in
the Parliamentary debates recorded in Flansard. The Labour
Government front benches fought against Conservative
criticism that they were betraying the Poles in their
charge, while at the same time they fought against their
own back benches who accused them of jeopardizing
relations with the Soviet Union for the sake of, as they
saw it, "fascist11 Poles. This was a debate that raged
among the British public from 1945 and was only superseded
by anxiety at the first waves of black immigrants from the
Caribbean and the racial tension that erupted in Britain
in the 1950s.
When General Wadysaw Anders, the commander of the
Polish 2nd Corps which fought in Italy, wrote his memoirs
he entitled them Bez Ostatniego Rozdzia,Zu (Montgomery
Printing Co. Ltd, Newtown, Wales, 1949) or "Without
A Final Chapter". This thesis, written nearly half a
century after Anders' book, is a record of that final
chapter of the Polish Armed Forces under British command
and of the bitterness that he and many of his men
felt - a bitterness that even the passage of time has not
assuaged.
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CHAPTER ONE
"Our March Is Towards Poland, Whole,
Free And Independent."
The Origins Of The Polish Armed forces Question.
Katyñ Memorial, London.
Unveiled 18th September, 1976.
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CHAPTER ONE
When it comes to histories of the Second World War, every
country, inevitably, plays up its own role and it
contribution to the overall victory. There are, however,
few countries like Poland whose contribution was so great
and yet whose contribution has been so forgotten by the
world. It is little wonder that fifty years on, the war
still evokes much bitterness and pain among the Poles.
The Second World War has been a wound in Poland that has
adamantly refused to heal.
The treatment of the Polish Forces during and after
the war has remained controversial - to the Poles at
least. At their height, the manpower of the Polish Armed
Forces under British command reached 249,000.
35,000
1,780
14,210
2,290
83,000
89,300
7,000
21,750
254,830
26,830
228,000
+
21,000
249,000
were evacuated from France in June 1940
were recruited in Britain
escaped from occupied Europe
were recruited from Canada/Argentina/Brazil
were evacuated from the USSR
joined after deserting German Forces
joined from liberated France
were liberated Polish Prisoners of War [POW]
Killed in Action/Missing/Died of Wounds
July 1945 (technical close of recruitment)
former POWs recruited after July 1945
[1]
This made the Polish Armed Forces the fourth largest after
the Soviet, United States and the British Armed Forces.
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hen the war began the Poles had to witness two
defeats in as many years; In September 1939, German
technological superiority won over the Poles. In a bitter
and hard fought campaign, the ferocity of which surprised
even the Germans, few histories of the war remember more
than the apocryphal stories of Polish cavalry charging
German tanks, fewer still give more than a passing word to
the other invasion of Poland from the Soviet Union and its
effect of dashing any hope of a Polish stand in the east.
Arguably Poland's greatest contribution to the final
victory over the Nazis was the presentation to the British
and French Governments of "Enigma" decoders which helped
the Allies read German coded messages. Just before Poland
fell to the Germans, the Polish intelligence service
managed to smuggle two machines out of the country and
Polish cryptologists helped in the decoding of the
high-level German communications that is now recognised as
being crucial to the outcome of the war.
Thousands of Polish troops escaped their country and
made their way to France - the traditional home of the
Polish exile - and set up an exile Government at
Angers. The army and air force were reformed and
placed under French command.
When the Poles took to the front to defend France
they manned two full infantry divisions with a further two
in the process of being formed - an independent Highland
Brigade and an armoured brigade under General Maczek. The
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Polish Air Force in France consisted of two fighter
squadrons, with a further two in training but when the
Germans invaded France, the French collapse was as swift
as the Polish one and, some might argue, less creditable.
The Poles took part in the abortive invasion of
Norway, landing the Highland Brigade at Narvik, but as
that joint British and French campaign collapsed, the
allies were evacuated - the Poles were returned to France
only to be captured defending Brest. Of the Polish Armed
Forces in France, only some 20% were evacuated to Britain
to fight again. Of those who were left behind, many Poles
set up independent Polish underground units in France but
most, however, went into German captivity.
The Polish Government-in-Exile reformed for a second
time, this time in London, just in time for the Battle of
Britain - another effort where the Poles can claim that
their contribution did have an effect on the overall
victory in Europe. The 71 Polish fighter pilots of 302 and
303 Polish squadrons and the 80 Poles who flew with
British squadrons shot down 203 German planes and damaged
a further 36. This vas over 11% of allenemy planes shot
down in the Battle of Britain and at that time the Poles
made up the largest contingent of foreign pilots flying
with the Royal Air Force.
The Polish Army saw action again in 1941 as the
Independent Carpathian Rifle Brigade was moved to Tobruk
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in North Africa to take part in its defence, besieged as
it was by German and Italian troops. The Poles defended
the town for four months alongside the British 70 Division
and Czech and Australian battalions until it was relieved
by a British offensive.
1942 saw the creation of the Polish Army in the
Soviet Union from the over one and a half million Poles
who were deported from Poland to all parts of the Soviet
Union after its 1939 invasion of Poland. After the German
invasion of the USSR, the Soviets found themselves on
the same side as Britain and Poland and so issued an
"amnesty" for these Poles and allowed recruitment under
General WXadys.Zaw Anders. After much pressure on Moscow,
Anders managed to get his troops evacuated to Persia where
they were equipped by the British and began life as the
Polish 2nd Corps. The Corps took part in the campaign in
Italy. It fought at Cassino and hoisted a Polish flag on
the ruins of the abbey which it captured; it took Ancona
and ended the war by liberating Bologna.
In Britain, General Maczek was given command of the
Polish 1st Armoured Division which was sent to France
shortly after D-Day. it took part in the drive through
Normandy, culminating in the battles of Falaise and
Chambois where the Poles cut off the retreat of 60,000
Germans. The Poles were fighting as part of the Canadian
Corps and so the victory was not attributed as a Polish
victory but, as a mark of respect, Canadian sappers
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erected a sign on Mont Ormel that read "A Polish
Battlefield" [2] The Division went on to liberate
Abeville, St Omer, Ypres and Ghent. The Poles drove
through France and Belgium into Holland where they
liberated Breda and then into Germany where the Polish
Division accepted the surrender of the port of
Wilhelmshaven.
The Polish Independent Parachute Brigade under
General Sosabowski had wanted to parachute into Poland
to help the ill-fated rising in Warsaw that had broken out
on the 1st August, 1944, but were dropped instead at
Arnhem as part of operation "Market-Garden" to fight
alongside the British 1st Airborne Division and to suffer
the same defeat.
The Polish Air Force continued flying throughout the
war. In North Africa, Polish pilots flew with 112 "Shark"
Fighter Squadron and the "Polish Fighting Team" that was
commonly referred to as "Skaiski's Flying Circus" after
its Commanding Officer [CO]. In Britain, the Poles' two
fighter squadrons were increased to seven (302, 303, 306,
315, 316 & 317) and a further one was formed in Italy
(318). The Poles flew a night fighter squadron (307), a
fighter-reconnaissance squadron (309), two bomber
squadrons (300 & 305), a Coastal Command bomber squadron
(304), an artillery observation squadron in Italy (663)
and a special duties flight (formerly 301 bomber squadron
redesignated as 1586 Flight).
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The Polish Navy, although small in 1939, was rapidly
expanded by the loan of British ships to be manned by
Polish crews. Polish submarines patrolled the North Sea
and the Mediterranean; Polish warships served in the
Atlantic and Murmansk convoys; the Polish Navy saw service
in the Narvik campaign, the Dunkirk evacuation, the
assault on Dieppe, hunting the Bismark, the invasion of
Sicily and the invasion of France on D-Day.
When the war in Europe ended in May 1945, the
position of the Polish Armed Forces was unclear. Despite
its long struggle alongside the Allies in the name of
Poland, it seemed that Poland was far from free. The Red
Army, which had come to Poland as liberator, was to
stay as conqueror with, it was widely felt at the
time, the complicity of London and Washington. Jan
Nowak-Jezioratiski, formerly a courier between London and
the underground Home Army [AK] in Poland, has views on the
' victory " that are typical of many Poles:
"Poland conducted two wars with two attackers. We on
against the Germans, but lost against the Soviets.
May 9 is an anniversary of both victory and defeat,
and that is how we should see it." [3]
and of the Soviet guns he heard celebrating the end of the
war he writes:
"For thousands of Poles, who had fought heroically
for freedom, those triumphant salvoes heralded death,
torture, prison and persecution."
The Poles felt betrayed. To many Poles it appeared
that their interests had been sacrificed to appease Stalin
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and whereas the Poles had remained faithful to the Allied
cause, the same could not be said of the Allies to the
cause of a free and independent Poland.
In August, 1941, Winston Churchill and President
Roosevelt had signed what became known as the "Atlantic
Charter" - a declaration of war aims and aims for the
post-war world. Points two and three read:
"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes
that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes
of the people concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to
chose the form of government under which they will
live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and
self-government restored to those who have been
forcibly deprived of them; [...)"
	
[4)
These fine words were not matched by the outcome of the
wartime conferences at Teheran and Yalta, and then at
Potsdam. Poland had been consigned to the Soviet sphere of
influence and had lost vast tracts of land to the Soviet
Union. The Provisional Government in Poland was dominated
by a pro-Soviet element that had been imported from Moscow
by the Red Army. The Soviet secret police, the NKVD, was
detaining and deporting many Poles and while the Western
powers were, half-heartedly, demanding elections and
democracy in Poland, the Polish troops were in despair
knowing that it was already too late and they would not be
going home.
On the 50th anniversary of the end of World War Two
in May, 1995, the President of Poland, Lech Wasa, made a
speech to Polish veterans that was filled with the
bitterness that Poles feel towards the end of the war:
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"Having been invaded in September, 1939, the Poles
never laid down their weapons. They fought from the
first day of the war until the last. They fought on
many fronts, on Polish soil and abroad, for our
freedom and yours. They fought at Narvik, in France,
in the Battle of Britain, at Tobruk, Lenino, Monte
Cassino, in Normandy, in Belgium, in Holland, the
Warsaw Rising and the battle for the Pomeranian Wall.
Above defeated Berlin only three flags flew - the
white flag of capitulation, the red flag and the red
and white flag. The Polish Armed Forces were the
fourth largest Allied army. Poland never disgraced
itself by having a government that collaborated with
the fascists. However, our loyalty to the Allies was
put to a difficult test.
The information about the Katyti atrocity hit us
hard. Ignoring all human and military rights, and on
the orders of Stalin and the Soviet leadership,
20,000 prisoners were bestially murdered - the only
crime of these soldiers and policemen was that
they were Poles. At Katyti, Kharkov and Miednoje
the flower of our officer corps was exterminated.
This was not an accident; it was not a mistake. It
was political genocide, ruthlessly and coldly
planned. The Great Powers of the world knew about it.
The Allied leaders - they knew and still they said
nothing. The larger political interests, the greater
game of spheres of influence on the world map covered
over these uncomfortable truths. Politics knows no
sentiment. For that reason the Warsaw Rising had to
fail and that is why at Teheran and Yalta it was
agreed that after the war Poland would be in the
Soviet sphere of influence. A faithful ally was
sacrificed to maintain the world balance of power. On
hearing of the Yalta agreement General Montgomery
light-heartedly joked to General Maczek that Maczek
would now be a Soviet general - a bitter joke.
Let the West and the East not be surprised that
even after 50 years this bitterness still gnaws at
us. The 8th of May cannot just be a celebration of
victory. It is a day of thought and reflection on the
lessons of history, on the responsibilities of
political leaders and on the future. Every nation has
the right to its own appreciation of events. We
understand that others might see the past
differently... we can not, however, forget the nature
of the Stalini.st system. It had nothing in common
with liberty and democracy. Behind the frontline
troops the NKVD entered Poland and, with their Polish
supporters, began the persecution of Polish patriots.
The Stalinist night descended followed by the drama
and farce of the PRL [Polish People's Republic]. e
will not be silent about all of this just because it
does not fit into someone's concept of history." [5]
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a7sa went on to say that the Poles did not keep carping
on about the war to reproach and upbraid anyone. It was
simply to remind people that that was the way it was.
It is little wonder that the rest of the world has
forgotten about the Poles. For years in Poland the troops
in the West were a forgotten army of whom no one was
allowed to speak. General Anders, Sosnkowski and the other
military leaders were cast as traitors and fascists. In
January, 1945, the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish
Armed Forces, in Poland, Marshal Michaj Rola-Zymierski
announced:
"Carrying out the directives of the most reactionary
military and political enemies of the Soviet Union,
the Sosnkowski-Anders clique from the very beginning
decided to fight not against the Germans but against
Russia and they tried to bring up their soldiers in
that spirit.
The anti-Soviet blindness of these reactionary
maniacs who had learnt nothing from the war, as well
as the actions of General Anders which were damaging
to Polish affairs, had become a source of shame to
the Polish uniform." [6]
The Polish Armed Forces in the West were branded with the
mark of Cain by the Communist authorities and like Cain
they were forced to wander the earth to find a home. If
such a powerful representative as Marshal Zymierski could
make such a pronouncement about the Poles in the West,
then it did not bode well for a future return to Poland.
The casualty figures for the Poles in the West
clearly demonstrate that, far from being reluctant to
fight the Germans, the Poles threw themselves into battle
with an abandon that even impressed the Germans.
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1st ARMOURED DIV.
1st PARACHUTE BRIG.
COMMANDOS
+
POLISH AIR FORCE
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1,348
	
445
POLISH NAVY
[7]
+
	
404	 191	 -
	
6,171	 14,745	 1,190
TOTAL CASUALTIES
UNDER BRITISH COMMAND : 22,106
For years after the war, this effort and sacrifice was
ignored and minimised in Poland. The only source of pride
that the Poles were allowed to extol were the troops that
served under Soviet command. With the change in the
political climate this has swung full circle and few now
mention the Polish army that helped free Poland of the
Germans and then took part in the storming of Berlin.
Since this army was run under Moscow's auspices, its
role in establishing a Soviet backed government has led to
its efforts being marginalised. This is a fate it does not
deserve since its role in the storming of Berlin was an
important, if little known, contribution.
The Polish 1st and 2nd Armies comprised of ten full
infantry divisions, with another four in training, five
artillery divisions, a cavalry brigade, an armoured corps
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KILLED
510
1,092
4,011
1,087
7,228
WOUNDED MISSING
	
1,776	 765
	
2,174	 1,626
	
8,353	 2,484
3,138	 179
17,567	 3,765
and an air corps of fighter, bomber and ground assault
aircraft. In effect the Poles made up 13% of the manpower
and 25% of the independent armoured corps of Soviet
General Zhukov and General Koniev's drive on the capital
of Germany. The total strength stood near 400,000:
OFFICERS	 38,488
WARRANT OFFICERS	 14,166
NCOs	 87,179
OTHER RANKS	 252,238
AT OFFICERS SCHOOL	 336
CIVILIANS	 3,695
	
396,102	 [8]
When the men of the Polish 1st Division raised the red and
white flag over the Brandenburg Gate, they had done so at
great cost. In the 22 days of this final offensive, from
the 16th April, 1945, to the German surrender on the 8th
May, the Poles had lost 7,228 men killed in action.
Looked at another way, the Poles in the East lost more men
killed in 22 days than the Poles in the West lost in five
years under British command. The total casualty figures
for the Polish Army under Soviet command were:
BATTLE OF LENINO:
FORCING THE RIVER WISA:
FIGHTING IN POMERANIA
(1st Feb-7th Mar, 1945)
FIGHTING FOR KOOBRZEG:
(8th-l8th Mar, 1945)
ASSAULT ON BERLIN
(16th Apr-8th May, 1945)
17,478	 39,286	 9,770
[9]
	
TOTAL CASUALTIES : 66,534
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The fighting on the eastern front was on a scale and of a
ferocity that was unknown in the West.
The Polish Army under Soviet command has had similar
problems over recognition as had the Poles under British
command. The military historian Jerzy Poksittski cites
Lt-Col Zygmunt Duszyñski, the second-in-command of the 3rd
Infantry Regiment, 1st Division, who hoisted a Polish flag
next to three Soviet ones on Berlin's victory monument -
the Siegessaeule - in the Tiergarten. The next day it had
been taken down by order of the Soviet High Command. [10]
However, to give the Soviets credit, when they held their
victory parade in Red Square, representatives of the 1st
and 2nd Polish Armies were invited to attend and marched
alongside the victorious Red Army - this is more than can
be said for the British response.
After the British Government decided to switch its
recognition from the Polish Government-in-Exile in London
to the Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw, it no
longer felt obliged to invite the armed forces of the
exiled Government to the victory parade that was to be
held in London in 1946. Instead it asked Warsaw to send
its men to attend. This move not only created a great deal
of bitterness among the Poles in the West but brought
about an outraged cry of "unfair" from many leading
Britons. The day before the parade Harold MacMillan wrote
to General Anders:
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"I tell you this frankly; that with all the
legitimate joy and pride in every British heart will
be mingled much sorrow and even shame. My thoughts
will be with you and your troops." [11]
As the mood of anger and indignation rose - many saw the
invitation of Warsaw's people as the ultimate insult to
the Poles in the West - and the British press took up the
issue, so the British Government relented and invited a
delegation from the Polish Air Force to take part. The
airmen who, no doubt would have wanted to march, declined
the invitation as the British had not invited the Polish
Army or the Navy. As "The Times" reported at the time:
"The Polish Government accepted, but the contingent
has not yet arrived. Unfortunately, it seems that
none of the Polish servicemen who fought in the West
under British command will take part. Polish airmen
who took part in the Battle of Britain were invited,
but they do not wish to march unless Polish soldiers
and sailors of the Western Command can march with
them." [12]
The delegation from Warsaw never arrived. Warsaw's
military attache'
 in London, Colonel Kuropieska, was never
told why his superiors had decided not to attend. One
theory was that it was in protest at the former Polish
C-in-C, General Bór-Komorowski, being granted a visa to go
to the USA to spread what was seen as hostile propaganda
against the Warsaw regime [13]. A more likely explanation
is that they were prohibited from attending by political
consideration emanating from Moscow.
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The only Pole present at the British victory parade
on the 7th June, 1946, was Colonel Kuropieska who attended
as a diplomatic courtesy. In his memoirs, the colonel
describes his overwhelming feeling of disappointment that
there were no Poles marching. Although the Poles in the
West could be criticised for many things - contends
Kuropieska - no one could say the Poles spared themselves
on the field of battle. The Poles deserved better than
this. [14] While units like the Bermuda Volunteer Rifle
Corps and the British Solomon Islands Defence Force were
represented at the parade the Poles were not. As Krzysztof
Szmagier wrote:
"Those were bitter days for those who trusted the
Western Allies.
This atmosphere of irritation - although elegantly
formulated - was culminated in two incidents. The
first was the failure to invite the Polish Armed
Forces to the victory parade in London. Only 15
airmen were invited and they declined to take part.
Formally the British were right. It was, after all,
after they had recognised the Warsaw Government and
had withdrawn recognition from the emigres - but it
hurt...." [15]
The second incident was an "oath" made by General Anders a
week after the victory parade. This is covered in the next
chapter.
The atmosphere of mutual irritation resulted in a
great deal of mutual recrimination. When the Belgian towns
of Beverriwaas and St Nicolas proposed to present banners
to regiments of the 1st Armoured Division who had
liberated them, the idea was vetoed by the Foreign Office
[FO]:
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"In the circumstances we feel that any public
ceremonies of the nature contemplated by the Belgian
town would be inappropriate at the present
juncture." [16]
The key element in the equation was not to offend the
Provisional Government in Warsaw and so, by extension, to
offend Moscow. The Foreign Office tried to persuade the
Belgians to stop the presentation ceremonies or at least
to tone them down so as not to draw attention to them. The
Polish Armed Forces in the West had become a political
embarrassment to be hidden away. In any case the Foreign
Office would not agree to General Maczek or the Polish
Chief of Staff, General Kopatiski, attending.
Although the controversial subject of the murder of
Polish officers at Katyti often came between those who were
prepared to believe the best about the Soviet Union and
those who were not, the issue came to public attention
again in 1976. Whereas the Poles in Britain had no doubt
as to Soviet guilt in the matter, the Labour Government of
the day remained, at least publicly, unconvinced. During
and after the war pro-Soviet apologists still maintained
that Katyñ was a Nazi crime and poured scorn on those who
believed the German propaganda:
"Did the Polish Government believe this allegation?
We doubt it very strongly. [...]
Yet the Polish Government ostensibly would have had
the world believe that they were prepared to
entertain seriously a charge made by the Nazi
Government against an allied Government. In our
judgement, the Polish Government did not believe this
monstrous accusation. They seized on it as a means of
blackmailing the Soviet Government." [17]
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There seems little doubt that Churchill knew the truth
about Katyñ but for reasons of maintaining Allied unity he
would not openly blame the Soviet Union for the murder.
Count Raczytiski, Poland's wartime ambassador to London,
recounts that Churchill knew full well:
"My feeling was that he understood it fully, as we
did. It was obvious that it was a Russian doing.
There was not the slightest possibility of explaining
it otherwise. So that when we met, soon after the
news was released, Churchill said to us, "Oh, the
Soviets can be very cruel." So he knew very
well." [18)
The Poles erected a monument to the murdered in
Gunnersbury Cemetery in north London; the British
Government refused to attend the unveiling ceremony on the
18th September, 1976, and forbade any British military
representation on the day. [19] This attitude drew angry
protests from several quarters. Winston Churchill,
grandson of the wartime premier, wrote indignantly in
"The Times":
"The unveiling which is to be attended by thousands
of British and Polish Comrades-in-Arms, as well as by
a representative of the Government of the United
States and many members of the Diplomatic Corps, is
apparently to be boycotted by the British Government
for fear of annoying the Soviet Union. Indeed the
Government has gone further: it has refused a
military band and forbidden serving officers from
attending in uniform. A sad and shameful tribute to
the sacrifice of the valiant ally for which Britain
went to war in 1939." [20]
Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the RAF, also wrote to
"The Times" seething at the British reaction:
"For gross bad manners and craven ingratitude this is
surely unbeatable. It is, alas, only one more example
of the sort of thing that makes it difficult nowadays
to be proud to be British." [21]
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This was one more snub in a long line. Even as late as
1984 and the 40th Anniversary of the D-Day landing, the
Poles were not invited to take part. Although the British
Government had changed its political complexion, the
commemoration was turned into a strictly NATO event.
Possibly the prospect of having to explain how a one time
ally was now, nominally, an enemy might have proved
embarrassing so the Poles were ignored completely.
After the momentous events in central and eastern
Europe after 1989, it suddenly became politically correct
to invite Poles to wartime anniversaries but first the
Poles had to hold their own victory parade - the first
parade that would see veterans from all the fronts that
the Poles fought on marching together in Warsaw. The
parade was held on 15th August, traditionally 'Soldiers
Day', 1992, in the presence of the Polish President, the
Polish Premier and the Polish Chief of Staff.
Poland's role in the Second World War is now
beginning to be recognised. Poles across Europe watched
with pride as satellite television broadcast the Polish
Army marching alongside its former allies at the 50th
anniversary of the D-Day landings, Polish ships were
represented at the anniversary of the Battle of the
Atlantic and men of the Polish 6th Air Assault Brigade
made a commemorative parachute jump at Arnhem to mark that
battle's anniversary.
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In the autumn of 1994, a platoon of Scots Guards
went to Poland to take part in "Co-operative Bridge" - the
first joint exercise under the "Partnership for Peace" and
the British 5th Airborne Brigade flew to Poland to take
part in "Valkyrie Venture" a joint parachute exercise
that began to re-establish Poland's place alongside its
former allies. [22)
The Poles who fought under British command had been
vilified by the Communists in Poland and the response from
the British was, at best, cool. The Polish Armed Forces'
march ". . .towards Poland, whole, free and independent"
took a long time and it remains difficult to come to a
conclusion other than the one reached by 3ohn Ellis that,
along the way, the Poles had indeed been "shabbily
treated". [23)
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CHAPTER TWO
"A Choice of Evils.
Official British Reaction To The
Polish Armed Forces Question.
P / WJJOCZ\
OSR ZAP I D PANGi
2Tl-tMi\.CH I46 '\G2
POLISH ORCE
..	 ,•
.-. -'L .d,
	
- ;•	 I....
	
.	 -	 •-
	
£ 1 ,.jr	 '
•4 :.	 '.
"Speaking on behalf of the British Government, I declare
that it is in the best interests of Poland that you
return to her now. ..
Ernest Bevin, 20th March 1946.
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CHAPTER TWO
Given that the British Government had decided to
recognise the Polish Provisional Government in
Warsaw, it seemed only natural to the Government and
the Foreign Office that the Warsaw authorities
should have some involvement in the whole question
of the repatriation of the Polish Armed Forces in
the West.
In principle this seemed, at the time, to be a
good idea. Some resistance from the Polish Forces
was to be expected, and possibly the British
military authorities might have something to say
about it, but it was considered that anything that
helped to remove the Poles from British hands could
not be a bad thing.
What the British in London failed to realise
was just how resented these Warsaw Poles were by the
troops in the field, and just how much of a nuisance
they could make themselves.
The British field commanders who had Poles
serving under them were painfully aware of a
potentially explosive situation which was being laid
on their shoulders, none more so than Supreme Allied
Commander Mediterranean [SACMEDJ, Field-Marshal
Alexander. In a note to the War Office [WO] of the
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18th August, 1945, Alexander wrote of his worries:
"...1 am not prepared to guarantee personal
safety of any representative of Polish
Provisional Government who may be allowed
access to Polish Troops nor am I prepared to
answer for the morale or discipline of Polish
troops in Italy should any such access be
permitted. Morgan [Alexander's Chief of Staff]
during a recent interview with Sir Orme Sargent
at Foreign Office warned him in this sense."[l]
The War Office reply, although sympathetic in
saying that they "Fully appreciate difficulties you
mention", still maintained that Alexander would have
to obey Government policy whether he liked it or
not.
The two men who proved the biggest problem
in Italy were Prof. Stanisjaw Kot, newly named as
Warsaw's ambassador in Rome, and Colonel Kazimierz
Sidor, the military attache'.
Kot was almost universally unpopular with the
Poles in the West. Formerly a member of Sikorski's
Cabinet he had served as Minister of Information, an
appointment described by Tadeusz Kochanowicz as
"unfortunate". [2] There were rumours circulating at
the time that it was Kot who was the inspiration of
the Polish note to the Geneva Red Cross over the
Katyti massacre, with the resulting break in
Polish-Soviet relations. A notorious intriguer, Kot,
apparently, had a talent for offending people from
all sides.
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General Anders was certainly of the opinion
that Kot was a bad choice. In a report from
the Resident Minister's Office, Allied Forces
Headquarters [AFHQ), Caserta, to the Foreign Office,
22nd August, 1945, the opinion was put that Kot's
appointment was opposed by Anders and that he "would
be lynched" by Anders' men if they got hold of
him. [3]
Although unpopular, Kot did not present the
same degree of annoyance as Col. Sidor who seemed to
spend his time in Italy thinking up new ways of
giving SACMED a headache.
Described by Dennis Hills, who had first worked
with the 2nd Polish Corps and then became a
repatriation officer for Russian POWs, as "an
elegant colonel who wore a magnificent peaked cap"
[4], Sidor was the subject of some heated inter
office communication. According to a report from the
Liaison Section AFHQ, Sidor had the habit of calling
himself the "Chief of the Polish Military Mission
for Repatriation, Rome" - as already mentioned he
was in fact the military attach. The principal
complaints against him were that he condoned and
even encouraged desertion from the Polish Armed
Forces. He would employ some of the deserters in his
staff in Rome, others he would train to return to
the Polish ranks and spy on the high ranking
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personnel. The recommendations of the report were
threefold: the Foreign Office had to ask the Warsaw
authorities to remove Sidor; all the Poles had to be
moved to the UK to keep them away from such
unhealthy influences; Rome had to be asked to
declare Sidor persona non grata. [5]
This was not the first complaint against him.
On the 5th February, 1946, General Morgan, the new
SACMED who had replaced Alexander, ciphered the
Foreign Office with a protest about an interview
given by Sidor to the newspaper of the Italian
Communist Party "Unita". Morgan pointed out that if
Sidor got himself beaten up then he only had himself
to blame. Similarly "Unita" might well "go up in
flames". The General again requested that Sidor be
removed before things got out of hand. If not then
SACMED would "disclaim responsibility for any
retaliatory measures taken by the troops of the 2nd
Corps." [6] The Foreign Office was unmoved by the
military point of view and answered that His
Majesty's Government [HMG] could not appear to be
pro-Anders or anti-Warsaw, therefore Sidor would
have to stay. SACMED would have to step up control
of the Polish Corps to prevent things from getting
out of hand. Doubtless this was not what General
Morgan wanted to hear.
The text of the "Unita" interview consisted of
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three main points - the accusation that 2 Polcorps
was involved in Italian right wing politics and that
anyone who volunteered for repatriation among the
Polish forces risked disappearing without trace. The
third point related to the case of one 2nd Lt.
Francziszek Fereric who had been repatriated from
Italy to Poland and then managed to escape and
return to Italy. There were in fact nine such Poles
with whom the ar Office was concerned as the
picture they presented of Poland was one that would
do little to encourage further repatriation.
According to Sidor, Ferenc and the other returnees
were "collaborators and Gestapo agents".
warsaw's attitude to Volksliste Poles is dealt
with later; from the British point of view, however,
Ferenc was a nuisance they could have well done
without. A Top Secret report by Major Shergold, of
the 11th January, 1946, tried to work out what
motivation Ferenc may have had in his attack on the
new Polish regime.
"a/ the fact that he had himself registered in
the Volksliste would be held against him;
b/ he was from Feb 43 until Nov 44 a member of
the Wehrmacht which would prove detrimental to
any career in the new POLAND even if he could
prove that he deserted at the first opportunity
and was subsequently fighting on the Allied
side;
Cl the raping of his wife by a Russian officer
and the loss of all his property at the hands
of Russian soldiers made him hate anything
connected with Russia and the Russians and thus
incapable of accepting the official policy of
friendship with and gratitude to the Russians." [7]
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The War Office decided to wash their hands of
this small group of Poles, with the exception of
Ferenc. A letter from Lt Col. Hemans of the O to
W.D. Allen at the FO suggests that in the case of
Ferenc "some British Army involvement may have been
involved" [8] and he should be an exception. The
rest would be handed over to the Italian Government
to deal with. The Foreign Office agreed to this
point: the Poles returned to Italy as civilians and
not as soldiers and they could be dealt with as
such.
The agitation of the Warsaw Poles in Italy did
nothing to endear them to the British. After Major
Gawronski, Officer Commanding [OC] AFHQ Liaison
Section, submitted a report of his conversation with
Kot and Sidor, Hancock of the FO minuted:
"Quite interesting; but both Prof. Kot + Col.
Sidor are ruffians and one cannot believe that
anything they may say is a sincere expression
of their views." [9]
Similarly the agitation of Sidor's mission did
little to endear him to the Polish Forces in Italy.
According to Czerkawski the mission was so over the
top with its calls for the soldiers to attack their
'fascist' officers and to refuse to obey their
orders that it put many off, and proved to be
counter-productive. Czerkawski says that many
soldiers asked their officers as to why they had to
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beat their officers up. Had they not gone through
the same misfortune and painful wanderings as the
other ranks. [10]
Sidor continued to be the major pain in
AFHQ's side. SACMED again complained to the FO on
the 24th April, 1946. The first repatriation
shipment from the camp at Cervinara had been held up
largely due to a protest over gratuity payments.
Sidor had told the Poles not to board the ships
until the matter had been sorted out. Such agitation
was guaranteed to raise British hackles.
The meddling of the 'Warsaw Poles' was not
confined to Italy. General Paget, C-in-C Middle East
Forces [MEF] ciphered London in protest at the
actions of Warsaw. Colonel Podwysocki, an officer
of the 'London Poles', had been promoted to Major
General on the authority of Warsaw and although
sympathetic to the new Polish regime he did not want
to return to Poland - this caused Paget the problem
of pay and seniority. The British could not enforce
his promotion to the rank of General as this would
risk the morale and security of the Polish troops
under his command. The Polish Army in the Middle
East on the other hand had no intention of enacting
the promotion. Paget's recommendation was that
Warsaw should act only among the Poles who had
volunteered for repatriation. The Foreign Office
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agreed with this view. [12]
The concerns of the Foreign Office were such
that on the 24th of August, 1946, Robin Hankey,
newly appointed Head of the Northern Department,
wrote:
"We must continue to preserve the distinction
we have made hitherto:- the Polish Govt. may
have access to Poles who wish to return, but we
must continue to prevent their carrying out any
subversive activities among Polish formations +
units under our command. (Warsaw might in
certain circumstances be delighted if the
Resettlement Corps broke up in disorder!) WO
agree this general line." [13]
On the 14th of February a new storm had broken
from Warsaw. They had announced that the Polish
Armed Forces in the West no longer existed - the
troops that had constituted this body would, from
then on, have to apply to the Polish Consulate as
individuals. This was described by the Foreign
Office as "grossly discourteous" [14] in the way
they had sprung the news on HMG. In this respect it
appears that the Polish (Warsaw) Embassy in London
was equally surprised. Colonel Kuropieska, the
military attach, according to his memoirs, was told
the news in Warsaw and told he would have to go to
London to explain. He even had to break the news to
Deputy Foreign Minister Modzelewski, who had read
the news in the British Press but had not been
officially informed. According to Kuropieska the
news came as a bombshell, made worse since
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Modzelewski seemed to be making progress on the
question of repatriation. [15)
The excuse the Warsaw authorities had used to
act in the way it had was apparent obstruction and
British stalling on getting the Poles 'home'. On the
20th February, 1946, the BBC monitoring unit picked
up a "Proclamation by the National Unity Government
to Polish Soldiers Abroad":
"The Polish Government has failed to break down
the barriers separating you from the homeland.
It has been unable to obtain consent for you to
return in battle units. Therefore we appeal to
you to return individually. Let every one of
you who has had enough of the lies and the
instigators of fratricidal struggle and who
wants to return home with a clear heart, report
to the nearest Polish Consulate, Legation or
Embassy, which will do its utmost to get you
home." [16]
But the Communist criticism did not end there. A
'Warsaw' news-sheet "Polish Facts and Figures" No.22
from November, 1946, again laid the blame for the
slow rate of repatriation to Poland squarely at the
British.
"Until October this year, the repatriation,
which was entirely in British hands was being
constantly delayed, in spite of the continuous
flow of soldiers wishing to return and many
interventions made by the Polish Government."
[17]
The Foreign Office took great offence at
these words, Hankey describing them as "Shocking".
The Poles had written that they had even begun to
work on Sundays to screen Polish troops while it was
known to the British that this was no longer the
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case.
By the end of November mutual feelings were
hitting a definite low; tempers at the Foreign
Office were beginning to fray. The acrimony came to
a head with a letter from the Polish (Warsaw) chargé
d'affaires, K. Lapter, on the 30th of November,
1946, in which he complained that Polish volunteers
for repatriation were being used as forced labour to
collect the harvest in England, and on the work of
de-mining British beaches. The protest went on that
only German POWs were required to work - the Poles
should be paid for their work, like UK workers.
There was a protest that only volunteers for
repatriation were required to work and this was
discrimination. The fact that the Poles in question
were working must, according to Lapter, be having an
effect on the rate of repatriation: there were many
thousands of Poles who wanted to return to Poland
yet there were only 2,000 a month returning.
Hankey's file minute was short and to the
point;
"Let's tell him he can't have it both ways. He
objects to the Polish army existing and doing
military training. It is illogical for him to
object to their doing civilian work." [18]
Lt.Col. Fitzgeorge-Balfour from the war Office wrote
to the Foreign Office in support.
"To my mind his assertion amounts to a not very
well veiled insult in that he virtually accuses
you of stating a falsehood. It is absurd for
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him to say that the rate of 2,000 a month is
due to harvest work and the kindest thing to do
is to believe that he is acting on instructions
to make trouble on every possible point." [19]
It did not end there. Dr Przewanski, the Consul
General, sent a letter to Hankey again complaining
that the British were holding up repatriation; a
group from Cumnock Camp in Scotland who had
volunteered had, apparently, been left out
completely. Hankey's anger and frustration are
evident in the draft of a letter to the Consul:
"I must say I resent the numerous unpleasant
insinuations in your letter and I must reject
them all herewith. I do not see any point in
raking up a lot of past episodes, but in view
of what you say I feel obliged to point out
that most of our present difficulties are due
to the refusal, or inability, of your consulate
to screen men in the camps as your own MFA
[Ministry of Foreign Affairs] said you would
and as you did screen them in October, to say
nothing of your failure to send screening teams
when invited last May.
As for the men in Cumnock we have repeatedly
told you of their discontent at the delay owing
to your attitude about screening in camps. We
shall, I understand, have to bring many of them
to London for screening at your consulate at
great expense to the taxpayer + much
inconvenience to the railways. I do not know
what would be said of this in Parliament if the
facts became known. I should really like to
settle these questions in co-operation with
your Embassy + yourself, but quite frankly it
is not easy and letters like yours make it no
easier." [20]
Hancock of the FO pointed out to his chief,
tactfully, that the letter was not very diplomatic.
"They are swine," he minuted to Hankey, "but I'm not
sure quarrelling with them does much good." Hankey
was forced, "reluctantly", to agree to a toned down
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version being sent instead.
The question of screening the Poles was
definitely causing a backlog of repatriation, but
the composition of the body in charge of
repatriation did not help matters either. Warsaw's
original intention was to send
	 General	 Karol
wierczewski to become Commander-in-Chief of the
Polish Armed Forces in the West and organise their
return. This plan was unacceptable to the British:
the Poles in London would certainly not accept a
Communist nominee as their head and the British had
no intention of forcing the issue. General Izydor
Modeiski was sent instead as head of the Polish
Mission. Swierczewski was subsequently killed by the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army [UPA] in 1946.
Modeiski's arrival in London on the 15th
October, 1945, was welcomed originally by the
Foreign Office as a step in the right direction; the
London Poles, not surprisingly, did not welcome him
with open arms. Kuropieska's opinion of Modeiski was
that Warsaw had made a mistake in choosing him for
the job that he had been sent. General Modeiski was
one of the handful of Polish Generals who had
volunteered for repatriation and many of the exiled
Poles considered this as close to desertion; in any
case they would not take him seriously. Kuropieska
asked the pertinent question:
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"What an idea. How could they send him here.
Who is going to believe him and how is he going
to convince any of these fine soldiers to
return?" [21]
The Foreign Office largely backed up the Colonel's
views. Although Modelski was a man of "moderate
political opinions" he was "not particularly popular
with the other Polish generals over here, who regard
him as too 'political'" [221
Modelski's 'deputy' was of little use either.
Colonel Grosz was sent to London to keep an eye on
Modelski, possibly to see that his loyalty did not
waver. The Foreign Office's W.D. Allen who wrote the
above report on Modeiski also commented there that
Grosz was in fact a "Communist watchdog sent to keep
an eye on General Modeiski."
The Military Mission had very little effect on
the whole repatriation, publicly the aspirations of
it and the British Government did converge. The
British wanted as many Poles as possible to return
to Poland and, apparently, so did the Warsaw Poles
(although to how great an extent is dealt with in
Chapter 5), yet the repatriation was still going
slowly. The Communists blamed Britain and the London
Poles and so pushed for command of the troops. Grosz
is reported to have said to Stafford Cripps:
"The Republic does not make pacts with its
Generals it only gives them orders. If they do
not want to listen and act in a systematic way
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that is against the good of their country and
try to ensure that as few soldiers as possible
return home then we will have nothing to do
with them, and they do England a disservice too
since you are also interested in as great a
number of returnees as possible." [23]
According to the Military Mission, opting out of
repatriation was a better way forward than opting
in. In other words the Polish forces would be sent
back to Poland unless they specifically objected.
For the Poles in question this was not a happy
solution, but worse than that, many feared that the
British might decide to solve the whole problem by
shipping them back against their will.
British Government policy towards the Poles
should be seen in a context that includes the policy
towards the other foreign nationals that were in
British hands at the end of the Second World War. As
one Polish exile wrote:
"Another threat which hung over our heads was
the possibility of being sent back to Poland by
force. Some of us were afraid of this
horse-trade arrangement. Anything could happen
in a nation governed only by self-interest. We
did not know Britain's limit in selling us out
to Soviet Russia. Different rumours were
circulating from Germany, where all Ukrainians
and Russians who had surrendered to the German
Armed Forces and organised some anti-Communist
units were being forcibly sent to Russia by the
Allies. Some of those unfortunates were
so-afraid of going back to their homeland that
they committed suicide. Who could guarantee
that the same thing would not happen to us?
More important promises and principles had been
broken in the last few years." [24)
The Poles in the West were fully aware of what the
British and Americans were doing in forcibly
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repatriating those wanted both by Moscow and by the
Tito regime in Yugoslavia. Such was the efficiency
of the 'Oddzia% 2', the Polish Intelligence service,
commonly referred to at the time by the British as
the 'Deuxime Bureaus and by the Poles as the
'Dwójka', that very little happened in Italy without
the Polish General Staff knowing about it. On the
28th of May, 1945, Col. Bkiewicz head of 2 Polcorps
Intelligence ciphered the General Staff that the
forced repatriation of Russians was resulting in
"tragic scenes". To the Poles the British appeared
to be completely indifferent to the fate of these
unfortunate people. [25]
Despite all appearances to the contrary, the
British military establishment did not relish what
was a most distasteful job. Whereas the Foreign
Office decided that repatriation was the policy that
had to be carried out, it was the War Office which
was charged with the task. Just as the Poles had a
Military Mission in Italy, so too did the Soviet
Government and in June of 1945 they requested of the
SACMED, Field-Marshal Alexander, that he begin to
repatriate Soviet Citizens. He in turn contacted the
War Office for instructions:
"Two. Soviet Mission have requested their
transfer. This would require use of force
including handcuffs and travel under escort in
locked box cars.
Three. We believe that the handing over of
these individuals would almost certainly
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involve their death.
Four. There are likely to be many more such
cases.
Five. Request your ruling earliest possible as
how these personnel should be disposed of..."
[261
Alexander did his best to minimise the forced
repatriation. It was impossible for him to stop the
process; he was, after all, still a soldier and
orders were orders. But it appears that he was
prepared to go slowly and do as little as possible
unless he was given a direct order by the Chief of
the Imperial General Staff [CIGS], Field-Marshal Sir
Alan Brooke, and he wrote to "Brookie" in that
respect on the 20th August, 1945:
"So far I have refused to use force to
repatriate Soviet Citizens, although I suppose
I am not strictly entitled to adopt this
attitude - nevertheless, I shall continue with
this policy unless I am ordered to do
otherwise." [27]
The Foreign Office was at a loss to see why the
forced repatriation was not going ahead at speed.
Alexander maintained that he had not been ordered to
use force while the FO had already sent instructions
to the War Office. The Foreign Office complained to the
Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee:
"No instructions however to this effect [the
use of force] have been sent to Field-Marshal
Alexander who has referred the matter to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, making it clear that
he would be very reluctant to use force against
Soviet women and Children." [28]
The Foreign Office knew very well what was
happening. The War Office was fully aware what the
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policy on repatriation involved and they were
deliberately slowing it down. What was even worse
for the FO was that the War Office had withheld the
order from Alexander. It was, in the words of John
Galsworthy of the FO, "a matter in which they have
behaved shabbily, to say the least." [29]
If Alexander was willing to hold up the
repatriation of Soviet citizens, it seems most
unlikely that the Poles would have been sent back
from Italy, the British would first have to disarm
them and once it was known what was going on then
the results would not have been pleasant.
In the first American repatriation from a
detention centre set up in the former concentration
camp at Dachau there was a mass suicide. As the
Americans moved in to send back the Russians on
January 19th, 1946, 31 men tried to kill themselves
- 11 managed. Nine men hanged themselves and two
died from self-inflicted knife wounds. [30] The
whole episode made its way into the US press and the
public was shocked. Had the British attempted to
repatriate the Poles, an ally, the public outcry
sould have been more than the Government could deal
with. Anyone who advocated sending the Poles to
Poland was in a no-win situation; if the British
Army was ordered to repatriate the Poles in Italy,
firstly they would probably have stalled for time,
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and secondly they would have had a fight on their
hands - this could not be ithhe1d from the public.
If the Poles were sent to the UK and disarmed then
it would have been easier to use force, but in
Britain a Polish mutiny would certainly not have
gone unnoticed by the public, so here too secrecy
would be compromised. Since the whole question of
forced repatriation was shrouded in secrecy the
repatriation of the Poles by force was not really an
option.
Perhaps one of the strongest reasons why the
Poles would not have been repatriated by force was a
strong sense of mutual respect between the Polish
and British military. The Poles saw in Alexander a
good soldier who could be trusted, as one Polish
soldier noted, and a comment subsequently removed by
the Polish Base Censor Unit, "He is a soldier not a
politician who can easily sell even a loyal friend."
[31] The Field-Marshal was, according to Nicholas
Bethell, sympathetic to those who opposed Communism.
"Alexander had spent the year 1919, as a young
officer, organising forces to resist the
Bolsheviks in Poland and the Baltic States. It
may well be that his sympathy for people who
feared the revenge of the Soviet government
stemmed from this period in his life." [32]
Some Generals could not accept that they had a role
to play in trying to stop a reprehensible policy
from being carried out. General Musson, who was the
GOC Operation "Highjump" in which Croat POWs here
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returned to the hands of Tito to be exterminated,
claimed a soldier's obedience:
"I can't envisage a case where an officer would
ever disobey an order. A soldier is an agent of
government policy. He can't judge the rights
and wrongs. He doesn't have enough information.
He can represent his views, and we did this, we
made it perfectly clear how ghastly the job
was. But the ultimate decision must lie with
the political leaders. I don't see how you can
run an army or anything else if your soldiers
refuse to carry out orders." [33]
Bethell is right to parallel such attitudes with the
Nazis Jodi and Keitel who also claimed "soldier's
obedience" at the Nuremburg Trials but were hanged
regardless. Fortunately for many of these
'victims of Yalta' not all soldiers took this line.
Denis Hills, a Major in charge of Operation
"Keelhaul", soon realised that he had the power of
life and death over his Russian charges, and he did
everything possible to let as many as possible
escape the Soviet net. As he wrote:
"This incident illustrates the quandary in
which the politicians who signed the Yalta
repatriation terms had landed the British
soldiers responsible for carrying them out, and
the absurd power of a whim to decide a man's
fate. [...]
To many of us who were on the spot, however,
the Russian men and women, the refugees,
prisoners and deserters we had to handle, were
not names on a nominal roll, or War Crimes
statistics. They were human beings, sometimes
our batmen, cooks, orderlies and mechanics.
This is what the higher authorities, who never
set eyes on the men whose fates they were
controlling from far away offices, ignored or
did not sufficiently recognise." [34]
If the Communists could not get the British to hand
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over the Poles by force, they fell upon the idea of
claiming them back under the Yalta terms - according
to the Soviets any person born in Soviet territory
was, by definition, a Soviet citizen. The problem
for many of the Poles was that Polish Lwów and
Polish Wilno, and all the land in between, were now
Soviet Lithuanian Wilno and Soviet Ukrainian Lwów
and the land in between was Soviet Byelorussia. By
British definitions people from this area were
'disputed persons' who were to be given the choice
whether to return or not, for the Soviets it was
more clear cut - they would take everyone they could
get their hands on even to the extent of kidnapping
them.
The case of Jan Rasimowicz was highlighted in
an Intelligence cipher from Ancona in June, 1945.
Originally he had been held as a POW in Kiagenfurt
with fifty other Poles when they were being
transported to Italy by the British. Whilst in
transit they were kidnapped by Soviet soldiers who
were then about to send them on to Odessa. On the
18th of June, as the Taranto-Udine train was passing
Ancona most of the Poles managed to escape: eight,
however, did not. Urgent intervention was needed by
the British to rescue these unfortunates. [35]
On the 11th July, 1945, Gen. Anders wrote to
SACMED:
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"a/ As previously reported by this HQ [...] a
Soviet transport of Ex P[OJW, passing by rail
through ANCONA on 19 June, containing about 50
Polish citizens who were pressed into this
transport against their will and in spite of
their protests.
b/ Many Polish citizens are also being held in
Soviet Camps against their will. They have
endeavoured to escape by every means, sometimes
at the risk of their lives. A list of Poles who
have already escaped from Soviet camps can be
submitted on condition that it will not be
passed to the Soviet Representatives, in order
to avoid reprisals against their families in
Poland.
In the past, incidents have occurred in
which Soviet officers were apprehended and
detained in the area of 2 Polish Corps and
were subsequently handed over for disposal to
HQ Eighth Army. These incidents were, at the
time, reported, since the officers concerned
were engaged in illegal activities contrary to
the interests of Polish Corps." [36)
The campaign of mutual vilification between the
Poles and the Soviets was taken up by the Soviet
General Vassiliev, who protested to Alexander on the
3rd of August, 1945, with the accusation that Polish
soldiers had insulted Soviet officers, and with the
less convincing claim that Soviet citizens had been
conscripted into 2 Polcorps at gun point:
"I do not see what measures the British
military authorities in Italy intended to take
for safeguarding Soviet citizens from coercion
and ill treatment at the hands of militarists,
nor if anything has already been done to
liberate all the Soviet citizens compulsorily
embodied in Anders' Army, and hand them over to
the Soviet Military authorities." [37)
A copy of this protest was passed to Anders. Yet the
matter did not end there. According to the Soviet
authorities there were some 30,000 "Soviet citizens"
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in the Polish Corps in Italy, and Moscow was not
giving up its claim to them. On the 18th of August a
meeting was held at SACMED HQ, Caserta, where the
claim was again put to Alexander. The confidential
minutes of the meeting run:
"Referring to Major General Basilov's request
for Russian officers to visit Polish units,
Field-Marshal Alexander stated that it must be
clearly understood that the Poles were Allies.
Their forces formed a Corps, which had fought
exceedingly well in the armies under his
Command. They must, therefore, be treated
exactly as any other Allies were. He would not
dream of ordering an Allied Corps under his
command to submit to inspection by officers of
another nationality. That was not the way he
was in the habit of exercising his supreme
command. If General Anders should invite
Russian officers to visit the Polish Corps,
then Field-Marshal Alexander would have no
objection whatever. It would, however, be most
improper for him to order General Anders to
receive such officers uninvited, and he was
most surprised that Major General Basilov had
requested him to do such a thing." [38]
It has, as Alexander wrote to the CIGS "Brookie" in
his letter of the 20th August, a "...damned cheek
and I told him so in different words." [39) Yet the
Soviet claims to certain Poles were not confined to
Italy.
General Thorpe, GOC Allied Land Forces Norway,
protested to General Ratov, Head of the Soviet
Repatriation Mission there, about the abduction of a
Pole called Protasewycz, on the 6th July, 1945.
Ratov's reply is typical of the line Moscow was
taking on 'disputed persons'.
"Nevertheless, if you assert that citizen
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Protasewitch [sic] has already gone to his
Homeland, this has evidently occurred through
his own free wish, especially since you
yourself assert that Protasewitch is a resident
of Vilno. On this ground, he is a Soviet
citizen and therefore I, for my part, do not
see the reason for your objection which, in the
given instance, is groundless." [40)
As the unsigned comment on the Foreign Office file
put it: "I think we can only 'mark this up' against
General Ratov". This was, however, little comfort
for 'citizen' Protasewycz.
General Ratov's assertion that such people went
to their 'homeland' of their own free will had a
cruel and perverse truth to it. Tolstoy's 'Victims
of Yalta' examines one Polish citizen who returned
to Soviet territory under moral rather than physical
pressure.
"Later Olenicz, who was in tears, stated that
the Russian officer who interrogated him was a
member of the NKVD (Russian Secret Police), who
reminded him that his family were living in
Soviet territory. No threats were used and
nothing out of place was said, but he knew what
lay behind the Russian officer's words and was
afraid of him and what might happen to his
family. He therefore agreed to return to Russia
as a Soviet subject, and although concerned as
to what the future might hold for him, was
prepared to stand by his decision". [41]
Even when the Poles had reached Britain the
Soviet authorities still pursued them. In February,
1947, the Soviet Embassy still claimed 609 men in
the Polish Resettlement Corps [PRC] as Soviet
citizens. The British Advisory Staff PRC wrote to
HQ PRC to ask for the pre-war addresses of the
soldiers. The Polish response was: "It is to be
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pointed out that all these men resided on Polish
pre-war territory." [42]
There were, of course, Poles who were prepared
to be returned to what was then the Soviet Union.
When the Americans invaded Algeria in 1942 they took
over a camp at Djebel Oulad Nail in the Atlas
/
Mountains that had been run by Petain's Vichy
administration. In the camp there were 300 Poles
living in rather difficult conditions. When the
Poles were handed over to the Polish Consul in
Algeria he refused to have anything to do with the
men - the soldiers had served in the Spanish Civil
War as part of the 'Dbrowski Legion' and the Polish
Government deprived the men of their citizenship in
1938; this had been in the Polish constitution as
the punishment for any Pole who served in a foreign
armed force without the permission of the Polish
Government. Since the Poles refused to do anything
for this Algerian group, the Soviet Military Mission
stepped in to ensure the men's release. In June,
1943, the group left for the Soviet Union. [43]
In the Polish Armed Forces in the West there
were many 'Poles' who were in fact Soviet citizens.
The Soviet Embassy complained bitterly in April,
1946, that the British were trying to hold up the
repatriation of these 'Soviet citizens'. The Home
Office Aliens Dept. declared that this was far from
the truth:
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"On the question of putting a brake on a too
generous issue of the Soviet passports to
members of the Polish Forces, our view is too
many cannot be given...." [44]
The Foreign Office had no reason not to comply with
requests for voluntary repatriation but they were
also anxious to absolve themselves from allegations
of forcing these people to leave,so theyordered that
any person who wanted to go to the Soviet Union
would have to sign a document to that effect. This
move brought an angry response from the Soviets.
}lankey minuted his concerns:
"The question we have to answer is "why do you
make men who wish to go to Russia sign an
application while applicants for Poland apply
orally" - The real reason is of course that we
must protect ourselves against someone accusing
us afterwards of sending Poles to Russia
against their will. We however don't want to
make repatriation to Poland any harder." [45]
Many soldiers had brought all manner of trouble on
themselves by signing documents given to them by
foreign governments and so refused to sign the
British ones, however, they still expressed the
desire to go to the USSR. The Soviet Embassy
complained of victimisation by the British so the
Foreign Office tried to calm things down by saying
that if the Soviets themselves forwarded letters
from these Polish soldiers that would be acceptable.
The original plan was to send the 'Soviet'
transport to Poland and for them to go on from
there. This brought another protest from the Soviet
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Embassy and so much fuss was made that an
alternative route had to be found.
The first transport to the Soviet Union was due
to depart on the 27th June, 1947. Of the 130 men who
were scheduled to go, only 46 actually turned up on
the day.
46 Handed Over
33 Refused at the last minute in protest
over gratuities
2 Arrived too late for the transport
7 Repatriated to Poland
5 Changed their minds
37 Remained unaccounted for
130	 [46]
The second transport took 35 of these missing and
they left on the 11th July. The third transport on
the 29th July developed into a fiasco. The soldiers
were put on ships at Dover to sail to France only to
be turned back at Calais due to an administrative
error by the Soviet Embassy. The Foreign Office had
left it to the Soviet side to organise visas and
passports for France but they had forgotten and the
French would not let the troops land. The soldiers
were brought back to Dover to sit in a camp there
but t unfortunately for the plan, the French closed
their military transit route and so these soldiers
had to be moved via Poland after all. Hancock of the
FO, on hearing the episode, minuted: "Rather funny I
call this. Ha Ha". [47]
As well as the volunteers, the Soviets also had
strong claims on certain other "Poles". Denis Hills
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writes of the SS Halychyna (Galicia)
	
Division
that was
	 formed by the	 Germans	 in 1943
in	 Lwów	 from	 Ukrainians.	 The	 Anders
Poles would have nothing to with these people as
they were not Poles. At the same time they refused
to return to the Ukraine, their fate as 'Traitors to
the Soviet Union' could easily be imagined, so
Hills, as repatriation officer, classified them all
as Polish citizens from Polish Galicia. In that way,
as Hills himself confesses, Ukrainians and Soviet
citizens , war-criminals among them, all went free.
Such was the unwillingness of some British officers
to forcibly repatriate people. [48]
Some Ukrainians did not take the more pragmatic
approach of others, and did not hold to the idea
that it was better to live as a 'Pole' than to die
in a Soviet labour camp. The War Office, on the 5th
March, 1945, wrote to W.D. Allen of the FO regarding
a group of some 200 Ukrainians they were holding as
POWs. They had been offered the chance of joining
the Poles but had refused as they did not consider
themselves as Polish nationals but as independent
Ukrainians. The end result was that they would
continue to be held as prisoners with repatriation
the end result. [49]
The treatment of Baits was also a cause of many
arguments between London and Moscow.
	
Like the
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eastern Poles the Baits were "disputed". While
Moscow claimed all citizens of the pre-war Baltic
Republics as their own, from British and US
perspectives they had to be given the choice to
return home or not. Many senior Allied commanders
took this upon themselves. The 15th 'Latvian' SS
Division "melted away" after having been warned by
Army HQ in Germany. The Latvians 'acquired' civilian
clothes and papers and moved into "Displaced
Persons" [DP] camps in the East Friesland area. Here
too, war-criminals were to escape justice. [50]
It was easier for the British Departments of
State to decide what not to do with the Baits, what
was more difficult to decide was how best to dispose
of them. In a letter to the Control Commission for
Germany, October 27th, 1945, the War Office put
forward its view on the Baits: Because HMG did not
recognise the Soviet annexation of the Baltic
Republics it subsequently did not recognise the
people there as Soviet citizens and even if it did
recognise it "...the citizens of those states would
not be regarded as repatriable." [51] The War Office
wanted the Balts to go to Germany to be disposed of
as DPs. The Control Commission responded by saying
they could not take any more DPs as the camps were
full to bursting. Yet the Soviet insistence that all
Baits should be repatriated met with official
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opposition that was unknown in the case of the
Yugoslav anti-Titoists, the Ukrainians and the
Vlasov Russians. In Denmark there were some 1,000
Baits and in Finland the British were concerned for
37 of them and in a magnanimous gesture the Foreign
Office declared that it was ready to accept all the
Baits in the UK rather than see them handed over to
the Soviets. [52]
Of the other Allied nations whose war-time
history bears anyresemblance to the Poles', the Czechs
must come high on the list. Like the Poles, the
Czechs were expected to return home after the war.
As the Home Secretary, Chuter Ede, explained to the
Commons :
"The general arrangement as regards members of
the Czech Armed Forces is that they will be
repatriated to their own country. There are,
however, certain cases where there are special
grounds for allowing individuals to remain for
the present in this country...." [53]
What this meant in reality was explained in a FO
minute of February, 1946, whereby a Czech soldier
could make an individual application to his HQ to
stay in Britain. If this was rejected he would be
expected to return to Czechoslovakia, however, no
compulsion would be applied if he refused. [54]
Such was the nature of anti-Anders propaganda
that emerged after the war that the allegations that
the Polish Army was the enslaver of peoples was
taken seriously. Max Steinberg, the Secretary of the
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US Trade Union Committee for Jewish Unity, sent a
telegram to the British Government on the 26th
March, 1946:
"We are receiving numerous complaints to effect
that Jews are being detained against their will
in Polish Army commanded by General Anders.
Relatives and Friends of these Jewish soldiers
who are ready to assist them settle in
countries of their choice are prevented from
doing so. This monstrous situation adds insult
and injury to Jewish people everywhere. The
fascist anti-semitic character of Anders Army
too well known to warrant elaboration. Forcible
detention of Jews in this army is the more
reprehensible because they are being made the
instrument of their own destruction. This is
comparable to hideous practices of Nazi beasts
who forced Jews to dig own graves before
dispatching them. In view of acknowledged
financial support British Labour Government is
giving this fascist Polish Army you bear a
major responsibility for this deplorable
situation. In name of thousands of American
Jewish workers we ask you to immediately
correct this grave injustice and to liberate
these Jewish soldiers." [55]
The Foreign Office did not take such agitation
seriously but was still obliged to refute the
allegation by replying that the Jews in the Polish
Armed Forces were not being kept as prisoners but
demobilisation had not, at that time, begun. When
the Polish Forces were wound down the Jews would,
according to the FO, be treated the same as the
Poles.
One of the major problems that the British had seen
in their dealings with the Poles was the fear that
the Poles might withdraw from the front line. In the
overall grand strategy the effect of a Polish
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pull-out would not have been dire but politically
the fall-out would have been serious. The muttering
of the rank-and-file were picked up by the British
liaison officers who reported to the War Office
about a possible mutiny. General Beaumont-Nesbitt
from AFHQ Liaison Section reported to the War Office
in December, 1944:
"It is not desired in this report to present an
exaggerated picture, for outwardly there is
little indication of any very serious loss of
morale so far, but it must be stated that if
the present political uncertainty continues
regarding the ultimate policy which Great
Britain will adopt towards Poland, the fighting
efficiency of the Corps is liable to
deteriorate. [...]
"Finally in this connection I must state, with
all the force at my command, that I 	 am
convinced that, if the British Govt was to
recognise the LUBLIN Govt, this Corps will
cease fighting within 24 hours of the
publication of the news, or even less." [56]
Things did not get any better from a British
perspective. The Yalta agreement in February of 1945
was seen by the Poles in the West as a 'sell out'.
It appears that Anders' reaction to the Crimea
Conference was to threaten to pull his soldiers out
of the line, as an AFHQ report to Alexander from the
15th February, 1945, explains:
"Polish Situation: No catastrophic developments
reported. McCreery [GOC 8th Army] had three
hour interview with Anders this morning. He
wished to withdraw his troops from the line but
McCreery refused to agree pointing out that he
had nothing with which to relieve them and that
it was vital in their own best interests apart
from any other factors that Poles should
continue to participate fully in war against
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Germany. McCreery is satisfied that military
aspect of situation is reasonably satisfactory
but reports Anders himself desperately dejected
and apparently without hope for future." [57]
Field-Marshal Alexander was of the opinion that
given their strength of feeling it was probably best
not to push the Poles too far. In his reply to the
AFHQ cipher he wrote:
"I do NOT think we need have any fear that his
Polish troops will NOT do their duty but in
their present frame of mind I would NOT ask
them to carry out any operation which would
require great effort or loss of life. The only
advice I could usefully give Anders is to
remain calm and await events. Although this is
NOT in his nature I think he will follow this
advice." [58]
The Polish military cemetery near Bologna bears
witness to the fact that the Poles were asked to
carry on the fight in Italy. The final assault on
Bologna, from the 9th to the 21st of April, 1945,
cost 300 Polish lives with at least 50 being killed
in a 'friendly fire' incident as a wave of Liberator
bombers emptied their loads on Polish positions.
The obvious question that is now asked is: why
did the Poles continue to fight? Given what the
Poles knew at the time and given their feeling of
general betrayal what drove the Poles forward to
further sacrifice? The question is not an academic
one as at the time the Polish troops were in fact
asking themselves that very same question. Although
most soldiers, at some time, ask themselves the
perennial question: "why am I here?", there is
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usually some rationale that can be used to justify
military action. After Yalta the Poles found it
increasingly difficult to find such motivation.
Ever aware of the need for security, the
British had issued new "Guidelines for Censorship"
in October of 1944:
11 4(m) Negative Criticism Derogatory opinions,
criticism or statements likely to have a
detrimental effect on individuals, units or
the whole Polish Army or Allied troops.
(n) Reports of atrocities unless officially
released. [59]
The Chief Polish Base Censor would send AFHQ a
fortnightly report of excisions he had made to
Forces letters. The short extracts remain some of
the best indications as to what the Polish soldier
was thinking at the time, and to the bitterness that
most felt.
l2th-27th August, 1944. Officer:
" We are fighting for "Yours and our freedom".
But now I think rather only for yours."
27th July-l2th August, 1944. Sergeant:
"I can say only that the Polish blood is very
cheap because it's soaking the soil all over
the world and probably not for our freedom."
27th July-l2th August, 1944. Cadet Officer:
"If you have heard the latest radio news you
will know that the future of my country is not
clear. I don't know who we are fighting for and
bleeding here? Nobody is going to do anything
for us but in 1940 the British Prime Minister
told that our land must be the same as before
the war. We are trusting very much to every
word he had said. And now.. .
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Yalta, described by the Poles as "the grave of our
hopes" only highlighted how hopeless the Polish
position was:
l2th-27th February, 1945. Officer:
"When this morning we heard the news about the
statement from the Big Three meeting we got
deadly silent. Up to now I was one of the most
trusting Pole in your policy which now I can
call only as the policy of an ostrich hiding
its head into the sand. You can think about our
'small' and 'too proud' nation as you like,
that we are politically narrow-minded, stupid
in a way, naughty, or obstinate, but you can't
treat us worse than you treat countries which
didn't put up any effort at all to help you
against Germany. We sacrificed most of all
countries - more than you even. We trusted you
so much, and what have we got. Our biggest
friend let us go down. That is darling my
accusation. How I wish I was wrong but I can't
see it."
Even more depressing to the Poles was not the
question of the future but rather if the past
suffering had achieved anything at all or had it
been one, almighty, waste. Further to this there was
the hope, more a case of optimism over realism, that
someone would preserve 'natural justice'.
l2th-27th January, 1945. Officer:
"Sometimes we ask even each other what are we
fighting for? And more and more we can't find a
proper answer.
.but don't think please that I'm a pessimist,
not at all, in my heart of hearts I do believe
that the better part of the world won't permit
so that something with the ending on "ism" will
rule over the world. Don't you think so?" [60]
Jan Podoski, who spent the war among the
British and had had any idealism and hope for the
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future removed in the cold of the British climate,
put forward the idea that such hopeless optimism was
almost virtually confined to the Poles in Italy and
the Middle East. When General Kiemens Rudnicki, the
'Liberator of Bologna', was made GOC 1st (Polish)
Armoured Division in Germany the first thing
Podoski noticed was Rudnicki's different attitude.
Unlike the rest of his men the new Co was an
optimist. Rudnicki was convinced that Poland would
have to be reborn as a full and independent country.
"The great sacrifices which we have made surely will
not be allowed to go to waste." Podoski's cynical
response was: "why not?" In the end Rudnicki was
right, but as Podoski admits, he had to wait nearly
half a century for it to come about. [61]
Yet the censor continued to extract protests
from Polish letters, a fact that made a bad
situation seem worse, as one Polish officer wrote:
l2th-27th February, 1945. Officer:
"Never, never congratulate our people of Warsaw
and Poland being 'liberated'. This sounds like
the most cruel irony and is deeply resented by
every Pole. You could speak about a lamb being
liberated from a bear by a tiger. A day will
come when most if not all of the British people
I like and love so much, will understand full
meaning of what I am saying - including the
censor who is probably wondering if he has
to cut out certain sentences of this
letter or destroy it as a whole. Don't
do it, it is not propaganda - it is truth
and	 remember	 that	 the	 only countries
where we Poles can express our thoughts
and feelings are
	 your	 great	 democracies
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Great Britain and United States. If you
order us to close our mouths - I ask you - what
are we fighting for ?" [62]
The natural extension to this line of thinking was
to stop fighting. As with all the armies there were
sporadic desertions from the Polish ranks, but on
the whole the fighting unity was maintained. This
did not stop the Polish Government from feeling that
it had to appeal to its troops for calm and
co-operation with the Allies. Directly after Yalta
the Polish Government issued the following:
"In view of the heavy blow which the Polish
cause has suffered - the Polish Government
realising the worries and disquiet pervading
the Polish Forces - appeals to its commanders
and soldiers for further carrying out of duty,
retaining peace, dignity and solidarity as well
as maintaining brotherhood in arms with
soldiers of Forces of Great Britain, Canada,
United States and France, with whom they have
been tied by bloodshed in common battles.
The esteem and friendship for Poland, grown
during service full of sacrifice by the Polish
Armed Forces among free peoples of the West,
are still in possession of the Polish Republic,
which her soldiers must retain and multiply."
[63]
If Sikorski represented this esteem and
friendship for Poland until his death in 1943, then
Anders was the man most people associated with
Poland at the end of the war. Attitudes to him
largely depended on political grounds. To the
British political right wing and to the military
establishment he was a soldier whose record
commanded respect; to the left he was an avid
- 75 -
anti-Communist ho had been labelled a fascist by
Moscow, and the label had stuck to him in British
eyes. Churchill, for one, had some respect for
Anders and on the 31st May, 1945, he sent a memo to
both the Foreign Office and ar Office requesting
some decoration for him:
"This gallant man has long fought with us. I am
not prepared to allow our distribution of
military honours to be overshadowed by
Bolshevik prejudices. I should propose that
General Anders should receive a decoration for
his long fighting services." [64]
For Anders this was not to be. On June 15th
Parliament was dissolved for the General Election,
an election that Churchill lost. The new Labour
administration was less well disposed to Anders and
any idea of further honours died a swift death. To
be honest, Anders did not help his own cause with an
endless stream of anti-Soviet Orders of the Day and
speeches that were guaranteed to irritate British
Government circles, and in particular the Foreign
Office.
Anders' Order of the Day for July 6th, 1945,
was written just after the British and US
Governments had switched their recognition from the
London Poles to warsaw. Not surprisingly the text is
a bitter attack on Allied policy and echoes the then
current Polish feeling that their sacrifice should
not be allowed to go in vain:
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"Men - I am turning to you at a period of
extreme difficulty and of far-reaching
importance. The Governments of the estern
Powers have decided to recognise the so-called
Provisional Government of National Unity
imposed on Poland by her occupation and thus to
withdraw recognition from the legal Government
of the Polish Republic in London. [...)
The World Powers by-pass our constitution and
our lawful authorities, and in accepting the
present circumstances, they have agreed to the
fait accomplis created with regard to Poland
and the Poles by a foreign force.
Men, at this moment we are the only part of
the Polish Nation which is able, and has the
duty, loudly to voice its will, and just for
this reason we must prove today by word and by
deed that we are faithful to our oath of
allegiance, true to our citizen's duty towards
our country, and faithful to the last wish of
our fallen comrades in arms, who fought and
died for an independent, sovereign and truly
free Poland. [...j
Our country, deprived of the rights of
speech, looks towards us. It wishes to see us
in the land of our ancestors - to that end we
are striving and longing from the bottom of our
hearts - but it does not want to see us as
slaves of a foreign force: It wants to see us
with our banners flying as forerunners of true
freedom.
As such a return is impossible today, we must
wait in closed and disciplined ranks for a
favourable change of conditions. This change
must come, or otherwise all the terrible and
bloody sacrifices of the whole world, suffered
throughout six years, will have been in vain.
It is impossible to imagine that humanity has
suddenly become blind and has really lost the
consciousness of a mortal danger. [...J
We will fulfil our duty towards our country
and its lawful authorities!
Long live the glorious republic of Poland!"
[65]
The British reaction to Anders' words was one of
shock and horror. Sir Orme Sargent of the FO
described it as "lamentable", but later toned down
his assessment to "not at all suitable". The War
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Office laid out its objections in a cipher to all
Commands:
"...it was a most unsuitable declaration to
have been made by General under British High
Command.
2.	 Order contained:
a/ direct and almost insulting criticism HMG's
policy;
b/ mischievous propaganda in conflict with our
guiding principles approved by Prime Minister
namely that we should do our best to ensure
that individual Poles have proper chance of
opting for return to Poland;
Cl description of either our Russian allies or
Polish Government now recognised by HMG as
enemies;
d/ Improper remarks on general situation in
Poland." 1166]
Something as profoundly damaging to British
interests as this could not be kept quiet for long.
To reassure Stalin, who was at the Potsdam Conference,
or 'Terminal' as it was referred to in official
circles, Churchill announced at the Second Plenary
Meeting that "Disciplinary action w[oul]d be taken
against this officer." [67] On the 25th of July,
1945, Anders received a letter from Alexander's
Chief of Staff, W.D. Morgan, the terms of which were
quite clear:
"1/ Field-Marshal Alexander reports from Potsdam
that he has been approached on the highest
level concerning an Order of the Day issued by
you on 6 July, to which exception has been
taken.
2/ In order to close the matter, Field-Marshal
Alexander sought and obtained permission to
deal with it himself on his return. He
accordingly desires me to send you the
following message:
"As a friend I most sincerely advise you not
to repeat anything of this nature and as your
Commander-in-Chief I must insist that, in
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future, all statements by you which might be
politically controversial must be submitted to
me for my approval first."
3/ Pending Field-Marshal Alexander's return, I
ask you to ensure that nothing which might be
politically controversial is issued without
prior submission to, and approval by, this
Headquarters.
W.D. MORGAN
Lieutenant-General
Chief of Staff"
[68]
The British press, always keen for a scandal,
picked up on the Anders affair, and "The Observer"
ran a story about Anders' visit to AFHQ in Caserta,
on the 13th of July, where Alexander was reported to
have rebuked Anders for his Order. For the sake of
unity Alexander informed the War Office that:
"No (rpt no) rebuke was issued by Field Marshal
Alexander at this or any other time and
interview was most cordial." [69]
Anders was not alone in feeling that the end of the
war was, for the Poles, not really the end of the
struggle. As the Polish Base Censor's reports
indicate, the Polish Forces could foresee that the
West's honeymoon period with the 'Russian Ally'
would not last. This did not, however, mitigate the
feeling of emptiness and waste:
27th May-l2th June, 1945. Cadet Officer:
"When the loudspeakers announced the end of the
war - 1 was not happy. I abstained with
difficulty from the weeping. The weeping of an
immeasurable pain. I am an old soldier. I took
part in a number of battles. And I was happy
that I was left alive. I did it because I was
sure that it happened for my destination for a
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beautiful future and now? The end of the war
indicates for me:- the certainty that I'll
never more see my beautiful fatherland - the
certainty that I'll never see my family and
friends - the certainty that the ideas for
which I fought about 6 years never have existed
- the beginning of leading a homeless life.
Bitter words. Bitter minds. But - can they be
other?"
Or as another officer put it:
"In the time when the whole world rejoices at
the end of the war, we Poles are sad. We pray
for the second war, which will bring the real
liberty for us and our country." [sic]
This was a particularly worrying aspect of the
Polish problem. The British Government had on its
hands several tens of thousands of very bitter
troops waiting for an excuse to fight the
Communists. To quote one sergeant:
"Oh! My Dear, the war is finished, but not for
us! We are further soldiers and we are
expecting a moment when we will go back to
Poland with weapons in our hands." [70] [sic]
Although the British did not expect a spontaneous
rising by the Polish Forces, there was a worry about
the more radical officers inciting revolt.
Brigadier Frith of !-IQ 26 British Liaison Unit
forwarded new guidelines to HQ 2 Polcorps entitled
"Press Interviews - Instructions to Commanders" in
which it was forbidden to openly discuss certain
topics:
"3c - Political matters of any kind which may
involve higher policy.
d - Matters of policy outside the jurisdiction of
the Command.
[...]
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4 - Statements by Senior Officers
A summary of the text of all statements
(verbal, written or broadcast) which are to be
attributed to Senior Officers by name, by
appointment or by implication, will be
submitted for prior approval." [71]
Although it was the Brigadier's intention to control
Anders' brand of anti-Communist propaganda the
effect was largely unsuccessful.
The Polish Chiefs of Staff, Anders, Kopatiski,
wirski and Uycki, sent a letter to the British
Government on the 25th May, 1946, saying that it was
in Britain's own interest to keep the Polish Armed
Forces to safeguard the future. The Poles protested
at the plans to demobilise their forces. According
to Anders' ADC this letter was by way of a final
protest, 'for the record' as it were. After this
Capt. Lubomirski told Hankey of the FO that the
Poles would quietly co-operate with British plans.
[72]
Anders was still determined to get his message
across to anyone who would listen. His Order of the
Day for the 29th May, 1946, was another text
guaranteed to incite the wrath of the British
political establishment.
"c'e are marching from Italy through British
lands, and tomorrow, by a road which is still
unknown, to the true Poland for which we have
fought and which no Polish heart can picture
without Lwow and Wilno. We shall not depart
from this road which is our historical road.
Our service is not ending. Our march is towards
Poland, free, whole and independent."
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To Polish ears this was just what they wanted to
hear, defiant words that harked back to another time
when Poles fought in Italy under General D4browski
'for Poland' and Napoleon. From the British
perspective just the opposite was true. Hankey of
the FO minuted that it was "Pretty bad + one sided
statement. I'd hoped for better than this" and in a
Cabinet minute...
"It was pointed out that these statements were
likely to give offence to the Governments of
Poland and the Soviet Union and might increase
the difficulties of arranging for the disposal
of these Polish forces." [73]
For the Foreign Office the course was clear. Anders
had to go. The plan formulated was to replace him by
General Tadeusz Kutrzeba (the spelling of whose name
provided some difficulty for the clerks at the FO)
as Kutrzeba was considered to be a non-political
soldier who was then in a state of semi-retirement
writing a military history. During the September
Campaign in 1939 he had commanded the Poznati Army
and taken part in the battle on the Bzura. He was
also the officer who had signed General Blaskowitz's
act of capitulation for warsaw. After having spent
the war as a POW in Germany he was released in May,
1945, and had made his way to London. Although he
was acceptable to London and to the Warsaw Poles, to
the troops on the ground he was a poor substitute
for Anders.
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General Boruta-Spiechowicz, one of the handful
of Generals who returned to Poland after the war,
agreed with the British view, in highly secret talks
on a return visit to London, that Kutrzeba was the
best candidate to replace Anders. As the minutes of
the meeting show:
"Boruta saw Kusczeba [sic] in London and he
(Boruta) is convinced that Kusczeba would be
the only officer acceptable to both sides who
could take command for repatriation purposes of
the forces outside Poland in case at any time
it is considered that command must be changed."
[74]
In the list of possible candidates to fill Anders'
shoes Boruta-Spiechowicz's name had also been
mentioned in high places. Marshal Rola-Zymierski,
Warsaw's Minister of Defence, had put the suggestion
forward to the British in August of 1945. The War
Office was painfully aware of what the effects of
imposing a Warsaw appointee on the Polish Armed
Forces would be. As with Colonel Sidor's Mission,
the London Poles, who had little enough respect for
Boruta-Spiechowicz for going back to Poland, would
have had nothing to do with him as Commander. An
AFHQ cipher to Field-Marshal Alexander on the 31st
of August, shows that the military foresaw the
worst:
"%e must handle this affair very firmly
otherwise we shall have a disaster. To replace
ANDERS by any nominee of the Warsaw Government
will lead to mutiny. Anders is NOT only a well
loved Commander but the trusted guide and
mentor of his men whom he has brought out of
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Russian captivity and led through years of
fighting ending in great victory. My advice is
NOT to allow any intervention in Italy by
representatives of the warsaw Government. I
have already segregated 12,000 Poles who wish
to go back to Poland and as soon as I get
authority I will arrange their return." [75]
Six months later Alexander's successor as SACMED,
General Morgan, was coming to the same conclusions.
As this Top Secret report to the Cabinet Offices
concludes - Anders should stay:
"The turn out of the Poles and discipline was
of a very high standard. Poles were helping
local Carabinieri to ensure a higher standard
of law and order than in most of Italy.
iv! There is a considerable volume of evidence
from refugees - some Jewish - from Poland which
gives fairly conclusive information that
conditions in Poland for all except supporters
of the existing Communist Government are
deplorable and are deteriorating further.
vu As a result of my visit...I view with the
gravest concern the certainty of serious
trouble that will arise throughout the Corps if
General Anders is arbitrarily removed from
command or not permitted to rejoin the Corps
after his visit to London." [76]
The last passage was highlighted in the Foreign
Office and C.F.A. warner noted: "Altho' Gen. Morgan
may exaggerate Gen. Anders' qualities, we cannot
altogether discount the last sentence of his tel.m".
The prospect of mutiny was one that did not
leave British policy makers. Even at Potsdam
Churchill had to tell Stalin that ". . .we had to be
careful about the Polish Army, for if the situation
was mishandled there might be a mutiny." [77]
Certainly while the Poles were carrying out
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occupation duties tnere was always the possibility
of armed protest, and even when the Poles were in
Britain for demobilisation the risk did not subside.
General Lyne, the War Office Director of Staff
Duties, wrote to Hill of the Home Office Aliens Dept.:
"We have not in England at present nearly
sufficient troops of the right type, and
standing by, ready to deal with such a
situation, if it was well organised." [78]
The agreed line was that 'prevention was better than
cure' and conditions would have to be made that the
Poles did not feel it necessary to rebel. In any
case, in the event of "large scale disturbances" the
War Office might have to bring back troops to the UK
from 'Imperial policing' duties. It ould not be
possible to keep large numbers of troops in the UK
mobilised for an eventuality that, hopefully, would
never happen.
But still the Warsaw regime kept insisting that
the British hand over control of the Polish Armed
Forces in the West and still the British had to keep
refusing. The official policy of the British
Government was ciphered by the Foreign Office to
Cavendish-Bentinck, UK ambassador to Warsaw, on the
6th March, 1946.
"They [the Polish Provisional Government]
proposed that the Polish Armed Forces should be
placed under the command of officers appointed
from Warsaw and that they should then be
returned to Poland in their existing units.
3. It was impossible for His Majesty's Government
both on practical and on moral grounds, to
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agree to the proposed transfer of command to
officers appointed from Warsaw. The state of
mind of the majority of the men described above
made it certain that there would have been a
breakdown of discipline and grave disorders if
an attempt had been made to impose commanders
appointed by Warsaw. There can be no doubt
whatsoever that the majority of the officers
and men would simply have refused to obey such
officers." [79]
Yet if the Foreign Office expected Anders to
maintain some discretion then they were to be
disappointed. On the 15th of June, 1946, he issued
what was to be known as his 'Oath'. Another call to
his men to remain faithful to the cause and a, not
very thinly disguised, attack on the post-war
settlement was sure to vex the British, and indeed
it did.
"Our tradition which is a thousand years old
binds us with the Western civilisation and we
do not intend to be forced in to the Eastern
system which is foreign to us and hostile
towards us. We shall therefore, remain loyal to
our Allies. We shall stick to them even if they
do not at the moment see eye to eye with us, as
we believe that the true liberty of nations and
men will be achieved through the triumph of
truth over falsehood and of Christian Culture
over barbarism." [80]
The reaction of the Warsaw regime was swift and
angry. The BBC monitors picked up the Polish Press
Agency • S response:
"Would the British Government allow any other
military commander to announce his intention to
fight with arms Allied Governments, members of
the United Nations?
We are convinced that it would not do so. Why
does the British Government allow Anders to
make such declarations? Do they consider that
this is a better way to encourage Polish
soldiers to return home?" [81]
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Other sections of	 Anders'	 text	 were	 even
more belligerent:
"According to the decision of our Allies with
whom we fought side by side all the time for
the common cause of freedom, the Independent
Polish forces are to be demobilised.... Today
the world understands that Poland is ruled by
servile agents of Moscow.... We are deeply
convinced that we were always loyal to our
Allies at times most perilous for them. In
spite of this, however, there were no Polish
soldiers parading on V-Day. The Polish airmen,
who were the only ones to be invited, refused
to take part in the celebration as the Polish
sailors and soldiers from Monte Cassino were
absent.... As soldiers of the sovereign Polish
Republic, who remain faithful to their oath, we
vow before God, our colours and the graves of
our comrades, that in unity with the aims of
the whole nation, both in Poland and abroad, we
shall continue our struggle for the liberty of
Poland, regardless of the conditions in which
we shall have to live and work" [82]
W.D. Allen of the FO minuted the file about the
'Oath':
"Ihis summary suffices to show that the
statement is as bad as it could be... if
anything were needed to damn the Resettlement
Corps in their [Warsaw's] eyes this is it. We
could tell the press that the statement was not
authorised by the British Command. But I think
we should have to ask Caserta before doing so
and in any case such an announcement would
provoke the further question (a) how is it that
we have so little control over the Poles under
our command and (b) what do we propose to do
about this obvious indiscipline. The logical
course would be to remove Gen. Anders from his
command. But by doing do we should probably
weaken rather than strengthen our control and
make Gen. Morgan's task all the more
difficult." [83]
The Head of the Northern Department minuted in the
margin: "I agree... We haven't got to stand Anders
much longer anyway."
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'Ihe ar Office contacted General Morgan to
find out what was going on in Italy. In a cipher
from AFHQ to the War Office on the 25th of June, the
SACMED explained that he was not consulted by Anders
about the text. He had met Anders who had told him
that he had not asked Morgan since Morgan would,
undoubtedly, have refused permission and Anders did
not want to put the onus on him. Morgan believed
that this as an honest explanation. What was of
greater concern was the idea that Anders was not the
master of his house. Morgan's telegram continued:
"The statement was presented to him [Anders] by
the officers and men of the corps with a demand
for ratification. He toned it down considerably
but he is convinced that unless some statement
had been made he was in danger of losing
control of his corps." [84]
There had been murmurings of unrest from Anders'
subordinates for some months and this only served to
complicate the deliberations over Ander& future.
The Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin wrote to
J.J. Lawson, Minister of ,ar, back in January of
1946:
"HM Embassy in Rome... have recently reported
that General Anders himself is less extreme in
his views than some of his senior staff
officers, and have suggested that the latter
might be capable of causing any amount of
mischief in the General's absence. I think
therefore that serious consideration should be
given to recalling some of the most undesirable
senior Polish officers in Italy at the same
time as General Anders himself." [85]
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The predicament of the British appeared to be such that
they could not live with Anders and they could not
live without him.
Anders himself appears to have undergone periods of
self-doubt. Like his troops Anders could not help thinking
that all that had gone before had been a supreme waste of
effort, and1 as the officer in command, Anders had asked
thousands of Poles to make sacrifices for little reward.
Ihe Resident Minister to AFHQ wrote of Anders:
"General Anders is generally considered in Polish
circles to be pro-British, even excessively so. [...]
He has around him however several officers of
Pisudski's faction who have not failed to seize on
any British "exposition" towards Polish Forces to
urge the General to adopt a reactionary nationalistic
policy. Only the General's loyalty to us and his
personal control of his troops have prevented the
spread of such anti-British tendencies in the Corps."
[86]
Yet if Anders was 'pro-British' then the conflict of
interests was gradually wearing him down. One of the
Polish liaison officers to AFHQ, Major Gawronski, wrote a
report for the British under the title "Atmosphere in
Polcorps" on the 5th of June, 1946:
"General Anders is in a most pathetic mood. He feels
he has let down his men who have trusted him so
blindly. He speaks with the highest admiration and
gratitude of the sympathy and kindness he has met
with everywhere in London and in AFHQ. He says he has
met with nothing but friends who quite obviously are
doing their best to give him decent treatment, but at
the same time they fail to see that he has been let
down on what is essential, and that owing to that he
has - what is far worse - let down his own men. That
is what hurts him most." [87]
The constant umbrage that was taken by the British
Government over the attitude of the Poles in London and on
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military service overseas rather begs the question - what
did they expect? The British had achieved their war aims;
the Poles in the West had fulfilled none of theirs. By the
end of the war Poland had not been liberated from foreign
occupation, Poland had been robbed of her eastern
territory and her allies in London and Washington had
stood by and let it happen, they had signed the Yalta
accord that made it 'legal' but what was worse was that
the	 Poles	 were	 being	 humiliated	 through being
forced to accept it without	 protest or criticism.
To many in Britain Anders was a 'nationalist', a
'reactionary' and even a 'fascist'. The fact, however, was
that Britain at Yalta had not signed away British
territory but rather one more of those small European
states about which the British confessed they knew so
little.
Perhaps what is more surprising about the Polish
reaction to events was just how restrained they were. As
Field-Marshal Alexander was leaving Italy for the last
time Anders gave him a memorandum containing the main
objections which grieved the Poles. in Anders' own words:
"In this memorandum I called attention to the strong
feeling of the average Polish soldier that, although
he knew that he had done his duty well and loyally,
he and his country had been wronged, and that
conditions did not permit of his return to the free
and independent Poland for which he had so
steadfastly fought. 1...]
If the state of uncertainty continued, the Polish
troops, whose patience was, after all, not limitless,
might well get out of hand." [881
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Apparently Alexander's opinion on Anders' memorandum was
that it was "True, sound and moderate" yet Anders never
heard anything else about it. His comments "...disappeared
like a stone thrown into water."
Anders was certainly not the only Polish commander
whose outspoken criticism got him into trouble. The
commander of the 14th Armoured Brigade, Colonel Bobiñski,
stationed in Egypt also wrote a hostile Order of the Day
for the 7th of May, 1945:
"Today all hostilities against the Germans in Europe
have ceased. Our eternal Teutonic enemy has been
defeated. [...)
This is not (repeat not) the end of our efforts. Our
country is occupied by the second enemy Soviet Russia
to (? war) with whom we must further prepare
ourselves. Do your best in order to become good
Armoured soldiers in the least possible time. Poland
suffers in captivity and awaits her liberation which
can only be brought home by the Polish Soldiers."
[89]
General Paget, the C-in-C Middle East Forces, wrote to
Alexander as to whether Bobitiski should be relieved of his
command, but the SACMED replied on the 19th of May that a
rebuke would be enough but, just to pre-empt a total
collapse of morale, the Brigade was moved from Quassasin
near the Suez Canal to El Amerya on the outskirts of
Alexandria "for a change of climate and to improve the
facilities for training." [90] - Alexandria also
contained some of the more obvious facilities for bored
troops to amuse themselves.
The Poles were becoming a major problem for the
British Authorities. The Cabinet, at its meeting on the
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22nd of January, 1946, agreed that:
"...the maintenance of these substantial Polish
Forces under arms was a source of increasing
political embarrassment to us in our relations with
the Soviet Union and with Poland."
Above all the Government had to get from Warsaw:
". . .a precise statement of the conditions that would
be offered to them on return; and it contemplated
that this information should be included in a
statement of our policy in respect of the future of
the Polish Armed Forces, which would be drawn up for
communication to all Polish troops under British
command. This statement must also include
information, which at this stage should be definitely
discouraging, about the prospects for those not
desiring to return to Poland."
The Government also had to explain "fully and frankly" to
Anders and the Polish General Staff that they should not
use their "great influence with their troops to prevent
men returning to Poland". It was considered that it would
probably be necessary to prevent them returning to Italy.
Although the Home Secretary had no legal powers to prevent
Ariders leaving the UK:
.it was suggested that, without the exercise of
any civil powers, military measures could be taken to
secure that, as a soldier under British Command, he
could not return to Italy."
The key line which the British were to take was that:
"...it should be recognised now that we should be
under a moral obligation to deal generously with
them, even though it were not thought possible to
grant them British nationality to the extent implied
in the statement by the late Prime Minister on the
27th February, 1945." [91]
The statement mentioned here was the so-called 'pledge' by
Churchill. It appeared that the new Labour administration
was to follow the gist of what Churchill had announced
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although not the letter and so Operation ' 1 Keynote" was
born. The idea was to distribute a copy of an appeal by
Bevin to all the Polish Forces in the West in the hope
that it would convince as many as possible to return to
Poland. The Polish Armed Forces would be dissolved and the
Poles had either to return to Poland or await some, as
yet, unclear future at the hands of the British
Government.
Although the Foreign Office had largely given up the
idea of removing Anders from his command, it was assumed
that his attitude to the note would be unhelpful and so
further steps would have to be taken in the event that
this proved to be so. The Foreign Office minuted on the
4th March, 1946:
"On the other hand it is probably unlikely that we
shall find General Anders and the Commanders very
co-operative. We shall be lucky if they adopt merely
a neutral attitude and there is certainly a
substantial risk that their attitude may be so
unco-operative that we shall have to retain them in
this country." [92]
So Anders was summoned to London on the 14th of March and
the next day he and the senior Polish commanders met with
Attlee and Bevin where the future as outlined in no
uncertain terms. As Anders later freely admitted, he had
little option but to go along with the plan, dependent as
he was on the largesse and goodwill of London. He convinced
the British that he would not not use his influence to
prevent the distribution of the appeal nor to hinder the
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way for any Pole who wanted to be repatriated. Thus Anders was
allowed to return to his troops.
The whole operation, carried out by the War Office
in strict secrecy, involved the transport of copies of Bevin's
note to all commands where Poles were stationed. The
details for distribution were:
	
90,000 fly	 Naples	 Friday	 8 March
	
10,000 fly	 Cairo	 Friday	 8 March
	
30,000 fly	 Naples	 Saturday 9 March
	
5,000 fly	 Paris	 Sunday 10 March
	
25,000 fly	 Buckeburg Sunday 10 March
	
50,000 Train Edingburgh Sunday 10 March	 [93]
There were some 210,000 leaflets to be distributed to the
Poles. What many Poles found the most disturbing was the
British refusal to allow informed debate on the subject of
repatriation. The War Office sent a Top Secret cipher to
GHQ Central Mediterranean Forces on the 6th of March:
"In view forthcoming announcement giving HMG's policy
on return of Poles it is essential you ensure that no
articles advising refusal to return to Poland or
questioning bona fides of Warsaw Government terms
should be allowed to appear in papers run by Polish
Forces.
GHQ CMF in its return cipher to the War Office stated that
censorship of Army newspapers had been stopped from
September 1st, 1945, so articles could not, in fact, be
refused.
The War Office, full of helpful advice, returned the
cipher to Italy saying:
"These papers are regarded as official mouthpiece of
2 Polish Forces. At this stage some control is
therefore essential. In UK control is exercised by
making paper allotment only on condition that
controversial political questions are avoided.
Suggest you adopt same procedure." [94]
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This did not affect any pro-Warsaw, pro-repatriation
articles. Anything that got rid of the Poles was allowed;
anything that encouraged Poles not to return was frowned
upon.
Because "Keynote" was such an important element of
British Policy, and because the Government had told arsaw
that it was doing its utmost to get the Polish Forces to
return to Poland, then the distribution had to go
smoothly. No pretext was to be given for the Communists to
turn around and say that the British were not really
serious in their aim. Not only had Bevin's note to be
given out to each and every Pole, but it had to be seen to
be given out by Warsaw.
Since neither the War Office nor the Foreign Office
had confidence in the good will of the Polish Forces in
this matter so it would have to be supervised very
carefully by the British. On the 3rd March the War Office
ciphered General Paget, C-in-C MEF:
"On date of issue a British officer hill be present
in all major Polish units in all theatres other than
ITALY. In ITALY British supervision will be to
greatest possible extent and must in any case be
sufficient to ensure British evidence that statements
were issued down to Polish rank and file." 1951
Although the Poles in question had nothing to do with the
formulation of the note they were still expected to carry
out the distribution, whether they liked it or not. As the
cable from 2 Polcorps Quartermaster shows, the Poles here
expected to be an instrument of their own demobilisation:
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"For the days 20 and 21/111 arrange 5 translators to
be at the disposal of 3 District. They will escort
the British officers controlling the distribution of
the declaration of the English and Warsaw
Governments. They are to be equipped with field
beds." 196]
The British also made provision for the Polish Air
Force and Navy to receive Bevin's appeal, but, as with the
Army, mutiny could not be ruled out by the Poles. Once the
Poles knew that they were to be disbanded as a military
body there was a threat that they might scuttle their
ships or take to the sea like a latter-day "Potemkin". The
Admiralty contacted all commanders of naval bases used by
the Poles on the 13th March, 1946:
"2. Polish Ships are not repeat not to leave present
British ports without express Admiralty authority.
Polish ships in foreign ports are to be recalled.
2.[sic) No further ammunition is to be embarked and only
stores necessary for current maintenance should be
supplied." [97]
This was confirmed on the 22nd March, 1946 when a
"Stand-Still Order" was issued to ensure the rapid
distribution of pamphlets and to "keep ships manned by
Polish personnel in close supervision by appropriate
authorities" until evidence became available as to what
the reactions to the pamphlet were likely to be.
On March 20th, 1946, Operation "Keynote" swung into
action and the text was delivered to the Polish Armed
Forces. [The text of Bevin's address and that of the
Warsaw Provisional Government is at Appendix B, including
sections - highlighted - that were deleted from the text
just prior to distribution] The reactions from the Poles
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were varied. Although there were sporadic refusals to
accept the Bevin note, on the vhole the British were very
pleased with the distribution. An AFHQ Interim Report to
General Morgan, who was visiting the War Office at the
time, was quite positive in its appraisal:
"Two. The distribution of the pamphlets to the entire
rank and file of the Corps was completed without
incident by evening 21 March. Most of it was
completed by evening 20 March. The smooth
accomplishment of this task reflect great credit on 2
Polcorps and upon British officers participating, it
is evident that General Anders' orders were explicit
and the Corps abided by the spirit as well as by
letter of the orders. Individual Unit Commanders
distributed statement to individual soldiers without
comment or propaganda.
Three. 2 Polcorps press has co-operated fully
printing statement without editorial comment." [98]
But the report did say that further reaction might come
about and a close watch would have to be kept. Colonel
Tappin, Head of the AFHQ Liaison Section, noted that
distribution as "...carried out without incident and in
an atmosphere of calm efficiency. ." and that was
• .despite the strong dislike of the majority for
political doctrines of the Polish Government." [99]
It was not only the British who were keen to find out
just what the reaction among Polish troops was. Polish
Forces HQ in Ancona sent a cipher to the Head of
2 Polcorps Intelligence, Colonel Bkiewicz on the 21st of
March to find out if attitudes had changed in the ranks:
"Please report by telegram, before 23/Ill, what
impression has been made on the troops by the address
of Minister Bevin and also how their moods are being
affected in relation to this." [100]
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If the initial reaction was one of calm, that is not to
say that there were no problems. Ihe Interim Report for
General Morgan, cited above, also made several
observations that the Poles were quick to notice.
"Four. Following general reaction apparent so far.
A- Personnel are perplexed that neither General Anders
nor their Commanding Officers have issued clarifying
statement. It seems then that this may affect the
final decision of a large number.
B- Some confusion caused by fact that no date for
decision indicated.
C- Personnel are suspicious because,
1- Warsaw terms are neither signed nor dated.
2- Bevin's statement is not dated and no title
appears below his signature.
3- Pamphlet is in bad Polish. [...J" [101]
Another of the minor over-sights with the text was
its layout. It was presented as a four sided pamphlet but
only three and a half of the pages had printing on them,
half of page four was left blank - an ideal space for
angry Poles to write their ideas on what Bevin could co
with his offer. The files of the PRO contain some of these
returned pamphlets with opinions written on them, for
example:
Major Bolesaw Glaser: "After you Sir. It is not truth. Do
you know, maybe, what happened with my family."
2nd Lt. Dr. Leon aldman: "I	 have	 been one time in
Russia - that is sufficient."
Rifleman Franciszek Luszcz: ". ..I therefore beg you for
protection abroad. I would rather die under a hedge
in a democratic country than experience communistic
luxury." [102]
As these comments began to arrive at the Foreign Office
suspicions began to arise that there might be some form of
Polish conspiracy to register this mass protest. One of
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the key pieces of evidence was that the same phrases began
to crop up - "Asiatic" being the most common. Cadet
Officer Edward Laniewski, for example, wrote:
"I decided after reading above, to fight for our
freedom and yours against Asiatic dominators of
Europe. I can't come back to Poland in present
conditions." [103J [sic]
Suspicions were confirmed at the FO when they received the
reply of 2nd Lt Dr Roman Drozd which was a not even thinly
veiled copy of Laniewski's. Even a cursory study of Polish
letters to the Foreign Office demonstrates that there must
have been some collusion and the similarity of these
letters could not have been by chance.
The Polish Press reaction was, on the whole, not as
negative as the British had feared. In a report to its
Embassy in Warsaw the Foreign Office concluded that
although the "Polish Daily" has a few references to the
Warsaw regime like "so-called Government" and "imposed on
Poland by a foreign will" the reaction had been
acceptable. As Hankey minuted in the margin of the report:
"This is probably the best that could be expected - we
shall continue to watch it." [104] The report in the
"Polish Daily" was considered to be fair as it did not
dissuade Poles from going back.
The war-diaries of Polish units show that,
officially, the reaction of the Poles was deemed as
dignified and efficient - echoing the War Office view. The
14th Armoured Brigade records that:
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"The soldiers of the Brigade, after making themselves
familiar with the text of the pamphlet accepted it
with calm and dignity" [105]
The HQ 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division was more precise:
"In general the address was accepted without
incident. The Brit. officers who were controlling
whether the address would reach all the soldiers
received a clear and unequivocal answer in that:
a! The soldiers have no confidence or certainty in
the guarantees of return or of personal security.
b/ The announced reprisals against soldiers formerly
serving in the German Army may be applied quite
arbitrarily.
C! Every soldier is liable to action against him
under the Polish Penal Code." [106]
Whereas the British tried their best to be reassuring,
positive and deliberately vague, the text that accompanied
Bevin's from the Warsaw Provisional Government was
decidedly unhelpful to the British cause. If the British
wanted the Poles to go back to Poland, and this was also
the stated aim of the Warsaw Poles, then to issue a
statement which dwelt on the fact that some repatriates
would, almost certainly, end up in prison was not best
advised.
Anders in the Polish version of his memoirs, a
version not quite so tactfully edited as "An Army in
Exile" for an English reading audience, puts down exactly
what was wrong with the message in "Keynote".
"The understanding between the British Government and
the Provisional Government of National Unity in
Warsaw, underlining the treatment for soldiers of the
Polish Armed Forces returning to their country, in
the first section dealt with a precise catalogue of
repression and punishment which might be visited upon
them. The second section gave some nebulous promise
to treat them on an equal footing to all troops in
the reborn Polish Army based on public declarations
by Bierut and Zymierski, on the addresses of the
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Provisional Government and on Orders of the Day to
celebrate various festivals. This understanding did
not have the character of a mutually binding
agreement between two governments and it was not
signed by anyone. On the document that was given to
me there was neither a date nor a place of signing."
[107]
One of the other major criticisms made by the AFHQ Interim
Report of the presentation of Bevin's declaration was:
"Pamphlet is in bad Polish". Such was the secrecy involved
in the preparation of the text, and in particular in its
translation, and such was the mistrust in which the Poles
were held that the Polish version, translated by an
Englishman, came out in a most un-Polish Polish. This, of
course, had a most negative effect of the troops:
"Sir,
As a member of the Polish forces who has received a
copy of the foreign secretary's appeal, may I suggest
that more care might have been exercised in
translating it into Polish?
It contains at least 25 errors of grammar and
syntax which do anything but sweeten a bitter pill.
One would have expected the authority in charge to
realise that the poor quality of the language in
which a historical document is couched does not
contribute to its intended effect.
L.R. Lewitter, Christ's College, Cambridge." [108]
Lewitter's letter to "1he Times", March 25th, 1946,
highlights the indignation many Poles felt at this lapse
in organisation. The poor language, per se, was not the
problem. Jerzy Potocki writes that the bad Polish made the
Poles feel that if His Majesty's Government had neglected
such an easily remedied fault as the translation of a note
then how could they have confidence in the British
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to stand by them over the more difficult	 question
of repatriation. [109]
I
Even Kuropieska, Warsaw's military attache, agreed
that the language of Bevin's text was "monstrous"
[potworny]. But worse than that it did not create a
favourable impression on Poles all round. For reasons
already mentioned it hurt the exiles but it also offended
the Poles in Warsaw who were galled at Bevin's
presumptuous nerve at guaranteeing things outside his
bailiwick. [110] Warsaw Radio, on the 21st March,
broadcast the view of the Communists:
"Minister Bevin's attitude, as defined by these
words, is misrepresenting the truth. Neither the
Yalta nor the Potsdam decisions entitle Britain or
any other power to interfere in internal Polish
matters.
We are sorry, but we will pay no attention to the
magnanimous and enigmatic gestures of the British
Foreign Minister." [FO Highlights - 111]
The Polish Armed Forces refused to take "Keynote"
seriously. Certainly some Poles were tempted to go back at
that point; most were not.
Professor Kot, the old 'ruffian' complained in Rome
that the Polish troops were not getting the message.
Perhaps Bevin had been overly vague with regards to the
future. On the 14th May, 1946 he contacted the Foreign
Office via Rome:
"From a number of conversations with officers and men
of second Polish corps I have gained the impression
that Mr Bevin's declaration was received by them as a
first step towards a solution and that they still
expect to be asked a direct question and to fill up
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and sign some kind of individual question form to be
distributed by the British Military authorities."
[112]
Bevin's appeal to the Polish troops' sense of honour,
historical tradition and patriotic duty were clearly not
enough to get the Poles to leave. There was widespread
resentment at Bevin's effrontery at telling the troops
what was in Poland's best interest and it was apparent
that there would be no mass exodus to Poland. If nothing
else worked then bribery was one idea that was still open.
On the 19th February Cavendish-Bentinck in arsaw had
put one idea to the Foreign Office which he considered
might be worth investigating:
"... a large gratuity might prove a potent incentive
to many to return, and it may be cheaper in the long
run to pay these gratuities than to have to maintain
the Poles or provide for their future." [113]
This was not a new concept as LaGuardia, when he became
the Head of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration [UNRRA], tried to reduce the chronic
problem of European refugees and Displaced Persons in
Germany by offering sixty days'ration for any Polish DP
who returned to Poland. While most did not avail
themselves of the offer; many did. [114] Although it was
an idea in embryo, the British did not attempt to pay the
Poles to return to Poland. They preferred to concentrate
on encouragement and appeal while at the same time being
deliberately vague about the options.
At the sixth meeting of the Polish Armed Forces
Committee on January 4th, 1946, where discussions were
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held	 as	 to what	 to put into Bevin's address,
Cavendish-Bentinck...:
• .said that members of the Polish Armed Forces and
their families in Poland entertained unduly
optimistic ideas about what His Majesty's Government
was prepared to do for them if they did not go back.
It was necessary to correct this. The statement
should therefore be in a frank and discouraging tone.
The men would in fact be presented with a choice of
evils."
The minutes of the meeting go on to elaborate just how
this "choice of evils" was to be put into practice for the
Poles.
"i/It should make clear the restricted scope of the Home
Secretary's offer to accept in the United Kingdom the
relations of aliens established here.
u/It should present His Majesty's Government's
interpretation of Mr. inston Churchill's "Pledge" to
the Poles.
ui/It should elaborate His Majesty's Government's policy
towards Poles who elected to remain behind indicating
the possibility that they might be able to expect no
better treatment than that accorded to stateless
persons." [115]
The original draft of the minutes included the phrase that
the Poles would be "...treated as displaced persons" but
this was later amended.
The Government put off for as long as possible any
discussion on what it was going to do for the Poles so as
not to give the wrong impression. As Bevin, quoted in
"The Times" of the 21st March, 1946, explained to the
House of Commons:
"I would like all hon. members not to encourage
members of the Polish forces to decline to go back.
(Cheers) I feel that these magnificent troops will be
such an asset to Poland in her political and
industrial reconstruction that if too much emphasis
is placed on what we will do a wrong impression may
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be caused. e are very anxious, extremely anxious,
that the Polish will return to their own country."
[116]
The British were hampered in their planning by a great
deal of uncertainty of just how many Poles they would have
to be dealing with. Although they had hoped that a great
proportion would return to Poland they had always
suspected that the numbers who did not go would be great.
On the 4th April the Ministerial Committee on Polish
Questions met to:
.direct and stimulate the search for an early
solution of the problems connected with the dispersal
of the Polish Armed Forces under British Command,
their dependents and certain Polish civilians now in
this country." [117.]
On the 20th February prior to that meeting the Committee
had tried to estimate the scope of their problem:
"We are faced with the problem not only of finding
permanent employment and places of settlement for
between one and two hundred thousand members of the
Polish Armed Forces under British command as well as
at least fifty thousand civilians many of whom are
dependents of service personnel. Recent moves on the
part of the Polish Provisional Government are likely
to have reduced our chances of persuading any
substantial number of these Poles to return to Poland
in the near future." [118]
Sir Orme Sargent's words were echoed in a reply to the
Ministry of Labour which had enquired of the FO as to how
many Poles to budget for. There was a rumour that as many
as 75% of the Poles might go back. The Foreign Office was
quick to dash such hopes. Again they wrote that the actual
numbers would depend on what was happening in Poland and
how the Warsaw regime was behaving. The first and most
obvious symbol of Warsaw's good intent would be the 'free
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and unfettered' elections that had been promised. Ihe FO
concluded:
"Our present indications are that elections are
unlikely to be free. If this is the case we cannot
expect that the rate of repatriation to Poland will
increase and it may indeed dry up altogether.
In any case, I think that we should be careful
to avoid undue optimism... I fear that we ought to
budget for 150,000 Poles for the next two years."
[119]
Once the British Government had decided to demobilise
the Polish Armed Forces events began to move quickly.
Plans were drawn up to to move all the Polish troops to
Britain - another move fraught with tension as the
reaction of the Polish troops could not be counted on. On
the 25th of May, 1946, the Head of 2nd Corps Intelligence
contacted the heads of his Intelligence stations 'C', '3',
'R', 'S' and 'Z' located over Italy to: "Report by
telegram the mood and change of mood with the new
situation of the Corps' transfer to England." [120]
The plans of shipment from Italy were set by the War
Office on the 5th June. Advance parties from all Commands
would be the first to arrive in Britain then by the
following order:
14th Armoured Brigade - 4,000 troops
2nd Armoured Division - 15,000 troops
Corps and Base Troops - 42,000 troops +
3,000 Women's Auxiliaries
3 Carpathian Rifle Div.- 19,000 troops
5 Kresowa Infantry Div.- 20,000 troops
103,000
The exact number and geographical location of the
2nd Corps in Britain is attached as appendix C but the
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total number of troops, including those already in Britain
forming the 1st Polish Corps, came to 137,000 spread over
the five Home Commands:
Scottish Command - 38,000
Northern Command - 16,000
Eastern Command - 22,000
Southern Command - 20,000
western Command - 41,000
137,000	 [121]
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CHAPTER THREE
"Góralu Czy Ci Nie Zal. -."
The Polish Armed Forces Decide.
1.
14 S
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Polish Air Force Memorial
Northolt, London.
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CHAPTER THREE
whenever Poles of a certain generation meet over a
bottle of vodka, they invariably turn to a sentimental
song that reminds them of the melancholia of exile -
a situation with which Poles are only too familiar.
"Góralu, czy ci nie al,
Odchodziá od stron ojczystych.
wierkowych lasów ± hal,
I tych potoków srebrzystych.
Góralu, czy ci nie a1?
Góralu wracaj do hal!
Góral, don't you feel sad,
To leave your own native land.
The pastures and forests of spruce,
And those silvery brooks.
Góral, don't you feel sad?
Góral return to your valley!
The "Góral" of the song, the Highlander of the Polish
Tatra mountains, looks back at his home with tears in
his eyes, knowing he will never see it again; a feeling
that generations of Poles have, all too often, had to
go through.
Polish history, dotted as it is with partitions,
revolutions and insurrections, has been the mother of
exiles and emigres; so much so that it is estimated
that there are some 15 million Poles and people of
Polish extraction living beyond Poland's borders. The
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three partitions of Poland at the end of the 18th
Century led to the emigrations of 1771, 1792 and 1794.
The Polish insurrection in 1830 led to what became
known as the "Great Emigration" [Wielka Emigracja] and
a flood of patriotic outpourings from the leading
lights of Polish culture in exile: Chopin, Mickiewicz,
SXowacki, Krasitiski and Norwid. The failed risings of
1846 and 1848 led to a fresh wave of emigration as did
the "January Insurrection" of 1863 - the year of the
so-called "Young Emigration" [M)oda Ernigracja].
The Polish Armed Forces which found themselves
under British command in Northern Europe and the
Mediterranean in 1945 were part of a long and unhappy
tradition and the dilemma that faced them had been
faced by generations of Poles before: to return to
Poland or not?
The effects of this new Polish Diaspora are
discussed in Poland today in a way that would have been
impossible fifty years ago. General Paszkowski, an
officer of the "People's" Polish Air Force writes:
"The troops of the Polish Armed Forces in the West
were not - unfortunately - permitted to fulfil
their dreams of a victorious return, in closed
ranks, to a liberated Fatherland. Thousands
remained abroad; thousands had to follow a long
and difficult road before returning to their
country - a country in which more than one of
these soldiers had to suffer the bitterness of
humiliation and undeserved suffering." [1]
In 1945, however, the arsaw authorities were not so
understanding. It served the new regime's propaganda
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purposes to paint all those who returned to Poland as
patriots and those who did not as bourgeois landowners,
'kulaks' and counter-revolutionaries with no interest
in the welfare of Poland. As one repatriate wrote:
"To return or not to return? This dilemma split
our Army into two camps. In the first rank of
those who decided to remain belonged those whom
the revolution in Poland had seized their estates
and fortunes." [2]
Many of the Poles who returned to Poland were full of
criticism of their officers - for that matter many of
the Poles who did not return were filled with the same
allegations of self-service and corruption.
"Towns were crumbling into ruins, people were
dying by the thousand, the fate of the world was
hanging on a hair yet the Poles in London were
doing everything except what they should have been
doing. The pilots were dying - let them die; brave
lads. The Army - lovely boys - was going into
battle. Orders; fine words; crosses. In the
offices where these orders were printed sat such
types - so much bickering; so much filth and
nothing else." [31
Even Colonel Kuropieska, whose writing is marked by its
very reasonableness, comments that of all the Polish
officers the worst were in Eritain. Many had been given
no command or had fallen into disfavour and had been,
as the colonel put it, "discarded" [wybrakowani]. [4]
One former Polish soldier, Jean Carrer, puts
forward a criticism that was often made by men who had
seen service with the AK in Poland and had then made
their way to London. These men...
.bitterly complained of the behaviour of even
high ranking officers in London. There was no
comparison between their comrades-in-arms in the
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ilno AK and those who surrounaed them in the
London staff. The ilno AK were filled only by
highly motivated soldiers, ready to serve and die
for their country. They did not join the AK to
receive a promotion or a salary, because neither
was given often. The London staff frequently
consisted of the people who were not fit for the
frontline service or whose motivation was to have
a good time." [5]
This criticism goes beyond a mere question of
personality. Some have gone as far as to claim a
conspiracy between the British Government and the
Polish High Command. Kazimierz Koniewski, writing in
arsaw in 1960, questioned the motives of the "London"
Poles:
"In 1945 or 1946 all of them could have returned.
They chose emigration; they gave way to the
determined propaganda of the so-called "London"
camp, members of the former Polish Government who,
disregarding the good of the country needing hands
for reconstruction and disregarding the personal
tragedy of family separation, unleashed a campaign
against the returnees stamping them as traitors.
For many families this decision to stay in
emigration has been the source of great tragedy
and a tragedy that is still alive today. It is
difficult to determine how many of those who
stayed abroad regret their decision. The "London"
politics are today finally bankrupt but its fruit
remains in the form of several thousand Poles
living in a new emigration." [6]
General Machalski, former military attach to Turkey,
was no less unequivocal in his condemnation of the
"London" camp of which he was, nominally at least, a
member. It was clear the British were having trouble
dealing with the Poles so, Machaiski alleges, they
bribed the Poles into submission.
"So they [the British] had a different idea. They
invited the elders of the Polish General Staff to
London and bought them like some negro cacique.
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For the price of a lifelong general's pension they
agreed to lay down their arms and send their
unarmed soldiers to England." [7]
Having said this there was still a desire to return to
Poland from the rank and file of the Poles - a desire
that could not be quelled by the promise of exile and a
British passport. As one Cadet Officer wrote:
"The Prime Minister Churchill wants to give us the
British citizenship after the war. I appreciate
this, but it wasn't the reason we opposed the
Germans. Whether this would mean that Mr Churchill
doesn't believe in his own word that Poland would
be really free and independent country." [8][sic]
The campaign run by the Poles who opposed
repatriation to Poland was particularly bitter and
vitriolic and, on occasion, deadly. Reactions depended
very much on the individuals approach to the events in
Poland. Linowski, for example, complained that it
created for itself...
. .a false picture of Poland expounding and
exaggerating every negative aspect associated with
the process of revolutionary change that was
taking place in the country." [9]
Mrowiec continues this theme:
"Our country was described as a Soviet training
ground in which Polish women were being raped, in
which the Polish language was being blunted and in
which churches were being turned into barracks or
'houses of immorality'. Speeches, discussions,
articles and military orders were all poisoned by
a hatred of those who in Poland were turning
castles and palaces into sanatoria and rest homes.
It has to be admitted that the cancer of doubt and
uncertainty began to eat at the heart of more than
one soldier who could not come to an independent
and objective view of the situation." [10]
The Dzierytiski Academy of Military Politics published
a similar denunciation in 1967:
- 113 -
"The Soviet Union was portrayed in the worst
possible light, usually by way of generalised
slander. So, for example, by using all available
means, the lie was spread that the Red Army,
entering Poland, was murdering old people and
children and was deporting people en masse to
Siberia or enlisting them into its ranks. With the
help of its press it published news of the alleged
raping of Polish women and, continuing the line,
of their subsequent suicides.
In the area of anti-Soviet propaganda the
propaganda bureau of the 2nd Corps was not even
surpassed by Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. The
propaganda was so acute that even the British had
to take an interest in the matter." [11]
The substance of these "lies" and "slanders" are dealt
with in the next chapter. Rutkowski is, however,
correct in saying that the British took an interest in
Polish produced propaganda and for that matter the
propaganda that was reaching the Poles from outside.
In Italy both the Germans and the Polish
Provisional Government broadcast their messages over the
airwaves to the Polish forces. This radio war became
known as the "war of the Wandas" as the German
"Radio Wanda" vied with "Radio Kociuszko", sponsored
by Wanda Wasilewska in Poland, to get its message
across. Whereas few believed the words that were
broadcast from Poland it was more difficult to ignore
the Germans. As Meichior Wankowicz, a respected
war-correspondent, admitted: although "Radio Wanda"
told a lot of lies it told a lot of truth as well,
especially about the situation in Poland. [121
This was brought to the attention of the car
Office and in April, 1944, AFFIO issued a memo to the
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Polish Base Censor to pick out any references to German
radio broadcasts liice the one from a Private in June:
"We can believe this time what says German Radio
that NKVD arrests, kills or deports the Polish
population who did not resist actively the German:
This is the truth for the Russian motto - "Who is
not with us is against us". The West is silent and
commands to be silent in order not to endanger
itself to his Ally." [l31[sic]
The Foreign Office were equally concerned to counter
this German propaganda that seemed to be having a
harmful impact on the Poles. For the troops in Italy
new short-wave bands were set up and in Scotland a new
medium-wave band was launched so that the BBC could
'explain' events in Poland. [14] The Poles had a
surfeit of information but very little could be deemed
as balanced. Ihe BBC would not say anything critical of
the Soviet Union - a fact that rankled with the Poles
and, what was worse, often expounded the Soviet
viewpoint while the British censored the Polish
military press. The Germans were rubbing salt into
Polish wounds with constant carping about Katyñ, ana
the "bloody hordes of Stalin" entering Poland - they
even had a leaflet campaign [see Appendix D] and while
the Poles secretly, and sometimes even openly, knew
much of what they were saying was true, it went against
the grain to agree with the Nazis. The Communist
broadcasts from Poland were the least convincing simply
because their message of revolution was too hostile for
its audience.
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The Polish Ease Censor picked up the comments of one
officer:
"I listen sometimes to the Russian broadcast in
Polish. They speak in such vile manner about our
government and about our political chiefs. It is
funny but I found out from the Russian news that
we Polish troops in Italy are Nazi and we don't
want to fight with the Allied troops against
Jerries." [15j[sic]
This "fascist" label that had been given to the Poles
in the West was not only inaccurate but also offensive
to the Poles, even to many who nad returned to Poland.
Bernard Newman recalls a conversation with one such
repatriated Polish soldier:
"I was captured by the Germans in Italy, got away
when they collapsed, and am now in the Polish Army
again - in Poland. It worries me - and makes me
mad - when I hear some of our bosses talking about
General Anders as a fascist. After all, he was
fighting the fascists while these people were
sitting pretty in Moscow. I fought at Tobruk and
Cassino, I suppose that is fascist?" [16)
The two principal allegations laid by Warsaw and
Moscow against the Poles in the West was that, firstly,
they did not want to fight against the Germans, as in
this article from Moscow's "Pravda" of February, 1944:
"The emigre Polish Government and its servants
wage no fight against the Germans, do not wish to
wage it and cannot wage it...
The emigre Polish Government, which includes
fascist political cheapjacks, has lost all sense
of reality. It lives in a phantom world of Hitler
mirage. It has completely severed itself from the
real Polish peoples, who are waging a relentless
struggle against the German invaders and their
Polish assistants. The London Polish political
cheapjacks have nobody to back them in Poland
except the pro-fascist agencies which are helping
the Germans, and the simpletons they have misled.
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All Poles who value Poland's honour and
independence march with the "Union of Polish
Patriots" in the USSR." [17]
The second assault on the Poles is that they actively
collaborated with pro-Nazi elements - in particular the
Chetniks in Yugoslavia. How far the Chetniks were pro-
Nazi as opposed to anti-Communist is today a moot
point, yet at the time any association with the
Mihailovich Chetniks was enough to tar the Poles with
the epithet of fascists. Colonel Sidor wrote of the
mutual co-operation between Anders and the Chetniks and
noted that after the execution of General Mihailovich
special masses were said by the chaplains of 2
Polcorps. [18] The Tito regime was not above
complaining about the Poles and its influence among the
anti-Communist opposition. It complained to the Foreign
Office in February 1946:
"The Polish Emigrants Army is in close touch with
the groups of Quisling formations, which are at
present in Italy, in particular the Ustashi (Croat
terrorists). In Italy these Quisling groups enjo
the	 material	 support	 of	 General	 Anders'
Army." [19]
The Foreign Office steadfastly refused to rise to
Belgrade's bait. Since the Yugoslays had produced no
evidence for their allegations so they had to be
discounted. Czerkawski recounts the story of BolesXaw
Rozek who was escorting war criminal Ante Pavelic to
Trieste to stand trial in Yugoslavia. Instead of
thanks, he was called a "Polish fascist from Anders'
fascist army". [20] This came as something of a culture
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shock to Rozek.
The propaganda that was issued by those advocating
non-return to Poland proved to be highly successful.
The fact that so many Poles did go back gives testimony
to the power of homesickness rather than to such Poles being
won over by the pronouncements of Warsaw. The fact that
so many Poles did not go back shows just how much fear
had been put in the minds of the individual soldier.
"Less happy, but for that more damaging, was the
propaganda designed to frighten those who wished
to return to their country. They continued to
announce through megaphones that those who went
back would be sent to the 'land of the Polar
bear'. Obviously the British wanted as many Poles
as possible to stay as their guests. The contents
of letters that were received from Poland were
varied: some encouraged return others warned
against it. As it turned out the letters of this
second category often came from the wives of
soldiers who had started new lives with other men.
At night there were lively discussions on this
subject. Some people had nervous breakdowns as a
result." [21]
Dzikiewicz, himself a repatriate, is quite wrong in his
assertion that the propaganda not to return came from
the British, in fact nothing could be further from the
truth. The point he makes about the mental anguish the
propaganda caused is, however, a valid one.
There were many reports of suicide among the
Polish Forces and among the Displaced Persons scattered
across Europe. One account from Camp Kaefertal in
Germany reports that as 1,600 Polish former POWs were
being repatriated to Poland, one of the officers took
out his revolver and shot himself. [22] Another report
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from Brazil was the case of Edward Kurdziel who had
oeen in Rio since June, 1946, out had only found a low
paid job. Kurdziel had gone to the British Embassy in
November to see the trade attache for help. As the
/
attache left the room to ring a Polish company in
Brazil, Kurdziel shot himself in the chest "in a fit of
depression and helplessness". The story made the Rio
press and was picked up by the arsaw Ministry of
Information and Propaganda who claimed, with some
accuracy, that the British were trying to keep the
whole story as quiet as possible. According to the FO
report on the event the local papers in Rio had...
". . .expressed annoyance that they were unable to
obtain full information from the Press Section of
the Police Headquarters and suggested that an
undue amount of respect was being shown for
foreign diplomatic privilege." [23]
The FO minute to the report stated: "I don't think any
action is called for. Luckily the press here has not,
so far as I know, mentioned the incident." The
conclusion was that, obviously, the man had been
"mentally unbalanced" as it was unlikely he had chosen
the embassy for his demise. Furthermore, it was not the
responsibility of the British Government to look after
the Poles once they were abroad and out of the armed
forces. The Poles "...should go to the Warsaw people
with their troubles.. .which they refused to do."
In January, 1947, the "West Sussex County Times"
ran a story that Karl Pazdziernick [sic] had been found
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hanging from a tree at Mannings Heath Golf Club.
"Evidence as given that he was worried at not being
able to rejoin his wife in Germany." [24]
Despite the mental anguish the propaganda caused,
it continued unabated. The disillusioned Gen. Machalski
continues:
"Gen. Anders, for whom there was no road to
Poland, had seen his world turn upside-down so he
commenced a hysterical propaganda against
returning home. Sick people who had volunteered
for repatriation were brutally thrown out of
hospital, the healthy were isolated in special
camps, the infected had to be separated. This
violent propaganda had its results as a sizeable
number of soldiers decided against returning."
[25]
Reading the official pronouncements from the General
Staff today they do not appear unreasonable. Certainly
they appealed to the soldiers' sense of patriotism and
sense of history, General Sosnkowski, the former Polish
C-in-C, said in a speech:
"What have the Poles been dying for the last five
years? In whose name have the rivers of our blood
covered the ground in Italy? The Carpathian and
Kresowa Divisions, the Lwowska Brigade and the
Wilenska Brigade.... They did not think of
themselves or about some internal quarrel when
they fell like corn cut with a scythe. They were
faithful and modest soldiers whom death had made
equal. They died with the name of the Fatherland
on their lips and with a faith in its future.[...J
They died, as die other soldiers in Poland and
abroad, for all of Poland and the future of Poland
decided by Polish hands on the Polish land." [26]
General Rudnicki in his Order of the Day on the 6th
July, 1945, also made a patriotic appeal to his men
after he became GOC 1st Armoured Division:
"Our duty as the Polish occupation Division on
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German soil, uncer Allied command, will be
accomplished with loyalty and honour. e will one
day return to Poland, but only with arms in our
hands - to the Poland whom we have dreamt about
during the last five years of the war. Poland
truly free and independent. We will return to wipe
the tears of our women and children, and to ensure
that law and justice, and not foreign domination,
will reign in Poland.
We will never give up our struggle to free
Poland and all the other enslaved nations, and we
will live up to our traditional motto, "For your
freedom and ours". In this struggle we shall not
be alone. Polish soldiers! This is our position,
our will, and our decision." [27]
General Anders, the bane of the Foreign Office, was the
man most associated with the anti-return campaign. His
pronouncements that Poland was under a foreign
occupation did little to enhance his popularity with
the British but it was the message many Polish troops
wanted to hear. Anders' warning to his subordinates was
reproduced in the War Diary of the 13 Battn, 5 Kresowa
Division:
"Among us we may still find some tired people,
some people who are weak, who do not feel they
have the strength to go with us on our journey
which must eventually lead to victory but will
still present us with more than one problem. We
will not keep anyone in our army by force" General
Anders underlines in all his speeches that anyone
who volunteers for repatriation to Poland must be
either physically or mentally ill because no one
else would willingly return to Poland under a
foreign government. We do not want sick people
amongst us. In our particular situation the value
of an army is judged more by the quality of its
men rather than the number and General Anders does
not want any soldier who returns to Poland and
then meets some miserable fate to be able to say
that he had not been warned in time by his
Commanding Officer. The General further states
that from the moment our erstwhile colleague
volunteers for return and he is sent off to the
Allied transit camp the General would take no
further responsibility for his fate.
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Our newest colleagues who came to us, throwing
away their German uniforms, were recognised and
are continued to be recognised as good Poles.
To the Soviet authorities they will be,
above all, "fascists", "Volksdeutsche", "Spies",
"deserters", etc. etc. We know from personal
experience what the Soviet authorities do with
those who are inconvenient to them.
If anyone thinks they will return to Poland and
see their family and then find themselves in the
heart of Russia let them have no pretensions to
us." [28]
Another of Anders' warnings read:
"We considered and continue to consider them as
good Poles. e will not stop them from taking this
step. They have a free decision to either stay
with us or to go where terror reigns to be
persecuted by a foreign occupation." [29]
As a 'them and us' situation developed, so it
threatened to spiral out of control. Some of the less
political Generals recognised that the group that
gained the label of "Communists" were in serious
danger. General Sosabowski, former GOC Polish Parachute
Brigade, writes that the title of "Communists" came not
only from the rank and file but from certain officers.
The relationship between these officers and the future
repatriates became so bad that it often became
necessary to separate them. [30]
The Warsaw authorities were well aware of what was
happening in the Polish camps but were powerless to
intervene. warsaw's Military Missions constantly
complained about the attitude of those Poles who did
not want to return to Poland and of their treatment
towards those who did. One report states:
"Today this soldier - this	 faithless one
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[sprzeniewierca] - to his commanders and to his,
up to this point, friends; to his comrades in arms
with whom he shared the pain of battle at Monte
Cassino and Falaise, at Tobruk and Narvik, has
become a leper. Because he is returning to his
country he has at once stopped being a
patriot." [31)
Lt Proczka, another of Warsaw's men in Italy, wrote to
his superiors complaining about the treatment of
possible repatriates in DP camps at Barletta and Trani
that were run by the Polish 2nd Corps. Men from the
Corps were using pressure to discourage return. In
particular, posters had been put up all over the camp
showing a mouse in Italy looking at a mousetrap in
Poland. Since the camp had been "hermetically sealed
off" by Anders' men, only their views were being put
forward. Proczka also complained that the UNRRA camp at
Ban and the repatriation camp at Reglo Emilia were
also under the influence of Anders. He complained that
special hitsquads' were coming from Bologna and Modena
to work on those who might be wavering. [32]
Zygmunt Boger, a Pole who had served in the German
Army and found himself under pressure in his POW camp,
recounts:
"Every Saturday, between 10 and 12 in the morning
we would form a horseshoe on the barrack parade
ground and a jeep with a megaphone would drive up
and someone from Anders' army would speak to us.
He would tell us that there was no use in us
thinking about returning to Poland, that Poland
was a subject country dependent on the Soviet
Union...." [33]
The theme that Poland was a vassal state to Moscow was
hotly denied by Warsaw's people. Dr Prawin, head of the
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Polish Mission in Berlin, told representatives of the
British FO that he thought it was undesirable for the
British "...to treat Poland as [a) mere adjunct of the
Soviet Union". To which Hankey minuted: "Cordially
support his last point." [34] This, not surprisingly,
was not a view shared by Anders:
"Our country, deprived of the rights of speech,
looks towards us. It wishes to see us in the land
of our ancestors - to that end we are striving and
longing from the bottom of our hearts - but it
does not want to see us as slaves of a foreign
force: It wants to see us with our banners flying
as forerunners of true freedom.
As such a return is impossible today, we must
wait in closed and disciplined ranks for a
favourable change of conditions." [35]
Anders was well aware of the unusual position he and
his soldiers found themselves in. The post-war paradox
was that while all the other armies in the world were
anxiously awaiting demobilisation, the Poles wanted to
keep their forces intact [36], although some did find
the situation rather perplexing. Edmund Thielmann
relates his feelings at the situation he was in:
"The war was long over and still our position was
unclear. The emigre propaganda did everything it
could to create confusion and doubt in our minds
so as to impede our making a decision about
returning to Poland. We were disorientated.
- What do you think about the growth in the number
of soldiers? - I asked Ireneusz.
- Someone has to keep the Japanese down. Don't
worry yourself, Polish cannon-fodder is still
valuable - he answered." [37]
Thielmann could not understand why the Polish forces
were being upgraded - for example the 2nd Armoured
Brigade was raised to a Division and the 14th Armoured
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Brigade was brought into service. It all seemed very
strange to him. Eventually Thielmann volunteered for
repatriation and went bacic to Poland.
There was a darker side to the campaign against
returning to Poland. Those who volunteered often had to
suffer the indignity of being ostracised by their
comrades. Tadeusz Kochanowicz writes that after he had
made his decision to return he was told that no one
would have anything to do with him and he would be
treated like a man infected with gonorrhoea. [38] The
fact that men volunteering to go back to Poland had to
sit at separate tables so as not to "infect" others was
a minor inconvenience compared to the reports of men
being attacked after requesting repatriation. Mrosiec
reports that a group of these "excommunicated" soldiers
were being driven by road from San Basilia to the
Cervinara repatriation camp when, on a certain bend in
a mountain pass, the driver jumped out of the vehicle
leaving it to plummet over the edge. [39) Many soldiers
decided it would be safer to wait until the 2nd Corps
was brought to the UK before requesting repatriation.
At least in Britain the matter would not be so
dependent on the largesse of the "Anders clique".
Although Mrowiec has few kind words to say about his
Polish commanders, he gives grudging praise to the
British saying: "It has to be admitted, however, that
the British authorities looked after us with great care
- 125 -
and equipped us well for our return to Poland."
One of the popular metaphors used at the time to
address the issue of repatriation was that of a railway
Journey. Nowakowski, in his "At the railway stop" [Na
Przystanku], explained that, whereas some Poles would
be catching the train back to Poland, most would not
and would have to wait at the station. Maybe one day
their train would arrive. [40]
The commemorative album of the Polish Parachute
Brigade continues this theme:
"Our mutual road, the road we have all followed to
a free Poland, remains the same - only we will no
longer travel it together. Some will return to
Poland sooner, others later. Each of us will
decide, according to his own conscience, when the
right moment to return is. [...]
Those who leave us now will leave us as
brothers. We will shake hands, thank each other
for our mutual effort and look in each others
eyes. This open look will confirm our complete
mutual respect. The aim that binds us in our
separation remains the same: A free and
independent Fatherland." [41]
The pronouncements from the Parachute Brigade are
typical of the style emanating from the Polish Forces
in Germany - a style less extreme than those in Italy.
The 1st Armoured Division had not been through the
Soviet prison system like so many in the 2nd Corps and
so viewed the Soviet Union in a different light. Even
Warsaw's Academy of Military Politics recognised the
difference:
"It must be said that despite the grief at losing
the land in the east, and in contrast to the
Polish Second Corps, the 1st Armoured Division
still considered that the Germans were Enemy
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Number One - although the USSR was also regarded
as an enemy. Regardless of this, however, there
was no special anti-Soviet Campaign in the 1st
Armoured Division." [42]
General Sosabowski, one of the more moderate members of
the Polish High Command, tried to reassure volunteers
for repatriation that they were not the pariah some
would make out:
"Lads - There seems to have been a
misunderstanding here. Who doesn't want to return
home? We all want and desire this - those who go
back now, and those who have decided not to go
back yet. Its just like passengers waiting for a
train. Some - that's you, want to be off at all
costs on the first available train and
some - your comrades, have yet to decide which
train to take." [43]
Despite	 the	 masses	 of	 propaganda	 and
counter-propaganda that was floating about at the end
of the war, most Polish soldiers knew whether they were
going to return to Poland or not - the information
provided by senior officers only served to confirm
certain opinions.
The opinion not to go back to Poland was viewed
with some sympathy by "The Economist" of August 1946:
"In fairness to them [the Poles) it must be said
that their experience is sufficient comment on
Mr Bevin's declaration of March 10 [sic - 20th] in
which he said that it was the "duty" of the Polish
exiles to return and that a Polish memorandum,
which no Polish Minister had even troubled to
sign, was a sufficient guarantee for their
personal safety. [...]
No promises made by, or on behalf of, the
Polish Government can inspire confidence as long
as the political police, whether Soviet or Polish
Communist, remain a law to themselves. In March of
last year the Polish Underground leaders who were
given a formal safe conduct by General Ivanov were
nevertheless	 arrested	 on	 arrival	 at	 his
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headquarters. After such examples of treachery the
Polish exiles do not believe in any assurances
which come from varsaw." [44]
This scepticism was a view shared by thousands of
Poles; good faith was a commodity in short supply.
Bernard Newman met one Pole who explained why he had
not returned to Poland:
"You cannot picture it," said one man. "I was in
a lumber camp in North Russia, almost in rags. You
can guess the winter conditions. We were worked
shockingly hard on a minimum of food. One day I
said to a Russian officer who appeared friendly:
"But why do you treat us like this? In your own
interests you should feed us, so that we can work
properly." He replied: "Why should we? We have
tried out the system: at the present rate you will
last for about five years. Then you will be used
up, but there are plenty more where you come
from!" Are you surprised to find that I don't want
to go back to serve the remainder of my five
years?"" [45)
MieczysXaw Stelmaszytiski was another Pole who had his
reasons for not returning to Poland - he had nowhere to
return to:
"Remember! That was our problem! To return to our
country or to continue our wanderings. We received
all sorts of horrific information from Poland
- it was destroyed, burnt down. This played no
small role. There was other information. That the
Polish authorities of the time had completely
subordinated themselves to the Soviets.
Information about the arrests and deportations to
the Gulag - in particular the soldiers of the
Home Army. Wilno and Lwów had been taken
away from us at Yalta. Many people had nowhere to
return to; just like me. [...]
Some, paying no attention to anything, departed
for Poland. Others preferred to wait, just in case
the Third World War did break out, and yet others
emigrated to the USA, Canada, Australia. The
English were chasing the Poles out to Poland and
our people considered those who went as traitors
to the Fatherland! That's the way it was." [46]
Jean Carrer explained his reason for not returning:
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"One of the biggest human tragedies was that these
people who dreamed to return to Poland and join
their families, when pressed to go back by the
British Government were reluctant or refused to
return. It is doubtful that anyone can describe
this irony of fate, as it is impossible to
describe hunger, love or hatred unless one is
affected by such feelings. Next door to my
quarters lived several officers. It was
heartbreaking to see their internal fight. They
all asked themselves the same questions. If they
decided to stay in England, they would never see
their beloved country and family; if they
returned, they would be arrested or would not get
any work. In both these cases instead of a help to
their families they would become liabilities to
them and would require their support in the form
of parcels to a prison or another mouth to be fed.
[...] They decided to wait. It seemed to others
that compared to them I did not have any serious
problems. My wife was with me and expecting a
child soon. I did not have to ask myself the
Shakespearian question: "to be or not to be" or,
in any case, "to return to Poland or not to
return." It was clear to me that I could not
return and I did not have any intention of giving
myself up to certain death after a successful
escape just one year ago." [47]
Much of the propaganda against returning to Poland
dwelt on the fact that it was the duty of 'patriotic'
Poles not to return - they were expected to wait and
fight against the Communist take-over in Poland.
Couched in the terms of an idealistic crusade, the
'wait and see' gained credibility. Janusz Krajewski
remained unconvinced, contending that he had not stayed
in Britain from any idealistic motive - the idealists
were, in fact, the ones who went back to Poland to help
in reconstruction - and he freely admitted that he did
not go back to Poland from fear.
The fear of returning was an overwhelming barrier
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that would prevent thousands from returning. Another
Polish soldier who did not go back explains:
"hat was I to do? Grim news reached us from the
homeland. Everyday newspapers and radio broadcast
news of the terror in Poland, of the waves of
arrests, court cases, sentences. Those who made
their way from Poland added new snippets and
career gossips magnified each small detail until
they achieved the grandest proportions. Drop by
drop the poison of fear which remained from Italy
took hold. Nobody then was in a position to
establish how much truth there was in all this and
how much rumour. Everyone believed the worst. In
our situation the rallying cry, "Return! The
homeland is being rebuilt and needs your
help" - far from reaching our hearts, missed its
aim.
I turned down then the chance of returning to
Poland, as did thousands of others. I became an
emigrant out of fear!" [49]
According to Nicholas Bethell it was not a fear of
death that frightened the Poles from returning to
Poland but rather it was the hopelessness of opposition
to the Soviets and their acolytes. Indeed the soldiers
who refused to return were, in general, the bravest
troops in the Polish Forces who had been with the
colours for the longest. During the war the Nazis had
murdered millions yet there was hope - the Poles knew
that sooner or later the Nazis would be gone and it was
more a question of surviving in the meantime. The
Soviet Army was a different proposition altogether.
According to Bethell the west had "effectively
abandoned Poland. There was no hope of Poland being
'liberated' from Stalinism." [50]
"The Economist" of August, 1946, took up the same
theme:
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"The Polish exiles are "non-repatriable" on the
principle that a burnt child dreads the fire. This
is not cowardice; the soldiers of Poland have
demonstrated many times over that they do not fear
death in battle. But they see no cause to face
death without battle and without prospects of
victory." [51]
Jerzy Lerski was a member of the Polish SOE who had
parachuted into occupied Poland during the war to
contact the underground and had made his way to the UK
again. No one could accuse him of being a coward and
yet he too did not return to Poland after the war.
Although Lerski knew how to risk his life he had no
intention of throwing it away. [52]
Many of the Poles took it upon themselves to tell
the British authorities just why they were refusing to
return to Poland and many wrote to Bevin directly at
the Foreign Office. One artillery colonel wrote:
"I trust the opportunity of returning to Poland
will occur again. I will crawl back to Poland on
all fours, when it is vacated by the NKVD, the Red
Army and Messrs. BIERUT, ZYMIERSKI, RADKIEICZ,
ETC."
Another soldier wrote:
"I will accept anything that happens to me, but I
don't want to fall for a second time into the
hands of Communist liberators."
Szczepan Sadieski wrote to Bevin saying:
"We know, as well as you know, that there is
neither freedom of the press or freedom of speech
there. We know, from eyewitnesses returning from
Poland, of the mass disappearance of people for no
reason. You persuade us to return to that sort of
Poland! No, Sir! A hundred times, no!" [53]
The War Office also had a good insight into the minds
of the Polish troops. At the end of July, 1944, the
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Polish Base Censor noted these comments from on.
sergeant:
"1 will never go back to Poland if she is under
Russian control because I don't want to be in the
Red Russian Paradise. It is better to die than to
go there. Really I don't know what I shall do
after the War."
Another officer wrote:
"There is no return for us to the Soviet republic
of Poland which seems to be the newest invention
of our Allies. Those who know Russia from
newspapers only or from propaganda don't realise
that the life under the Soviet regime is not for
civilised people." [54]
General Anders gave an interview to the former Mayor of
New York and the then head of UNRRA, LaGuardia, in
which he frankly outlined his views on why Poles were
not returning to Poland:
LaGuardia: why don't your soldiers want to return to
Poland?
Anders: Poland is under Soviet occupation. The
soldiers of the 2nd Corps know Russia very
well since up to 60% of my men have been
through the prisons and camps of the USSR.
LaGuardia: If the Polish Provisional Government gave
the Allies a guarantee that any returning
soldier would in no way be persecuted would
many of them volunteer for return?
Anders: Today none of the troops believe in the
pledges of either Poland or Russia. Not one
commitment and not one pledge had been
upheld by the Russians - not even Stalin's
personal assurances to me. What then can
Warsaw's guarantees be worth when they are
so dependent on Moscow? [...]
LaGuardia: Your soldiers are, of course, good Poles and
all of them, I am sure, would like to live
in Poland rather than wandering around the
world. To work in the reconstruction of the
country and to change the regime it would be
necessary to return to Poland and to
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influence the current of political life. Do
I understand the situation correctly?
Anders: e are all waiting for the moment when we
can return - but return to Poland and not a
Soviet puppet. ve will return when the
Russian Army leaves Poland. In the Corps 1
have soldiers of the most varied faiths:
Catholics (the majority), Uniates, Orthodox,
Jews and Muslims. Nearly 75% of their number
are workers and peasants. Everyone could,
and can still, go back but at this present
moment yet they all know that they would not
return to a free country or a normal life.
The majority would end up in prison camps or
in Siberia. Any influence in political life
or in economic life is as impossible in
Poland as it is in Russia." [55]
Anders became known as the arch anti-Communist yet he
apologised to no one for his opinions. He was asked by
the italian paper "Voce Adriatica" why his soldiers
went around Italy pulling down all the "Long Live
Stalin"	 posters,	 to which Anders replied:	 "To
understand that you had to have been there...." [56]
As well as the pressure from within the military
establishment from senior officers and from colleagues,
there was the pressure from friends and family in
Poland.	 Foster Anderson visited Poland in 1946 and
asked some members of the soldiers' families for
messages to take back with him regarding the return of
their relatives. "What shall I say to your son?' he
asked one mother; ""Tell him I want to see him." "You
will do no such thing," snapped the daughter, "it would
be madness for him to return and you know that
mother."" [57] The war and the political situation
afterwards	 split families and it was the troops with
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families in Poland that felt the misery of exile most
acutely. As Mrowiec wrote:
"For years nostalgia had been gnawing at us and a
million times on our distant path of war we had
thought of our mothers, or wives and our children.
In our dreams we visited our homes and asked
ourselves if our dearest were alive or if they haa
anything to eat - we never received an answer:
Anyone who doesn't understand this will never
understand the most worthy impulse that inclined
us to return." [58]
The political divide separated the families of even the
most powerful in Poland. The Commander of the Polish
Armed Forces in the East, Poland's Minister of Defence,
Marshal Zymierski had, according to Kuropieska, tw'o
brothers who served in the best - StanisXaw who was in
London and Józef who was in Palestine with an armoured
unit. [59]
There were, of course, families who said they
wanted their relatives to come back to Poland from
exile. Foster Anderson met the son of a colonel and
asked his usual question of whether he should tell him
to return to Poland. The son's first piece of advice
was that his father should not get mixed up in 4migr
politics as it would permanently damage his chances of
returning to Poland. As to the return the son's answer
was:
"Yes. I cannot bear to think of him as an migr
exiled from Poland. That is no life for an old
man. If he were young and without a family that
would be another matter. He could build up his
life abroad. But he is old and he is too Polish to
do that.'
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Anderson asked the son if he worried about his father
being arrested or imprisoned:
""i Go not know anyone returning having been sent
to Siberia."
"That does not answer my question."
Again silence. Then the youth burst out: "My
mother wants him back. He may have got into his
head that hopeless idea of Anders' that Polish
officers must become crusaders and cut themselves
off from their families so as not to be weakened
in their resolve."
"Crusade for what?" I asked.
"The freedom of Poland."" [60]
Another soldier who received a letter from home was
Edmund Thielmann who in March, 1947, got a letter from
his mother asking him when he was coming home. He
describes his reasoning for returning home:
"I can't put it off any longer. Its time to make a
decision.... Am I to join the PRC and cut myself
off from everything that has been important to me
up to now and in the name of which the account of
wrongs had been evened? No, I can't do that. It
would mean renouncing my national identity....
- Colonel, I would like to report that I am
returning to Poland!
- I wish you well - the commander of the regiment
shook my hand and smiled sorrowfully... He had
signed himself up for a course in tailoring. I
felt sorry for the old soldier." [61]
Jan Podoski, who returned to Poland on a
fact-finding mission for UIRRA with three tons of
penicillin, was told by Cardinal Sapieha that although
there would be bad times ahead, as many Poles as
possible should return. This, notes Podoski, was not
what his senior commanders wanted to hear and he was
treated with scepticism and his popularity within his
unit fell to zero. [62]
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Karol Popiel was one of the Poles who agreed with
Bevin that his patriotic duty was in Poland:
"The reader who is used to the emigre slogans may
say that this was probably naive or an agreement
to the Yalta accord. No. It is simply an admission
of the unquestionable fact that the mainstream of
national life runs along the WisRa and Odra. it
is there that the nation examines the worth of its
politicians. Above all the country wants to see in
its leaders people who are ready to run risks
alongside the nation." [63]
ladeusz Czerkawski was one of the few frontline
officers from the 2nd Corps who returned to Poland. He
seems to have been swayed by the changes that had
occurred in the country. He writes that the men of his
artillery regiment were all cheered up when an AK Major
informed them that it was unthinkable that Poland would
revert back to its pre-war way of doing things.
According to the Major the people had turned very
Leftist. [64] Although, if left to its own devices,
Poland might have turned to the political Left after
the war - just as Britain had - there was little
support for the type of government thrust upon Polana
under Soviet auspices, hence few Polish troops returned
home to support the 'revolution'. Most Polish soldiers
were not concerned with the political polemics
occurring around them. Tadeusz Kochanowicz's main fear
was of spending the rest of his life as an exile in
Britain and, as such, made the only decision possible -
he returned to Poland. [65]
- 136 -
In the Autumn of 1945, the British began to move
the question of repatriation at a faster pace and asked
the members of the Polish Armed Forces to volunteer for
return. According to Kuropieska, 37,497 elected to go
to Poland in this 'plebiscite'. The areas of operations
that the volunteers came from were:
United Kingdom	 23,000
Italy/Middle East 14,000
Germany	 400
Polish Air Force	 57
Polish Navy	 40
Or, expressed as percentages of the total force in that
area, the numbers were:
United Kingdom	 38.8%
Italy	 10.8%
Middle East	 6.0%
Germany	 1.2%	 [66]
This represented a total of 17.2% of the total number
of Poles serving under British command.
The War Office strongly denied that they had ever
organised a 'plebiscite' among the Poles but, after a
question from Vice—Admiral Taylor in the Commons, the
Government admitted the numbers who had volunteered for
return. There were only slight variations from
Kuropieska 's figures:
United Kingdom	 33.0%
BAOR [Germany]
	
1.0%
AFHQ [Italy]
	
14.0%
MEF [Middle East] 4.5%
From a total of 207,000 troops, there had been 37,060
volunteers for repatriation or 17.9% of the total. [67]
The figures for the Polish Navy and Air Force were even
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less encouraging. According to an October, 1945, FO
report to Hankey, then working in the British Embassy
in arsaw, from 4,000 naval personnel, only 30 to 40
had offered to return. From a total of 17,000 Polish
Air Force personnel, only 57 men had volunteered - 50
'other ranks' and 7 officers of which only one was a
Flying Officer. [68]
The Polish Forces tried to breakdown the figures
to make sense of them and to establish who it was who
was volunteering. The "Soldiers Daily" from the 19th
December, 1945, proudly announced that the soldiers who
declared themselves for repatriation in the 2nd Corps
were not the soldiers who had been at Tobruk and
Monte Cassino. By December, 1945, there were 14,207
Poles in Cerviriara Repatriation Centre awaiting return.
	
CORPS TROOPS : BASE TROOPS :	 TOTAL
Officer - O/R : Officer - O/R : Officer - O/R
	
At Cervinara: 3
	
4,660 :	 4	 9,540 :	 7	 14,200
Of whom the following declared prior to 8th May, 1945:
	
3	 2,600 :	 4	 2,900 :	 7	 5,500
Of these 5,500 'other ranks' 4,610 (83.81%) had
formerly been in the German Army, 580 (10.54%) had been
recruited from France, Italy and other areas. Of the
men who had been with the Corps since the evacuation
from the USSR, only 310 (5.63%) volunteered to go back
to Poland.
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A different breakdown of the figures were those
who had seen action and those ho had not:
Infantry
Cava iry
Armour
Artillery
Sappers
Signals
Military Police
Supply/'Iransport
Stores
Engineers
Medical Services
870
65
20
265
100
35
5
130
10
	
40	 Not in Action
	
160	 with the Corps
	
1,700	 (30.90%)	 3,800 (69.09%)
5,500
[69j
General Anders commented on these figure with some
pride. He felt that the men of his army - the "Anders
Army" - had not let him down. In "An Army in Exile" he
wrote:
"It is significant that out of the 112,000 in the
II Polish Army Corps at the end of 1945, only
seven officers and 14,200 men applied for
repatriation, 8,700 being men who had joined after
the end of hostilities. Of those who had come with
us from Russia, and had been with the Corps
throughout the campaign, only 310 applied for
repatriation. Two things exerted a great influence
on the men in deciding them not to go home. First,
was the considerable number of soldiers who, after
repatriation, fled from Poland and found their way
through Czechoslovakia and Germany back to Italy,
where they gave the men eye-witness accounts of
events in the home country. Second was the
significant wording of the letters sent back to
Italy." [70]
There has yet to be a definitive study of the
Polish Forces and how many soldiers returned to Poland
from any particular unit, however, the ar Diaries of
the larger formations do give some indication of how
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the detachments were thinking. The diarist to
Reconnaissance Platoon, 5 Battn, 2nd Brigade, 3rd
Carpathian Div. noted with pride that after Bevin's
"Keynote" campaign, not one soldier volunteered for
repatriation, [71] a fact also noted by 4 Company, 4
Battn, of the 2nd Brigade. [72] Bevin's words seemed to
be having little effect among the frontline troops in
Italy. This was not a universal phenomenon - the 3rd
Battn of the Polish Parachute Brigade saw a marked
increase in repatriation after "Keynote". The unit size
was 40 officers and 414 men and the diary notes the the
number of troops who volunteered for repatriation:
Officer:Other Ranks
24 January	 1946 -	 15
3 April	 1946 -	 74
6 May	 1946 -	 18
16 July	 1946 -	 1 /
	
0
5 August	 1946 -	 8
19 August	 1946 -	 1 /
	
6
	
16 September 1946 -
	 1
12 October	 1946 -	 21
18 October	 1946 -	 6
24 March	 1947 -	 1 /
	
10
	
==========-	 [73]
3/	 159
The biggest jump in the figures came in April, 1946,
just two weeks after Bevin's note was handed out. The
7th Workshop Company of 7 Division, a reserve unit that
only came into existence at the end of the war, did not
see a corresponding rise in March, 1946. The biggest
move to Poland came in August, 1945, as 137 men
returned to Poland - this was the best part of the
unit's establishment. The unit was quickly brought up
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to strength but in September a further 105 left and
December saw another 13 go. By the start of 1946, most
of the soldiers who were likely to go to Poland had
already left so that by Bevin's March appeal only a
further four volunteered. The next move to repatriation
came in December, 1946, just after the creation
of the Resettlement Corps. The unit had been brought to
the UK in July, 1946, and the complement of the company
was 10 Officers and 148 men - of this number nine
officers and only 66 men joined the PRC. Six men went
to Germany and three became PRC 'recalcitrants', the
rest returned to Poland. [74) These results from a
non-combatant unit were fairly typical in the Army. New
units did not have the esprit de corps of others - when
7 workshop Company disbanded, only 24 soldiers had been
with the unit for over two years. The 14 Armoured
Brigade, also formed at the end of the war, reported a
serious drain on its manpower. By the end of August,
1945, there had been 335 declarations for return from
among NCOs and 'other ranks' - this amounted to 9.6% of
the Brigade; within this number, however, there were
glaring differences across the board. 20% of the
Signals Company returned to Poland, 32.8% of the
Service Company returned and the Materials Park lost
43.5% of its troops. The report highlights the case of
army cooks who seemed particularly prone to returning
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to Poland - 14 Service Company had no cooks left in its
ranks. [75]
The 65th Pomeranian Infantry Battalion, formed in
January, 1945, also showed that these new units were
more likely to return than the more established ones.
The unit was formed in January yet on the 27th July,
1945, one officer and 154 'other ranks' returned to
Poland. The numbers were quickly made up so that when
the unit was moved to the UK its strength stood at 817
men yet, even here, a further 310 soldiers returned to
Poland rather than join the PRC. [76]
The opening of the PRC list seemed to give a
certain impetus to the undecided about whether to
return or not. No.1 Battery, 5 Wilenski Field Artillery
Regiment had a total strength of 68 gunners. In April,
1946, seven returned to Poland from Italy just after
Bevin's "Keynote". On the 16th September the unit was
moved to the UK in preparation for joining the
Resettlement Corps. The list for the PRC opened on the
13th January, 1947, and exactly a week before, 25 Poles
volunteered to return. [77]
Some of the longer-standing military units did not
show these returns en masse but rather a steady trickle
over the two years in question. The 3rd Heavy Machine
Gun Company of 3 Battalion, 3rd Carpathian Division had
an establishment of 166 men; the returns to Poland
here:
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18th December 1945 : 6
15th January 1946 : 6
18th February 1946 : 3
19th April	 1946 : 1
8th October 1946 : 5
1st November 1946 : 11
14th November 1946 : 13
18th November 1946 : 7
26th November 1946 : 14
30th January 1947 : 1
12th February 1947 :2
69
A further 14 stayed in Italy to go on to Canada and
five stayed in Italy to marry Italians. Even in this
unit, although the returns were on-going, the biggest
rise in repatriation came in November, 1946, as 45 men
decided to leave at that point once the unit had been
brought to the UK. [78]
These figures are largely confirmed by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sarsaw who published the
figures for the return to Poland from 1945 to 1949:
WINTER	 SPRING	 SUMNER	 AUTUMN
1945	 --	 --	 --	 12,100
1946	 22,500	 5,800	 3,100	 7,000
1947	 6,300	 25,200	 9,200	 8,600
1948	 3,000	 1,600	 500 in 2nd ½ of year
1949	 Around 1,000 in the whole year
The end of 1945 and start of 1946 saw the first flurry
of repatriation as those who were going to go went home
regardless of events in Poland. Then, even after
Bevin's advice in the Spring of 1946, the rush died to
a steady flow until the Polish Armed Forces were
brought to Britain. As the prospect of joining the PRC
loomed ahead of the Poles, so another mass move to
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repatriation began in the Spring of 1947 and the
soldiers who returned after that were those who became
disillusioned with life in the UK. The total figures
for return to Poland were:
1945 - 12,100
1946 - 38,400
1947 - 49,300
1948 - 5,100
1949 - 1,000
=======	 [ 79 1
105,900
As of the 1st November, 1947 the total strength of
the Polish Army and Navy in the west had been reduced
by about a half. Its strength stood at 67,263.
TOTAL: 1/8/1945 - 216,379
+
Recruited after -
	 6,914
223,293
Repatriated to Poland 	 - 101,056
+
Repatriated to other countries -
	 7,172
+	 minus
Emigrated to third countries
	 - 14,218
+
Enlisted in the PRC	 - 30,886
	
153,332	 153,332
69, 961
Other Losses 2,698
67,263
of which: In Great Britain : In Other Areas:
Officers	 13,016	 654
Other Ranks	 46,983	 2,426
women's Army	 3,852	 332
	
63,851	 +	 3,412	 = 67,263
[80]
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The other major body of Poles who were trying to
decide whether to go back to Poland or not was General
Pruger-Ketling's 2nd Infantry Division that had spent
the war interned in Switzerland. After the collapse of
the French Army in 1940, the Division that had been
fighting under French command had crossed the Swiss
border rather than fall into German hands. In 1945,
however, their problem was the same as beset the rest
of the Polish military - to return or not?
The Warsaw repatriation authorities took a great
deal of interest in the fate of the 2nd Division with
its 3,618 men. A report from the 7th November, 1945,
found that 1,848 had expressed the desire to go to
France to live - many in fact were Poles who had been
living in France before 1939. 686 Poles were either on
courses in Switzerland or would not be returning to
Poland come what may, and some 1,084 would vote to
return. Pruger-Ketling had the idea of settling his men
as a body in the newly acquired areas of Silesia and,
in particular, the town of KXodzko, formerly German
Glatz. Indeed, to that end he established a Temporary
Settlement Commission and found 486 men to join him.
[81] As well as the soldiers, there were a further
1,700 Polish civilians in Switzerland who also had the
same difficult decision to make. A report from Warsaw
highlights the situation of these Poles:
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"1/ The group of committed opponents to the new
order in Poland are not numerous but are well
organised and serve the former Government in
London. They have at their disposal certain
financial resources and have connections in the
world of Swiss business. They publish a newspaper
- Paszkwil [lampoon] which is presumably
subscribed to in Germany and Italy. The group is
recruited from amongst the intelligentsia and the
pseudo-intelligentsia. Their impact is, however,
limited. Their range of activity in this territory
is small.
2/ The undecided group is partly being influenced
by 'London' propaganda. They will decide to return
when the repatriation is organised and when
communications with their families are more secure
(letters, etc.)
3/ The largest group is those who have decided to
return. On the whole this element is very healthy
and positive. 97% of the civilians arriving here
from Germany before the end of the war, and 60% of
the 2nd Infantry Division belong to this group.
4/ The old emigres who in part look favourably on
the New Poland have no intention of returning to
Poland due to the nature of the economy and to
private life." [82]
These 'Swiss' Poles at least had the option of
returning to their homes - few came from eastern Poland
that was now part of the Soviet Union - but another
group of Poles who had had their homes taken away from
them were the 'Czech' Poles. After the First World War,
the Czechs had overrun the Zaolzie area of Poland with
its largely Polish population and, following the Munich
agreement in 1938, the Poles re-occupied the area much
to the delight of the locals. Poles from the towns of
Cieszyn and Frysztat who were in the West were faced
with the dilemma of returning to their homes and
becoming Czech citizens or resettling in Poland.
According to Kuropieska, this problem affected nearly
2,000 troops. The problems were compounded by the poor
- 146 -
relations at the time between the Polish and Czech
Governments [83] as each made territorial claim and
counter-claim. The Warsaw Government did not help the
issue by giving unclear advice to its charges. Polish
Foreign Minister Modzelewski, during a visit to London
in January, 1946, advised the Zaolzie Poles to put off
making a decision about return until the negotiations
between the two countries had reached some agreement.
Sadly for the soldiers in question, these talks did not
provide a solution and in April, 1946, the Polish
ambassador in London could "still see no possibility of
giving the people of Zaolzie any advice other than
staying abroad and awaiting further developments." [84]
The biggest problem for the Polish Government was that
if the troops decided to settle in Poland - the
'recovered land' in the west was one possible area -
then the soldiers' families would also follow, thus
depolonising the area. [85] It was not until 1958 that
the borders between Poland and Czechoslovakia were
formally settled and today the Zaolzie Poles remain a
sizeable national minority in the Czech Republic.
Another of the groups who found their future
uncertain were the 'Volksdeutsche' - Poles who had been
classed by the Germans, to a lesser or greater degree,
as their own. When the Germans occupied Poland they
compiled a list - the 'Volksliste' - of people who were
German or Polish citizens of German descent.
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According to a report from ajor Gondowicz of
warsaw's Repatriation Mission in Germany to HQ BAOR in
November, 1946, there were four classes on the
Volksliste:
Class 1 - Full German. These people belonged to
pre-war German associations were fully German and had
'Reichsdeutsche' identity cards. These people had no
right of repatriation to Poland and had lost their
right to citizenship and rehabilitation to Polish
society.
Class 2 - 50% German. The Nazis issued blue
identity papers to these people who had a "positive
attitude" to Germany and the German occupation. nlhese
people had lost their Polish citizenship but could re-apply
for it after a process of rehabilitation.
Class 3 - German by name, origin or ancestry and
holding green identity papers. It was possible for this
class to return to Poland and sign a declaration of
'Polishness' - no rehabilitation was needed.
Class 4 - The holders of yellow identity papers
could best be described as 'Germanic' rather than
German. These were the least trusted by the Nazis.
According to Gondowicz, a return to Poland
depended on which class the Volksdeutsche belonged to.
He went on: "It should be made clear that enlistment on
the 'Volksliste' could take place only on base [sic] of
a voluntarily signed application." [86] This, as
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Gondowicz probably knew, was not strictly true. Names
very often appeared on the Volksliste without the
consent of the owner. Very often fear promoted people
to sign and often, given the harsh terms of the Nazi
occupation, the promise of better conditions was enough
incentive for people to sign up.
Franciszek Janikowski was a Pomeranian who had
been conscripted to the German Army before joining the
Polish 1st Armoured Division. His appearance on the
Volksliste was typical:
' 1 My father worked on the railways. He had no land
and no fortune so he was afraid. When they took
them away in 1942 and asked who doesn't want to be
Germanised? Nobody answered. My father signed and,
as he told me later, he thought: I have a son and
he is going to go to war...." [87]
Ludwik Matuszek from Wielkopolska tells much the same
story:
"What can I have against my father? That he was
German? We lived in Wielkopolska, we were Polish
citizens. The Germans came - father had to quickly
become German. Nobody asked if we wanted to or
didn't want to. People who live by borders never
quite know to whom they belong. One day here,
tomorrow there....
That we went to war, what about it? I was
called up and I had to go. If I hadn't gone I
would have been a deserter and we all know what
happens to them." [88]
The propaganda from the 'London' Poles was also
directed at these Volksdeutsche Poles to discourage
them from returning to Poland. Pamphlets like "The
Guide for a Returning Soldier - A Explanation Of The
Provisional Government Of National Unity's Declaration
About The Treatment Of Soldiers Of The Polish Armed
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Forces Returning To Poland" (a pamphlet that the
Foreign Office was quick to disclaim as being printed
in London by civilians on a commercial basis so not
liable to any action on their part [891) were quick to
point out that the Volksdeutsche - even of classes 3
and 4 - were seen in arsaw as collaborators with the
Nazis and their fate could only be imagined. As the
warning in the pamphlet states:
"In other words every one of our soldiers who
returns to Poland and had the misfortune to belong
to the 3rd and 4th group Volksdeutsche through no
fault of his own will be at the mercy of the first
trouble-maker or person with whom he has an
argument and reports him to the secret police that
his behaviour during the German occupation was not
"compatible with Polish nationality". It is
difficult to defend oneself against such an
ambiguous and general accusation. What it will
result in is the accused being locked up in a
concentration camp...." [90]
How Warsaw actually felt about the Volksdeutsche is
dealt with later, but the fear of reprisal that was
produced by such propaganda could, potentially, have
dried up the repatriation of the thousands of men who
had previously served in the Wehrmacht. However, the
situation produced a major anomaly as the Poles who
were the most anxious to return to Poland were these
very Volksdeutsche. As already stated, the units that
produced the highest rates of return were the units
that had been formed toward the end of the war and were
manned, predominantly, from the nearly 29,000 men who
had been in the German Army.
'Ihe propaganda that emanated from both sides of
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the Polish political divide after the war did much to
formulate attitudes to return among the soldiers,
sailors and airmen concerned. Many did not return to
Poland - many did. Few of those who went back
did not suffer, one way or another, at the hands
of a regime that disowned them. Dennet Skibniewska,
a Polish Tartar who served in Italy with the Polish
Women's Auxilliary Corps, puts forward a common view
that the Poles did not deserve the treatment that they
received in Poland:
"Who today from the 'authorities' of the former
People's Republic of Poland remembers those years
just after the war and the return of those who had
lived through its nightmare? For years they had
fought for Poland. They dreamed of peaceful work;
they were homesick for the land they had not
tended for so many years; for their nearest and
dearest. When they returned they were met by all
manner of trouble. Can those who lie in the
Monte Cassino cemetery rest in peace until someone
finally realises the tragedy of those days?
Personally, I think they should apologise to us.
It's the least they can do. To say - we're sorry.
One little word - sorry" [91]
As a postscript to this, Aleksander Kwasniewski, the
man who finally closed the Polish United Worker's
Party, stood in the Polish Parliament on the 9th
November, 1993 and announced:
"I also want to say today - although perhaps it is
not up to me to say this - to all those, and some
of them are here in this chamber, who experienced
wrongs and foulness from the authorities and the
system before 1989: We are sorry. [Applause]" [92]
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CHAPTER FOUR
"Ojczyzn Wo1n, Racz Nam Wróciá Panie."
Conditions In Post-war Poland.
An Officer of the Security Office
"Killed In The Fight Against The
Reactionary Underground."
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CHAPTER FOUR
The link between Poland and religion is possibly best
expressed in one hymn that invokes God to protect
Poland:
Boe co Po1sk przez tak liczne wieki,
OtaczaX blaskiem potgi i chway,
Co	 j	 osXaniaj tarcz Swej opieki
Od nieszczá, które przygnbiá j miay:
przed Twe OXtarzem zanosim bXaganie:
Ojczyzn woln pobogosaw Panie!
God, who for centuries, has given Poland both
Glory and might;
Who has preserved Her with Your sacred shield
From enemies always ready to engulf Her,
To Your altars, Oh God, we bring our fervent prayers,
Bless our free homeland.
[1]
The Polish Forces hymn and prayer book, published
in 1942, had one major alteration to the hymn; the last
line had been changed from: "Bless our free homeland"
to "Give us back our free homeland" - the variant
of the hymn adopted as an alternative national anthem
under the Russian Partitions of the 19th Century. After
the end of the Second World War the Polish Church
reverted to the pre-war version - except for a period
just prior to, and under, General Jaruzelski's Martial
Law when the Church felt itself powerful enough to
declare that Poland was not free. In the Church of the
exiles the wartime version continued to be used and has
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only recently, with the return of democracy to Poland,
has the old version been restored. It would appear then
that opinion was divided as to whether Poland was free
or not. In the case of the hymn the difference was on
the grounds of politics. The Church knew that Poland
was not free but to preserve its position it was
prepared to accept what it had to.
Whereas the Poles knew that Poland had not been
liberated by the Red Army, even the Communists who
cared to think about such things knew that the Poles
were not masters in their own house. The official
history of the war, as published by "People's" Poland,
did not enter into such polemics over freedom and
justice, similarly the Soviet historians were content
to expound the idea that all was well in the Soviet
bloc. As the "History of the USSR, the Soviet Period"
reads:
" In the course of its winter operations the Red
Army, together with a Polish Army, liberated
Poland from the German occupier and returned to
the Polish people the lost land in the West
formerly taken by the Germans. On the 21st April,
1945, a twenty year Soviet-Polish treaty was
signed about friendship, mutual assistance and
post-war co-operation." [2)
The fact that the Communists pushed this line is
not so surprising, what is more difficult to accept is
how, after the war, many western governments blindly
trusted the Soviets and put aside the natural
scepticism so necessary in international relations.
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The recognition of the Moscow—backed Polish
Provisional Government in Warsaw was one act that many
of the exiled Poles considered as a betrayal. The
French Government of De Gaulle comes in for particular
criticism, not simply because it recognised the
Communists, (after all most of the other western
democracies recognised them) but, according to Tadeusz
Modelski, because he was the first. The French
recognised the Provisional Government on the 31st
December, 1944:
"...six weeks before the Yalta Conference of
4th-lith February, 1945, and 30 weeks before the
United States and Britain recognised the
Government, and even 5 days before Stalin did.
This degrading, servile and unfriendly act of De
Gaulle's reckoning for the support of Stalin and
the French Communist Party will always be
remembered with scorn and aversion by the people
of Poland." [3]
Although it was not only the French who were criticised
for recognisiny the Provisional Government on grounds
other than strategic. On the 29th May, 1948, "The
Economist" launched an attack on the policy of
Churchill with regards to the 'Polish problem':
"But a general election was impending in Britain
and the Conservative Party wished to demonstrate
to the electorate that it was not anti-Soviet and
that it had 'solved' the Polish problem. The
recognition of the bogus "Government of National
Unity" was announced on the very day of the
election, though, as it turned out, it did not
help Mr Churchill very much." [4]
But this was written at a time when the 'Cold War' was
gaining momentum. The Communists in Czechoslovakia had
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just taken power and the Berlin Crisis was about to
break onto the scene so perceptions towards the
Communists were changing. Prior to this, attitudes in
many Western countries had been quite positive towards
Moscow and its acolytes, yet given the benefits of
historical hind-sight it seems unbelievable that
experienced and worldly politicians could have been
taken in by Moscow.
From 1939 the Poles in the West had been warning
the British that the Soviet Union was not to be
trusted, and when the Soviet Front swept into Poland
from 1944 onwards the Poles had shouted, to anyone who
would listen, that the Red Army was not coming as
liberator but as conqueror. Again they were ignored and
called 'Polish irresponsibles', anti-Soviet and
fascists. The questions that must be asked are how
justified were the Poles in claiming the conditions in
post-war Poland here not to be endured and how
justified were the British in dismissing their fears as
anti-Soviet propaganda ?
Captain Turowski, the Chief Polish Base Censor of
2 Polcorps, in a report to AFHQ in June, 1945, wrote:
"Nearly in every letter written by an officer or a
soldier one can find some sentences expressing
their great disenchantment which brought them the
end of the war. "The war is over, all are looking
to go home, to their sweethearts, mothers or
friends, but we Polish Airmen which fought in
Battle of Britain and soldiers from Monte Cassino
are waiting in dark 1" The soldiers realise that
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they can't go back to Poland, because a life under
unceasing fear of the arrest or deportation would
be unbearable. [...][sic]
in general the letters are increasingly
pessimistic, full of sorrow and of a bitter
disappointment. "There is nothing to do now, a
lot of time which rests - makes the situation
tragic, we have now plenty of time to discuss and
worry about our future. Results: pessimism and the
atmosphere of uncertainty and apathy." [5]
This mood of despondency was something that the British
had to overcome as best they could. What the British
could not overcome was the deep-rooted and endemic
hatred of the Soviet Union, not only as a political
system but as the successor of an empire that had
removed Poland from the map of Europe. As one officer
explained, and whose comments were subsequently removed
by the Polish Base Censor:
"I am feeling unhappy and sad as I have never been
since the Germans invaded Poland in 1939. You
certainly will ask why? Because the dirty
Bolsheviks have invaded once again our beloved
fatherland. They are just now on the outskirts of
Warsaw. It means for us that Central and ma'be
West Europe will be under the Bolshevik
domination. It means for us that half of Poland
will be occupied and annexed by our eternal foe.
It means that the best men of Poland will be
killed or deported to the labour camps. It means
the annihilation of the Polish nation.... Please
remember that my grand-father was deported in 1863
into Siberia and he died there. My father was
buried alive by the Bolsheviks in December, 1917.
My brother was killed in the battle against them
in 1920.And Imyseif with my family was deported
into Russia in 1939 where I lost my wife and
daughter. And now will you please ask yourself
what would you feel on getting the news that
Bolshevik hordes have come again into the heart of
Poland.' [61
it was to this type of soldier that Bevin's appeal was
directed, but it was against generations of in-bred
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anti-Russian feeling that he had to contend.
Polish morale was low and the British knew it. The
Resident Minister at AFHQ sent a report to the Foreign
Office on June 23rd, 1945 which outlined some of the
more obvious criticism coming from the Polish ranks.
The apparent submission of the British Government over
sixteen Home Army leaders who had been arrested by the
Soviets and taken to Moscow for trial was one issue
causing dissent among the Poles as was the forthcoming
election in Britain - a change of Government could
lead to an even worse change of policy. [7]
The Soviet authorities were quick to establish
control over Poland and the establishment of a
pro-Moscow Government was just the first step to
changing the whole political system there. Trying to
avoid charges of imperialism, Soviet histories put a
slightly different emphasis on events in Poland.
Grigory Deboriri in "30 Years of Victory" writes:
"The Soviet Government viewed the Polish patriots'
aspiration to create their own democratic
statehood with understanding and profound
approval. It set up no administrative bodies of
any kind on Polish territory, but handed over all
powers to the people's representative body. This
decision was formulated legally in the agreement
between the Soviet Government and the Polish
Committee of National Liberation on the relations
between the Soviet Command and the Polish
administration.
The formation of an executive body in liberated
Poland gave rise to an outburst of fury from the
Polish Government-in-exile, which was in London
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and divorced from the people. It had now become
illegal and had finally had the ground cut from
underneath its feet.
These rnanoeuvres by Polish reaction could not
impede the process whereby people's power was
established and consolidated in Poland. The Polish
Committee of National Liberation confidently led
the people towards the goal of creating a strong
and independent Poland." [8]
Whereas many Communists and fellow-travellers followed
Moscow's line, the Polish exiles could not. According to
Jan Ciechanowski, formerly Polish ambassador to the
USA, writing in 1948:
"The very composition of the Soviet-sponsored
Committee of Liberation clearly showed Stalin's
intention. He had placed at the head of this
outfit a notorious Communist, an agent of the
Comintern, who used the alias 'Bierut'. This agent
had for years been a Soviet citizen, though he was
of Polish origin. He had always been entirely
subservient to Moscow." [9]
While the Communists were becoming firmly established
in Poland1 Moscow was claiming that it was by the will
of the people rather than at the point of a bayonet.
The British Government was willing to go along with the
fiction, for public consumption at least, in order to
maintain Allied unity. As Churchill declared to the
Commons on 15th December, 1944:
"...the fate of the Polish nation holds a prime
place in the thoughts and policies of His
Majesty's Government and the British Parliament.
It was with great pleasure that I heard from
Marshal Stalin that he, too, was resolved upon the
creation and maintenance of a strong, integral,
independent Poland as one of the leading Powers in
Europe. He has several times repeated these
declarations in public, and I am convinced that
they represent the settled policy of the Soviet
Union." [10]
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Churchill's public confidence in Stalin's word was not
shared by all the British in senior positions. As Sir
John Slessor, the Mediterranean Air Commander whose
planes flew to relieve the Warsaw Rising with a
horrendous loss rate, explained:
"How, after the fall of Warsaw, any responsible
statesman could trust any Russian Communist
further than he could kick him, passes the
comprehension of ordinary men." [11]
Although many Poles feared the worst about life in
Poland under the new regime, some were prepared to take
them at face value and see what conditions were like.
Karol Popiel, himself a repatriate, explains the spirit
of self sacrifice that led some Poles to return:
The regime holds out its hand for co-operation
and mutual coexistence. Somebody, despite their
doubts, has to find out if it's being honest.
Someone has to put their head on the block and, if
there is treachery, show the world that it is a
deception. We returned, we took up the challenge,
we lost. [...]
Nearly everyone went to prison but the country
was clear that the Christian leadership was not
shooting from the other side of the fence but were
there in person...." [121
The idea that conditions in Poland could only be
changed from within was taken up by the Polish Peasant
Party [PSL] under its leader Stanisaw Mikoajczyk. The
1945 New Year edition of the PSL paper "Jutro Poiski"
explained why the Party was returning to Poland:
"We fight for the spirit of the nation, for its
ideals and values, for the economic reconstruction
of the country, for the development of the economy
and of culture. We want to lead that struggle in
Poland, where our place and destiny is." [131
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Whereas Mikoajczyk considered his duty was in
Poland, others in the exile camp, Anders in particular,
considered him and the PSL leadership as no less
than traitors.	 The newspaper of the 5th Kresowa
Division, the "iadomoái Kresowe",	 virtually called
Miko)ajczyk a traitor in an article titled 	 "The
Black Roll of the Polish Quisling":
• .MikoXajczy k - together with his associates
will one day stand before a tribunal in a free
Poland to face just punishment for his guilt which
stems from his false ambition, his petty
character, his lack of scruples and his servility.
No one can convince us that such an agent of
others' interests is a 'defender of a really
independent	 Poland'.	 MikoXajczyk's
	
professed
'opposition' is, in reality, a smoke-screen to
hide the final blood-letting of the living
organism that is Independent Poland, and of which
we are an organ." [14]
Churchill had convinced Miko)ajczyk that he had to
return to Poland to play his part in the Provisional
Government 'for the good of Poland' and many people in
Poland read a great deal into this supposed support.
Stefan Korboi'ski wrote in his dairy on the 30th July,
1945:
• .all these people believe that Mikoajczyk has
come with the approval of the British and American
governments, bringing a recipe for relieving
Poland of its eastern guests." [15)
In November Korbor'iski wrote of MikoYajczyk that his...
.popularity is based on the fact that, as every
child knows, he has returned with the approval of
the British and American governments in order to
liberate Poland in accordance with the plan he has
drawn up with them. The Communists laugh at this
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but let them laugh, everyone thinks. "He laughs
best who laughs last". Surely Mikolajczyk wouldn't
be so stupid as to come on his own with nothing at
all." [16]
The sad fact was that Mikoajczyk did return to Poland
with nothing more than a vague promise of support from
Churchill and no word of what would happen if things
went wrong and the plan fell to pieces. The PSL thought
they were doing their best for the country but before
Mikoajczyk left Britain, Anders made one final
attempt to convince him not to go and to preserve the
unity of the Polish exiles. Anders, in his memoirs,
recounts his conversation with the PSL leader:
Anders: "I should like to express my conviction that
you are not only committing a grave error, but
that you are also acting to the detriment of
Poland. [...] You have too great a political
standing to endorse, by your consent, this new
partition of Poland. Our generation and those to
come will curse you for that. World public opinion
will be misled, if only by Soviet propaganda, into
thinking that everything that has happened has
been in agreement with the Poles. [...) You will
have no influence on the course of events in
Poland; on the contrary, you will be gradually
eliminated. The decisions of Yalta are a crime
against the Polish nation. And we Poles - that
means you also - cannot be party to them".
Miko%ajczyk: "You are wrong, General. I am deeply
convinced that I shall contribute to Poland's
retaining her independence. [...] I consider that
Stalin is interested in having a strong Poland,
and he has told me so more than once. I am sure
that the elections will prove the great support I
have in Poland. After these elections a democratic
government will be established there."
Anders: "You deceive yourself about the elections.... I
have no doubt that you would have not only the
support of the men of your party, but also of all
decent Poles, simply because they would like to
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show their real attitudes towards Soviet Russia.
That is why I am convinced that the elections will
be faked, just as they were faked in our eastern
territories in 1939. [...] I am afraid that within
three months of the falsified elections, you may
find yourself in prison, even in my former cell
at Lubianka, where you will be detained as a
traitor to the nation and a spy. What is horse, I
am certain you would then confess it yourself.'
[17]
This was a remarkable piece of prognostication; the
election in Poland was held on January 19th, 1947,
and exactly eight months later Mikoajczyk was fleeing
for his life. Admittedly Anders' book was sritten cx
post facto in 1949 but the general line is indicative
of the polemic that was raging among the Poles at the
time. Anders' idea was that if any prominent Pole was
seen to be accepting the terms of lalta then it would
be seen by the outside world that all the Poles went
along with them.
Jan Nowak-Jezioratxski, one of the couriers between
the Polish Government in London and the "Home Army"
[AK] in Poland, in a conversation with Michael Chariton
maintained the rightness of the exile course in not
accepting the post-war settlement:
"I feel they were right not to do it. The problem
was (and this was said - if I remember - by
Raczyxski to Eden) that if we really accept the
kind of concession you try to impose on us, the
union of the Polish nation will be ruined. This
'Union Sacre', he used this word, will be
destroyed. All right, the cause was lost, the war
was lost - but we have to think in terms of the
future and to preserve unity. And this unity was
preserved." [18]
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As the PSL's role as the 'official opposition'
disintegrated, 'warsaw's Ministry of Information and
Propaganda noted a mood of despondency sweeping one
time supporters. According to many, the PSL had made a
mistake in committing themselves to working with the
Provisional Government and they should have foreseen
the hopelessness of their position. In many respects
General Anders had had a more realistic view as he
refused to collaborate. [l9}
Although	 the	 Poles,	 with	 certain	 notable
exceptions, opposed Yalta and everything it stood for,
the matter was not really in Polish hands. The future
of Poland was very much wrapped up in 'great power'
politics and the question of how far the British and US
Governments were prepared to go in promoting what
appeared to be an injustice. As it turned out they
were prepared to go a long way and, in order to justify
a breach of the Atlantic Charter, political expediency
had to be claimed. For Stalin this was good news as he
could have a free hand in central and eastern Europe.
As Jan Nowak continues:
"The Poles were asking, 'If you cannot do anything
for us, please do not do anything against us; do
not weaken our position. At least do not say
openly that there will be no resistance, no
conflict over Poland.'
I read the document where Bierut, the Polish
Communist leader, asked Stalin, 'Will there be any
conflict over Poland with the best V and Stalin
says there will be no conflict whatsoever. He just
dismissed the idea. You know this is what the
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Anglo-Saxons did: they really offered, in advance,
an assurance that 'there will be no resistance
over the Polish issue.'" [20]
Churchill, of course, was aware of the nature of the
Soviet Union but also how history would judge his
dealings with it. In a telegram to Smuts he wrote:
"Will it be said of me that I was so obsessed with
the destruction of Hitlerism that I neglected to
see the enemy rising in the East? Will this
somehow be my epitaph on everything that I have
done from the Blitz, the Battle of Britain and
onwards?" [21]
This particular burst of self-doubt came about as a
result of the Katyñ graves disclosure in 1943. Yet
Churchill continued to be aware of the public's
reaction to his dealings with Moscow. In his memoirs
Churchill recounts that he explained to Stalin just why
he would not be recognising the Provisional Government
in Poland:
"It would be said that His Majesty's Government
have given way completely on the eastern frontier
(as in fact we have) and have accepted and
championed the Soviet view. It would also be said
that we have broken altogether with the lawful
Government of Poland, which we have recognised for
these five years of war and that we have no
knowledge of what is actually going on in Poland.
We cannot see and hear what opinion is. It would
be said we can only accept what the Lublin
Government proclaims about the opinions of the
Polish people, and His Majesty's Government would
be charged in Parliament with having altogether
forsaken the cause of Poland." [22]
Churchill informed Stalin of his position here on the
8th February, 1945, yet five months later conditions
must have improved to such an extent that Churchill
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felt himself able to do what he said he would not do
and recognise the 'Lublin' Poles. In truth, conditions,
if anything, deteriorated in Poland but recognition
went on ahead regardless. The fact was that for all the
concerned words of the western politicians it was not
really their problem. Churchill, at Teheran, said that
the Poles would be wise to take his advice but that he
"...was not prepared to make a great squawk about
Lvov." [23] Giving up Poland's eastern territory did
not prove too difficult for Churchill, after all, as he
told Capt. Count Lubomirski, ADC and translator to
Anders: "I really don't understand	 why the Poles
make such a fuss about those Pripet Marshes -
nothing but mud." [24] But it was not Churchill's
Lwów and they were not Churchill's Pripet Marshes.
A telling comment on Churchill's attitude to the
post-war world came in 1943 as the Prime Minister
talked to one of the British Liaison Officers in
Jugoslavia. Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean recounts:
""Do you intend," he asked, "to make Jugoslavia
your home after the war?"
"No, Sir," I replied.
"Neither do I," he said. "And that being so, the
less you and I worry about the form of Government
they set up, the better. That is for them to
decide." [25]
For the Poles the question of the eastern lands
was a dilemma	 of	 some	 difficulty. The	 London
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Arciszeski Government knew that, barring a miracle,
the 'Kresy' were lost but the 'Big Three' were offering
parts of Germany as compensation. On political and
moral grounds the Poles refused to accept the loss in
the east but at the same time knew that if Poland was
to survive the future then she needed the industrial
land in the west - the Poles could not have one without
the other. If the west was accepted as compensation
then they would have to accept the east was gone.
Zygmunt Nowakowski, writing an article in 1947 in
"Wiadomoái" put a slightly different emphasis on the
compensation issue:
"The gains in the west are just in their entirety
as only part compensation, but not for Lwów or for
Wilno, but rather for the terrible German crimes
to which Poland has been victim. These
acquisitions are a matter of justice. We deserve
them to redress the wrong that the Germans have
done Poland, even though it will not put them
right." 126]
Poles of many political complexions pressed the claim
for German territory, and for as much of it as they
could get their hands on but like so many other issues
of the time the matter was largely out of Polish hands.
Whatever parts of Germany that would be ceded by the
Germans would be won by the Red Army and given by the
good will of Moscow.
Churchill was insistent that Poland's western
border should run down the rivers Oder and Eastern
Neisse (Nysa Kodzka), while Stalin, the Poles in
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Warsaw and the Poles in London preferred the Western
Neisse (Nysa juycka). Churchill's plan
	 would	 have
left Zielona Góra, Legnica, Wajbrzych and Lower
Silesia to Germany. For the Poles it appeared that
Churchill was siding with the Germans against their
interests and it appears that, according to Churchill's
own memoirs, he was prepared to take this issue as far
as it needed to go in order to keep the area German.
"For instance, neither I nor Mr. Eden would ever
have agreed to the Western Neisse being the
frontier line. The line of the Oder and the
Eastern Neisse had already been recognised as the
Polish compensation for retiring to the Curzon
Line, but the overrunning by the Russian armies of
the territory up to and even beyond the Western
Neisse was never and would never have been agreed
to by any Government of which I was the head."
[27]
Not only was Churchill willing to disagree with Stalin,
he was also ready to break up Potsdam and...:
"...namely, to have a show-down at the end of the
Conference, and, if necessary, to have a public
break rather than allow anything beyond the Oder
and the Eastern Neisse to be ceded to Poland."
[28]
It could be argued that it was unfortunate that
Churchill did not employ the same level of commitment
to protecting the Poles from the Soviet Union as he did
protecting the Germans from the Poles. Churchill,
during his famous "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton,
Missouri, complained about "Slav penetration deep into
German territory" and the US Secretary of State, James
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Byrnes, in a speech in Stuttgart, told his audience
that the Polish western frontier was not necessarily
permanent. This fell right into the hands of the Soviet
propaganda machine. A great deal of effort was put into
convincing the Poles, with some success and
justification, that both the British and the US were
unreliable as Allies. German 'revanchism' would only be
countered by the Soviet Union. As Gomuka put it:
"If ever in the future the Germans should again
fall upon Poland, without the Soviet Union's help,
without a Soviet Polish alliance, we should be
threatened with the same fate we suffered in
September 1939." [29)
As Bethell writes in his biography of Gomuka,
Churchill was largely seen to be responsible for
handing over eastern Poland to Moscow and now he wanted
to take away the Poles' one consolation; this was
bitterly resented by the Poles, and no doubt many were
glad that he did not win the 1945 election and so be in
a position to have his final 'show-down' at Potsdam.
Despite what Churchill said he might have done, the
fact was that when he had the opportunity he did not
oppose Stalin to any valuable degree. The opportunity
was then taken away from him by the electorate of
Britain and handed to Attlee - he too would not defy
the Soviets and so, to quote Bethell's conclusion:
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"Great Britain, war weary and immersed in a
general election, wanted to wash her hands of the
'Polish imbroglio'. The idea of a crisis with the
Soviet Union, much less a war, was intolerable.
Anything was better than that. So Britain gave up
her 'matter of honour' and broke her word towards
the Poles, just as she had done in 1939." [30]
But even at this stage the exiled Poles were still
being criticised in many quarters for not meekly
accepting the will of the 'great powers' and protesting
an injustice. If only, some argued, the Poles would
behave like the Czechs and accept the situation as it
was. In 1947 G.D.H. Cole wrote his "Intelligent Man's
Guide to the Post-War World" in which he asserted:
"President Benes saw, at an early stage, that the
best hope for the re-establishment of a free
Czechoslovakia lay in coming to terms with the
Soviet Union, and thus making it possible for the
exiled Government to return and to re-shape the
country's institutions without the same sharp
break with the past as befell the Poles because of
the foolish intransigence of the Polish Government
in London." [31]
In March of the following year, 1948, the Communists
staged a coup in Prague that led to the resignation of
the 12 centre and right-wing ministers in the
Government. The last hope of the anti-Communists, the
Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, was found dead on March
10th after having 'fallen' from his office window - it
still remains unclear whether he committed suicide or
if he was disposed of by the Communists.
The Czechs had gone along with the Communists in
the hope that, given public support, they would win.
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whereas most Poles could see the folly of such an
approach, others took up the challenge - even though
with hind-sight it is now clear just how pitiful
were their chances. In a conversation with W.D.Allefl
of the Foreign Office Mikoajczyk described events in
Poland as a battle:
"The battle for Poland's independence was now
joined. In commenting upon the attitudes of Poles
abroad he said rather grimly that this was now a
fight and where there was fighting people were apt
to get hurt or even killed. Patriotic Poles
should, however, accept this risk." [32]
MikoXajc zyk , who was here insinuating that he was
more patriotic than those generals who refused to
return to Poland, agreed to go back and give
credibility to that which had been agreed at Yalta and
I
Potsdam. The Final communique from Potsdam, signed on
August 2nd, 1945, laid down the fine aspirations to
which the Polish Provisional Government were meant to
aspire:
"The three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish
Provisional Government in facilitating the return
to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles
abroad who wish to go, including members of the
Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They
expect that those Poles who return home shall be
accorded personal and property rights on the same
basis as all Polish citizens.
The three Powers note that the Polish
Provisional Government in accordance with the
decisions of the Crimea Conference has agreed to
the holding of free and unfettered elections as
soon as possible on the basis of universal
suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic
and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take
- 171 -
part and to put forward candidates and that
representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy
full freedom to report to the world upon
developments in Poland before and during the
elections." [331
Laudable as these words were, they did not convince
everyone. Obviously many of the Poles in the West
retained their natural scepticism over any document
signed by Stalin, but there were also many in British
politics, mostly Conservatives now relegated to the
Opposition, who could also see just how unlikely the
aspirations were to come about. Potsdam was, on the
whole, a reaffirmation of the Yalta Accord and the
debate over that agreement brought out the divisions in
British attitudes. One Conservative, Major Lord
Willoughby de Evesby, who was prepared to stand against
his Government and abstain in the vote, said in the
Commons:
"'...democratic principles.., democratic means...
democratic elements... broader democratic basis...
free and unfettered elections', and so on. It
would be disappointing and to my mind disastrous,
after the long journeys which the Prime Minister
undertook to get to the Crimea and all the hard
work that was done, if we found that he, the
President of the United States and Marshal Stalin
were not all speaking exactly the same language.
In fact, a slightly different definition was given
to this word by all three of them." [34)
Certainly Stalin's interpretation of democracy was
considered that which was politically expedient at the
time. Alger Hiss, assistant to the US Secretary of
State,	 recounts that at the Teheran meeting in 1943
President Roosevelt had
	 told	 Stalin	 that many
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Americans viewed the Soviet annexation of the Baltic
States with some anxiety and asked that in order to
placate this disturbed feeling might it be possible to
hold some plebiscite to legitimize events. Stalin was
supposed to have "very casually" said: "You want a
plebiscite? Of course!" [35] Such was the view of
Stalin towards 'free and unfettered' elections. The
results were never in doubt; they were falsified in the
Baltic States, they were falsified in 1939 when the
Soviets had occupied Eastern Poland under the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and it seemed likely that they
would again be falsified in Poland whenever the
Provisional Government got around to holding them. The
British and US Governments appeared to have more faith
in Stalin and the Polish Communists than did many Poles
in Poland. The Ministry of Information and Propaganda
in Warsaw recorded a popular joke that was circulating
in the country just before the January, 1947, election
that said there would be no winter in 1946 as the
"lipa" would be in bloom in January - the "lipa" in
Polish is a lime-tree and is also the word for a lie or
an untrue story. [36]
Bierut, who met Churchill in July, 1945, tried his
best to put forward the idea that Poland would emerge
from the shadow of the war as a freer and more
democratic state. He told Churchill that he did not
want to stop
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the Polish people expressing their views and that the
elections in Poland would be "even more democratic than
English ones, and home politics would develop more and
more harmoniously." [37]
Eight months after Bierut had met Churchill the
elections had still not taken place. The reluctance of
the Provisional Government to put itself to the public
vote began to ring alarm bells in Whitehall. The Labour
Foreign Minister Bevin declared to Parliament that
Britain would use its influence to make sure the Poles
observed the Yalta declaration; this in turn led to an
angry note of protest from Bevin's equivalent in Warsaw
Wincenty Rzymowski with the accusation that Bevin was
meddling in Polish internal affairs.
In Boruta-Spiechowicz's secret meeting with the
Foreign Office he spoke of what might happen in the
Polish elections if all things were left to run their
natural course:
"Boruta considers that in free elections
Mikolaiczyk [sic] would have not less than 80% and
probably as much as 90% of the votes. The peasants
themselves are strong and fearless and would vote
up to 99% for the Peasant Party. If elections were
held today Mikolaiczyk might get 70% in spite of
the efforts of the present regime to arrange for
the 'cooking' of the elections. The present regime
is very concerned and much of its energy is
devoted to securing an overwhelming vote for its
own block." [38]
There was a great deal of underestimation in the
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capacity of the Communists to so 'cook'. Dr S. Taylor
MP, in a report to Hector McNeil on his recent visit to
Poland, expresses the view that was common at the time,
that the Communist Party, or to give it its correct
title of Polish orkers Party [PPR], was actually
worried about the election and that the outcome was
anything but a forgone conclusion.
"Strangely enough they are far less frightened of
a free election than PPS [Polish Socialist Party].
This may be because they have overestimated
support for the left parties, because they intend
to cook the elections, because they intend to
fight if they lose, or because they realise that a
free election, by splitting PPS, would favour them
in the long run. My guess is 1 and 4. I doubt if
they could cook on a sufficient scale." [39]
Cavendish-Bentinck, who had also read Dr Taylor's
report contradicted his findings:
"I think that the reason for which the P.P.R. are
less frightened of a free election than the
leaders of the P.P.S. is that they are quite
determined that there will be no free elections,
and that whatever happens they will somehow or
other manage to stay in power." [40]
This was a more realistic scenario than that presented
by Dr Taylor. So much emphasis had been placed by the
'Big Three' on the Polish elections but very few
British politicians by the beginning of 1946, and even
fewer in the Foreign Office, believed that the
elections would be anything but a sham; at best they
would not be 'free and unfettered'.
The Foreign Office received a report of a
conversation between Mr Bourdillon Ford and Jerzy
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Szapiro, a Polish Socialist. Szapiro advocated putting
off the election until August, 1947. This would give
the country a chance to settle down - if the political
violence continued, said Szapiro, then the Soviet Army
might take control of Poland. By August of 1947 "You
could have a election that would be fought on the true
issues." [41] This drew an untypical minute from Hankey
at the FO: "Crap 1!" Clearly the Head of the Northern
Department remained unconvinced by Szapiro's argument.
Whereas he agreed that the PPS would be the middle
ground between the PPR and the PSL, Hankey was of the
opinion that if elections were not held soon then there
would be no PSL left, such as the campaign of
repression used by the Communist security apparatus.
The elections in Poland, if the Provisional
Government ever agreed to hold them, would be
unsupervised by the rest of the world, despite the
provisions made in the Yalta terms. This would
inevitably lead to accusations of electoral abuse but
the British had no plans to send monitors. The Earl of
Craven brought that very point to the attention of the
Government in the House of Lords on the 19th March,
1946. If the Government were sending a Commission to
supervise the elections in Greece hy were they not
sending one to Poland? Lord Ammon, replying for the
Government, declared that:
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"The Polish President further assured the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Potsdam
that the elections would be held on the basis of
the 1921 Polish Constitution. If these pledges are
strictly fulfilled in the arrangements made for
the elections, an international Commission would
not appear necessary." [42]
This begs the question; what would happen if these
pledges were not strictly fulfilled? It was widely
believed at the time that they would not be. By giving
up the demand for international supervision the estern
Powers were giving the Communists a free hand to hold
the election on their terms. This, of course, did not
deter the British Government from its policy of trying
to convince the Polish Armed Forces under its command
to return to Poland. Not only were the Poles told that
it was their patriotic duty to return but also they
were told that if enough of them went back then they
would make a substantial difference to the outcome of
the election. The Poles pointed out the loophole in
this logic that whether they returned or not the
Communists would retain power in Poland by fixing the
election. As Anders was later to write:
"The British decision had indeed surprised us, for
it had always been my impression that no decision
would be taken in regard to the Polish Forces
until after elections had been held in the
country. Mr Bevin, however, said that the British
view had always been that the troops should return
to take part in the elections. He seemed to think
that their votes would really count and that by
returning they would help in the attainment of
Polish freedom." [43)
Anders was not alone in this view. In the FO's first
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"arsaw Weekly Summary" for 1947 Caveridish-Beritinck,
the British ambassador, confirmed the Foreign Office's
worst fears:
"It is now clear that as a result of pre-election
activities staged by the Communist Party there is
no chance of the elections being anything but a
farce." [44]
The or1d had a foretaste of Communist election
fraud in July of 1946 during the, so-called, "3 Times
Yes" Referendum. As officially announced the result to
the three questions asked were:
1/ Are you in favour of abolishing the Senate?
Yes:	 7,844,522	 (66.2%)
No :	 3,686,029	 (33.8%)
2/ Are you for making permanent, through
the future Constitution, the economic
system instituted by the land-reform and
nationalisation of the basic industries with
maintenance	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 private
enterprise?
Yes:	 8,896,105	 (77.3%)
No :	 2,634,446	 (22.7%)
3/ Are you for the Polish western frontiers as
fixed on the Baltic and on the Oder and Neisse?
Yes:	 10,534,697	 (94.2%)
No :	 995,854	 ( 5.8%)	 [45]
The Communists campaigned for a show of support from
the public that they should vote '3 x Yes', and that is
what they announced the public had done. This did not
convince many people. The PSL complained bitterly that
the results were a fraud but due to censorship and
Communist control over the means to broadcast to the
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Party
Government Bloc
PSL
Labour Party
PSL
(New Liberation)
Others
public the truth could not easily be told.
The true results in some districts did become
known to the PSL. A total of 2,805 electoral districts
did manage to announce their real voting figures to
independent sources before the Provisional Government
could falsify them.
MikoYajczyk cites one example in 	 his	 book "The
Rape of Poland" - The official results to question 1,
in the Krakow area, were: Yes 68% 	 No 32% but the
real results, according to the PSL, were: Yes 16.46%
No 83.54%	 [46]
The results of the national elections were even
worse. The PSL was offered membership of the Government
bloc or political and physical annihilation. The PSL
decided to call in its support from the mass of the
Polish people and stand alone. All the estimates of PSL
popularity were accurate and in a free election they
would have undoubtedly won so the 'official' results
when they were announced did not convince anyone. [47]
Valid Votes
9,003,684
1,154,847
530,979
379,754
157,611
11,244,875
% of vote
80.1
10.3
4.7
3.5
1.4
100.0
Representatives
384
28
15
13
4
444
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MikoXajc z yk and the PSL passed into political
oblivion just as Anders and other Poles had said they
would. Their obliteration was complete and with them
died any hope of democracy in Poland.
The British Government was forced to concede that
things had not gone according to plan. On February 3rd,
1947, the Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Mr Mayhew, told the Commons:
"Our information regarding the conduct of the
Polish elections, unfortunately, confirms reports
from reliable British Press correspondents, which
have already been published. The powers of the
Polish Provisional Government were extensively
used to reduce to a minimum the vote of those
opposed to the Government bloc. Opposition lists
of candidates in areas covering 22 per cent. of
the electorate were completely suppressed.
Candidates and voters' names were removed from the
lists; candidates were arrested; Government
officials, members of the Armed Forces and many
others were made to vote openly, and other forms
of intimidation and pressure were used. The count
was conducted in conditions entirely controlled by
the Government bloc. His Majesty's Government
cannot regard these elections as fulfilling the
solemn contract which the Polish Provisional
Government entered into with them and with the
United States Government and Soviet Government
that free and unfettered elections would be held.
They cannot, therefore, regard the results as a
true expression of the will of the Polish people."
[48]
This was very much a case of closing the stable door
after the horse had bolted. The Poles in the West had
warned that the elections would not be free, the PSL by
standing in the elections had given them a credibility
that they did not deserve, and when everything had
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fallen apart there was very little that anyone could do
about it - the damage had already been done.
Back in July, 1945 , when recognition had been
transferred from the London Poles to the Warsaw
Polish Government, Count Raczytiski, the exiled Foreign
Minister, wrote to his British counterpart, Anthony
Eden, to protest the move:
"3: The persecution which thousands of Poles are
enduring in Poland today, and which afflict with
particular severity all those citizens of the
Republic who have actively demonstrated their
devotion to the cause of freedom and independence
by their implacable struggle against the German
invader, prove beyond any doubt that the so-called
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in
no way represents the will of the nation, but
constitutes a subservient body imposed on Poland
by force from without.
4: The first attribute of the independence of a
State is its freedom to chose a Government. In the
present circumstances, the source of the authority
of the Government headed by N Osobka-Morawski is a
decision made not by the Polish nation but by
three foreign powers, one of which controls de
facto the whole administration of Poland through
its army and police force. The legal basis of the
authority of that Government can be compared with
the legal basis of the authority of the so-called
Governments set up in occupied countries during
the war by Germany. In both cases they are
based on the will of a foreign power." [49]
For the Poles there was no sense of satisfaction at
being able to sit back and say - we told you so! The
feeling of national disaster was all pervading and the
knowledge that it was too late to do anything about it
did not help. The Poles had pleaded with the British
not to recognise the Polish Government in Warsaw until
after the elections, then a better idea of what the
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Provisional Government thought about 'free and
unfettered' elections would be known. Britain and the
United States had declared themselves publicly to be
committed to democracy in Poland; Anthony Eden, in his
contribution to the Yalta debate, declared:
"First, is it our desire that Poland should be
really and truly free? Yes, certainly, most
certainly it is. In examining that Government, if
and when it is brought together, it will be for us
and our Allies to decide whether that Government
is really and truly, as far as we can judge,
representative of the Polish people. Our
recognition must depend on that. We would not
recognise a Government which we did not think
representative. The addition of one or two
Ministers would not meet our views. It must be, or
as far as it can be made, representative of the
Polish parties as they are known, and include
representative national Polish figures. That is
what we mean." [50]
President Truman, in a speech made on Navy Day, October
27th, 1945, echoed Eden:
"We shall refuse to recognise any government
imposed on any nation by the force of any foreign
power. In some cases it may be impossible to
prevent forceful imposition of such a government.
But the United States will not recognise any such
government." [51]
Despite such pious platitudes to freedom and to
national self determination, the fact was that, to
paraphrase the then US ambassador to Warsaw, the
betrayal had been legalized.
The options for action by the British and US
Governments were limited. The first reaction was to
break off diplomatic relations with Poland and to deny
that recognition already given. Arthur Bliss Lane,
the US ambassador in Warsaw, forwarded a note from
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Cardinal Hiond to ashington on February 3rd, 1947, in
which the Primate of Poland said that the withdrawal of
foreign embassies would mean the end of the Polish
people and would end Poland's long association with the
western world. [52] The removal of recognition would
not change anything. Poland would not become any more
democratic as a result, the move would not hurt the
Government - if anything the move would push Poland
further towards the Soviet Camp - and the only ones who
would suffer would be the Polish people.
Bliss Lane was so at odds with his Government's
policy towards Poland that he felt obliged to resign
his position. In his resignation letter of 21st March,
1947, he wrote to President Truman:
"As you know, these elections were not 'free and
unfettered' as the Polish Provisional Government
of National Unity had previously pledged, in
keeping with the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.
Quite the contrary, the pre-election period was
characterised by coercion, intimidation and
violence - thus rendering the election a farce and
indicating on the part of the Polish Government a
cynical	 disregard	 of	 its	 international
obligations.
Under the circumstances I feel that I can do
far more for the cause of the relations between
the peoples of the United States and Poland if I
should revert to the status of a private citizen
and thus be enabled to speak and write openly,
without being hampered by diplomatic convention,
regarding the present tragedy of Poland." [53]
Protesting was all that was left with regards to
Poland. At the first sitting of the Sejm, the Polish
Parliament, on the 4th February, 1947, there was a
sharp protest from the PSL:
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"From the side of the PSL every effort was made to
ensure the elections were clean arid that they
could be carried out peacefully. The
responsibility for breaking the commitments given
to the nation that the elections would be 'free
and unfettered' lies solely with the parties.
We have protested against all aspects of the
election and are aiming to have the election
declared as invalid across the whole country."
[54)
This last comment, according to the stenographic
record, led to "merriment" in the chamber. The
'victors' in the election did not take such words
seriously, after all they, like Stalin, knew that there
would be no conflict over Poland. The West would do
nothing and the PSL were already on the political
sidelines. However, for public consumption the
Communists maintained the fiction that the elections
had been a true expression of the people's will. The
verbatim record of the 19th Sitting on 23rd June, 1947,
records one Bloc delegate:
"Every word of Delegate Mikoajczyk brings a
stream of fury on account of losing the election.
The last election held in Poland was free from
reactionary pressure and that is why the result
was as it was and no other. (Applause. Delegate
Miko%ajczyk: But it was not free from the pressure
of rifles. Voice from the PSL benches: nor was it
free from UB [Security Office) pressure) The
elections were carried out in accordance with the
principles of fair voting." [55]
Another delegate during the 	 next	 day's	 sitting
continued:
"The nation, in voting against you [the PSLI here
voting against Anders, Komorowski, Sosnkowski and
MikoXajczyk, they were voting against another
twenty years Government of Endecja, Sanacja and
Piast Party politics. That is why it is the people
who are the victors of the elections." [56]
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The historians of "People's Poland also turned this
blatant lie into an official truth. According to
Józef Szaflik's "Historia Polski" the election would
prove whether the voters would choose social and
economic reform or whether they would be "lured by the
demagogue slogans of the PSL, based as they were on the
support of reactionaries." (57] The fiction was
maintained by the Communists as it added legitimacy to
their authority: historians in the West preferred to
see the Provisional Government and the elections in
Poland for what they were:
"Soviet support was necessary in this case to
allow the Communists to hold onto positions they
had already won. It can be asserted that in Poland
the breakup of the coalition in 1947 was already
guaranteed in 1945 and the coalition itself was
never anything but a trick." [58]
For the Polish Armed Forces in the West who were
desperately watching events unfold in Poland the
prospect of return seemed more and more remote. Those
who were concerned with the eventual repatriation of
the Poles favoured a more optimistic view on the
situation.
Cavendish-Bentinck, in a secret cipher to the
Foreign Office of 14th January, 1946, discussed his
conversation with Mikoajczyk who had said that
probably 80% of Anders' troops and a similar number
from Germany and the UK would return to Poland in the
Spring of 1946. According to MikoXajczyk the Officer
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Corps had...:
• .overreached themselves in the propaganda
against returning, and that a number of men from
these forces who had visited this country have
returned with reports showing that whilst
conditions are far from satisfactory they are not
as bad as has been depicted." [59]
From Miko%ajczyk's various declarations and
conversations before his return to Poland and then
prior to the election it would appear that he spent
much of his time trying to play down events in Poland
and to present	 a	 picture	 that	 was decidedly
unrealistic.	 In November	 of	 1945	 the	 Foreign
Office sent a report	 of	 one	 of	 Mikoajczyk's
conversations that, no doubt, he went on to regret.
'M. Mikolajczyk said that the country was settling
down and he alleged as proof of this that 95% of
the Underground Army had emerged from the Maquis,
and that casualties in the operations against the
underground army which had at one time, I
understand him to say, reached the enormous figure
of 15,000 a month on each side had ceased. The
battle for political freedom was being won. The
Communists were no longer able to put down the
other political parties except by force, which.
they would now hesitate to use.
M. Mikolajczyk said that the withdrawal of Russian
troops was going fairly well and he thought that
the majority of what he called field units had
departed or were departing. Leaving only
administrative, supply and L. of C. [lines of
communication] personnel. [...] He regarded the
recent arrangements for stationing a special
Russian force in each area of Poland to mop up Red
Army stragglers and looters as valuable and
deplored its having been represented in some
quarters as a new Russian occupation." [60]
It is little wonder that the British dismissed the
fears and warnings of people like Anders as so much
anti-Soviet propaganda when such an internationally
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respected politician as MikoXajczyk was
sending contradictory and misleading messages that
things in Poland were not as bad as some made out.
Much was made at the time of Poles being shipped
out to Soviet prisons, but again, this could be played
down as scaremongering. Professor Douglas Savory, the
Ulster Unionist MP for Belfast University who did so
much to increase awareness of the Polish cause, was
equally dismissed when he broached the matter in the
Commons. Savory argued that since 40% of the Polish
Armed Forces had escaped from Soviet camps once before
it seemed highly unlikely that they would return to
Poland under the conditions that prevailed at the time.
The Government spokesman, as reported in "The Times",
responded:
"In regard to concentration camps, I know the hon.
gentleman comes from a sister Island which is in
the habit of looking backwards. (Laughter) May
I suggest that we all look forward in this
problem ? (Cheers)." [611
General Anders, the béte noire of the Foreign Office,
in an interview with "The Times" of October 23rd, 1946,
stated that many of the Polish troops who had
volunteered for return had also ended up in Soviet
concentration camps. Hankey's letter from the Foreign
Office to Brig. Pyman at the War Office expresses the
real reason why talk of prisons should be played down:
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"1 believe it is true that some of the men of the
Polish Second Corps have got into concentration
camps in Poland and it is also true that the
Russians control the security police. All the same
I do not believe any have got into specifically
Russian concentration camps in Poland (if there
are any) or that any have found their way into
Russian concentration camps in Russia.
Might we ask you to telegraph to Italy and ask
General Anders for his evidence. If it is true
that these chaps are being sent to Russian
concentration camps then we should be glad to know
that it is so. If there is no evidence of that,
however, then I do think we should discourage
Polish Generals under our command from making
statements which are calculated to cause alarm and
despondency among those who wish to return." [62)
By causing 'alarm and despondency' among possible
repatriates the flow back to Poland might dry up
altogether, the last thing that the Government wanted.
Every effort had to be made to get the Poles to go back
to Poland and talk of concentration camps did not help.
During the Foreign Affairs debate on the 22nd
November, 1945, one MP who had just returned from a
visit to Poland declared:
"I am authorised to say from the President of
Poland that those Poles in the Polish Army in this
country who return, will not only be given full
civic rights but that no recrimination, in any
shape or form, will be visited upon them because
of anything they may have done in the past." [63]
These fine words, largely for the consumption of the
Poles, were not matched by the deeds of the Warsaw
authorities.
A report from Major Irwin, a War Office
representative who had been attached to repatriation
duties in Poland, had reached Hankey and the contents
were less than glowing in their appreciation. According
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to Irwin the Poles were turned loose to fend for
themselves with only a railway ticket; there had been
no grants of land as had been suggested by Warsaw. The
officers did not even get that. Their treatment was
described as being worse than that for displaced
persons. The officers had to undergo interrogation by
Soviet Officers with the ever—present threat of
deportation to Siberia.
Hankey,	 who was seeking confirmation from
Cavendish-Bentinck in Warsaw, wrote:
.You will agree that it sounds pretty grim. Do
you think that the treatment those Poles are
receiving is in accordance with what the Polish
Provisional Government promised, viz, equal
treatment with those from the East?" [64)
The Polish security apparatus, alongside the NKVD, was
busy arresting thousands of Poles and putting them in
to the concentration camps of whose existence there was
such a question in the West. Professor Savory in the
Commons, on February 20th, 1946, tried to alert the
Government to what was happening.
"I have here extracts from the correspondent of
the Associated Press in Warsaw. I have made
inquiries and have been told by an American friend
that this Mr Larry Allen is one of their most
respected and esteemed correspondents. This is his
dispatch on 5th February: 'Authoritative sources
reported today a new drive by Polish secret police
whose net has swept an estimated 75,000 to 100,000
persons into prison. Official accounts of Police
activity were not available and Brigadier General
Stanislas Radkiewicz' - that is to say the
Minister of Security '- has repeatedly refused to
see journalists. Newspaper reports are censored
and all incoming and outgoing messages are
scrutinised by the military.'" [65]
- 189 -
While the Foreign Office could ignore Anders and his
fellow officers as being avidly anti-Soviet - and
therefore his opinions were biased - Military
Intelligence sent the following assessment of Anders to
the FO:
"General ANDERS and his country, especially his
social class have suffered heavily at Russian
hands, and it is not unnatural that he should feel
strongly about RUSSIA at the present time.
Evidence at our disposal, which is admittedly very
limited, does not support his conclusions that
Russian policy is fundamentally Imperialist and
abetted by subversive use of the Communist parties
in the democratic states." [66)
The views of independent outsiders could not be
dismissed as easily as the MI branch dismissed Anders.
As the information from Poland began to leak through to
Whitehall so the seeds of doubt began to be sown.
During the preparation of Bevin's ' 1 Keynote" text
the second paragraph was heavily amended in light of
the new information coming out of Poland and the
growing lack of faith in the good will of the Warsaw
Poles in the statement which they attached. The text
ran:
"The	 Government	 regard	 this	 statement	 as
satisfactory. [They are satisfied that it
represents the firm policy of the Polish
Provisional Government and that that Government
will abide by the detailed assurances it
contains.]" [67]
The highlighted passage was removed from the text by
the Permanent Under-secretary of State, Hankey's
immediate superior, Christopher 'arner with a margined
minute: "? Omit: I am far from sure. CFAW". Although
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the Foreign Office was 'far from sure' that the Poles
would be safe returning to Poland they still advised
them "to return to Poland of their own free will."
In a prepared answer to a question in the Commons,
on the 7th December, 1946, the full Government position
was laid out.
"Although we are watching for any confirmation of
an unsatisfactory reception for repatriates, we do
not want to discourage members of the Polish Armed
Forces from returning home by giving grounds for
anxiety based on unconfirmed rumours." [68]
There was also a line that the treatment was "In the
main satisfactory" but this was removed by Hankey. In
an answer to a supplementary question it was said that
the...:
.precise degree of assistance given to
returned Polish Soldiers in Poland is, of course,
a matter for the Polish Provisional Government."
This was a clear abrogation of all the responsibilities
that Britain as a 'great power' had taken upon itself
at Yalta and Potsdam. The message the Foreign Office
were sending to the Polish troops was that the Poles
should go back to Poland but their treatment there was
not an issue that could be of concern to the British
Government. The message did not inspire confidence
among the Poles - on the one hand the British were
telling the Poles that it was safe for them to return
to Poland yet Bevin had felt compelled to publicly
guarantee their safety, but was also put in the
position of having to say that there was little that
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could be done if the safety of the returnees was
threatened.
One WREN, Jessie Bradnum, who was engaged to a
Pole wrote to the Foreign Office on this very point:
"As an ardent trade unionist (Railway Clerks
Assoc.) and a member of the Labour Party, I should
very much appreciate your assurance that the
Government will satisfy itself that all members of
the Russian secret police are removed from Poland,
before our Polish allies return to settle down.
Furthermore can we assume that if Polish nationals
return now they will receive the protection of
HM Government should further political troubles
arise." [69]
The Foreign Office reply was that "...the protection of
His Majesty's Government cannot	 be	 extended	 to
individual Poles in Poland."
The approach of the Government to events in Poland
did change with time. Count Raczytxski, in his published
diary, writes of this change in attitude, in particular
as it related to British POWs who had been freed by the
Red Army and then robbed by the Soviet soldiers.
"I saw the effect of this at the Foreign Office.
Till recently, many of our reliable reports had
been met with scepticism because they conflicted
with official hopes and wishes. Doubts were
expressed to us as to whether we genuinely
represented the Polish nation, whether the Lublin
regime was really hated by almost all Poles, and
whether the country's sufferings were so great as
had been made out. These questions are now no
longer asked." [70]
Although he overestimates the change in London, writing
as the ambassador was in June, 1945, the mood change
was certainly beginning.
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In response to a request from the National
Assistance Board for more 'active propaganda' to
encourage men to return to Poland, Hankey of the FO
wrote to Mr hetmath of the NAB:
"As you know, the Foreign Secretary has, on
numerous occasions made clear his view that it is
the duty of all Poles who feel able to do so to
return to Poland, in order to take their part in
the work of national reconstruction. I do not
think that we can go any further than this. The
fact is that conditions in Poland are thoroughly
unsatisfactory, a steady drive toards
Communization is underway, and there have been
many arrests of independent socialists and others
who wish the tendency to be resisted. In the
circumstances, we really could not accept the
moral responsibility of advising men to go back."
[71]
Hankey's position in 1947 was considerably changed from
the declaration of Bevin in the Commons, August 20th,
1945:
.1 inquired from Marshal Stalin whether the
Soviet troops were to be withdrawn, and I was
assured that they would be, with the exception of
a small number required to maintain the
communications necessary for the Soviet troops in
Germany. That is not unreasonable. There is also
the question of the presence of secret police in
Poland. That still needs clearing up, but, with
these assurances, I would urge Poles overseas,
both military and civilian, to go back to their
country and assume their responsibilities in
building a new Poland. They will render a far
greater service there than they can do from
outside." [72]
For many of the Poles this change in attitude came too
late. Many of the troops had been convinced by the
early declarations of the British and Polish
Provisional Governments, and many had fallen victim to
the 'question of the presence of the secret police'
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that had yet to be cleared up.
Paul Tabori, while on a visit to arsaw in 1964,
met a taxi driver "who cursed his own stupidity" for
having returned to Poland. The driver had formerly been
in the Anders Army but after the war had gone back to
marry his pre-war girl-friend and quickly found himself
in a Communist prison for having "spent the war at the
wrong point of the compass". [73]
Jan Podoski was another repatriate who had cause
to regret his actions. [74] An engineer before the war,
he had worked for the Polish subsidiary of the Bradford
based English Electric Company. Although he spent the
first years after the war in the same position as many
other Poles - trying to decided whether to return or
not - it was a letter from the rector of the Faculty of
Electrical Engineering at the Warsaw Polytechnic
offering him a post lecturing that finally won him over
to return. On July 7th, 1947, Podoski returned to
Poland on a Polish freighter only to find himself the
subject of an investigation by the security services.
When the case went to trial he was sentenced to 8 years
- a victory according to Podoski's defence lawyer
considering the charges were spying and conspiracy. He
was pardoned in 1989 by the post-Communist authorities.
The fact that the Polish Security Service - the
UB, were arresting Poles on spurious charges was known
to the British.	 In a confidential letter from Hankey
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of the P0 to Colonel Fitzgeorge-Ealfour of the War
Office he wrote on the subject of offering guarantees
of safety to repatriates, on the 27th May, 1947, that:
"The Warsaw Government is not trustworthy and if they
were to break the guarantee, we should have no means of
executing ours." [75]
Reports of conditions continued to reach the
Foreign Office from both partisan and impartial
sources. The Communists claimed that all talk of
repression was part of the 'fascist' propaganda by
Anders and his 'band of reactionaries'. On the other
hand the claims of the exiles could also be played
down. What was more difficult to ignore were the
reports from independent sources such as Britons who
had been to visit Poland and versions from the staff at
the British embassy. A memorandum was sent to the
Foreign Office by Sir Waldron Smithers NP in June,
1946, claiming that as many as 50,000 Poles had been
imprisoned by the Communists. The report further stated
that:
". . .the new trend in British policy towards the
Warsaw regime prevents official circles from
taking sufficient interest in these people's fate
to investigate the matter with the Soviet
Government." [76]
Hankey's file minute read:
"I am sorry to say this deplorable story is likely
to be true. I collected a good deal of information
on the subject while in Warsaw, but the figure of
50,000 is probably much too high."
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Hankey had a great deal of experience with Polish
issues; before the War he had been the Second Secretary
in Warsaw under Sir William Kennard, and he had been
Acting Councellor under Cavendish-Bentinck when
recognition had been given to Warsaw in 1945. There
were few in the Foreign Office as qualified as Hankey
to discuss events in Poland but even he underestimated
the full extent of the internecine struggle that was
going on in Poland.
Cavendish-Bentinck had presented a report to the
FO in February, 1946, after a conversation with
Dr Litwin, arsaw's Minister of Health. hi1e
discussing the widespread typhus epidemic in Polish
prisons the UK ambassador had come to the conclusion
that there may have been some 40,000 political
prisoners in Poland. [77] But even with the increased
intelligence that was coming out of Poland the fact
remained that the more that was known about events
there, the less it would encourage Poles to return. In
a Foreign Office letter to Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, the problem of Anders inciting
anti-Communist propaganda was again causing friction:
"...According to the "Times" of the 25th October,
he has just claimed, in a speech made in Italy
that, of those Poles who have opted to return to
Poland, many have found their way into Russian
concentration camps. We think that this is an
exaggeration of the truth but, even if it were
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true, it would not be at all the sort of tning we
wanted sala publicly, since it is just the sort of
thing that discourages Poles from going bacK to
Poland." [781
The idea was that any public disclosure of what was
happening in Poland should be covered-up to ensure that
as many Poles as possible returned - even if prison did
await many of them. It was a hopeless task to keep
conditions in Poland a secret, altnough not for want of
trying. The Poles refused to be convinced. As one
British spouse wrote to Bevin:
"The position being as it is would you yourself
return to that country were it yours? I am sure
not.
I am the Scottish wife of a Polish soldier and
I know what Poland means to him let alone his
compatriots.
I assure you they would return to a man Mr
Bevin, if only you'd give them that guarantee of
safety which they so badly need. The whole
question rests on the removal of the Russian
Gestapo." [79]
Mrs Nowak makes a fair point that was difficult to
answer by the Foreign Office. The British Government
could not and would not guarantee the safety of the
Poles returning to Poland; there was serious doubt
about the safety of those returning to Poland and still
they were encouraging more to go back.
One of the more distressing aspects of life in
post-war Poland that drew criticism from the outside
world was a resurgence of anti-Semitism that culminated
in the Kielce pogrom on July 4th, 1946. As 40 Jews were
murdered by local peasants the Government blamed
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right-wing	 extremists	 while	 the more moderate
politicians of the PSL blamed Government provocation.
Emil Sommerstein, a Zionist, gives one possible
explanation for the phenomenon:
"Given the numerical weakness of the Party [PPRJ
and the traditionally high percentage of Jews in
the leadership of the Polish Communist movement,
it is not surprising that they became highly
visible," [80]
Despite the sufferings of the Polish Jews under the
Nazis they found themselves being attacked after the
war by some Poles who saw them as the embodiment of all
that was wrong with Poland. Underground organisations
like the NSZ [National Armed Forces], had fought
against the Germans and the Communists with equal
vigour and now looked at the Jews as part of a
conspiracy that drew Poland towards Moscow. The NSZ
news-letter "Szczerbiec", named after the coronation
sword of the Polish Kings, still speaks of the
"2ydokomuna" - the 'Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy' that
the Nazis were so fond of talking about. The
former Chief of Staff of the NSZ, StanisXaw Zochowski,
highlighted a top secret order from the Minister of
Public Security, StanisXaw Radkiewicz, to UB posts in
Poland:
"Therefore we recommend to all directors of UB
posts to prepare actions with the utmost secrecy
to liquidate all opposition activists but they
must be carried out as though they were done by
bands of reactionaries." [81]
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The Polish Government while instigating many of the
most serious incidents in Poland then used them to
denounce the NSZ and the anti-government opposition in
general and use them as a pretext for extermination.
Everyone in Poland, and the Poles in the best,
knew what was going on in Poland - the Communists,
however, did not talk about it. It was only after many
years that it became possible to review the post-war
years with anything like an accurate picture.
Stefan	 Staszewski,	 the	 former Minister of
Agriculture, once wrote:
"There is nothing to compare with the period of
violence, cruelty and lawlessness that Poland
experienced in 1944-47. Not thousands but tens of
thousands of people were killed then. The official
trials that were organised after 1949 were merely
an epilogue to the liquidation of the wartime
resistance, of activists, of independent parties,
and of independent thought in general." [82]
During the period of de-Stalinisation in Poland, as in
the Soviet Union after Knrushchev's 'secret speech', a
wealth of information began to emerge as to what had
been going on in the Communist world. Leon Wudzki, in a
speech to the Central Committee of the Polish United
Workers Party [PZPR) made on the 20th October, 1956,
reflected on the horrors that had just passed:
'.. .People who were caught in the streets and
released after seven days of interrogation, unfit
to live. These people had to be taken to lunatic
asylums. Others sought refuge in the asylums to
avoid the security police. Men in panic, even
honest men, were fleeing abroad to escape our
system.... The whole city knew that people were
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being murdered, the whole city knew that there
were cells in which people were kept for three
weeks standing in excrernent...cold water was
poured on people who were left in the cold to
freeze...." [83]
But it was not only the Polish Security forces that
were carrying out mass arrests, there was also the
Soviet Army and Soviet Secret Police [NKVDJ in Poland
acting very much as a law unto itself. Officially the
Soviet elements did not exist in Poland. After all had
not Bierut told Churchill at Potsdam that "generally
speaking, the whole Russian Army was leaving". [84]
According to Bierut "The NKVD played no role in
Poland". This, of course, was far from the truth. From
the first days of Soviet 'liberation' many Poles had
begun to disappear - mostly soldiers of the Home Army
[ AK]. In August 1944 the AK Commander of the Lublin
area contacted AKHQ:
"The NKVD is carrying out mass arrests of
Home	 Army	 Soldiers	 throughout the area.
They	 are put into Majdanek. The staffs of
the 3rd and 9th infantry divisions and General
'Halka' are there,	 about 200 officers and
2,500 privates. New isolated camps in the
Krasków WXodawski marshes are being organised...
the Majdanek officers and some of the men were
deported to Russia on 23 August." [85]
Another AK source reported that from the 6th November,
1944, there had been mass arrests in the Polish
People's Army of officers who had confessed to
having belonged to the AK. Some 600 of these were being
held in a camp at Skrobów, guarded by 900 Soviet
- 200 -
security guards, apparently dressed in Polish uniforms.
(86] On the 6th March, 1945, the AK Commander of the
Lwów district contacted the AKHQ that the Soviet
authorities were systematically removing Poles from
Eastern MaXopolska, and in particular from Lwów.
According to 'Winnica', who wrote the report, some
6,000 Poles had been arrested in Lwów in one week of
January, this number included University professors,
priests, students, workers from the gas-works and power
station. The usual pretext for arrest was collaboration
with the Germans. [87)
Another report to AKHQ came from Stefan Korboñski
in April, 1945. He reported that the greatest action
of pacification by the Red Army was in the Turobina
area. He wrote that units which had left Lublin going
westwards had now returned and were in the process of
rounding up more Poles. In Lublin Castle alone there
were about 8,000 prisoners - there had also been some
99 death sentences carried out. He also wrote of the
Soviet concentration camp in
	 Skrobów which was
exclusively for AK soldiers. [88]
The OC Biaystok region, 'Mcisaw', a man who,
according to Korbofiski, was "worshipped" in the area
[89], ciphered AKHQ that the NKVD had deported more
Polish intellectuals in the few months previous to May,
1945, than the Germans had done in four years of
occupation. The Poles in the city's prisons were living
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and dying in unheard of squalor. After interrogation
the Poles were then deported to Siberia. [90]
'Mcisaw' - Colonel Zadysaw Liniarski's report
of 12th May, ten days after the one cited above, gave
an even more disturbing picture of what happened to the
Poles after the NKVD had finished questioning them. The
NKVD took the Poles, former soldiers of the AK, out to
the forest and shot them and 1 in order to keep the
executions secret1 the bodies were then buried in the
mass graves of the victims murdered by the Gestapo in
1944. [91)
The battle around Bia%ystok and into the Kresy
around Grodno, had taken its toll on the AK
establishment. By the start of February 1945, the AK
had lost 6 Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the
district, 2 Inspectors and 3 Deputy Inspectors, 3 Area
Commandants, nearly 100 officers, 400 NCOs and several
hundred AK soldiers and their families. The NKVD had
deported 5,000 people from Grodno and 10,000 from
BiaYystok and moved them to unknown destinations. [92]
The end of the war did not bring the peace that
Poland so desperately needed. According to one source
there were around 730,000 members of the Polish and
Soviet security services in Poland out of a total
population of 28 Million:
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Polish People's Army : 200,000
Soviet Army in Poland: 300,000
UB and Militia	 : 230,000
	
730,000	 [93]
but this civil war was not one sided - up to 1948 there
were some 1,364 units of various size and armament with
a total manpower of 90,991. These units, of various
political complexion, all joined in hatred of the
Communists, made 7,154 attacks on (.JB and Militia
targets killing 17,000 and capturing 100,000 separate
arms. [94]
A top secret report from the Warsaw Ministry of
the Interior from 1964 published for the first time in
1993, highlights the true scale of the armed opposition
to the Communist Government from 1944 to 1956:
AK Groups: 353 of various sizes
AK Youth Groups: 60 of various sizes
AK Scout Groups: 80 of various sizes
WiN [olnoá i Niezawis7o6] Groups: 136 of various sizes
WiN Type Groups: 35 of various sizes
iN Type Youth Groups: 8 of various sizes
(WiN - "Freedom and Independence" was formed in
September, 1945, from the official command structure of
the AK under Colonel Jan Rzepecki. At its height in
1946 it numbered some 20-25,000 men)
'Konspiracyjne Wojsko Poiskie' [KWP] - 3,500 men
'ie1kopolska Samodzielna Grupa Ochotnicza "Warta"'
[WSGO "Warta"]
	
- 7,000 men
'Ruch Oporu Armii Krajowe' [ROAK]
	
- 1,500 men
Catholic Clerical Organisations: 20 of various sizes
Clerical Youth Groups: 40 of various sizes
'Narodowe SIXy Zbrojne' [NSZ] Groups: 170 of various sizes
'Narodowe Zjednoczenie Wojskowe' Groups: 71 of various sizes
'Narodowa Organizacja Wojskowa' Groups: 10 of various sizes
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Groups with NSZ ideology: 16 of various sizes
NSZ youth organisations: 8 of various sizes
Groups with no political affiliations: 178 of various sizes
Other Youth Organisations: 288 of various sizes
Unnamed organisations: 13 of various sizes
"Criminal Terrorist Groups": 94 of various sizes
Ukrainian Insurgent Army [UPA] - 3,500 men (April, 1947)
German Revisionist Groups: 49 of various sizes
Unnamed German Groups: 11 of various sizes
German Youth Groups: 16 of various sizes 	 [95]
These underground groups were not all active at
any one time - the UB, the specially formed KB
[Internal Security Corps] and the Army fought a
relentless and ruthless campaign of repression that led
to many deaths and imprisonments. According to Zbigniew
Brzezinski, former US National Security Adviser, from
1945 to 1949 there were around 6,000 secret executions
in Poland. People simply disappeared into the network
of 97 concentration camps never to be seen again. [96]
The prisons here full after the war. German
prisoners and war criminals shared the same cells as
the heroes of the Polish underground. In Jerzy
Topolski's newest history of Poland, published in
varsaw in 1992, he cites the fact that Kazimierz
Moczarski of the AK GHQ was arrested and put into the
same cell as SS General Jurgen Stroop, responsible for
the brutal liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto in 1943.
[97) But this was repeated all over	 Poland. The
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prison roll for Firubiesz^'w, April 1947, is a guide to
the pretext of many arrests:
Membership of WiN : 13
Conspiracy : 9
Possession of Arms : 7
Collaboration with Germans : 5
Murder : 2
Conspiracy + Desertion : 2
Conspiracy + Manslaughter : 2
Conspiracy + Possession of Arms : 1
Assault : 1
Desertion	 1
Robbery : 1
Membership of UPA : 1
	
Prisoners in total : 45
	 [98]
Political crime was high on the agenda of the Polish
Militia and UB. The virtual civil war in the country
divided families and set brother against brother. One
regional security commander published the following
announcement:
"On the night of 4/5th November, 1945, the
dangerous bandit Piotr Wieprow was
	 shot	 by
Special	 Units	 in	 Piaski; the
	 village	 of
Paszki Ma IZe;	 Parish of BiaXa.
Piotr Wieprow had been proved to be in several
armed raids in the area.
It is also announced here that the younger brother
of Piotr Wieprow serves in the Security Office.
[99]
The situation, and its effects on Polish society, was
not lost on the Central Committee. GomuXka, later to
fall from official grace, spoke at the PPR Plenary
Session on the 20th May, 1945;
"A second state within our state is beginning to
rise up over our heads. The security organs
themselves follow a certain policy in which no one
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can interfere. At times the reaction has realised
its policy through our security organs. The
activities of security include numerous examples
of narrow sectarian policies.... People are being
held in bestial conditions in our jails. e must
stop this. People are either becoming demoralised
or leaving.... This is a descent down the wrong
political path which does us political harm."[lOO]
The situation in Poland was not lost on London
either. After reading the "Warsaw Weekly Summary",
10.7, for March 1st, 1947, Hankey of the FO minuted:
"The present system really is the so-called
'dictatorship of the proletariat' being put into
practice." [101]
The stories of atrocities that were coming
out of Poland were horrific indeed. In his memoirs
Mi koXa jczyk describes the activities of the Bochnia
Secret Police Commander:
"Bartkowicz tortured the mayor of Lapanow, Jan
Jarotek, to a pitilessly slow death in full view
of the victim's son. He then ordered his
torturers to seize Jozef Szydlowski, the Peasant
Party's local executive committee member, whose
tongue was cut out, fingernails ripped off and
eyes seared with a hot poker before he was finally
shot." [102]
The Peasant Party came under serious attack from the
regime, and this was heightened just prior to the
elections. In 1946 the PSL presented a list of
complaints to the Provisional Government:
"1. Mass arrests, destruction and robbery by security
police in Sarniki near Siedlce.
2. Murder of Jan Orlowski in Gladczyn. He was a
district executive of the PSL.
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3. Mass arrests, burning of three villages in Siedlce
area.
4. Murder of Zygmunt O1szoviec near Lublin.
5. Illegal arrests of 'ladeusz Noak + Wojciech
Drozdzik: PSL MPs.
6. Murder of Stefan Zurawinski.
7. Murder of 'ici' [PSL youth Movement) official
Edward Chruscielewski in Krasnik nr Lublin.
8. Murders in Kepno.
9. Shooting of Franciszek Bozer, PSL secretary from
Miechow nr Krakow.
10. Intimidation of warsaw's PSL 'Self Help' group +
mass arrests.
11. Torture of	 ladyslaw Machowiak + Bronislaw
Styczynski: Mogilo nr Poznan.
12. Murder of PSL Chairman Joseph Majka of Kilczyce in
the Cieszyn prison + burning of his house.
13. Murder of PSL Chairman Franciszek Lazowski at
Sierpce.
14. Murder of Josef Kulesza. . .." etc etc.
	 [103)
Mikolajczyk asked the question of whether
countries "subjugated by Communists [could) liberate
themselves without outside help?" His answer was a
decisive 'No." [104]
Joseph Retinger [see biography page 462] had his
own experience of the Security apparatus:
"The day I was leaving arsaw with my chief
assistant, Mr Celt, I was told at the last moment
that there was no seat on the plane for him, but
as assured by the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr
Berman, as well as by the Foreign minister, Mr
Modzelewski, that he would follow on the next
plane. In view of this formal assurance I left
without misgiving. Celt did not arrive by the next
plane, and after a few weeks I learned that after
my departure he had been jailed, together with the
experts. I received no reply to my repeated
telegrams to Mr Berman, but through the grapevine
I heard that Celt was still in prison." [105]
It was only Retinger's personal intervention with
Molotov that got Celt released - two years later Celt
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had escaped to Austria.
The diplomatic corps was also not immune from the
scrutiny of the UB. Whereas the foreign diplomats were
out of reach - the worst that threatened them was to be
expelled from the country - the staff of the embassies
and legations, who were mostly Poles, as well as the
friends of the diplomats were liable to persecution.
Count Grochoiski, a long time friend of the British
ambassador, was arrested by the UB at his country
residence along with the ambassador. Cavendish-Bentinck
was released because of his diplomatic immunity,
Grochoiski was not so lucky. At his trial the Count
confessed to association with the political
underground and to communicating information to a
foreign diplomat. On the 14th of January, 1947, Count
Grochoiski was executed - as the former US ambassador,
Arthur Bliss Lane, commented; this was five days before
the elections in Poland and was to be seen as a warning
to other Poles not to tell the outside world about the
vote rigging that was to come. [106]
The US Embassy also had evidence of the UB in
action with the arrest of Mrs Dmochowska, a US citizen
working in the Embassy. At her trial in August, 1946,
she too 'confessed' to the charges that were laid
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against her and was sentenced to five years. Although
she was released in the 1947 Amnesty it only confirmed
Bliss-Lane's view that if the Polish State did not
respect US citizens then there was little hope for the
Poles. [107]
The Polish Courts came in for criticism from many
interested parties. One member of the public sent the
Foreign Office a newspaper cutting of the Vice-Minister
of Justice 'ladeusz Rek's speech that the courts should
defend working class interests and fight against 'the
enemies of the people'. The note attached to the
cutting was addressed to Hankey.
Mr Hankey, "This is almost verbatim what Hitler did to
the	 German	 courts.	 Only	 of	 course
they had to defend N.Socialism against its
enemies and give judgement in the N.Soc. spirit
rather than in accordance with the law. Your
friends every day in every way are more and
more apeing Hitler and I find that very
repugnant.' [108]
Hankey's minute to this reads:
"So do I. I dislike even more to see the daily
abolition of truth, mercy and justice."
The Foreign Office plan was to have an information
campaign by the BBC to "blacken the face of E[ast)
European justice". The idea was to stop the embassy
trials by making them appear ridiculous in advance.
[109]
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There is no doubt that the British Government knew
of the decline in Polish law. On the 3rd February,
1948, the FO's John Russell in Warsaw sent Fiankey a
report to indulge Hankey's "morbid interest in the more
gruesome manifestations of the orkers' Paradise."[llO]
Similarly the Polish decree of 20th January, 1946,
making provision for "responsibility for the defeat of
Poland in September, 1939 and for aiding and abetting
the introduction of fascism in the state before the
second world war" to be punished was commented upon by
Sir Donald Gainer to the Foreign Office.
"I need hardly point out the sinister
possibilities of this retrospective legislation
and it will be interesting to see how far the
decree is used to settle old scores." [111]
There were other decrees passed that were equally
specific to the socialist world. "Reducing the
efficiency of work" as well as "mocking or abusing the
State" were punishable, as was spreading "false news
which is capable of injuring vitally the interests of
the Polish State or of lowering the dignity of its
authoritative organs.' These were described in the
decree of June 13th, 1946, as "Offences Particularly
Dangerous During the Reconstruction of the State." In
reality it meant that anyone could be arrested by the
security police and some charge would be found to taKe
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them to trial - and invariably they would confess to
the charges themselves, although confession was not, as
ambassador Sir Donald Gainer pointed out in his letter
to the FO on the 29th of December, 1947, to be taken as
a true indication of guilt. One case he highlighted had
'confessed' his crime and been convicted. The date of
his appeal did not come through until after he had
finished his term in prison but he went through the
motions of the appeal to regain his civic rights which
had been withdrawn by the original court: he was
acquitted on all charges even though he had confessed.
The obvious conclusion drawn by the British ambassador
was that a confession was recognised as being valueless
even by the Polish courts. [112]
Eugen Loebl, who was himself persecuted by the
Secret Police in Czechoslovakia, described the way that
confessions were extracted:
"hat they achieve is to demoralize. They have
time, you see. If they had beaten me up - and if I
had given in, under pain - well, one day pain
disappears and I would deny it all again. But here
I had to convince myself, and in this demoralized
state of affairs (and this is a process of
demoralization), I confessed to whatever they
wanted." [113)
In the best Orwellian tradition of "1984", it was not
enough that the convict be made to confess - he had to
believe his own confession as well.
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According to the National Committee for a Free
Europe's review of the Year: 1950, published in New
York, Poland had from 300,000 to half a million
prisoners in compulsory labour camps. The construction
of the Odra-Danube Canal had led to a mass wave of
arrests and a massive camp being built to house the
45,000 prisoners. The review continues:
"The Warsaw regime had already begun in 1945
systematically to deprive the working class of all
social rights, first of all by banning strikes
(unlawfully) and later by gradually imposing
methods of so-called competitive work
(stakhanovism), piece-work pay, etc. These steps
were preliminary to the introduction of a system
of slave labour, fully realised only in 1950."
[114]
The point of all this was not lost in the discussion
about the Polish Armed Forces in the west. Whereas it
	
was easy to	 say	 that all Poles ought to go back
to Poland, the reality of the situation was far from
ideal for return. The NP for Glasgow, Comlachie,
McGovern, made a speech during the second reading of the
Polish Resettlement Bill:
"If Warsaw wants these men - and I would like to
see them go back to their own country - let them
make conditions tolerable in Poland. Let them give
these men freedom of thought, and see that there
is fair play for all. Let them create a Poland
where a man is free to express his iil1, not, as
it is today, a country where darkness prevails,
where every person who opposes the Communist
regime is condemned as a fascist." [115]
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Not all MPs were as well reasoned as McGovern. Reading
the speeches made by some - given nearly fifty years of
hind-sight - reveals an overwhelming and almost
embarrassing lack of objectivity in their view of
post-war events. One Labour MP made the following,
remarkable, speech during the Yalta debate:
"The first point I want to make on that subject is
this. What about the good faith of the USSR? I
might have dilated upon that, and hon. Members
would not have been surprised if I had given a
number of instances of its good faith, but I do
not wish to make my speech longer.... Does she
[the USSR] want to absorb Poland herself or make a
puppet of Poland? [...] I do not see for one
moment why she should desire, in the very least,
to make the Polish a puppet. It would only lead to
endless squabbles with Great Britain and the
United States. Further, the Soviet Union has shown
very clearly in recent months that she values, at
least as much as we do, the vital business of the
three Great Powers remaining friends.
...One of the amazingly remarkable things
demonstrated in this war is that a multi-national
state like the Soviet Union, with a great variety
of races and with a hideous history of repression
in Tsarist days of almost all these races by one
of them, has remained completely strong and
coherent, so that the ordinary observer does not
know that it is a multi-national state. Remember
that every nation within it has the absolute right
to secede at any moment, but none has wanted to,
because it is perfectly happy where it is." [116]
Fortunately not every one agreed with Labour's
Mr Pritt, but there were not enough MPs who opposed
him. The debate over yalta was the real test in
Parliament of the true friends of Poland and the issues
which her cause represented. Vice-Admiral Taylor spoke
eloquently on the subject.
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'e have won the war, but the Poles say that they
have lost it. We owe Poland a great debt. Surely
it is our obligation to Poland to see to it that
the sovereignty, independence and freedom of
Poland are assured by democratic means in that
country in fulfilment of our pledges and our
principles and as an earnest of our gratitude to
her heroic people." [117]
One of the bravest speeches was by the Conservative MP,
Captain McEwen, who stood on a point of honour and
protested about what was happening to Poland:
"However, I want to deal in the first instance
with the excuse which has been put forward - hat
else could we have done 7 [...] Quite apart from
the unworthiness of such a reason being put
forward by a great Power which has been dealing,
presumably, on an equal footing with the other
great Powers in a conference, in my view it would
have been better to say frankly that we could not,
in this instance agree. [...] Then it is said: "If
that is the line you take, then you would have
left the Poles in Poland to what you consider to
be a Russianized Lublin Government and done
nothing for them." On the whole, and taking the
admittedly pessimistic view of the future of the
Poles under the arrangements which have been
reached, which I do, I would answer: "Yes, I do
not think they would have been much worse off."
[Hon Members: "Oh."] Believe me, I am not only
thinking, or even mainly thinking, in this respect
of Poland; I am thinking of this country. Had we
refused to agree, and stuck to the Arciszewski
Government... I say we would at least now have no
cause to be ashamed. If it is said further that
had we done so we would have found ourselves in
complete diplomatic isolation, why then, I can
only marvel that even now, at this late hour, we
have still not learned the lesson of 1940 - that
it is a very little thing to stand alone if we are
convinced that we are standing for the right, nor,
in that cause will we ever lack friends for long.
[...]
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What has been done in the Crimea Conference has
been done, but I for one cannot join in the chorus
of approval which has greeted its doing, and
both for the sake of my conscience and in the hope
of lessening the possibilities of this sort of
thing repeating itself at some future stage, I
feel I cannot allow it to pass without registering
a definite but uncompromising protest." [1181
When the Division came the Yalta Declaration was passed
with 413 Ayes and no votes against (although several
Members, including Capt. McEwen abstained). [119] There
was one note of dissent in the proceedings with several
MPs sponsoring an amendment to the original declaration
which read:
"But, remembering that Great Britain took up arms
in a war of which the immediate cause was the
defence of Poland against German aggression and in
which the overriding motive was the prevention of
the domination by a strong nation of its weaker
neighbours, regrets the decision to transfer to
another power the territory of an ally contrary to
treaty and to Article 2 of the Atlantic Charter
and furthermore regrets the failure to ensure to
those nations which have been liberated from
German oppression the full right to chose their
own government free from the influence of any
other power." [120)
This was supported by 25 MPs and the Commons threw it
out with 396 Noes. It is one of the perverse ironies of
history that the people who most objected to the Munich
Agreement in 1938 tended to be the most ardent
supporters of the Yalta Accords. Mr Gallacher, the
Communist, said the following of Munich:
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"No one desires peace more than I and my party,
but it must be a peace based upon freedom and
democracy and not upon the cutting up and
destruction of a small state." [121]
Gallacher's views on the post-war settlement are dealt
with in Chapter 6 but the contradiction comes in his
support for small states against Nazism yet supported
the Soviet Union against the small states of East
Central Europe. Umiastowski points out the other
anomaly of the situation:
"The members of Parliament who cast their vote in
approval of Churchill's policy in the Crimea were
the same men from whom Chamberlain had collected
366 votes . . .in support of his deal at Munich."
[122]
As Poland slipped into totalitarianism and the
extinction of recognised law, so the 'great powers'
applauded themselves that they had solved the 'Polish
Question'. But as Leszek Ko?akowski put it forty years
after the meeting in the Crimea:
"Let us remember, Poland was in no way represented
at Yalta and the fate of millions was decided by
three old men: a bloodthirsty tyrant, a terminally
ill statesman who knew little about the issues,
and a Realpolitiker of a declining Empire." [123]
The attitude pursued by many British MPs in relation to
the Soviet Union was akin to the 'Peace at all costs'
policy of before the war. Another of the Conservative
MPs who supported the Yalta Amendment, Mr Raikes,
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championed the idea that Poland, with British help, was
dismantling democracy.
"...even though Great Britain might not be able at
this stage to do much for Poland, we could do
something more than underwrite a charter for
Poland which, without proper safeguards, must be
the end of Poland. The Prime Minister said in his
speech that of course all parties will have free
elections, except pro-Nazi and anti-democratic
parties. I challenge him now: Can he name one
pro-Nazi party in Poland? If there is one country
which, under suffering and misery, has kept its
soul, it is Poland. We know so well that the
Russians, and indeed the Lublin definition of
'democracy' and 'Pro-Nazi' are rather different
from ours. Everybody with whom you disagree in
Russia is a pro-Nazi or an anti-democrat. [...]
We have even had General Bor himself, the hero
of Warsaw, described as a capitulating traitor in
the pay of Berlin." [124]
The Poles in the West were not as reticent as the
British authorities might have liked about the
conditions in Poland. On the 5th of May, 1939, Poland's
Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck spoke to the Polish
Sejm:
"Peace is a valuable and desirable thing. Our
generation, which bled in several wars, surely
deserves a period of peace. However, peace, like
almost all things of this world has its price,
high but definable. We in Poland do not know the
conception of peace at any price. There is only
one thing in the life of men, nations and states
which is without price - that is honour." [125]
As discredited as the pre-war regime was, the words of
Colonel Beck were as true in 1945 as they were in 1939
and they were shared by most of the Poles who refusect
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to return to Poland. Tne Polish press in the West
attacked the estern Allies' apparent lack of will to
resist Moscow. An article entitled: "The Ideology Of
The Capitulators - In What Fashion Should Poles Gain
The Trust Of The Soviet Union?" in the "Polish Daily &
Soldiers Daily" attacked what it saw as craven
submission to the Soviet Union:
"Is it by defiling oneself, by calling ourselves
fascists, blackguards, and Hitlerite lackeys from
morning to evening? Is it by declaring war on
Europe, the Church, European culture? Is it by the
promise, that with the dazed peasant and gaunt
worker whom we have created with our very own
Polish hands that we will destroy our
intelligentsia, faith, culture, and accept a faith
that is alien to us, which is nothing to us....
History teaches us that no one can stop
dictatorial totalitarianism through even the
farthest reaching compromises...." [126]
The Poles' sense of isolation was profound. The Poles
in the West knew what conditions in Poland here like,
and they knew that the British and US Governments also
knew, yet they were still expected to remain silent and
not complain. Neal Ascherson wrote that after five
years of Nazi occupation the liberation of Poland had
come ". . .wearing a uniform of irony". [127] In 1945,
the Polish American Congress announced:
"As Poland's independence is being strangled by a
Soviet military noose, there is not a single word
of protest from our government. This silence only
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intensifies the mental, physical and spiritual
anguish of the people of Poltnd." [128]
"The world is too weary to protest.
And for Poland, Justice sleeps."
Polish American Congress
September 27th, 1945.[129)
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CHAPTER FIVE
"The Regime Holds Out Its Hand..."
Warsaw's Reaction To The Repatriation
Of The Poles.
After Half A Century General Anders Is
Finally Acknowledged in Poland.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Poland of 1945 had lost six million people in the
death camps, the execution grounds, and as a result of
the many battles that occurred in the country as the war
front swept east and then swept back to the west. The
country was also short of some one and a half million
Poles who had, mostly through no fault of their own,
found themselves beyond Poland's borders as Displaced
Persons and members of the Polish Armed Forces.
If Poland was to make good the devastation that five
years of war had brought to it then the Poles needed all
the help they could get, in particular they needed hands
to work. The country could not make good the six million
immediately but it could encourage as many Poles as
possible to return from abroad to help in reconstruction.
Despite the many calls for the Poles abroad to
return there is still a great deal of doubt as to the
good will of the Polish Provisional Government. Certainly
many of the members of the Polish Repatriation Missions
were honourable men whose positive efforts can not be
doubted, yet even they, given time and the light of
experience, came to believe that they were fighting
against a hidden agenda in which the repatriates, and in
particular the Polish Armed Forces in the West, were to
play no part.
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The Information Bureau for Military Affairs of the
Citizen's Committee for Poles announced in August, 1945:
"The overwhelming majority of soldiers in emigration
have decided to return to Poland. There are numerous
cases where this figure reaches 90-100% of the total
personnel of the unit. This is happening despite the
anti-patriotic propaganda of General B6r-Komorowski,
Koparski, Guchowski, Iycki and others....
The Polish soldier in emigration has understood
that his place is at home, helping - in the ranks of
the army or in the workshops - to build a new
democratic Poland.
Poland is being raised from her collapse and is
being rebuilt. No true Pole can absent himself from
this undertaking...." [1]
The Polish Government was unequivocal in its appeal
for Poles to return to Poland yet often this call fell on
deaf ears - most Poles distrusted the Warsaw regime and
had little faith in the promise of good treatment. What
is more revealing is the attitude of many leading Poles
ho were prepared to work with the new regime while at
trie same time secretly telling anyone who would listen
that all was not well in Poland. General
Boruta-Spiechowicz was one senior officer who had been to
the 'new' Poland and had returned to London to resign his
commission before returning to Poland for good. In a top
secret meeting with War Office representatives in March
1946, Boruta outlined what he considered to be Warsaw's
attitude to repatriation. The O footnote said the talks
were "...of particular secrecy + Boruta's name should not
be used in conjunction with information contained."
Brigadier Davy's conclusions about the meeting here:
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4. Boruta considers that the present regime does not
want the Polish Armed Forces back in Poland,
especially before the elections. It is generally
believed that the vast majority of them are
supporters of Mikolaiczyk [sic]. It is not a question
of their numbers and their personal votes, but rather
of the moral influence they would have in favour of
the Peasant Party. All the present difficulties are
really intended to delay their return until the
elections are over and decided in favour of the
present regime.
5. Boruta considers that the only solution which can
solve our problem of disposing of the Poles and the
Polish problem of ensuring freedom for Poland is for
all Poles, with the exception of a few who would be
unacceptable in Poland, to return to Poland
unconditionally as soon as the terms are published.
He fears that, encouraged by what Warsaw calls the
"black reactionaries", they hill at once start to
stipulate that they must return as armed units or at
least as armed soldiers. This would immediately give
an excuse to the Warsaw authorities for further
procrastination. If on the other hand they agreed to
return unconditionally the Warsaw authorities could
hardly refuse to receive them." [2]
These views were confirmed by another of the Poles who
had gone over to the Provisional Government - the old
'ruffian' as Hancock of the FO had called him - Professor
Kot, Warsaw's newly appointed ambassador to Rome:
"I understand that Professor Kot has admitted to
Major Gawronski that he is much embarrassed by the
Polish Government's unwillingness to accept
repatriates. He blames the Communists in Warsaw for
the attitude and claims that they are opposed to the
repatriation	 of	 anyone	 who	 might	 join
M.Mikolajczyk's party". [3]
The report went on that it could not be ruled out that
the Polish authorities would not allow the ships
bringing the soldiers to Poland to dock. These secret
views were far from the official pronouncements of the
new	 regime. The	 other 'ruffian' in Rome, %'arsaw's
military attache, Colonel Sidor, in his book "W Niewoli U
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Andersa" - wrote that:
"The attitude of the Polish Government towards the
soldiers and officers of the 2nd Corps was
completely positive and remains so today [written
1947). The Polish people condemn the criminal
politics of the leaders of the 2nd Corps but still
wanted the speediest repatriation of all the Polish
soldiers who found themselves beyond Poland's
borders." [4]
The Poles in Warsaw declared that they wanted the
repatriation to go ahead; the British certainly wanted to
rid themselves of the Poles in their charge and speeded
the situation along, yet at the same time Warsaw appeared
to be stalling the issue. There seemed to be some
contradiction in the way the Poles were acting and the
Foreign Office found it increasingly difficult to work
out just what the Provisional Government was up to - and
Hankey told Kuropieska as much in April, 1946. He, for
one, could not see what the problem was and why the Poles
who did want to go back were not being allowed to do
so. [5]
The staff of the Polish Legations across Europe and
of the State Directorate for Repatriation [FUR] were at
the front line of trying to get the Poles to return to
Poland. The effectiveness of these bodies largely
depended on the quality of staff that were employed.
According to a PUR directive of 1945, members of Military
Missions should be:
"Positive and Idealistic about the new political
system.
a/ They should be well informed about the
construction of the new system;
b/ they should be intelligent and be able to give
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clear and convincing answers to the most sensitive
of questions;
Cl they should be fully acquainted with both foreign
and internal politics and with the state of the
national economy;
d/ they should pay particular attention to their
personal behaviour, especially in the consumption of
alcohol." [6]
In London Colonel Kuropieska was Warsaw's man to
deal with military repatriation. He had originally been
selected to be on the Polish Armed Forces General
Staff after Warsaw took over command - if and when
the British let them. The Commander-in-Chief was	 to
be General	 wierczewski, his deputy and
	 Chief	 of
Political Affairs was Colonel Grosz, the Chief of Staff
was General Mossor, Chief of the Information
Department was Lt-Col. Zadrzyñski, and Colonel Kuropieska
was to have been the Chief of Operations. When Warsawts
plans fell through Kuropieska was sent to London as part
of the Repatriation Mission under General Modelski. He
was there appointed as military attaché, almost by
default. The first candidate, Paris attache' Colonel
Naszkowski, was offered the post but declined saying he
would prefer to stay in France - ostensibly as his wife
was ill. Kuropieska, a committed supporter of the new
regime in Poland, seems, by his own pen at least, to have
had a genuine concern for the repatriation of the Poles
in the West and criticises the shortcomings of his fellow
Mission members. General Modeiski was criticised by him
as bearing a grudge against the very people he was
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supposed to be encouraging to return; the naval
attache was criticised for much the same reason.
According to Kuropieska Commodore Jerzy Klossowski was
responsible for many sailors not going home. Before the
war he had been by-passed for promotion and had retired
from active service in 1934. He was unknown in the new
Navy and the fact that he was sarcastic by nature did not
endear him to anyone. [7] Similarly General Mossor seemed
to be a bad choice to send to London. Kuropieska reports
Mossor as saying of the officers who fought in the
September Campaign that when they returned to Poland they
would have "buckets of slops thrown over them." [8)
Hardly words designed to encourage a mass return of the
Officer Corps - and this from the proposed Chief of
Staff. The only member of the Mission that Kuropieska
seems to have had any respect for at all was Colonel
Grosz who was, according to Kuropieska, the real head of
the Mission, not only intellectually but by nature of
the trust put in him by the political leaders in Warsaw.
[9] The impression the military attache' gives is that
if the Provisional Government had wanted not to
encourage repatriation then they had the right staff in
London.
The biggest complaint from Warsaw's representatives
was that they were rarely told just what they were
expected to do or how they were expected to do it.
Kuropieska wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
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warsaw with his own ideas as to why he was in London:
"I have not been called to formulate the aims of our
game with the British and - while I am sure these
aims have been formulated - I am not party to their
contents. For the purposes of my work here I take
our aim to be the following:
1. To return to Poland as many able and morally
healthy citizens as possible. f...]' [10]
Even officers working towards the aim of full
repatriation had to contend with the unpredictable and,
more often than not, unhelpful interventions from arsaw.
One of the biggest shocks for Kuropieska came with
the news that as of the 14th of February, 1946, Warsaw
was disclaiming the Polish Armed Forces in the West. He
was told about the move while on a visit to Warsaw and
told to inform Deputy-Foreign Minister Modzelewski, who
was then on a visit in London. Because Kuropieska's plane
was delayed in Brussels by bad weather Modzelewski had to
read about the move from a British newspaper. It seemed
that there was little or no coherent policy in Warsaw. This
was confirmed by Kuropieska who adds that at a press
conference just prior to his departure from Warsaw there
had been no mention made of the move. [11]
Opinions were divided as to the benefits of Warsaw's
February edict. Wilk, the editor of the PSL paper, told
Kuropieska that the timing of the move was particularly
bad. Apparently talks with the British were going well
and that some 80% of the Polish forces may have gone
back, but following the announcement arsaw would be
lucky if 10 to 15% went back. Wilk found it difficult to
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work out the reasoning behind the Provisional
Government's thinking. Kuropieska, loyal to the regime,
said that the situation had not changed and if anything
it made repatriation more likely. [12]
One of the principal reasons for denying the Polish
forces in the way Warsaw did was do encourage Britain to
demobilise the troops and to make the appropriate
payments. Current British policy was to return Poles to
Poland as soldiers and leave it up to Poland to
demobilise them. In this way it was the Polish Government
who were liable for demob payments and not London. This
had led to many protests from the Polish Embassy accusing
London of bad faith and led to the move in February that
Polish Consulates would not deal with Polish soldiers but
only civilians. The logic being that if the British
wanted to be rid of the Poles - and Warsaw knew
they did - then they would have to pay the demobilisation
payments. [13]
rlhe question of war gratuities threatened to disrupt
the whole process of repatriation. The first transport
from the UK was held up for a time as soldiers protested
at the way they were being sent home. It was certainly
not the grand return to Poland that most had expected; if
anything it had been rushed and makeshift. As the ship
was about to leave on New Year's Eve, 1945, - Bevin had
promised Parliament that repatriation would begin that
year - the soldiers wanted to leave their weapons on the
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jetty as a silent protest but on contacting Warsaw
Kuropieska told them that they should not go ahead with
the protest. [14)
There were very few issues on which the Poles in
London and in Warsaw agreed but London's apparent
tightfisted approach to Polish soldiers returning home
was one. Major Jan Kuniarz of the Polish (London)
Demobilisation Office wrote to the Deputy Chief of Staff
saying that French, Belgian, Czech and Dutch soldiers,
whose contribution to the war effort had not been as
great as that of the Poles and whose home situation was
not as grave, had no restrictions as to what they could
take home with them. Similarly a British rifleman who was
being sent home from overseas could, after 5 years
service, carry lOOkgs of luggage, an officer could carry
25Okgs all at the Governments expense. As for gratuities,
other ranks were paid £100, a lieutenant £150 and a
colonel £280. A Pole, on the other hand, received no
gratuity, no civilian clothing and could not even take
things he had bought with his own money unless he could
carry them. Worse than this was the worry that the
savings that soldiers had made might well be wasted due
to a problem in the transfer of funds from British to
Polish banks. [15]
	
The kit that a Polish soldier was
allowed to take with him was:
Battledress	 Rations: 10 Day
Dress Coat
	
Sterling: £5.00
Underwear x2	 (or £10.00 in other currency)
Shirts	 x2	 Baggage: Hand portable.
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Blankets x3
Kitbag
Bread sack
Webbing Harness
Rifle or Pistol (no ammunition) [16]
The issue again made it to the House of Commons when the
Secretary of State for War, Mr Bellenger, was asked how
many Polish soldiers in Italy had volunteered for
repatriation since Bevin's "Keynote" speech. Bellenger'S
answer was that 3,500 had volunteered but 2,300 had
subsequently refused repatriation at the last moment, the
reason for these refusals was put down to not being paid
war gratuities, arrangements not having been made to move
savings to Poland and the fact that new uniforms had not
been issued to soldiers. [17]
The question of the soldiers' savings was proving
such a problem that the British Government had to produce
a leaflet to hand to Polish soldiers explaining the
financial aspects of repatriation. No Postal Orders were
to be taken out of the UK, similarly US and Canadian
Dollars and Swiss Francs were forbidden to be taken
abroad. No more than £5.00 Sterling was allowed to be
taken out of the country and any excess was to be paid
into the Post Office Savings Bank and they could then
take the savings book with them to Poland or they could
deposit the book with the British authorities for safe
keeping, the soldier would then get a receipt. The
leaflet concluded with the words that "exact compliance
with the above instructions will ensure the absolute
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security of their savings." [18]
The British did finally concede the point of
gratuities but on a discretionary basis - the 22nd May,
1946, was chosen as the date from when payments would be
made. It was argued in the Foreign Office that prior to
that date the British Government did not have to make
payment and after that date they were only paid as a
symbol of good faith to encourage the Poles to return.
[19] This then prompted Warsaw's representatives to
protest in the name of all the soldiers who had returned
to Poland without these payments as they tried to get
London to come forward with the back pay, with little
success. Every Polish soldier who had entered the Polish
Armed Forces prior to the 15th of June, 1945, and had
completed 180 days service was entitled, for every month
served, to 10 Us Dollars as a Private, 12 US Dollars as a
Corporal and so on up the scale. Further to this they
would be entitled to 56 days paid leave as soon as they
crossed the Polish border. [20] As far as the War and
Foreign Offices were concerned they were going out of
their way to help the Poles get home)
 yet the Provisional
Government still appeared to be looking for a fight with
London.
One episode that confirmed London's worst fears
about the positive attitude of the Poles was the
protest by Marshal Rola-Zymierski that in the returning
convoys only one round of ammunition was issued per man.
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'Ihe British were again accused of bad faith. The Foreign
Office did its best to explain that the ammunition, 2,000
rounds in all, had been loaded on the ship and was never
intended for individual distribution, its presence was
meant to be seen as symbolic. The FO had no objection to
a 'reasonable' amount of ammunition being carried per man
providing the Warsaw authorities said what they
considered as 'reasonable'. Dennis Allen of the FO, in a
letter to Cavendish-Bentinck, could not help coming to
the conclusion that: "It seems pretty clear that,
whatever arrangements are made, the Polish authorities
will complain about something!". Major Roberts of the WO
had come to much the same opinion, writing to Hancock of
the FO, he stated that: "There is no doubt that the
Warsaw Poles are all out to pick upon any and every
excuse for a complaint, whether one
	 is	 justified
or not!" [21]
Warsaw's February 14th announcement, bombshell as it
was, was also a mixed blessing for the British
administration as it gave them a free hand in dealing
with the Polish Armed Forces. It also gave them the
reasoning that if harsaw had given up its claim to the
Polish Armed Forces it must also have given up its claim
to the not insubstantial military hardware that went with
a modern army, and for which Poland was making demands.
Warsaw was again rapidly using up its store of British
goodwill in its dealings with London.
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Kuropieska had told Hankey that the Poles wanted the
planes of the Polish Squadrons of the RAF to be handed
over to Warsaw's control. He further added that the
planes had no military value to Poland, equipped as they
were with Soviet hardware, but the gift would be seen as
an earnest gesture of Britain's goodwill towards Poland.
Hankey's reply was that Britain could not afford such
gestures and the Provisional Government was not helping
its own cause by its persecution of the PSL and by the
fact that Britain had already given Poland Bailey bridges
with no response from the Warsaw Poles. [221 Joseph Retinger
acting as an intermediary between the British Government and
the Warsaw Poles, recalled the same incident:
"So long as the supplies were arriving, the Warsaw
officials were all smiles, and I was received as a
friend and benefactor. However, when I asked them to
thank the British ambassador they would not do so.
On the contrary, they prevented any publicity in
Poland which would show that the goods were gifts
from Britain. [...]
I asked the Polish authorities a number of
times to thank the British Government, arid at least
to pay their share of the expenses but they flatly
refused. Mr Cavendish-Bentinck told me that as they
could not do otherwise, they invited him to the
inauguration of the Stettin Bridge, but during the
ceremony not a word was said of its being a gift
from Britain." [23]
The feeling of hostility towards the Warsaw Poles
reached the highest level of Government - even to
Bevin himself. Retinger had a first hand encounter
with Bevin's	 true feelings.
"Incidentally, when I was taking Mr Modzelewski
along the long corridors of the House of Commons to
Sir Stafford's [Cripps] room I met Ernest Bevin, who
said in his very rough way: "I hear that you are
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bringing these bastards from Warsaw here. I agree
that you ought to do your best for your country, but
I am sorry that you are in such bad company." [24]
Personal feelings aside, there were more substantial
reasons why the British Government was reluctant to give
Warsaw more military equipment than it had to. Kuropieska
recounts that the former Tory Air Minister, Sir Archibald
Sinclair, had told Polish Pilot-Colonel Brzezina that the
Polish Forces should not return to Poland straight away,
at least not for two years, so as not to give away
military secrets to a "potential adversary". Although
Kuropieska had heard the exiles using such 'cold-war'
rhetoric he was surprised that it had come from such a
high British source. [25]
The behaviour of the Warsaw authorities did not help
their own cause in this issue. The provisions of the
Yalta Agreement had not been fulfilled, as the
Conservative Opposition did not fail to communicate at
every opportunity in the Commons; there had not been
elections in Poland and the Polish Secret Police still
terrorised the opposition parties and at the same time
Warsaw's military attache' was running around London
telling the British that they should hand over Spitfires
and warships as 'a gesture of good faith'. Needless to
say this appeal was not met with open arms. Particularly
revealing is a draft text from the FO to the Admiralty
from March of 1946:
"It seems to us that our best policy may well now
prove to be to stall on the whole question of the
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return of any naval units until such time as the
present provisional government is replaced by a more
permanent administration as the result of elections
in Poland when we might hope to secure a reasonable
agreement with better hopes of it being
carried out." [26]
This paragraph was removed from the text that was sent,
but its meaning was clear, echoed as it was by Hankey of
the FO in May, 1946: "Personally I wouldn't give Warsaw
anything till they hold elections". [27]
The Admiralty did not dispute the return of the
warships that the Polish forces had brought with them,
ships like the B7yskawica and Burza which had been in
the Polish Navy before 1939. Other ships had been given
to Poland by the	 Royal	 Navy;	 the Conrad and the
Krakowiak had been HMS Danae 	 and	 HMS Silverton
respectively. Whereas the Warsaw Poles took the line
that they were morally entitled to these ships - the
Admiralty, not surprisingly, opposed this view. More
than this, the Admiralty were not prepared to hand over
its newest equipment to the Communists, the old
Polish ships had been extensively refitted since 1939 and
it was decided that when the BXyskawica did go back to
Poland it would be stripped back down to 1939 standard -
another clear example, according to Kuropieska, of more
bad faith from London. [28]
The autumn of 1946 brought a fresh wave of protest
and counter-protest over the issue of Polish citizenship
and the call to join the Resettlement Corps. Kuropieska
highlighted the options open to Warsaw in his memo of
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August 8th, 1946. The first option was to protest over
the creation of the PRC and to threaten to withdraw the
citizenship of any Pole who joined the Corps and at the
same time to be ready for a mass rise in repatriation.
The other option was to go along with the idea of the
Resettlement Corps as the best solution for its citizens
and to try to influence the structure. By maintaining
good relations with the British the Poles would then have
a claim after two years to the technical material used in
the PRC, the Poles would receive the best possible
training and education and the Embassy could make sure
that the Poles were not exploited or used for dangerous
or degrading work. The first option would, according to
Kuropieska, fall into the hands of the British who would
like nothing more than to get rid of the Poles with the
least possible expense. The second option was certainly
the most favourable as regards the treatment of the
Polish troops. The British had given very little thought
to what would happen if the Poles stayed in the UK;
someone had to influence the organisation of the Corps
and by showing a kind face to the Polish troops and by
demonstrating that after two years the Poles would still
be welcome in their own country the troops would go back,
and they would go back trained and skilled at British
expense. By careful use of propaganda the Warsaw Poles
could show the world and the Polish Forces that they here
interested in the well being of the individual and the
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well being of Poland, rather than just starting a third
world war as the exiles seemed to be. The political
leaders in arsaw chose the first option and Kuropieska,
then a devout Party member, says he also favoured this
first option of protest at the time. Writing many years
later he admits that Warsaw should have chosen the second
option and it was an opportunity that was missed. The bad
faith he accused the British of at the time was
over-stated if not completely wrong. [29)
The propaganda machine of the Provisional Government
swung into action threatening to deprive any Pole of his
citizenship for joining the PRC.
Marshal Rola-Zymierski declared that:
"The Polish Armed Forces, remaining to this point
under British command, will be demobilised and in
their place there will be created - without asking
the opinion of the Government of National Unity -
the so called 'Polish Resettlement Corps' which will
be a unit of the British Army. Former Polish
soldiers will be treated as citizens without
Government and without a country. [...)
I remind everyone that the honour of the Polish
soldier will not allow a Pole to serve under a
standard that is not red and white when his country
needs him and call for his return home." [30]
The threat of loss of citizenship was announced by
Warsaw Radio on the 12th September, 1946, in another
speech by Rola-Zymierski:
"In accordance with the Law on Polish Nationality of
1929 entry into foreign military service without the
consent of the Polish Government renders the
offender liable to loss of citizenship. On behalf of
the Government of National Unity I want to warn you,
soldiers, that entry in to the resettlement corps
exposes you to the danger of losing your rights as
citizens and, following from this, of losing the
possibility	 of	 returning home." [31]
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The move was widely reported by the British press at the
time. As already mentioned certain British newspapers
were hostile to the Polish forces and their treatment of
certain issues was questionable to say the least. Even
Hankey compared the wording of the above statement with
the way it was treated in "The Times" of the 16th
September. Although 'varsaw had only said that the Poles
could lose their citizenship but it was reported that
they would lose it. The implication being - go home
before it's too late.
The threat of losing their nationality and with it
the right to return to Poland was taken very seriously by
many Poles - just as it was intended - and many of the
senior officers did their best to allay these fears.
Maj-Gen. Macleod of the PRC Advisory Staff wrote to
Hankey with a paraphrase of General Anders' view on the
situation:
"Don't worry, a lot of us won't go back to Poland
anyway if this Government is in Power, and if
another Government comes into Power under which we
may be willing to live in Poland, that Government
would be almost certain to revoke the decree
withdrawing your nationality." [32]
Warsaw's men were going around telling the Polish Forces
in Britain not to join the PRC while knowing full well
that the Poles were apprehensive about returning to
Poland. The mental anguish that they created was immense
and the bad feeling they created in hiteha1l was also
very strong. Both the FO and the WO had invested a great
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deal of time in creating the Resettlement Corps only to
see it threatened at birth by Warsaw's latest policy
decision.
Linowski in "Trudne Powroty" states:
"Of course the aim of Polish policy was not to make
life difficult for the British authorities but
rather to find a solution that was most advantageous
for their particular point of view. This is
something the British did not want to understand."
[33]
It is doubtful that the corridors of the Foreign Office
reverberated with praise for how reasonable the Warsaw
Poles were being and as to their 'particular point of
view' it was still an open question as to which, if any,
soldiers were wanted back in Poland.
In private and public conversation the Communist
representatives could appear to be very reasonable. The
following minutes were noted in a London meeting between
Grosz and Cripps, with Retinger in attendance:
Grosz to Cripps:"Furthermore these people have done
nothing wrong against Poland. On the
contrary, they are returning covered with
the glory of fighting the Germans, so
what possible harm is going to come to
them?
[He than mentions the AK; that they have
been recognised and are working with the
full confidence of the authorities.]
Retinger:	 Not all of them - far from all of them.
Grosz (Categorically): All of them that don't have Polish
blood on their hands." [34]
This left the door open for Warsaw to refuse to accept
back any group of soldiers it did not want back. The
question of the Volksliste was one that vexed many a
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repatriation officer. hi1st some officers like
Kuropieska did their best to get all the Poles back to
Poland - even those who had been on the Volksliste, his
equivalent in Rome, Colonel Sidor, did the opposite. In
his 1947 book he wrote about the Second Corps continuing
the argument that Anders' Army were all fascists and
collaborators:
"The 2nd Corps marched into Italy with 50,000
people. In action - through death and injury - it
was reduced to 15,000. When the 2nd Corps was
evacuated to England it numbered 110,000 people, not
counting paramilitary auxiliaries. Where did these
"Soldiers" come from?" [35]
Putting aside the inaccuracy of Sidor's calculation he
answers his own question by saying that most came from
the German Army and war criminals from the SS, the
Gestapo, from the Russian 'Vlasov ' Army and from
Lithuanian collaborators. Although there is some truth
that a small number of criminals did escape justice by
claiming to be Poles this was largely as a result of poor
Allied screening than to a Polish desire to fill its
ranks with Nazis. Nevertheless Warsaw felt obliged to
point out the groups of soldiers that it did not want
to see in Poland. Cavendish-Bentinck ciphered the
Foreign Office in March, 1946, with news that Poland:
"Would not receive back in Poland persons who were
on the first and second categories of German
Volksliste (i.e. Reichsdeutsche and persons of
acknowledged German Race living in Poland before
1939), individuals who had been members of S.S.
formations or Vassor [sic] Army, Ukrainians and all
persons who had been on the staff of the Polish
Deuxime Bureau (STS and SOE) [Special Training
School and Special Operations Executive]"
- 240 -
Three days after GomuXka's speech, Zygmunt Modzelewski,
the Vice—Minister for Foreign Affairs, added to
this that former members of the Nazi SA were also excluded
"and persons who had publicly conducted propaganda against
the	 present Government." [36]
This last, retrospective, category could, given ill
will from Warsaw, be used to persecute repatriates.
General Anders was under no illusions what awaited the
Polish soldier who returned home and he warned them to
that effect:
"They will attempt to destroy our Armed Forces. We
shall all be exposed to their cunning agitation.
They will call for our return to our country, but we
know only too well how that would end. They will
look among Polish soldiers for men of weak
resolution. Their work will be easier as a result of
the withdrawal of the recognition of the lawful
Government of the Polish Republic, since the Polish
authorities have been deprived of the means of
information, even in the form of radio broadcasts
from London, which broadcasts have now ceased to
serve the cause of Poland.
I do not doubt for a moment that the men of the
II Polish Corps, who know why and for what Poland
has been fighting for so long, will withstand all
hostile attempts." [37]
The Repatriation Missions expended much effort to counter
such ideas. Among the troops they had their work cut out
but among the masses of Displaced Persons in Germany and
Austria there was more fertile ground in which to work.
Many of the Poles who had been moved west by the Germans
to work in German industry had been put on the Volksliste
- most often through no choice of their own - and now
felt apprehensive about returning to Poland. Since Poland
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needed their labour they were to be encouraged to return.
The Polish Repatriation Mission at Graz—Klagenfurt
broadcast to the DPs in 1946:
"Recently the verification undertaken by Polish
liaison officers at the request of the British
authorities in certain Polish centres has led to a
spread of rumours by some people, interested in
covering up their 'Volksliste' past and the fact
that they have no right to be DPs. The rumours say
that this verification is the first step to forced
repatriation. .e point out that according to
international principles no one will be forced to
return if they are confirmed by this verification to
be Poles. Poland does not need elements who do not
want to be there and work there. Similarly we need
not add that Poland does not go through the trouble
of repatriation simply to send its citizens to
another country, to imprison them or to persecute
them. Land, workshops, factories and institutions
are waiting for you. The Polish Repatriation Mission
has no intention of forcing anyone to return. On the
contrary we refuse the right to return to anyone who
by collaborating with the Germans or by obtaining
German citizenship have lost the right to be Poles.
Do not believe the rumours that are being spread
about by people who have themselves nothing to lose
and try to tie their fate to yours - who try to
create	 a	 rift between	 yourselves and the
homeland." [38]
The message was that the Poles had no fear in returning
and that all statements to the contrary were, as
Kuropieska called them, the "vile insinuations" [39] of
reactionaries who wanted to harm the interests of the new
regime.
The idea that the Provisional Government did not
want mass repatriation would not go away. Even in the
autumn of 1945 Retinger - a friend of arsaw - had come
to that very conclusion in talks with Warner, then head
of the FO's Northern Department, and whose words were
reported to the Polish Armed Forces Committee:
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"Dr R. has come to the conclusion that the Polish
Government did not want the bulk of the Polish
forces under our command to return before the
winter. Not only would they starve if they went back
in large numbers now, but also on political grounds.
Warsaw would prefer to take only picked officers and
specialists at the present stage. Moreover, they had
now "realised that the great majority of volunteers
for repatriation in this country were
"Volksdeutsche". (In point of fact, the majority of
the volunteers are Poles who came over from or were
captured with the Germans. One would have thought
that if they were Volksdeutsche they would not be
keen to return to Poland in present circumstamces
and it seems not unlikely that the Warsaw
authorities are applying this term to them as
providing a more respectable excuse for refusing to
accept them.)" [40]
This flew in the face of everything the military
attache was trying to achieve in London.
Kuropieska highlights the case of one sergeant who
had been an NCO in the German Army but had deserted to
the Poles, bringing with him a complete radio station. He
had fought well in the Polish Army and had been decorated
for his efforts yet he had heard from Poland that his
wife had been interned in a camp for Volksdeutsche;
this was hardly news to encourage soldiers to return.
Kuropieska contacted Modzelewski to ask for her release
and for her to write to her husband when she was free.
The letter was sent from Poland by diplomatic courier as
a demonstration that the ex-Wehrmacht would have nothing
to fear. The colonel also made sure that everyone knew
what had happened because, as he says, there was little
point hiding this particular light under a bushel. The
troops had to know. [41]
There was a smaller but perhaps more influential
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group of Polish soldiers who were earmarked for
particularly vitriolic denunciation - the generals, and
none more so than General Anders. An article in "Zycie
Warszawy" is typical of this vilification campaign:
"We do not want people in our country who, for their
own ambition and to preserve their privilege, are
ready to betray not only the lives of their own
people but the interests of their country. Anders
has compromised himself just as those who
supported him are compromised." [42]
According to a United Press article in August, 1946,
Anders had no intention of leaving Italy. According
to 'Warsaw' Polish sources in the USA,the General had
accumulated a fortune of some $200,000 US and had bought
himself a luxury villa where, after leaving the Army,
he would live the life of a 'bon viveur'. This was
repeated in the "Espresso" and "Il Mornento" in Italy.
[43] True or not, such stories were believed.
The "Osadnik na Ziemiach Odzyskanych", a fortnightly
paper published in Warsaw was even more specific in its
attack on the old order of Poland:
the emigration of the Polish inteligentsia to
do hard manual work abroad is some act of madness;
some political revenge by the Potockis, the Anders,
the Sosnkowskis and all the other former landowners
who, today, have lost their estates in Poland to the
peasants. They have set themselves up quite
comfortably abroad. Anders has an estate in Ireland,
Potocki in South America, Sosnkowski near Montreal.
Such people we can understand, but why does an
artist; why does an engineer; why does a lawyer go
to Canada to work for some farmer or in the forest
or on the railways? [...]
One day they will stop being white slaves on whose
backs the politically and morally bankrupt are
making interest and they too will find the shortest
route home." [44]
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Of the 181 Polish generals who ended the war in the West
(including senior commanders later promoted by the
Government-in-Exile) only 11 returned to Poland. [45]
The generals were not welcome back in Poland and
Kuropieska told the former GOC Polish Parachute Brigade,
General Sosabowski, as much when they met. He was told
that many officers had evaded capture during the war and
found themselves in the West, yet had received no
command. The situation in Poland was much the same - the
Polish Armed Forces had too many senior officers and
there would be no place for those in the West. According
to the General, Kuropieska said this:
"..in a serious tone that was not meant to offend,
as he was merely trying to prove that on active
service in the present reality as existed in Poland,
even if we did decide to return to Poland, there
would be no place for us." [46]
Some senior officers did find a role in Poland,
however briefly. Paszkiewicz became the Commander of the
Warsaw Military District, Colonel Mossor became the
head of the Krakow District, General Szarecki became
head of the Polish Medical Corps, Lt-Colonel Stef an
cibor became the Second in Command of a bomber squadron
in ZOd. Colonel Jerzy Kirchmayer returned to Poland
to join the Army, eventually to be promoted to
General. This was also the case with Colonel Franciszek
Skibiriski, former CO of the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade
of the 1st (Polish) Armoured Division. That is not to say
that General Anders' words did not come true for many of
- 245 -
the returned senior officers
The 'Trial of the Generals' that took place in
August, 1950 and the following year rocked the Polish
military establishment. The process of Polish
Stalinisatiori led to the arrest of many of those who
returned to Poland. General Tatar, Colonels Mossor,
Kirchmayer,	 Skibixcski	 and	 even	 Kuropieska	 found
themselves in the dock on espionage and conspiracy
charges with 129 other Polish officers. As well as long
prison sentences there were nineteen executions handed out.
Even those who might be regarded as loyal to the regime
fell	 victim	 to the	 process - Marian Spychaiski
was imprisoned in 1950 and three years later
Marshal Zymierski met the same fate. Although in 1956
GomuXka rehabilitated those who fell victim to the
regime (he too had fallen from grace in 1948), for many
it was too late. [47)
Some Poles, for the good of the country, were
prepared to go home whatever the reaction of the regime.
Poland needed Poles and that was an end to the matter.
Tadeusz Kochanowicz explained why he returned to Poland:
"...I considered that as many Poles as possible
should return to Poland, with the exception of those
who might return in order to continue the fight
against the new political system. Ruined by war and
by the occupation, Poland needed people to work.
Abroad there were many qualified people. No doubt
they would be useful in reconstruction. A return of
the greatest number of people of goodwill,
politicians included, regardless of the the economic
conditions at home, would, in my opinion, go a long
way to calm things down in Poland." [48)
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There was hardly a soldier who did not feel the urge
to return to Poland and to help in the rebuilding
of the country. General Machalski, although he
wanted to go back, would not under any circumstances.
"I considered it was our duty to return to Poland
in closed ranks, with standards unfurled and with
our arms in our hands to join with our brothers who
conquered Berlin and hoisted the Polish flag on the
ruins of the Reichstag. Although I did think to
myself that there would be problems after Anders
brought our Army out of the USSR and the
Sikorski-Maiski agreement broke down, the other
side was not blameless. Instead of holding out
their hand to us and welcoming us back in the
country with bread and salt and with showers of
flowers they demanded we lay down our weapons, take
off our uniforms and return on consular passports.
They threatened us with court processes and
prisons. Having a clear conscience I had no
intention of justifying myself before any
procurator or to suffer for something I had not
done. It did not appeal to me that I should be
tolerated as a second class citizen in my own
country to be maltreated and humiliated. I decided
to stay abroad where I would not have to be ashamed
to work as an unskilled labourer of the lowest
order. I could not entertain the idea that in my
own country I should have to clean streets while
others, less deserving, run around in cars. I did
not return to Poland, not because I did not want to
return but because the authorities in the country
didn't want me." [49)
The argument that it was better to be poor in Britain
than in the Poles' own country was scorned by the
officers trying to encourage repatriation. Kuropieska
told many men that given the choice it was always better
that they should break rocks on Polish roads rather than
British ones. [50] Colonel Sidor was equally critical of
the view that men like Machaiski took. He wrote:
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"Anders preferred to use Polish officers and
soldiers to dig English potatoes; to clear the
rubble of London and to locate land-mines on the
beaches of Great Britain rather than allow them to
return to their families and help rebuild their own
country." [51]
Many thousands of Poles agreed with the view that
they had to get home. As Jerzy Potocki writes, nostalgia
had been eating at the troops for years but fear was the
best incentive to return. Although there was a mass of
propaganda telling the Poles that they should fear the
Communists, many thousand feared life as an exile more.
They feared the sort of manual work that they would have
to do - they were qualified to do little else and they
feared the xenophobia of the local population; it was the
fear of dying abroad that drove many to return. [52] Many
Poles were prepared to defy the propaganda; as one Polish
newspaper wrote:
"Rome. lO.l. [ 1 9 4 6] (Polish Press Agency) On the 8th
of this month in Cinecitta camp near Rome Major
Stefan Count Tyszkiewicz, former director of Anders'
Red Cross, arrived for a visit accompanied by
several other people - supposedly under the pretext
of giving assistance to the repatriates staying in
the camp.
Anders' emissaries began to campaign against
returning to Poland however the mass of indignant
repatriates gave them the response they so deserved.
Amid cries of "You are not Poles! You have no right
to do this!" the repatriates made moves to lynch
Anders' representatives and to demolish their car.
The Count was only saved by the energetic
intervention of the officers of the Polish
Repatriation Mission who prevented a kangaroo court
and managed to calm the angry crowd. To shouts of
"We don't want your thieves money! Murderers! You're
killing hundreds of people in Poland!" and "Anders'
outcasts!" the car left the camp." [531
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As well as not wanting to be exiles many Poles were
tempted by the offers put forward by repatriation
officers and the State Directorate for Repatriation
[PUR]. One soldier was told that he would not have to
work but would receive a government grant for further and
higher education. He would get accommodation and
furniture from PUR in Poland, more so since he was going
to the 'recovered territories'. As the son of a worker he
would get priority in education and if he wanted to work
he would find it straight away. Because the Germans had
killed so many of the Polish inteligentsia he was told
the country needed his humble qualifications more than
ever. Although his friends sneered with cynical
disbelief it did seeni a tempting prospect and WacXawski
returned to Poland on the 8th November, 1948. [54]
The PUR budget for propaganda to the West in 1947
was Z) 17,700,000 and was necessarily higher than the
budget to the East; the Poles in the Soviet Union
needed less encouragement to return home. [55] The
Polish (Warsaw) Ministry of Information and Propaganda
also did its best to get the regime's message
across. Wojciech Albrycht, Director of the Information
Ministry's Foreign Department, reported on the propaganda
tools sent from	 Poland in November, 1945, alone
in	 "an	 action	 to	 combat	 the	 political
narrowmindedness of the II Corps": [56]
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159,453
34,527
1,827
6,092
134
10,662
1,124
1,787
445
83
132
71
15
3
2
18
1
PROPAGANDA TOOLS SENT TO UK FOR NOVEMBER 1945.
	
Embassy Military Other	 Worldwide
In	 Attache Polish	 Figure
London	 Bodies
Periodicals	 300	 420	 1,290
Weeklies	 168	 275	 772
Illustrated
Magazines...
...in Polish	 3	 7
• . .in English 1,253	 25
Statistical	 10	 17
Reports
Brochures	 82	 235
Posters	 30	 8
Prospectuses	 3	 3
Photos	 50	 15
National	 1	 1
Symbols
Portraits	 3	 6
Maps of Poland	 2	 4
Albums	 -	 1
Maps of	 -	 1
Death Camps
Articles	 -
Films	 -
Gramophone	 -
Records (sets)
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The need to inform Poles of what was happening in
Poland was important given the large number of them
abroad. In the British Zone of Germany, occupied by 30
Corps, the Chief of the Polish Repatriation Mission,
Major Starzec, presented a report on the number of Poles
in the area:
27th March, 1946
UNIT	 AREA	 CAMPS DPs
5 DIV.	 Braunschweig 178 51,811
1 (Pol) DIV. Meppen	 30 21,069
43 DIV.	 Celle	 10 24,579
51 DIV.	 Syke	 23 24,957
3 (Can) DIV. Oldenburg	 7	 1,052
75 AA BRIG.	 Osnabruck	 2	 5,883
PWX	 TOTAL
- (British (Polish
Figures) Figures)
10,247 62,058 62,550
4,048 25,117 24,586
1,640	 --	 26,219
3,355 28,312	 --
1,301 1,353	 --
798 6,681	 --
[57'
There were no exact figures as to the number of Poles in
the 30 Corps Area, the British Authorities and Polish
Mission counted differently, but there were some 148,441
to 171,673 civilian DPs and 23,232 former prisoners of
war (PWX) held in 250 camps.
Even with all the goodwill in the world the Polish
Missions were fighting an uphill battle to get their
message across to the Poles. Their biggest complaint was
the 'hermetic' nature of the Polish camps, sealed off as
they were by officers loyal to the Poles in London. If
the Warsaw Poles could not get their message across then
the obvious outcome would be a mass of rumours, all of
them negative.
- 251 -
The Mission to 30 Corps reported regularly to
Warsaw. The report from the 13th March, 1946, complained
that the area controlled by the 1st (Polish) Armd Div.
was the most difficult to work in. Polish officers would
go around trying to discourage DPs from returning to
Poland. Capt. Sobaski was quoted as telling DP5 that a
group of repatriates going to Libeck had been detoured
into wooded ground and robbed by the British escort.
Lt. Piotrowski had spread the rumour that three children
had died on one transport as no food had been given for
three days. By such use of exaggeration and
misinformation the seeds of doubt were sown in the minds
of possible volunteers for return. [581
The April 1st, 1946, report noted that rumours
were spreading about the fate of repatriates from Poznañ
and Pomorze who, it was said, were being sent to Siberia
directly on arriving in Poland. All the repatriates were
being forced to join the PPR and anyone who had been in
Germany after 1943 was being arrested; this particularly
affected many of the civilian DPs. Relations with the
Soviet Union were also another source of rumour for the
future. Any hold up in a transport was taken to be a sign
of the imminent start of war, any Pole married to a
'Soviet Citizen' - by Moscow's definition anyone who had
lived east of the Curzon Line in 1939 - would be
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separated from their partners who would then be deported
east. [59]
The Polish Mission had the problem that it was
treated as a pariah by the London Poles who would have
nothing to do with its members. The 1st March, 1946,
report to Warsaw complained that the commander of
the Wadysaw JagieX.Xo Camp in Braunschweig, 2nd Lt.
Zastawnik, had told Warsaw's representative that he
did not recognise the office of the Mission and would
do nothing to assist them. In the 1st Division's town
of Maczków posters began to appear about the arsaw
Liaison Officer - Capt. Kukia - saying that he "Will give
morning lessons in his mother tongue - Russian." [60]
When Kukia was recalled to Warsaw at the end of March the
situation was becoming critical. Major Starzec sent
another report to Warsaw in April, 1946.:
"The region in which we have the least control is
the area held by the 1st Polish Armoured Division
where, temporarily, we have no liaison officer. The
matter of sending one of our representatives to that
area has now become urgent. In the near future the
Division is awaiting demobilisation and it is
essential that our liaison officer starts work there
as soon as possible. On the basis of personal
contacts with many soldiers and officers
(particularly the younger ones) it must be said that
the majority would like to return to Poland but
would prefer to be demobilised first or they would
like to return as organised military units." [61]
If the Military Mission in Germany felt aggrieved at
the apparent ill will of the Poles in the 1st Armoured
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Division this was nothing to the problems they felt they
were facing from the British trying to get these very
same Poles back to Poland. The Head of Mission in Bad
Saizuflen wrote to the Chief of the Polish Mission in
Berlin, Dr Jakub Prawin, on the 3rd May, 1945, to
complain about the British attitude:
"Despite the apparent good will of Brig. Carthew and
Col. Ross from the Allied Liaison Office, to this
date, it has been impossible to reach a decision
regarding the organisation of a separate transport
for the 1st Armd. Div.
The British transport authorities are hiding
behind apparent technical difficulties; a lack of
available space at Quackenbruck and Lubeck Camps
(current capacity being 400) as well as the
necessity to use the transport for economic
purposes. To date the question of separate transport
lies on dead ground
The British authorities have several times
underlined that unless the position of the Polish
authorities undergoes some considerable change there
will be a serious delay in the repatriation of 1st
Armd. Div. Personally I can't see why the British
are making such problems with the transport. It
appears to be an unwillingness to take certain new
steps and to put in the necessary investment (to
enlarge transit camps, etc.) as well as trying to
force us to take the soldiers of the 1st Armd. Div.
out of this area as quickly as possible." [62]
The problems with moving elements of the 1st Armoured
Division to Poland were not resolved until May of 1947.
Whereas the Warsaw Poles blamed the British for the delay
the British thought the fault lay in the Warsaw Poles
who seemed	 constantly to put up new obstacles.
The minutes of a meeting at Lancaster House in
Berlin, the Headquarters of the Control Commission
Germany (British Element) [CCG (BE)], show that even the
first transport that was due to leave on May 1st was held
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up at the last minute by the Warsaw Poles demanding an
extra level of screening. Repatriates were first screened
at Divisional Headquarters in Meppen, then moved to
Quakenbruk Camp before being moved by train to Stettin in
parties of 400. They were to be kept separate from DP5
and PWX. The Polish Mission demanded a secondary stage of
screening at Libeck. General Westrop, Chief of the
Combined Services Division, who chaired the meeting found
it difficult to work out just why the Poles were
demanding this new move but agreed if the Poles would
promise to keep procedures to a minimum. [63]
The people who suffered the most due to this mutual
recrimination were the Polish soldiers who, by 1947, had
spent two years with an uncertain view of the future.
Seemingly the officers of the Bad Salzuflen Mission were
positive towards repatriation. In May, 1945, the Acting
Head of Mission wrote to Prawin in Berlin with his
worries:
"Due to the protracted delay in the matter of
repatriation I have noticed a decided change of mood
in the area of the 1st Armd. Div. Those who have
declared themselves for repatriation have to wait a
long time for transport (2-3 Months). In many cases
the soldiers have been subject to all manner of
unpleasantness. Elements hostile to us have tried to
lay the blame for the delay in repatriation on the
Polish authorities - this has started various
types of rumours. I have taken every step, by my
contacts with officers, to counter these rumours and
to explain the situation as it is. I maintain,
however, that the question of repatriation needs to
be be moved along with all possible speed." [64]
Although this report seems sincere enough the question of
repatriation was not 'moved along with all possible
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speed'. Almost exactly two years after the above report
the first transport was ready to go. Captain Bojenko of
the Meppen Consulate reported the particulars the day
after the 13th of May move. The numbers to return to
Poland in the transport were 399 soldiers and 37
dependants (although 12 pulled out at the last minute for
various reason). Each soldier received four days' personal
ration and seven days' ration per man was also loaded on the
train; they were entitled to carry 150 Kgs luggage each -
this amounted to 60 tons which filled three and a half
railway wagons with another being taken up with food. The
troops themselves were loaded in twelve carriages. Although
the transport was somewhat crowded and the train had not
been disinfected since the last DP transport there were
few complaints from the Poles.
"The mood among the soldiers was good, cheerful.
They were happy. I gave out newspapers to the
departing soldiers. From the British authorities
some Captain turned up towards the end but he didn't
seem to be interested in very much. From the
Division - General Rudnicki was there. He talked to
groups of the soldiers asking them if they had
received everything that was due to them. I cantt
say that he showed any signs of a heartfelt
farewell. There were no speeches." [65]
General Rudnicki's attitude seemed to confirm the faith
that was put in him by the ar Office and bore out
General Sir Ivor Thomas' view: "I have no fears at all as
to what will come from Germany - I know Rudnicki will
play the game in a way Anders never did." [66]
On the 1st May, 1947, the 1st (Polish) Armoured
Division was	 removed	 from the BAOR ready for
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demobilisation, its place being taken by the British 7th
Armoured Div. As the arsaw Liaison officers began to be
withdrawn they produced closing reports on their activity
in Germany. As the Consulate in Meppen was closing Major
Jankowski wrote to Warsaw with a situation report
praising the men of the Division for a very positive
attitude towards the 'new' Poland. In particular the
Division's Chief of Staff, Colonel Stankiewicz, and the
Divisional Quartermaster, Major Micha, were mentioned for
being more than helpful. Despite the efforts of well
meaning officers on both sides of the political divide
the troops were still not happy. Jankowski reported that
there were many complaints that they were being kept in
the dark and had been denied the triumphant return to
Poland that they had been waiting for - they claimed that
if General Maczek had still been in command of the
Division then things would have been different. Rudnicki,
who had spent the war in Italy, had never gained the
popularity of Maczek with the men in Germany, and shows
that Maczek's removal to head the new 1st Polish Corps
was a move welcomed by Warsaw.
The repatriation rate of the Division was quite
high, especially compared to front-line units in the 2nd
Corps. The Jankowski report. written in November, 1947,
records that in the Summer of 1946 some 1,500 soldiers
returned home and then from May to October, 1947, a
further 5,453 soldiers and 1,257 dependents returned. He
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added that many Poles returned to Poland after the unit
had been shipped to the UK so that in the end only 40% of
the Division did not end up in Poland - and this
considering that 65% of the Divisiorfs manpower were Class
3 \iolksdeutsche from Silesia, Pomerania and ielkopolska.
As to the claim that Warsaw did not want Polish soldiers
to return, Jankowski points out that the Government had
only refused three applications from the Division - two
Class 2 Volksdeutsche collaborators and a Ukrainian. The
Consulate in Meppen had refused two - a German and a
Ukrainian. There were, at the time the report was
written, still 42 cases where a decision had yet to be
reached. [67]
Whereas the Polish Mission to 30 Corps did not
alienate its British host to any great extent the communist-
backed Polish Mission in Berlin seemed to do little else.
As Berlin was being divided after the war the Poles,
recognised as being in the Soviet 'sphere of influence'
had been assigned property in the Soviet Zone. The Poles
protested and appealed directly to the British Military
Government in Berlin who had then given them an empty
block of flats at 42 Schlutterstrasse - much to the
annoyance of the Foreign Office and CCG (BE). The Poles
set up shop in the British Zone, originally claiming that
they would get provisions directly from Poland - this was
a claim that was not believed by the British who assumed
they must be "...scrounging right and left and obtaining
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provender by the usual surreptitious Polish methods."
[68] The FO was right in its assessment of the situation.
The Poles who now had a foot-hold in the British Zone
then appealed to them for supplies. The British refused
on the grounds that the Poles should be in the Soviet
Zone where they were guaranteed provisions - if the Poles
didn't like it then they should leave, and the FO
encouraged the Poles to do just that. Cavendish-Bentinck
did put a proposition forward that it might have been
prudent to feed the Poles:
"Whilst I have no doubt that it would be tiresome
for us to provide rations for [the] Polish Military
Mission in Berlin, and I expect they are probably
irritating people much given to complaint,
nevertheless it may be a good investment to have
these people dependent on us for their daily bread."
[69]
This view did not gain much popularity especially when
the Poles began to push their luck and asked the British
for a villa for official use. The Warsaw Foreign Ministry
requested that the British Military Government provide a
villa with reception rooms, quarters for the Mission
members, rations on the same scale and permission to
employ staff. The CCG were unimpressed and told the
ambassador in Warsaw that the position had not changed.
Since the Poles were effectively only squatters in their
current building and since there was a great deal of
demand for property in Berlin it was suggested that the
Poles would do better not to draw attention to themselves
as they might lose the building altogether. [70] This
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seemed to put an end to the matter.
The Polish Mission in Germany consisted of 233
people: 104 in the British Zone; 54 in the Soviet Zone;
48 in the US Zone and 27 in the French Zone. [71] Their
effectiveness was questioned by Cecil King of the CCG
(BE) Main HQ's Political Division in a letter to the BAOR
Advanced HQ in Berlin:
• .there seems no doubt that the Mission are a poor
lot, and Ross' [Allied Liaison Branch] view that
they hinder rather than encourage repatriation is
also held by our people 'on the ground'..." [72]
The Military did not need convincing about the Poles. In
a report about Warsaw's Liaison Officers [Los] by 13 Area
Security Office in Schleswig-Holstein another complaint
was made about the Poles.
"HQ Mu. Gov. (DP/Px) 8 Corps District agree that
so far from being of assistance these LOs have been
a sheer nuisance; they have fulfilled no useful
function and have wasted the time of FS [Field
Security) NCOs who have been obliged to
investigate their activities." [73]
Lt. Kossobudzki was suspected of espionage, Lt.
Gawron was also suspected of espionage and of drug
smuggling. Lt. Sukowski was under observation for sending
non-censored mail, as was 2nd Lt. Miernik who was also
under suspicion of currency irregularities.
Even if the personalities were of questioned value
the machinery of repatriation was formidable. PUR in
Germany had four ships at its disposal - the SS Rotenfels
that carried 1,300 people, SS Spree for 650, SS Poseidon
for 800 and the SS Izar with a 3,000 capacity that
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replaced the SS Fischer which was withdrawn after PUR
complaints about cockroach infestation and leaks in the
hull. [74]
As well as the four ships to take the DP5 back from
Germany arrangements had to be made for transport by sea
from Britain and overland from the rest of Europe. Dr
Przewanski, the Consul General in London, wrote a report
to PUR:
"As per my earlier communication - there was a
Conference today in the Consulate between Consular
representatives, the military attache, the War
Office and the Foreign Office to try to facilitate
the repatriation of the Army by land. The following
was decided: The 'Eastern Prince' will take about
1,500 on the 24th November [1947] and the rest e
will send by rail - that is to say about 1,000
soldiers who are currently waiting and declared
themselves later. With regards to rail transport we
set down the following conditions: 1/ During
transport, all the way to the Polish frontier, food
is to be provided. 2/ Adequate protection is to be
provided. 3/ The journey will be made without
changing trains. 4/ The repatriates are to be
delivered to our border crossing at Dziedzice. As it
transpires, all of this is within the competence of
the War Office which would have to take
responsibility for the planning - knowing that they
would have to provide passenger wagons for this. I
also brought up the question of the 5 invalids who
have died while waiting for repatriation. I asked
for better conditions for the invalids and sick
soldiers. For the Foreign Office the talks were led
by Hancock, for the War Office - Col. Telfer.
From the military attache's office there was Col.
Chojecki. There were also several advisors to both
sides present. After the Conference I invited
everyone for tea and cocktails where conversation
about work was avoided." [75]
The return by sea had been an available option
almost as soon as hostilities had ended. In November,
1945, at a Cabinet meeting it was...
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"(1) Agreed that, subject to satisfactory assurances
from the Admiralty about the safety of this route,
the Foreign Secretary should inform the Polish
Provisional Government that transport could be made
available to repatriate by sea the 23,000 members
of the Polish Armed Forces who had expressed a wish
to return to Poland." [76]
Once the security aspect - namely the disposal of sea
mines in Gdynia - had been cleared up, the British
designated four ships to run the round trip to Poland. In
May, 1946, for example, The 'Eastern Prince' sailed on
the 6th with 1,507 people, including 348 dependants; on
the 9th the 'Medina Victory' sailed with 1,300; on the
12th the 'Clan Lamont' sailed with 1,410; on the 17th the
'Marine Raven' sailed with 1,994. Each ship off-loaded in
Poland and sailed back to Britain to be ready for its
next trip. By the 24th of May the 'Eastern Prince' was
ready for its second trip of the month, the 'Medina
Victory' sailed again on the 27th, the Clan Lamont on
the 30th and the Marine Raven on the 4th of June and so
on. 177]
The repatriations, once the teething troubles had
been sorted out, went smoothly but the biggest
apprehension most of the troops had was the kind of
reception that awaited them in Poland. Those who were not
going back had told them to expect the worst. One
repatriate says that as his repatriation ship reached
Poland it was approached by a motor launch with armed
guards.
"The expression on their faces was, to say the
least, indifferent. as this an omen, a foretaste of
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what the reactionary propaganda had warned us about
- a welcome by the UB and then the labour camps? We
fell silent and our good humour left us.
The ship slowly approached the jetty. It
appeared that 'they' were right. On the jetty, every
few metres, soldiers with machine guns were lined up
in rows. The ship was in total silence." [78]
As it turned out Sgt. Mrowiec had little to worry about
and after a short stay in a transit camp in Wrzeszcz was
soon in Silesia with his family.
As well as repatriates being apprehensive about the
reception there were also complaints from the Ministry of
Information and Propaganda in Warsaw that the whole
repatriation was badly organised - with time the
situation got worse.
In a series of reports by Kaimiera Ostrowska of the
Ministry to her Head Office in Warsaw she traced with
growing desperation how badly the authorities were
organising the receptions.
Report #8, dated 20th January, 1946, covered the
'Baufora's' arrival in Poland with 17 officers and 1,981
other ranks:
"The ship sailed into port to the sound of the
national anthem played by the Army Orchestra from
Wrzeszcz. The soldiers returning to their country
were welcomed by representatives of the military
authorities - Col. SokoXowski at the head, and by
members of the civil authorities. As the ship
moored there were many moving scenes: One of the
women standing on the quay recognised her husband
among a group of soldiers standing on the upper
decks - another recognised her son and others
recognised friends and relatives. The enthusiastic
welcome given to these soldiers returning from their
wanderings was returned by a rain of chocolates,
cigarettes and sweets that poured onto the heads of
the waiting public.
After the gangway was lowered the officer in
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command of the transport - Col. Perko - stepped
ashore to be greeted with flowers and a kiss from a
group of ladies standing on the quay.
The unloading of the ship was carried out most
efficiently. The soldiers made their way to the
parade ground of the S%owacki Street barracks
where the official part of the welcome was to take
place.
After a series of long speeches it was possible
to observe that the soldiers looked decidedly
disheartened. Little wonder as they were tired,
hungry and cold. They were only dismissed at dusk
when they retired to the barracks.
On the ship I talked to some of the
repatriates. On the whole most are pleased to be
back in their country. Life over there [Britainj
is hard. Home-sickness and inactivity are convincing
more and more to return. They find British attitudes
towards the Poles discouraging - this feeling is
most pronounced in those who declare themselves for
repatriation home." [79]
By report #32, March 1946, the Ministry representative
was commenting that the reception committee for the 'Clan
Lamont' turned up late. When the Head of Department,
Irena Ostoja-Ostojska, went to see the 'Sobieski's' first
return to Poland since 1939 she too was critical of the
authorities. As the 'Sobieski' returned with 15 officers
and 2,003 other ranks on the 25th March, 1946, there was
no welcoming Committee at all. The families of the
repatriates were not allowed on to the quay - some
managed to break through the cordon and were also
showered with a hail of chocolates, oranges and
cigarettes. Families of the ship's crew were taken on
board and fed with oranges and bananas. The biggest
complaint from the people on board was that there was no
official welcome. "Didn't you know we were coming?" was
one question frequently asked. 	 The conclusion of
- 264 -
Ostoja-Ostojska was: "It does not serve us well in
propaganda terms.' [80]
Kaimiera Ostrowska's report #35, 25th April,
1946, relates to a further trip by the 'Sobieski' with
947 troops from Italy (including 5 officers) and 1,032
troops from the UK (with 5 officers including General
Ferek-BXeszytlski). As the ship had been given a formal
send off in Britain the Poles were most surprised to find
that in Poland there was no orchestra and no honour guard
to meet them. Even the British Consul commented that the
whole affair showed a lack of organisation and general
disinterest in the returning Polish troops. [81]
Her report #36, in May, covering the next return of
the ship was even more critical. The port had been sealed
off to the general public by port guards, border police
and security staff employed by Gdynia-American Shipping
Lines. Plinius, the director of the line, said that no
one, not even crew families would be allowed on board
(this was due to a string of thefts during previous
visits). The crew met and told the management that unless
their families were allowed on board they would go ashore
and not sail anymore. This serious threat of strike
action forced Plinius and the GAL management to back
down. [82]
With each subsequent return of the 'Sobieski' the
security became tighter and the welcome less friendly so
that by report #38, May 20th, 1946, there was widescale
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disquiet at the lack of welcome in Poland - especially
compared to the genuinely warm send off from Britain.
Ostrowska's next report was even more angry. As the
'Clan Lamont' docked on the 2nd June, 1946, the security
was completely tight. No one, not even Ostrowska, was
allowed on board. The repatriates had no official welcome
as they were marched off to a barbed wire compound where
they were kept under armed guard. The families were not
allowed to visit the returned troops and the best they
could do was look at them through the wire. As Ostrowska
pointed out to the Ministry in Warsaw this did not create
a favourable impression and did not help to encourage
repatriation. [831
The PUR establishment in Warsaw, based on Rakowiecka
Street No.4, was responsible for the reception of the
repatriates but also for encouraging the troops to
return.. .or at least that was the theory.
The events that happened in Italy from 1945 and the
virtual power struggle among Warsaw's representatives
must surely cast doubts on the veracity of Poland's claim
to wanting her sons back.
The PUR representative was Major Józef SaXkowski,
a man, judging by the available documents, very much at
odds with both the British military authorities and with
his own people in the Rome Embassy and military attache's
office.
In one of his regular 	 complaints	 to Warsaw
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Sa)kowski repeated in his letter of 30th March, 1946,
what he had been told in Warsaw his role would be -
namely...
"...your responsibilities will be the repatriation
of civilians and military personnel.' ?
The question mark was added in the PUR office in
Warsaw, as was the underlining of the words "military
personnel". Why this addition was made to the
letter is unclear but the impression it gives is that
whatever Sa)kowski thought his mission was regarding the
Polish Armed Forces in Italy, it was 	 not a view
shared by the higher echelons of PUR. [841
Apparently few people wanted SaXkowski's Mission
in Italy. The British, who had had enough problems
trying to contain Colonel Sidor, certainly did not
want more Communist backed Poles running around Italy
making	 trouble and	 so	 refused	 to	 give him
accreditation to AFHQ.	 Sidor himself did not want
SaXkowski	 in Italy, especially since Sidor was going
around calling himself	 "Chief of the Polish Military
Mission for Repatriation, Rome" - which was actually
the major's job.
The Polish chargé d'affaires in Rome, Wyszytiski,
wrote to the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw informing them of
the problems that were occurring in Italy - in particular
the fact that Warsaw was not telling him anything, not
even about the impending arrival of the newly appointed
ambassador Kot.
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Secret "I was only informed about the impending
arrival of the ambassador's Mission in Rome
when Major SaZkowski arrived here. Neither PUR
nor our post in Prague or Berne had informed this
office that the Mission was in transit.
Our problems have arisen primarily due to the
fact that the Polish Military Mission of
Col. Sidor has not been acting like the office of
the military attache and after accreditation at
Caserta (as Gen. Modeiski's Military Mission had
done in London) they then began to present
themselves to the Allied authorities in the
character of a Repatriation Mission dealing with
members of Polish military units under British
Command who wish to return to Poland.
The arrival of Major SaXkowski's Mission in
Rome and the fact that it has so far been impossible
to accredit it to AFHQ in Caserta due to its unclear
relationship with the already operating Military
Mission has provoked a great many rumours in this
region." [85]
Wyszytiski had written to AFHQ on the 15th March, 1946, to
prepare them for the impending arrival of the new
Mission:
"The State Repatriation Office in warsaw, acting on
authority of the Polish Government, has appointed a
special Repatriation Mission to organise the
repatriation of Polish citizens, military and
civilian as well, having expressed their wish to
return to their country from Italy.
This Mission, headed by Major Jozef SALKOWSKI,
has been placed under the direct authority of the
head of the Polish military Mission, acting in
Italy since October last, and accredited to AFHQ.
The Polish Repatriation Mission will therefore
constitute a part of the Polish Military Mission
but act on an autonomous basis as dealing with
questions relating to repatriation of not only
military but civilians as well." [86]
The British on the other hand were having none of this as
Brigadier Napier of GHQ CMF replied to the Poles:
111/ This GHQ has now been informed that the Polish
Mission for Repatriation which has been functioning
in London, and to which the proposed Polish
Repatriation Mission in Italy was to have been
subordinated, has now been withdrawn, and the status
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of the proposed mission in Italy is now under
discussion between the British and Polish
Governments.
2/ This GHQ now awaits further instruction from the
War Office, London, on this matter and, pending
receipt of such instructions, will continue to
regard Col. SIDOR as Polish military attache to
the Polish Embassy ROME.
3/ In view of the change of circumstances it will be
appreciated that no useful purpose would be served
by calling a meeting of AFHQ representatives, and
representatives from your Embassy to discuss the
matter at this juncture.
4/ Until the establishment of a Polish Repatriation
Mission in Italy is possible it will not be
necessary for any Polish officers to be called to
ROME for attachment to the Polish Military Mission
as prospective members of the proposed Repatriation
Mission, and you are requested to ensure that no
such attachments are made." [87]
Not only did the British not want SaXkowski in Italy,
but they used thinly—veiled threats to make sure the
Poles got the message, Lt-Colonei Count De Sails, an
AFHQ Liaison Officer, had a conversation with the Polish
Chargé which was then communicated to Pt.JR and the
Warsaw Foreign Office. According to Wyszytiski, Colonel
De Salis...
". . .was compelled by Order of AFHQ to communicate
the view that he "could not be held responsible for
the personal safety of Major Salkowski's Mission".
To my question of whether this was related to
this transitional period or to the period after the
eventual official accreditation he replied that he
would have to ask Head Quarters, but in his opinion
he judged it would relate to the whole time the
mission was in Italy. In a very nervous tone he
declared "we're talking too much about incidents
that haven't happened" but there may be incidents
and this despite "keeping the peace by force". [88]
Colonel De Sails
	 went	 on	 that AFHQ "...in these
sort of circumstances could not give a guarantee of
safety."	 As to the question of
	 whether Wyszytiski
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should tell Warsaw about the meeting he was told that
as a "good diplomat" it was his duty.
SaXkowski was well aware of the precarious position
he held in Italy. The British offered him no protection
from the wrath of Anders' men and without recognition
from AFHQ his only hope for protection was as a diplomat
with the rights that went with that. On the 17th March,
1946, he contacted PUR in Warsaw: "Please forward
diplomatic passports for the members of the Mission. This
is very important for security reasons given the
present situation." [89]
The 'present situation' for the PUR Mission in
Italy was a bleak one. Sa%kowski, unwanted, under
staffed and undervalued by all sides, sent streams of
letters asking for help to achieve what he had been
sent to do.
"Please send officers (at least 5) and a secretary.
To this point I have to do even the smallest things
myself (looking for a location for the office,
looking for cars, typing, translating, etc.) My
office work takes 18 hours a day. I don't like to
complain but to work under such conditions is simply
impossible." [90]
A month after that note was written SaXkowski again
complained that he could not find an office:
"To date we still do not have a location for our
office. The premises which were to be given over for
the Mission's use as of May 1st have, for some
unknown reason, been refused. The Polish Embassy has
had a hand in this although, according to the latest
information, the Ministry of Finance which was
disposing of the property took a negative attitude."
[91]
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At every turn SaX kowski felt he was being hindered by
the very people who should have been helping him. In
September of 1946 he had asked Colonel Sidor to open a
Mission in Ban to combat 2nd Corps propaganda. This was
refused by Sidor as the British would certainly not allow
it. Wyszytiski had the idea that possibly a Consulate
might be a better idea. Although the Poles had opened three
- in Venice, Ancona and Naples - if Kot agreed then a
fourth one could be opened. As it turned out Kot did not
agree and the request was turned down by the Embassy on
the 27th August, 1946. [92]
To	 add	 further insult to an already serious
injury, the staff of the Mission also proved to be a
hindrance to the major - particularly the issue of
Lt.Powalkowski who seemed to be doing his best to create
havoc.
On the 1st June, 1946, SaXkowski wrote to both PUR
and the Warsaw Foreign Office to complain:
"At this moment a rather compromising situation has
developed. Lt. Powalkowski has been guilty of
insubordination and of acting without my authority.
He is a disorganising influence. As evidence of his
behaviour I record his saying, in the presence
of representatives of the Polish Military Mission
that: "Mr SaXkowski is only from PUR whereas I am an
officer of the General Staff." [93]
The obvious recourse for SaXkowski was to remove
the troublesome Lieutenant but was told by Colonel Sidor
that it was up to him who stayed and went and
Sidor decided that PowaXkowski would stay.
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Relations between the trio did not	 improve,
especially	 after	 Powakowski crashed the Mission's
'Lincoln' car in August of 	 1946.	 Colonel Sidor had
suggested a tour of the various Polish camps in
Italy, a round trip of some 2,000 km. On a trip of
this magnitude the usual procedure would be to take the
train. Leon Szybek, head of PUR's Western section,
recommended a reprimand for Powa%kowski, as opposed to
the dismissal Sakowski had demanded. [94)
By September, 1946, the situation was so bad
that PowaXkowski had to be recalled to Warsaw. SaZkowski
wrote to Minister Wolski again complaining. Even on
his departure PowaXkowski decided to take his driver,
Adolf PawXa, with him - a move that caused all
manner of problems for the Mission. PawXa could not get a
visa for the transport that the Lieutenant was due to go
on, the formalities would take at least two weeks and
this would involve delaying the whole train, this was
something that UNRRA would not permit. On the other hand
Pawja could not go without a visa as this would break an
agreement with UNRRA that once a transport list had been
finalised no new names could be added to it. On the 6th
of September, 1946, SaXkowski had given express orders
that Pawa was not to go - he left on the 7th
regardless.
In a confidential report to FUR, SaXkowski wrote
what his objections to PowaXkowski were:
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"1/ He disregarded repatriation agreements.
2/ That on his own authority he allowed a person,
unregistered with the Repatriation Dept. of the
Polish Military Mission, to join a repatriation
transport -
3/ That he lowered the authority of the Repatriation
Department, Polish Military Mission."
He had also ran off without settling his debts in Italy
for food and lodgings. "This was not the behaviour of a
gentleman, a citizen and an officer." [95] What was
worse was that he had threatened future transports with
UNRRA.
2nd Lt. Zeromski, according to Sakowski's letter
to PUR of the 17th March, 1946, was another problem
for the Head of the Mission. He was a drunk who
might "by his actions create a scandal and compromise
the Mission in the eyes of Poles hostile to the
Government." [96] But even when there were such people
it was difficult for the major to do anything about it.
Not only did Col. Sidor go to great lengths not to
help Sa,lkowski but the Embassy seemed to be putting up
obstacles to the Mission. In another of his long line of
complaining reports to PUR the major complained that he
had to buy petrol on the black market at 75 lira/litre as
his car was not registered with the Embassy whereby he
could have bought cheap rate fuel at 25 lira/litre. [97]
If this was not enough to contend with, AFHQ still
would not recognise the Mission, and the erratic
policy guidelines coming out of Warsaw did not help.
The work of the Mission began to grind to a halt.
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Sakowski wrote to PUR in March, 1946:
"The question of repatriation has fallen on barren
ground. Allied Forces Headquarters in Caserta has
not, to date, accredited the members of the Polish
Repatriation Mission; without this it is simply
impossible to resolve any matter on an official
level. On the other hand the order I have received
halting all transports, dated Warsaw 21.46 [sic],
has also put me in a rather difficult position. At
this time, a time when the 2nd Corps is being
demobilised, we should be undertaking a wide plan of
repatriation but given the above problems such work
is impossible. Neither the Embassy nor the Military
Mission have any idea as to this undertaking. Given
the above - please forward suitable instructions as
to our work here; sitting around waiting for an
explanation from HQ will not bring any results."
[98]
By May, 1946, Sakowski was so disillusioned with the
situation that he was on the verge of resigning. In a
secret letter to Minister Wolski at PUR the major wrote a
personal and highly critical report of the situation in
Italy and virtually asked Wolski to relieve him of his
post.
12th May, 1946:
"I am forced to describe my work in Italy to you as
frankly and openly as I can. I would categorise it
as a fight for truth among strangers, as well as
among our own. I have never encountered such a murky
and scheming environment.
Before I come to the specific problems I would
like to give light to certain incidents that have,
from the moment of my departure from Warsaw, put me
in a somewhat difficult and unpleasant situation.
Leaving Warsaw with two other officers (I
received 20 Dollars for the whole journey for three
people, forcing me to almost beg in order to reach
Italy) I was assured that the rest of the team would
leave within the week. To date they have yet to
materialise. Lt. PowaXkowski and 2nd Lt. Zeromski
have committed a list of errors - perhaps through
carelessness; perhaps through trying to ingratiate
themselves with persons outside the Mission. Their
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stay has led to many unpleasant situations and has
allowed certain elements to come to some
far-reaching suppositions. At this moment they are
in Poland and all the work rests with me. I do not
like complaining but the situation is draining my
enthusiasm for work and is damaging both physically
and mentally.
The principal obstacle is the lack of any
agreement regulating repatriation between the
Government of National Unity and the British
Government.
I have no independence of action, this means that
I can not enter into direct talks with any
individual Allied institution. The work which is
being done at the moment under such circumstances
will not lead to any results. Given this I would say
it is a waste to maintain the whole repatriation
apparatus when the Allied authorities will
themselves carry out the repatriation if not sooner
then later.
I would, therefore, ask for a decision in this
matter, as soon as possible, as one man (namely
myself) working on his own cannot be positive 	 nor
can	 he	 achieve	 any	 positive	 results."
[99]
It is difficult not to feel some degree 	 of
sympathy for Major Sakowski who seems to have been
an honourable man stranded - if not amongst thieves,
then amongst 'ruffians' who appeared to be intent on
hampering his mission at every turn. How this worked out
in real terms was that the Repatriation Mission in Italy
did not have the positive effect that those well meaning
officers who wanted Poles to return might have hoped for.
The reasons that the Poles did not return are many
but the Mission in Italy located three areas that PUR
could help with in order to encourage a greater number to
return. The first was the fact that the Poles in Italy
had received no letters from home. PUR was asked to act
as a go-between for mail to and from Poland. The idea was
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that a quick exchange of post would put an end to the
hostile propaganda about the situation in Poland. PUR was
also asked to supply a list of names of repatriates from
the Soviet Union. Many of the Poles from 'beyond the
River Bug' had had families deported into the Soviet
Union and had received no information about their
whereabouts. Lack of information about families was
causing many Poles not to return. The third request to
PUR was to assist in the transfer of cash to Poland.
Whilst many Poles would not be returning to Poland come
what may, they still wanted to send money to their
families and friends. Since Poland needed all the hard
currency it could get it was important to make the
necessary arrangements. 1100)
This first point about the letters was identified as
an important one by many of the repatriation bodies.
Kuropieska notes that the biggest boost to repatriation
from the UK came with the first post from home. Poles,
according to Kuropieska, have a great sense of family and
the letters from Poland caused a marked change in the
mood of the troops. [101] This was a factor not lost on
those hostile to repatriation. The (Warsaw) Polish Red
Cross Delegation in Great Britain reported in 1946 that
Poles loyal to the London regime were trying to hamper
such contacts:
"The soldiers, their minds clouded by the propaganda
of their education officers, were afraid to send
- 276 -
letters to their families because, it was said,
their families would be deported to Siberia for such
letters. Today more than one of these soldiers is in
Poland.
Soldiers in Anders' Corps - as they themselves
explained in London - were punished and persecuted
for writing and receiving letters from Poland. They
were called traitors and renegades. They were called
out in front of their units and reprimanded for
their lack of patriotism.
One soldier told me that when he received a
letter from his father calling him to return home he
was told by his Commanding Officer that the letter
was obviously not written by his father, but by an
NKVD man. When the soldier replied that he
recognised his fathefs handwriting his CO stated
that the letter must have been dictated at the point
of an NKVD bayonet." [102]
Colonel Sidor's accusations were even more serious
in that he accused the Soldiers' Welfare Section of
burning 12 sacks of letters from Poland at the end of
August, 1946. [103]
The (London) Polish Red Cross also came in for
criticism from its Warsaw based equivalent. On February
6th, 1946, ambassador Kot wrote to the Red Cross in
warsaw complaining about the Red Cross Delegation loyal
to Anders.
"...that I consider establishing a Mission of the
Polish Red Cross in Rome as absolutely essential.
The Red Cross here, according to the evidence I
have, is not the independent institution that it
should be but merely a militarised auxiliary branch
of Anders' Corps.
[...]
This organisation must blindly carry out the
orders of the head of 0.11 [Intelligence Service]
and steers clear of anything that would bring the
soldiers nearer to their country. They avoid, for
example, trying to forward letters from families in
Poland, we also have no guarantee that the letters
passed on by us ever reach their destination (we
have yet to see any replies)." [104]
The problem the Warsaw Red Cross faced was that only the
- 277 -
London—based body was recognised by AFHQ and the Italian
Government, and was the only body linked to the British
Red Cross. This caused rancour in Warsaw since the
Government which the London body represented was no
longer recognised. Sikorski's widow was still going
around calling herself the 'President of the Polish Red
Cross' and refusing to have anything to do with
Warsaw. What made the situation even more difficult was
that in London there were two bodies claiming to be the
Polish Red Cross. Dr. Kostkiewicz, the official President
of the (Warsaw) Polish Red Cross, wrote to Max Huber,
President of the International Committee of the Red
Cross, Geneva, in May 1946, about the fact that the
London Poles were, in fact, contravening the Red Cross
Convention. Kostkiewicz asked Huber for some 'ex-oficio'
reaction to help rationalise the situation in London.
Huber confirmed in June that only one delegation was
possible and that was the one that a/ worked in its own
country and b/ was recognised by its government. Whereas
it was possible in wartime to have a Red Cross working in
exile, the war was long over and the situation would not
be allowed to continue. Huber promised to send a copy of
both letters to London. [105J The London Poles did not
roll over and disappear without a fight. Warsaw had to
contact UNRRA to see if they could do anything to help.
The (London) Polish Red Cross had refused to work with
the Warsaw Red Cross in searching for relatives saying
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that the warsaw people were not in fact the Red Cross
"...but rather the organs of the Police and the Soviet
NKVD" who were looking for information. [106]
The Warsaw Red Cross also seemed reluctant to help
in Italy with the welfare of the troops. Just over a year
after Kot had first broached the subject about sending a
delegation to Rome, he was again writing to Kostkiewicz:
"I again draw your attention to a matter first put
forward a year ago - a matter that as yet,
unfortunately, remains unresolved. Today the matter
is very urgent."
For Kot it was important...
"...that our outpost be run so that any Pole
finding himself in difficulty should turn to us and
not to any other organisation; and that he should
find there a more friendly reception and better
provision than anywhere else." [107)
The Warsaw Red Cross' decision was far from what Kot
might have expected:
"With regards to the Polish ambassador in Rome's
repeated request for the opening of an outpost there
the Board has expressed the opinion that it does not
see the necessity to open the above mentioned
outpost." [1081
There was certainly much that needed doing in Italy. The
question of the disappearing letters was so serious that
Kot had to inquire of FUR what was happening in Poland to
the post. Repatriation Transport 139, November 2nd 1946,
had 3 extra railway wagons with some 700 sacks of Red
Cross parcels for the families of soldiers. According to
Kot it was the fifth such transport and as yet the
Embassy had received no information. Major Leon Szybek,
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PUR Director of Western Repatriation, contacted the
tvarsaw Red Cross:
"Given the propaganda being spread around Italy by
Anders' agents the Directorate requests information
be sent to the Polish Embassy in Rome concerning
this and other previous transports and also details
of the distribution of these parcels."
The Red Cross replied that it had indeed received all
five transports from Italy
7 September - 200 sacks (2 wagons)
25 September - 500 sacks (3 wagons)
	
17 October	 - 235 sacks (1 wagon)
	
18 October	 - 347 sacks (1 wagon)
	
7 October	 - 707 sacks (3 wagons)
All had been distributed in Poland. [109]
The question of packets to Poland was another key
reason for the need of (Warsaw) Red Cross representation
among the troops. As the exiled authorities would have
nothing to do with any body representing Warsaw so they
would not recommend any services provided by these
bodies. The Polish Red Cross offered parcels to Poland
that were both cheaper and of a higher quality than those
sold by private companies. The soldiers trying to do
their best for their people back home were getting a raw
deal due to the political situation. [110]
The Polish (arsaw) Red Cross did, eventually,
open a post in Italy nearly two years after Kot's
original letter. The contradiction that was found by
Dr. Kaimiera Zawadska, head of the Polish fact-finding
mission to Italy, was that Wyszytiski "...the present
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chargé d'affaires has taken an altogether positive
attitude (as opposed to Ambassador Kot)". [ill] It would
seem that after two years of pushing for a Red Cross
delegation in Italy Kot may not have been as in favour of
the idea as his letters might suggest.
If the Warsaw authorities wanted the Poles, both
military and civilian, to return then much would depend
on how repatriates were treated on their arrival and what
provisions were made for their resettlement.
In August, 1946 the UNRRA representative in Warsaw
cabled London with his report about the treatment of DP5
and PWX in Poland:
"(1) ROUTE FROM US AND FRENCH ZONES THROUGH CZECHO-
SLOVAKIA TO RECEP'IION CENTRES DZIEDZICE AND BIELSKO.
THESE CENTRES ALSO USED RECEPTION REPATRIATES
AUSTRIA AND ITALY. ROUTE FROM UK ZONE STETTIN BY
BOAT.
(2) DZIEDZICE AND BIELSKO CENTRES SEEN SEVERAL
OCCASIONS. ARRANGEMENTS CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY.
FACILITIES FOR MEDICAL INSPECTION, ISSUE OF IDENTITY
CARDS, REGISTRATION, PROVISION OF RAILWAY TICKETS TO
DESTINATION, SMALL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, THREE DAYS
FOOD. STETTIN NOT SEEN BUT UNDERSTOOD ON SIMILAR
LINES. CAPACITY OF CENTRES WILL BE CABLED LATER.
(3) 80 PER CENT OR MORE REPATRIATES GERMANY HAVE
DECIDED ON DESTINATION IN POLAND AFTER ARRIVAL AND
MERELY OBTAIN FREE RAILWAY TICKET TO APPROPRIATE
PLACE WHERE THEY HAVE FRIENDS, RELATIVES. ONLY SMALL
PROPORTION SETTLE IN NEW TERRITORIES, ARRANGEMENTS
WROCLAW FOR SETTLEMENT SEEN AND CONSIDERED ADEQUATE
IN VIEW OF LACK OF RESOURCES. AVERAGE STAY DZIEDZICE
AND BIELSKO 24 HOURS. UNRA [sic] OFFICER OBSERVED
RECENT PARTY FROM ITALY PROGRESSING WITHIN 12 HOURS,
THENCE JOURNEY HOME 3 TO 4 DAYS ACCORDING TO
DISTANCE." [112]
The Repatriation Missions tried to put every positive
view forward to potential returnees. In a radio broadcast
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from Graz-Klagenfurt to Poles in Austria, 24th May, 1946,
the Mission announced that all was well:
"To date nearly 1½ million Poles have returned to
Poland from the West, at least 90 odd percent are
repatriates from western and central Germany. After
crossing the Polish frontier all the repatriates
receive Polish documents, they receive medical
attention, they are given tickets for their onward
journey and are fed. The repatriates are not
subjected to any customs search." [113]
The Poles were careful that everything should go as
smoothly as possible as the slightest whiff of scandal
would have been seized upon by the London Poles and
repatriation could have dried up overnight. At all costs
adverse reports by escort and liaison officers had to be
avoided. In particular special attention had to be paid
to Alexander Kharitonoff, a US Army major and escort
officer. Dr. T. Chromecki, head of the Warsaw Foreign
Ministry's Western and Northern Department, wrote a top
secret and urgent note to FUR on the 20th January, 1946:
"Our Ambassador in Rome requests all possible
caution in dealing with Kharitonoff so as not to
give him any cause to complain. It is assumed in
Rome that he will be in charge of future transports
and any negative opinions about the reception of
repatriates in Italian wagons by the Polish
authorities may create problems in getting further
trains." [114]
Surprisingly, or perhaps not so surprisingly given the
enthusiasm to be rid of the refugee problem, few western
observers reported the serious troubles that faced the
repatriates. Some Polish observers involved with
repatriation did make an attempt to bring the situation
to the attention of those who might do something about
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it. One PUR representative wrote to Minister Wolski in
July, 1945:
"I have just this moment received a telephone report
from the Chief of the PUR section in Katowice that
in Zebrzydowice the repatriates returning from the
West - in whom we have an obligation to take the
closest interest - are being robbed in an
unprecedented manner by border guards, customs
officials etc. (Soviet)
In communicating the above I would ask the
Citizen Minister for some intervention - with
regards to this it has to be admitted that the
repatriates, while in transit through Czechoslovakia
are provided with excellent security from the
authorities there but on crossing the Polish border
they meet the sort of experience which I have
outlined above," [115]
The	 report	 from	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Information
representative to his superior about events at the
transit station was even more candid and angry:
25th July, 1945. To Citizen Matuszewski.
"What is happening here is very sad and cannot be
communicated over any great distance. The Poles who
are arriving in Poland are usually robbed by groups
of criminal Red Army soldiers. Under various
pretexts eg. checking identity or suspicion of being
German - they are robbed of their last possessions
and often beaten up. Instead of being welcomed back
to the homeland as they should be these Poles are
set upon. No one takes an interest in them nor asks
them where they are travelling on to. Often, in
broad daylight, women are raped on the station by
various degenerates. The Security Services seem to
cause them great annoyance as well. No one gives
them a warm meal or a piece of bread. I wonder what
has become of the 70,000,000 [ZXoty] which according
to figures, the Government has set aside for just
this purpose. I think the Citizen Minister should
use his influence with the military authorities so
that they escort the trains arriving from the West
into the interior of Poland. Regardless of this,
this issue must be positively sorted out. Similarly
some intervention with General Szatilov has to be
made regarding the Red Army's infringement of the
law. Furthermore food must be provided so that the
returnees can, at the very least, have a warm meal.
I have come to the conclusion that these people
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are badly misinformed about the internal situation
in Poland. They think that they will all be
immediately sent to Siberia and that in Poland only
the Soviets rule. A campaign of enlightenment must
absolutely be started. For my part I do what I can
but am always hampered in my task by a complete lack
of manpower.
I again ask for you help in this task.
Nowak, Kazimierz. Head of Dept.
Ministry of Information & Propaganda
Lignica, Lower Silesia
[116]
The remarkable thing about this confidential letter is
that it is not the work of the London Poles seeking to
pick faults with the Communists, but the appeal of a man,
otherwise loyal to the regime, who worked at the sharp
end of repatriation and could see where the problems
were.
A report in Krakow's "Dziennik Poiski" from
December 1945, shows that six children died in one night
because they had been left in open lorries in the
freezing cold. Somebody - as the article protests - had
to be responsible for the state of affairs. [117] The
Polish Minister of Justice, Henryk witkowski, was also
the President of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society, an
ironic position given the numbers of Polish women raped
by Red Army soldiers. Apologists for the Soviets glossed
over the massive military presence in Poland: John Ennals
for the "New Statesman" wrote that he had seen fewer
Russians in Warsaw than he had seen Poles in London.
[118] In a similar vein the Polish Socialist Tadeusz
wika who was on a visit to the UK publicly announced
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that while travelling from warsaw to Kielce he had only
seen one or two Soviet soldiers. [119] Even Kuropieska
commented on the primitive nature of this type of
propaganda. For years the British public had been used to
seeing masses of US soldiers on the streets so few people
were convinced by talk that there were no Soviet troops
in Poland.
That is not to say that such information did not
leak out westward. Some repatriates went back to Poland
to see conditions for themselves and then returned to
Italy and other places to inform colleagues. Roman
Nowakowski, an NCO of the 10th WoXytiski Rifle Battalion,
rejoined his unit in Italy. His conclusions were that
no true Pole would be able to stand living in the
prevailing situation.
"15/XII/1945: The transport of soldiers from 2nd
Corps arrived at the collection centre at Kozy. The
NKVD who had been waiting for the officers to arrive
separated about 200 according to a list and took
them to an unknown destination. The rest, about 800
people... were conscripted to ymierski's Army and
given a 2-3 week holiday. Persons suspected of any
political activity are demobilised and whisked off
for interrogation after which they do not return. No
one knows what becomes of them." [1201
Zygmunt Boger, a Volksliste DP's experience was very
similar to this, especially his very near conscription to
the "People's" Army.
"I arrived at Dziedzice. After three hours a patrol
from the Polish Army turned up - the news had
already gotten around that former German soldiers
had returned. The Lieutenant from the patrol got
into the railway wagon and told us that we had all
been enlisted into the Polish Army. How the
Silesians set upon these warriors! They wanted to go
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back to their families - "Our families" they
shouted. Two Americans turned up at the sound of the
argument. They too shouted that under no
circumstances was it going to happen. First we would
go to our families. The Lieutenant kept pressing and
I'll never forget how the American went up to him,
spat, and said "fucking Polak!" At that point the
patrol left.
e arrived in Poznañ around midnight. It was
silent and dark as hell. I was in American fatigues.
As I was going down the station stairs towards the
exit I was approached by a railwayman who had been
staring at me.
- Where are you off to?
- What do you mean 'where' - home!
- Have you gone crazy - he said - stay in the
station and sleep on the bench. Don't go wandering
about at night or they'll get you.
- What do you mean? The war's over. There are
no more Germans.
- Worse than the Germans have arrived." [121]
Even those who were conscripted to the Polish Army on
return had a surprise waiting for them. Tadeusz
Czerkawski found that he had been demoted. He read on his
registration form that the rank of Lieutenant had been
crossed out in red ink and "conscript" had been entered
instead. He approached his CO in the traditional manner
using the word "Pan" - Sir:
"- Panie Captain..." I started but he interupted.
- All the 'Panowie' stayed in England, here in
Poland there are only citizens. Is that
understood?"
- Citizen Captain there has been a mistake: I am a
2nd Lieutenant, that was my last rank in the
army...
Again he interrupted:
- That was not an army it was a criminal gang!
Dismissed!" [122]
Adolf Worzok, a Silesian who had served in the German
Army before his return, also lost his rank when he
reported to the Office of Public Security. They asked him
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about his past and he answered with some pride that he
had been a member of the Union of Poles in Germany, a
member of the Polish Scouts and the Union of Polish
Academics. To which the official shouted to one of his
colleagues: "Franek! Come and have a look. One more
fascist has returned to Poland!" When he was enrolled
to study in WrocXaw he told the authorities that he had
held the rank of Sargeant in the German Army but was
told that that could not be taken into account. If he
wanted to complain he would have to write to
Marshal Rola-Zymierski. He was granted a "Certificate of
Temporary Association to the Polish Nation" for which
he had to pay 25 Z%oty for the privilege - and could be
revoked at any time. [123] To cap it all Worzok was left
with the title of "Wehrmachtowiec". Considering the large
numbers of potential repatriates who had served in the
Wehrmacht this treatment would not make return more
likely.
In communist Poland the contribution of the Polish
Armed Forces in the West has been consistently
undervalued in comparison to the Poles who had had fought
on the eastern front. For decades in Poland the Battle of
Lenino in which Polish and Soviet units took part held a
foremost place in military history: Monte Cassino and
Falaise were virtually ignored. Even in 1970 the Polish
Defence Ministry was writing:
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"The Battle of Monte Cassino took place in a
secondary theatre of operations and the Allied
victory there, bought at great cost, had no real
influence on the course of, and the final victory of
the war in Europe." [124)
The only units to return to Poland as a body were
the two fighting groups from France. The Polish Force in
France was made up of the 19th and 21st Group -
consisting of 8 Companies	 of 290 men each. They
had been acting as occupation troops in parts of
the French Zone of Germany under the French 1st Army.
Their Commander, Major Bo1esaw Jeleti, was loyal to the
new regime in Poland and refused to join the mainstream
Armed Forces in the West. In October he and his men
returned to Poland and were greeted with a heroes welcome
- the only Polish troops from the West who were. On the
18th November, 1945, they were treated to a victory
parade on the Aleje Ujazdowskie (the only victory parade
attended by Poles from the West) in front of the General
Staff of the 'reborn' Polish Army. Marshal Zymierski
issued an Order of the Day, No. 257, on the 30th October,
1945.
"You return to your country in closed ranks and
fully armed as the first Polish units to return from
the West. You who fought the Germans in France at
the side of our great ally went on a glorious
fighting path that has spread widely the fame of
fighting Poland." [125]
Jeleti's return was used as a stick to beat the other
returning troops who were arriving from Italy and
Britain. Zymierski's Order No. 297, 29th November, 1945,
was directed at Polish units returning from Italy:
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"You return not like an organised military unit but
rather as a loose group of soldiers. Your leaders,
with only a few exceptions, have deserted you as
they did in September, 1939. They did not want to
return to Poland and with terror, threats and a
slanderous campaign against their own country they
prevented you from returning. As a result of this
tens of thousands of your brothers have remained in
Italy. Anders wants to turn them into an
interventionist army against the Polish nation that
would enter Poland and return the fortunes of the
landowners and great industrialists.
Your brothers, who fought by the side of the Red
Army returned to Poland from the East fully equipped
and with excellent weapons. They did not have their
fighting material taken away from them. They did not
have a plebiscite thrown at them about returning to
their country. Their standards, which went on the
most magnificent armed road to victory in our
history, from Lenino, across the WisXa, Warsaw,
Oder-Neisse, to Berlin and Dresden, have been
awarded the highest Polish Orders and those of our
ally the Soviet Union.
Recently the Polish Battalions which fought by
the side of the French Armed Forces returned. They
returned as organised units with their arms in their
hands and with their standards. They were given a
heart-felt and deeply grateful send off by the
French authorities. You on the other hand were sent
home in such a manner and with such material and
equipment that is not worthy of your efforts as
soldiers or of the blood that was spilt at Tobruk
and Monte Cassino." [126]
The troops who returned from Britain were treated much
the same; Zymierski's Order No. 2, 3rd January, 1946:
"You, like the soldiers of the 2nd Corps in Italy,
were sent like demobilised military repatriates
while those who fought by the side of the USSR and
France returned with unfurled banners, in closed
ranks and with formidable fighting material.
Your brothers who still remain abroad and who,
contrary to the will of the Polish nation, are under
a foreign Command and are terrorised and confused by
the Sanacja generals, will also return home when the
truth about Poland wins over the lies of Raczkiewicz
and Anders. Those who feel themselves to be Poles
will return without any appeals from us. About the
others - we shall not worry." [127]
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It was little surprise that such criticism raised hackles
with the British Foreign Office. Warsaw was complaining
that enough Poles were not going back to Poland, and not
returning in organised units, yet this begged the
question of whose fault this was. After receiving the
text of the order to 2 Corps veterans the FO contacted
Cavendish-Bentinck instructing him to protest in Warsaw.
"HMG wish to make it plain that if all the Polish
troops in Italy have not been able to return to
Poland in their existing units, this is solely
because HMG have left the choice entirely to the
individual men themselves and only some 14,000 out
of 110,000 in Italy and the Middle East at present
wish to return." [128]
The BBC Polish Service was instructed to send out
corrections to Warsaw's allegations. The Warsaw Poles
seemed to be doing everything possible to stop the Polish
Forces from returning and the troops were under little
illusion of what was happening at home. As they viewed
developments there they became more and more depressed.
Frank Savery wrote a report on the "stimmungen" of
the Poles in the UK, on the 8th February, 1946, to
W.D. Allen of the FO in which he described the Polish
state of mind:
"It is like a stagnant pond: there is no current of
fresh water flowing through and in consequence the
old, stale water smells just a little worse with
every day that passes." [129]
The Poles in the West did not know where they stood.
No one seemed to want them. The British were trying to
rid themselves of the Poles and the Poles in Poland
seemed just as reluctant to have them. Galsworthy of the
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FO continued Savery's metaphor saying that Warsaw had
recently stirred up the pond with its note "...disowning
their troops abroad". To some extent this had calmed the
anxiety of the troops "...since it increases the
difficulties in the way of repatriation" and that it made
• .agreement between Warsaw and ourselves less likely
than ever."
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CHAPTER SIX
"Get Them Back To Where They Belong
Or Shoot The B-."
British Public Reaction To The 'Polish Invasion'.
Half A Century On And The Poles In Britain
Begin To Be Acknowledged.
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CHAPTER SIX
By February of 1945 the gloom of despair had settled
over the Polish Armed Forces. The Yalta Conference, the
grave of so many Polish hopes, had removed the will of
the Poles to continue the struggle arid self doubt began
to creep into their minds. It became apparent to British
Government circles that if the Allies were still to make
use of the Polish Forces then some gesture would have to
be made.
From the Polish perspective the future did indeed
look bleak. On the battlefields of Europe the Poles were
still dying and it was becoming more and more difficult
to answer the question : why? The country they had set
out to fight for was now, apparently, out of reach. They
saw that they would probably not be going home but then
what? The future did indeed look empty.
During the Yalta debate in February, 1945, Churchill
made what became known as his 'pledge to the Poles:
"In any event, His Majesty's Government will
never forget the debt they owe to the Polish
troops who have served them so valiantly, and to
all those who have fought under our command. I
earnestly hope it may be possible to offer the
citizenship and freedom of the British Empire,
if they so desire.... But so far as we are
concerned we should think it an honour to have
such faithful and valiant warriors dwelling
among us as if they were men of our own blood."
[1)
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Fine words indeed but an expression not exactly
shared by all the Departments of State; the Home Office,
for example, did not see the influx of two hundred
thousand Poles as such a great 'honour'
"The Home Office view is that the settlement in this
country of Poles to the number of 100,000 to which
would have to be added a further figure for the
wives and children who have to be allowed to join
them - would present a most serious problem at the
present time. The fact that the resident alien
population of this country is some 150,000 gives a
measure of the problem involved. The addition of
large numbers of Poles would cause obvious
difficulties in view of the housing shortage and
present economic conditions and would moreover
involve a real risk of anti-alien agitation since
many people hold the view that there are already too
many foreigners resident here.
The Home Office therefore feel strongly that
the longer the possibility of opting for return to
Poland is kept open, and the less the Poles are
encouraged to suppose that they would be allowed to
settle here, the greater the number who may be
expected to go back to Poland." [2)
Similarly in a memo to the Committee on Polish Questions
the Home Secretary wrote the following:
"The total recorded foreign population of the United
Kingdom has not hitherto exceeded 290,000, and so
large an influx of foreigners (all of one
nationality and all coming within a comparatively
limited period) is likely to arouse considerable
public uneasiness or hostility. In so far as the
Poles can be employed in occupations in which there
is a shortage of labour their services will be of
advantage to this country; but experience suggests
that the quality of their work is poor and there are
likely to be strong representations that these
foreign newcomers are prejudicing the position of
our own people, especially of those who are being
demobilised from the British forces." [3]
The words of Home Secretary, Chuter Ede1 presaged
many of the problems that were soon to face the British
Government.
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The total number of Poles which was in question
at the end of the war was some 194,460 military
personnel and some 33,000 dependants and civilians [For
breakdown see Appendix E] but with continued recruitment,
much to the chagrin of the British, the number rose to
just over a quarter of a million.
Just as Government Ministers felt uneasy at the
prospect of the Poles arriving on their doorstep so too
did the British public. The Foreign Office was swamped
with a mass of protest letters about the impending
arrival of the Poles. Count Raczy/iski sent the following
note to the FO saying that someone was printing and
then distributing them in the Fife area.
ATTENTION I	 ATTENTION
Your Home and Job
demands that You
STOP POLISH INVASION NOW
STAND EASY and
You've "Had it Chum"	 [4]
Certainly the Scots, who had for so long put up with
the brunt of the Poles seemed to be getting frustrated at
the fact that the Poles were still not going home. While
Britain was at war with Germany the Scots were prepared
to put up with the foreigners in the sure and certain
knowledge that after Victory Day they would return to
Poland. With the messy conclusion of the post-war
settlement these previously—held truths could not be
relied on. It looked not only that the Poles in Scotland
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might be staying but that they might soon be joined by
thousands more from Europe.
That is not to say that all Scots had antipathy
towards the Poles. Many warm and lasting friendships had
been formed during the war years, and many Scots felt a
great deal of sympathy for the plight of the Poles.
Miss L. Herd wrote to the Foreign Office in June of
1946 about a meeting in Edinburgh where 2,500 Scots
called on the British Government to reconsider the plan
to bring the Poles to the UK. One of the speakers,
Councillor Sim of Inverkeithing, called to the attending:
"Are you going to stand by and allow this country to be
overrun by foreigners". According to Miss Herd:
"He seemed to be Anti-Everything. Anti-Bevin,
Anti-Churchill and was raising the Polish question
as a means for voicing his Anti-feeling for all
humanity." It was, she went on, "Ungrateful, unjust
and above all unchristian." [5]
Positive views were rather heavily outnumbered by
negative ones. As Hancock of the FO minuted plaintively
alongside Miss Herd's letter "I wish we had more letters
like this." And the truth was that protests came in by
the bag full. One Railway Union branch wrote to Attlee:
"I am instructed to forward the following resolution
which was passed at my branch yesterday:- 'That this
meeting of Railwaymen at Colwick protest at paying
taxation to maintain in Britain and Italy, Polish
armed forces that are not being used for the
furtherance of democratic ends, and are not
loyal to their National Government, with whom we
have diplomatic relations'.
F. elton, Secretary." [6]
Trades Unions, in particular, were open in their
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hostility to the Poles, for a variety of reasons that
will be discussed later. 	 The Kirkaldy branch of the
Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers was equally
vociferous in its letter to Attlee:
"Dear Sir and Brother.
At our branch meeting held on 9-7-45 I was
instructed to urge upon you to do everything in your
power to assist the Polish soldiers in this country
to get home to their families.
The position has become so bad for these men that
they are now appealing to the people in this area to
assist them in getting home, pointing out at the
same time that they are even impeded in getting
postal communication with their relatives." [7]
Similarly the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers
forwarded the following, setting down in no uncertain
terms just why they objected to the Poles:
"Our objection to the Poles is that they are a
reactionary corps of people who refuse to face
responsibility in their own country. They will
become not a temporary labour force but a permanent
labour force that will be a reactionary element in
the country if allowed to settle down."[8]
The accusation that the Poles were reactionaries was a
widespread one, and most of this venom was focused on
General Anders and his 2nd Corps. As one businessman from
Preston wrote:
"Can I ask you the exact cost to the British
taxpayer of all the Poles in Scotland, England and
Italy under fascist Gen. Anders? Over half of the
rank and file are anxious to return to Poland, but
are forcibly prevented by their reactionary
officers." [9]
The truth of these accusations is dealt with in chapter
four but here it is enough to say that, irrespective of
the truth, such thoughts were believed and gained
- 297 -
credibility in the public consciousness.
By July of 1946 the Foreign Office had received
forty protests from Trades Unions, Trades Councils and
from Co-operative Guilds plus twenty protest letters
forwarded by MPs from their constituents. The highest
proportion of these were from Scotland but many were not.
The Foreign Office was happy to dismiss the English
protests as a Leftist conspiracy. Hankey of the FO
minuted that they were "artificially stirred up by
Communist influence." [10]
Communist propaganda mixed with not a little
xenophobia led to many heated comments:
"...it's damned high time there were something done,
No wonder they say 'let us stay' they were never as
well off in all there lives. [sic] I say get them
back to where they belong or shoot the B-, I am
going to write to Sir Stafford Cripps about it."Ill]
Mr. Bell's letter to the FO typifies many of the opinions
that were circulating at that time.
The influence of the Communists can certainly not
be discounted. Believers in conspiracy theories would
find many similarities in the pronouncements of the
Warsaw Government and the Moscow Press agencies, and the
views listed above. If discrediting the Polish Armed
Forces in the eyes of the British was the general idea
then the plan seemed to be going well. By way of
comparison to the British Unions' views, the following is
the (Warsaw) Polish Trades Unions resolution at the World
Federation of Trades Unions on the 13th June, 1946.:
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"Considering that over a year after the end of the
war there are still in existence Polish Armed Forces
under the influence and command of reactionary
Officers headed by Gen. Anders, that Gen. Anders and
his associates are a basis and command centre for
terrorist gangs in Poland, that these gangs are
murdering Trade Union, workers and peasants leaders
and are supported with funds, arms and manpower by
Gen. Anders's staff, which has been established in
several court proceedings. [...]
Considering further that a further existence of
these Polish Armed Forces under British Command but
dominated by Polish fascist generals and Officers
constitutes one of the more dangerous focal points
of fascism in the world, threatens peaceful
relations and is a centre of imperialist propaganda
for a third war...." [12)
The resolution called for the Poles to be demobilised and
that the "Anders Officer Clique" should be removed from
any influence.
The attitude of the British Trades Union movement
was rather negative towards the Poles in the first years
after the war. One Polish commentator at the time wrote
that the T.UC. had made a mockery of the old Marxian
slogan "proletarians of the world unite..." changing it
to "proletarians of the UK unite - keep out the
foreigners!" 113] The biggest fear for the Unions in
Britain was that jobs and working conditions would suffer
as the new wave of foreigners arrived. Although the
apprehension was on the most part understandable, the
open hostility came as quite a surprise to many. Post-war
Britain was in desperate need of labour. Many men were
serving abroad as occupation forces. The war losses would
also have to be made up but at the same time the crops
had to brought in and the coal had to be dug. As "The
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Economist" wrote in May of 1946:
"It is fortunate that the question of their [the
Poles] demobilisation should come at a time when,
particularly in agriculture and the coal mines,
Britain is faced with a severe labour shortage.
There will presumably be no violent opposition from
the trades unions (in spite of the hostility of the
Communists to all non-returning Poles); but the
T.U.C. will certainly ask for safeguards." [14]
In order to quell the public and labour disquiet
about the incoming Poles the Foreign Office produced a
standard format reply [Appendix F] in which the main
public complaints were dealt with; the unnecessary
passages could be deleted by the FO secretaries.
One of the major anomalies in the whole labour
situation was that it appeared that the Unions preferred
that jobs remained unfilled than that Poles should take
them. This led to many a heated exchange in the Commons,
especially after interventions by Mr. Piratin, one of the
Communist members. In a question to the Labour Minister,
Mr Isaacs, the case of the Red Lion Hotel, High Wycombe,
was brought up in which a group of Poles were playing
music:
Mr. Piratin: "May I ask him to bear in mind that the
Polish musicians are taking the place of a
band, all the members of which belong to
the Musicians Union."
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: "Is it not the case in some quarters of
the House that if the Poles take jobs they
are abused and if they do not they are
called drones? [...]
Mr. Piratin: "May I ask the Minister to bear in mind
that the essence of my question is merely
to ensure that such Poles who are in this
country do not in any way scab or blackleg
on British Labour and that in this case
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they are actually replacing British
Labour? That is the essence of the
question, and if the hon. member for
Mid-Bedford (Mr. Lennox-Boyd) disputes
that, he is in favour of scab labour."
Lt.Col. Sir Thomas Moore: "Does the right hon. Gentleman
approve of this vendetta against Poles who
want to work here rather than return to
Communist Poland?"
Mr. Isaacs:	 "May I confine myself to the Question?
There has been a complaint. The
understanding which was reached and has
been accepted by everyone is that foreign
labour can only be employed when no
British labour is available and willing to
do the work." [15]
And as if to emphasise the point guidelines were issued
to ensure that Polish musicians were kept in line.
"No Member of Polish Units shall play in Uniform in
public outside the precints of his camp. Whether for
a fee or otherwise."
"No private contracts shall be discussed or arranged
within the precints of Camp."
"Any musical combination of Polish personnel or
individual Polish Officers or Soldiers shall not
advertise themselves on bills etc. by any title that
would indicate their membership of or connection
with the P.R.C."
"There is no objection to any Polish Officer or
Soldier becoming a member of the Musicians
Union." [16]
For the Poles the policy of the Unions seemed
bizarre. Even if no-one wanted a particular job Poles
were not allowed to take up the post just on the
off-chance a British worker might take it up. Mr
Lennox-Boyd again took up the case of the Poles in the
Commons, and in particular the case of F. Magrian, a PRC
soldier, who had been offered a job in a Brighton
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restaurant but had been refused permission by the
Brighton office of the Ministry of Labour who stated that
the post could be filled by a British labourer. The
Government reply was that that was the situation. Because
Brighton had a high number of unemployed, Poles could not
be employed. Poles could not be taken on if British
labour was available and willing. [17]
As well as the restrictive labour laws there were
other administrative problems that had to be overcome. A
letter of complaint was sent to the "Polish Daily" from
Sgt. Nietz:
"The day before yesterday the silk factory informed
several men who had applied for work that the
Preston Labour Exchange does not agree to the
employment of Poles from camps other than the one in
the neighbourhood of Preston and that for this
reason our application for work cannot at present be
taken into consideration. If the Poles in the camp
near Preston, which is only 9 miles from the town do
not apply for work and have not yet been engaged, it
must be because they either do not want to work or
have other prospects. Other Poles should be
admitted to work in Preston where there is plenty of
work. It is not my fault that I am living near the
town of Hereford where there is no industry and only
a few men can find work. This is an impediment
caused by the British authorities whose "raison
d'etre" is to direct men to productive employment.
(1) is it the task of the Resettlement Corps to
provide suitable civilian employment?
(2) I found suitable employment and can begin it
today.
(3) The factory is ready to accept me because it
needs workmen. Meanwhile I have to wander from camp
to camp and cannot find work. Is this common
sense?" [18]
This was not an isolated case as soldiers began to be
caught up in official red-tape. 	 ojciech	 çski was
offered a job but his move to the Army reserve took so
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long to complete that by the time he was ready to take up
the post the vacancy had been filled. [19] [see also
Appendix G]
At the Cabinet Foreign Labour Committee meeting,
on the 25th November, 1946, another problem of placement
was brought up. At a tin mine five miles from Partreath
there were vacancies for 80 men. Nearby there was a
Polish camp run by the Air Ministry for the Polish Air
Wing with a manpower of 2,000. If a Pole took a job he
would, by the terms of Resettlement provisions, have to
leave the service camp but in the area there was no
alternative accommodation, hence he could not take the
job. This type of no-win situation was resented by both
Poles and the Ministry of Labour who also protested to
the ar Office that the situation was "not logical".[20]
It appeared that the WO was putting forward
administrative difficulties that "could be surmounted if
the primary object was to get the Poles into work."
According to historian Keith Sword, there were some
valid reasons for Polish labour to be held as a less
desirable option for the British authorities, unlike the
labour using prisoners of war. The Poles could not be
directed into jobs at ministerial will; they could not be
prevented from mixing with the local population with all
the resulting risks of friction and civil disorder; if
the Poles were admitted to civil employment this would be
a first step to permanent settlement; once the labour
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crisis was over the Poles, unlike POs, could not be sent
home. [21] Such factors must surely have affected British
thinking at the time, but there were indeed other,
historical factors that had to be taken into
consideration.
According to Towpik-Szejnowska's study on the PRC in
the UK many miners in the Lancashire pits remembered
their history when in the 19th Century Polish miners were
used as blackleg labour and as strike-breakers. [22]
This possibly accounts for some of the paranoia that
affected the mining industry over the employment of the
Poles. Much also stemmed from a distrust of all things
foreign and a fear that Poles would be employed at lower
rates and have increased norms of production that would
affect the conditions of British miners. If, after all, a
mine manager could employ a labourer at lower cost and
with a higher rate of production would he not do so -
even if that worker was a 'bloody foreigner'. 	 From the
mineworkers' perspective the question was quite
straight-forward - it was not that there were not enough
British people who wanted to become miners but rather
that working conditions deterred people from employment.
The solution was to improve conditions rather than
bringing in Poles to, as they saw it, further undermine
the very fabric of worker-management relations. Hence
they fought the Government proposals tooth and nail. As
Emmanuel Shinwell, Minister for Fuel and Power, admitted to
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the Commons in October, 1946:
"I can assure hon. members that the question of
Polish labour in the Mines has been under review for
many months, I will not seek to deny it.
Unfortunately, as it appears to me, the National
Union of Mineworkers are not willing to have the
Poles in the pits. [...]
Therefore when 1 was faced with a problem of whether
I should force into the pits 200 trained Polish
miners, who were all that were available, or defer,
at any rate for the time being, to the views of the
National Union of Mineworkers, what would hon.
members expect me to do?"[23]
Not everyone was so understanding with regards to the
Governments position. "The Times", a newspaper not known
for its support of the Poles in the West as will be shown
later, wrote in its leader of September 2nd, 1946:
"If the nation shivers next winter it will at least
have the satisfaction of knowing that such coal as
it is possible to burn in British grates has not
been touched by foreign hands, except by a couple of
hundred pairs of Polish hands, if the Mineworkers'
Union decides one day to permit it." [24)
Of the many criticisms levelled against the Poles
one that caused much resentment was that somehow they
were parasites and lazy freeloaders living at the
expense of the British tax-payer. There was some effort
by the British Joint Committee for Polish Affairs to
redress the balance in the argument. It produced a
pamphlet titled "Do the Poles here really work? Some
facts". The pamphlet was reproduced in the "Polish Daily"
so that Poles could show it to their English friends. Ihe
main contention of the pamphlet, produced in early 1949,
was that the tax-money the British had put into the PRC
had been more than made up by the income tax received
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from Poles already in employment. [25] As logical as the
argument was 1 it was difficult for Poles to shake off the
epithet of 'sponger'
At Questions to the Under-secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, McNeil, on the 21st January, 1948 a
fairly typical exchange took place between those who
supported the Poles and those who did not:
Sir Stanley Reed: "Will the right hon. Gentleman take
into consideration the painful effect in
many areas in which these camps are
situated by the Poles being maintained in
idleness while British workers are called
upon for a special effort, and are even
directed into special employment."
[...)
Vice-Admiral Taylor: "Will the right hon. Gentleman say
whether the idleness on the part of the
Poles is their fault or not?"
Mr McNeil: "I should in fairness admit that there
has been a most gratifying volume of
volunteering by these people." [26)
One of the imperatives for the Resettlement Act in
1947 was to quell such murmurings. "The Manchester
Guardian" of the 4th February, 1947 wrote:
"Only those who are blind to our tragic background
of the Polish problem will question our moral
obligations to these Polish ex-service men. But it
is fair to wonder how long we can afford to maintain
such a costly contingent in idleness and vacillation
at a time when our labour force needs 657,000
recruits to bring it up to its strength in 1939."
[27)
Offering criticism is always easy, finding solutions is
usually the difficult part. For many MPs the
Resettlement Act was not the solution to the problem. To
quote Michael Astor speaking during the Bill's second
reading:
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"Today we are a bit complacent about them. These
Poles are positively rotting with boredom, in many
cases - absolute abject boredom. They have centred
their hopes in this country. Their hopes in their
own country have gone, for the time being, at any
rate. They had various reasons to believe they might
be allowed to acquire British citizenship. Now they
are forcibly unemployed, and they have no hopes or
prospects. The shortcoming of this bill is that it
does not provide what is needed - prospects." 128]
Vice-Admiral Taylor, another of the MPs who did
much to further awareness of the problems of the Poles
commented:
"They have been waiting a very long time, even
years, in this country, while doing nothing at all,
and there is nothing so devastating for a human
being as to be doing absolutely nothing. That is
one reason, I am afraid, why many people in the
United Kingdom think rather badly of the Poles."
[29]
Even as the Resettlement Corps was winding down
there was a small contingent for whom it was very hard to
find gainful employment. As a proportion to the overall
total, officers made up a large part of the unemployable.
By the 25th November, 1948, there were still 14,965
members still in the Resettlement Corps.
Men	 Women
	
Officers : 6,161 	 320
	
Other Ranks : 8,154	 330	 [30]
A proportion of these were involved in administrative
duties, while others were just too old or too ill to be
employed in civilian work, yet they too became a
weapon for those who would criticise the policy of Polish
resettlement.
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Mr Scollan : "Are the Government aware that the people
of this country are a bit tired of carrying
these 14,000 people for five years - [Hon.
Members : 'No.'] - and how much longer are
we to carry them? Either make them work or
get them home to where they came from."
Major Lloyd : "Can the right hon. Gentleman indicate
when this Russian vendetta against our
gallant Polish Ally will stop." [31]
For the most part the plans to help the Poles were
made with only a grudging will. On one side of British
society there was a friendly welcome with a recognition
of past struggles and on the other side was the feeling
that enough was enough; the Poles had played their part
and now it was time for them to go back to Poland. The
former view largely sums up the views of the British
Right and the latter the view of the Left - for the
Attlee Government steering a middle course was a
difficult one that pleased few and angered many. Yet
something had to be done - as one MP put it: "I feel that
we owe it to these Poles, not all of whom are villains."
[32] With such warm-hearted and friendly sentiments the
Poles were sure to feel welcome.
If the British public viewed the impending arrival
of the Polish Armed Forces with unparalleled horror then
for the Poles too it was not the answer to all their
dreams.
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To treat the Poles as a single body would be to do
them an injustice. For example the 1st Polish Corps,
stationed in Scotland, was made up of many pre-war
officers and administrators who had managed to make their
ay to the UK after the fall of Poland in 1939 (there
were also a great many administrators and civil
servants), whilst the 2nd Corps was made up from
agricultural workers and settlers of the eastern 'Kresy'
that now formed part of the Soviet Union. For this
second group their situation was easier to accept, and
for many pre-war peasants life in the UK was a vast
improvement. Since they had few demands out of life they
found it easy to save money. For others life was a step
down the social ladder. There was a severe element
of declassé as former white-collar workers had to take on
manual jobs by which to survive. For men with skills it
was easier but for men who had spent the pre-war period
as career officers or administrators life was difficult.
There are many stories of officers who were forced
to take menial work, such as one General who was refused
a job as a luggage porter since "...it wouldn't be fair
to such a man." The General, however, maintained that
even the humble job of a porter was better than begging
from the Assistance Board. Pride and ambition were the
key to many success stories after the war. Another Polish
officer spent his days cleaning toilets, but with the
money he earned in one week he would survive for two thus
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giving him the time to go to the library and educate
himself. [33] Another Polish soldier was refused work in
a biscuit factory because he was "too intelligent" to
carry sacks of flour. MieczysXaw Stelmaszyñski spent nine
years working as a junior clerk in a bank before moving
to Canada where he opened a motel. [34]
Many British people misunderstood the determination
of the first generation of Poles to make a success of
life in Britain. The Poles became unpopular because they
worked hard, especially if the job offered piecework. The
harder the Poles worked the greater the rewards. They
would start work early and, if they could, many would
work through lunch. Most of the Poles had nothing so they
needed the money; they were prepared to make sacrifices.
The Poles preferred to work in non-Union enterprises as
the high demand - high reward environment suited them;
overtime was also readily accepted, not only to get extra
money but also to kill the boredom of life. This
conscientiousness in work had a negative reaction on
their British work-mates who not only resented having
traditional work norms exceeded but also resented the
fact that the Poles soon had the money to buy cars and
houses yet they, born and bred in Britain, could not.
[35]
Jealousy led to all manner of wild accusation
against the Poles, but in particular they were accused of
'spivvery'. Poles tended to dress better than the
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British, possibly to convince the locals that they were
not tramps or beggars - even the youths wore long
trousers instead of the ubiquitous grey flannel shorts,
which in turn would certainly lead to the epithet of
'spiv'. Ewa Lipniacka writes about the Polish sense of
style	 in	 clothes:	 In	 Palestine	 Polish	 officers
transformed that "sartorial monstrosity, the standard
issue British Army tropical baggy shorts, into natty
little bum-hugging numbers" [36] But it went beyond the
look of the Poles.
Misunderstanding led to unhelpful comments such as
Mr. Beswick's pronouncement in the Commons regarding
spare time 'remunerative private business':
"Is it not the point that the whole of the time of
these men is spare time, and is it not a fact that
in these days, it is almost as rare to see a Polish
Resettlement Officer without a bulging brief case as
it used to be before the war to see an S.S. man in
Berlin without a Mercedes Car." [37]
The 'fascist' analogy returned here to haunt the Poles
with accusations of lawlessness. That is not to say that
occurrences of criminality did not take place. BronisXaw
Dzikiewicz, formerly a Major in Italy, wrote at length on
how the Poles managed to get past rationing:
"The Poles always seem to manage to get by in any
situation. They started by buying ration coupons
from the English for a shilling or two. There was
suddenly a great rush in the clothes shops. After a
while the English caught on that it was the Poles
who were buying up great quantities of clothing
material and so ruled that at the point of sale the
whole book had to be shown and not just the coupon.
But they managed to get round that too. Because it
was so difficult to get hold of these books the
Poles started to produce their own, and in the
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relevant places filled in names and addresses taken
from the phone book. The books sold like hot cakes.
There was another great rush in the shops. It was a
funny sight seeing a Pole, not knowing the language
at all, and often dressed in Polish uniform, using a
ration book made out in the name of a born
Englishman. Then came the ruling that the owner of
the book would have to prove that he was English.
Thankfully the Poles had stocked up with all the
goods they needed and besides they could always ask
an English friend to go shopping with them. The
'sons of Albion' retained their sense of humour and
willingly went along with the game." [38)
Even when the law was not being broken the Poles
seemed to cope well. Dzikiewicz goes on that the
resourcefulness of the Poles surprised even him. As soon
as the news got around that somewhere something was being
sold without coupons the Poles, not knowing any English
at all, would be off by train. They even managed to cope
with the fact that during the war all direction signs and
the names of railway stations were removed. Getting
around for foreigners was not easy but even so the Poles
managed to get by. [39]
The occurrences of crime were not restricted to the
petty day-to-day infringements of the black-market.
According to Jerzy Potocki, the Second Corps had its share
of problems as it approached its end. Although the
over-all unity of the Corps was maintained, there were
incidences of desertion, theft, robbery and even armed
raids as discipline fell apart. Potocki speaks of
currency rackets that were carried on in Italy and the
two way transports using Army transport vehicles.
Soldiers would ship olive oil from the South of Italy to
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the North and would move clothes from the North to the
South. In this way the lorries were always full. [40]
Slepokora was also involved in this two way movement but
he admits to moving machine parts South in return for
olive oil to the North. This was the first way he and
many Poles made their money. [41] This was not, however,
a singularly Polish problem. Anyone who reads
"Catch-22", Joseph Heller's fictional account of the
American campaign in Italy, will see that war has the
potential to make some people very wealthy.
The Poles in Britain also managed to get on the
wrong side of the British by fighting their
not-so-private war against Communism. One story made the
press on the 30th July, 1946, when it was reported
"...that a number of Polish soldiers serving under
His Majesty's command created a disturbance at a
public meeting held at Edinburgh on 21st June, 1946,
under the auspices of the British Council, presided
over by the Lord Provost, when they insulted the
Polish ambassador who was addressing the meeting, as
a result of which they had to be removed by the
Police." [42]
Rioting in the streets of Scotland was something
guaranteed to create bad feelings among the locals. A
report from the Scottish Office and Police painted a very
negative view of the Poles in Scotland. The Foreign
Office also received a copy and the following is the
internal correspondence between Hancock and Robin Bankey
of the FO.
Hancock: "I can't help feeling that this may be a rather
partial report. The Police see the gloomy side
of things. Personally I believe that, while
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there may be many people in Scotland who
dislike the Poles, there are also many who like
them."
Hankey: "Possibly but our correspondence tends to
confirm that these feelings of resentment are
pretty widespread. And many responsible Poles
such as Count Raczynski are seriously disturbed
at the present state of feeling." [43]
The views of the Scottish Police were not shared by all
Forces around the country. The Horsham Police in West
Sussex went on the public record in 1948. In an article
in a local newspaper entitled "A Bouquet for the Poles",
Supt. Miller announced that "considering the large number
of Poles we have in this district we get very little
trouble from them." [44] Unless one lived in a town like
Horsham with over 3,000 Poles stationed in its Council
area then the Poles were not a daily feature. In Scotland
the Poles were notable by their very visibility and
numbers. In October 1946, in Scotland, there was one
Pole to every 141 Scots: In England and hales there as
only one Pole to every 322 English and Welsh. [45]
When the 2nd Corps was brought from Italy it was decided
that most should not go to Scotland [see Appendix C] but
would be spread around the rest of the United Kingdom. As
Bevin put it, these "blessings" had to be shared around
the country.
The War Office did not help the Polish case by
forming the 1st Corps in Scotland. As a reserve Corps it
was made up of 'deserters' from the German Army. The
troops with whom such good relations had been built were
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serving in orth Germany as an army of occupation.
General Maczek's 1st Armoured Division is remembered
fondly by the Scots, but the new influx of Germans"
added fuel to the flames and gave credibility to the
'fascist' label.
According to Warsaw's military attache, Colonel
Kuropieska, there were some 89,000 Poles recruited
from the German Army.
1st Polish Corps
Recruited North Africa
Recruited from D-Day to end 1944
1st Jan. 1944 to End April 1945
May and June 1945
2nd Polish Corps
Recruited up to June 1944
Recruited Second half of 1944
Recruited first half of 1945
2,000
33,192
15,439
4,000
54,631
2,500
14,000
18,000
34,500
Total :	 89.131	 [46)
The ar Office gives a lower and more accurate breakdown
of the "Germans" in the 1st Corps both at home and
serving in the BAOR.
Ex-Wehrmacht + Todt
1st Armd Div (BAOR) 4,149 + 96 = 4,245 out of 15,000
1st Para Brig (BAOR) 1,984 + 55 = 2,039 out of 4,000
1st Corps (UK)	 16,200 out of 30,000
22,484 out of 39,000
[47]
Certainly Kuropieska was in a position to know about
the recruits from the German Army. Much to his surprise
he discovered that all his staff had been chosen from a
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Polish Repatriation Camp and that they had all, at one
time or another, served in the ehrmacht.
Kuropieska recounts a conversation he had with one
of his staff who was not well disposed to the English:
"If the colonel only knew how we chased them, and
now look at them; these layabouts! these
upstarts!"
"But where did you chase them?"
"In Africa - we were with Rommel." [48]
It transpired that all his staff had been in the Afrika
Korps until they were captured in 1942 and then joined
the Polish Army. According to Kuropieska their pride in
their former service was great and their behaviour with
him was exemplary. All were subsequently repatriated to
Poland.
The British Government was aware of the feeling that
British public opinion might tolerate the Poles who had
stood by them in the early war years, to ask them to
accept the men who had at one time fought against their
soldiers was pushing their good will. As more and more
letters of protest came in, so the Foreign Office added a
supplementary answer to the format answer [Appendix F] to
calm public concern.
The Foreign Office attitude was that it would not be
possible to discriminate against the ex-Wehrmacht Poles
as it would be more trouble than it was worth. As Hankey
minuted:
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"I don't see you can make the distinction
administratively effective. You have many
categories : -
Poles who fought in Poland or France ^ were
captured by Germans, put into Todt Orgri + escaped or
were recaptured by us + fought for us.
Poles who did not fight in 1940 but ditto
Poles who served willingly or otherwise on
E.Front + got out through Persia or Italy + fought
for us.
Poles from labour camps ho escaped + here
enlisted but never fought against Gs.
etc.
etc.
There 's only one tidy distinction; did he serve in
Polish A.F. under our command. Anything else
produces a hurricane of favouritism, discrimination
+ complaints.
Besides, what do we do with the others? Deport
them? And in British Uniform?
There'd be the whale of a howl. he'd better let
this aspect rest. It's being worked up [...] for
partisan purposes.	 RMAH 24/10/46" [49]
If it is possible to talk about being politically
'correct' then the Poles who were about to join British
society were definitely running against the flow of the
then current fashionable thought.
While in Italy the 2nd Corps was accused of all
manner of anti-Communist activity. Many of the
accusations were the work of Communist agitation. Italy
after all turned very Leftist after the war. But many
incidents did occur. In November of 1945 Anders felt
compelled to issue an order to his senior officers that
they should put an end to the attacks on Communists:
"I understand the negative feelings towards the
representatives of Bierut's Government but I cannot,
however, allow improper behaviour from my
subordinates. The local Communist press and these
very Bierut representatives instantly make the most
of every such incident." [50]
- 317 -
MieczysXaw acawski writes that while in Italy he
attended a speech by the local Communist delegate who got
as far as "Citizens of Alessano..." before being showered
in a hail of rotten Polish tomatoes and oranges. Another
group of Poles at the same time overturned the delegate's
car in front of the Church. [51]
Colonel Sidor lists 195 separate incidents taken
from the Italian press, ranging from shoplifting to the
rape and murder of a woman reported in "Il Giornale della
Sera" of 29th November, 1946. [52] Even given Sidor's
bias it cannot be denied that certain events did
occur - and not always started by the Poles. In a report
to the Chief of Staff, Colonel Skoczen of the Polish
Military Police lists the most serious incidents from
January 1945 to September 1946 including a fight in
Senigallia between the Poles and Italian Communists - an
italian, Mario Balducci, died of his wounds. A Polish
Sapper on the other hand was shot by Germano Germolini
for trying to remove a Communist Party poster. [53]
These sort of events did not go unnoticed in
Britain, and agitation by British Communists made sure it
would not be missed. Hankey of the FO was aware of this
and wrote to the ar Office in that respect:
"I may add in parenthesis that I doubt if the 2nd
Corps have been guilty of more than a fraction of
the things imputed to them for political motives by
their adversaries, but I would not care to put my
last shirt on it owing to their undoubtedly strong
bias." [54]
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The Polish Armed Forces rapidly gained the
reputation among the British as being vehemently opposed
to the Communists and anti-Russian, no surprise to anyone
who knew their history. The Polish way of thinking did
not endear them to the many British who supported the
Russians after the war. According to "The Sunday Times",
in August 1945, eight hundred Polish soldiers decided to
boycott the Scottish border town of Peebles and not
fraternise with the local population because the local
Council had asked the Government to send them all back to
Poland. Councillor John Mackay described them as "big,
lusty fellows with nothing to do while their own country
needs them badly." Mrs Kathleen Chapman from Sheffield
was so inspired by the Peebles story that she wrote to
Bevin in support of the Scots:
"We have given them sanctuary in our country for 4½
years now and it is time they were back in Poland,
great lusty fellows simply idling about with nothing
to do (but frat with our girls) while Poland needs
them now. I am sure you will regret it if you do not
act boldly and sensibly and order them to return,
they are all without exception anti-Russian and have
no good word for our fine brave allies."[55]
The reaction of the British public was to some
extent determined by their attitude towards the Soviet
Union. Those who believed the, not inconsiderable,
propaganda that the Soviets were the friends of all
workers tended to look at the Poles, who seemed to be
their main critics at the time, with animosity. Those who
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took a more pragmatic, and with hindsight we can say a
more realistic view of the Soviet Union, tended to look
at the Poles with sympathy as victims of an injustice and
a hostile campaign of misinformation.
Vice—Admiral Taylor, in another of his staunch
defences of Polish interests in the Commons, put forward
his ideas on why the Poles were not going to return to
Poland;
"The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr.N.Hynd) said that
the main object of the Government was to get the
Poles to go back to Poland. If conditions in Poland
were entirely different from what they 	 are
- I refer to the Communist set-up - and the
administration were changed so that these people
could go back, they would not require any pushing.
They are all most anxious to return to their own
country. There is no nation which is so patriotic;
no nation which loves their country more than the
Poles. They do not need any urging to go back; but
how is it possible for the Poles to go back to
Poland	 under the conditions which exist there
today?"
Mr. Ben Levy then asked if it was so bad why were 250
Poles returning every week? Admiral Taylor continued:
"Some of them are going back to Poland, of course,
that is a fact, but the vast majority of Poles here
will not return to their homeland under the
conditions which exist there. [...] The Government
is Communist, and anyone who opposed the Communist
regime in Poland is looked upon as a fascist, a
reactionary, and a traitor to his country, and is
dealt with accordingly if he goes back to Poland.
Under these conditions, how do hon. Members
consider that the Poles should go back to
Poland. "[56]
Admiral Taylor was not alone in feeling that more could,
and should, be done for the Poles. As Mrs Short wrote to
the Foreign Office in August, 1945:
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"I have seen what the Poles have suffered during
this war, and 1 have seen their pathetic loyalty and
faith in England and England's honour - a
faith which has, to our everlasting shame, not
been justified. In every quarter our enemies are
being better treated than our most faithful Ally
- Poland." [57]
The Poles felt this acutely, and knew that they were
losing the battle of hearts and minds for public
sympathy. As one soldier in Italy wrote:
"I am sorry that the majority of the English people
prefer not to see the truth. Perhaps it is more
convenient for them at the moment to be blind and
dumb, but to lean on a lie is rather dangerous."
[58]
The Labour Party in Britain - front benches
excluded - had swung to the extreme Left. The Hendon
Branch of the Party put forward the following resolution
at the 1946 Labour Party Conference:
"This Conference is of the opinion that world peace
can only be based on a British policy directed to
ensure firm friendship and co-operation with the
progressive forces throughout the world, and in
particular with the U.S.S.R. [...] The Conference
therefore calls upon the Government (a) to maintain
and foster an attitude of sympathy and friendship
towards the Soviet Union, . . . and (b) to repudiate
Mr. Churchill's defeatist proposal to make the
British Commonwealth a mere satellite of American
Monopoly Capitalism which will inevitably lead to
our being aligned in a partnership of hostility to
Russia." [59]
The question of this mass of pro-Soviet goodwill
must be on whose inspiration did it come about?
The British press came in for some criticism of its
partiality and balance. George Orwell, a writer more in
tune with reality than many of his contemporaries, wrote
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the following remarkably accurate piece in "Tribune", on
the 1st September, 1944:
'I cannot discuss here why it is that the British
intelligentsia, with few exceptions, have developed
a nationalistic loyalty towards the U.S.S.R., and
are dishonestly uncritical of its policies.... But I
would like to close with two considerations which
are worth thinking over.
First of all a message to English Left-Wing
journalists and intellectuals generally. Do remember
that dishonesty and cowardice always have to be paid
for. Don't imagine that for years on end you can
make yourself the boot-licking propagandist of the
Soviet regime, or any other regime, and then
suddenly return to mental decency. Once a whore,
always a whore.
Secondly, a wider consideration. Nothing is more
important in the world to-day than Anglo-Russian
friendship and co-operation, and that will not be
attained without plain speaking. The best way to
come to an agreement with a foreign nation is not to
refrain from criticising its policies, even to the
extent of leaving your own people in the dark about
them. At present, so slavish is the attitude of
nearly the whole British press that ordinary people
have very little idea of what is happening, and may
well be committed to policies which they will
repudiate in five years time." [60]
Hugh Trevor-Roper, writing the introduction to Bethell's
"Last Secret", is even more specific:
"Nevertheless, in the West, where public opinion was
powerful, the alliance of necessity had to be
represented as an understanding, a sympathy between
peoples of similar ideals. By 1944 British
propaganda had for three years recorded the
sufferings and extolled the heroism of the Russian
people. It had concealed the true character of the
Russian government. It had suggested that its aims
were similar to our own. Thereby it had created a
public attitude towards that government which made
possible,	 and even acceptable, certain great
betrayals." [61]
The cartoons reproduced as appendices H and I show how
over the course of the war attitudes changed towards the
"fine brave ally". In 1939, after the invasion of Poland,
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but in particular during the Soviet-Finnish war, the main
current was that both the Nazis and the Soviets used
similar methods and to the same ends. The images, whether
the 'Russian Bodysnatcher' or the 'Gorilla Ambassador',
are strong and negative. By 1945 the images had become
more heroic: it was now the desire to support the Soviet
Union. Past events had been reassessed and it became
"...worthwhile to review the military aspects of the war
from the Russian standpoint, in order to give its history
more objectively and to correct earlier impressions."
[62] What this meant in reality was that according to the
press, the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 was not the
'stab in the back' that was claimed at the time. In
Finland it was claimed that Stalin was fully justified in
seeking safe defensive borders, whereas at the time maps
were being published to ask the British public how they
would feel if asked to cede Southampton, the Isle of
White, parts of Norfolk and the Orkney Isles to a foreign
power.
The new, pro-Soviet, way of thinking was the reason
the Poles found it so difficult to convince the British
public of the validity of their arguments. The Poles were
well aware that they were losing the propaganda war, and
they knew why. Tadeusz Modeiski wrote, of the British
public:
"They [the Poles] also ignored the farcical
buffoonery and lies of "The Daily Worker"
correspondent in Moscow, Harold King, who wrote:
"The Soldiers of the Second Polish Corps who want to
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fight together shoulder to shoulder with the Red
Army are prosecuted, tortured and disappear without
trace." I can assure my readers that no Pole who
experienced the hell of Soviet captivity would want
to go to Russia again to fight together with the
Soviet Army, shoulder to shoulder. They were
embittered by the venomous comments of the British
press on the left towards the rightful Polish
Government in London. This press declared support
for "our Russian allies' territorial and political
demands in Poland" and demanded that a "sharp
hygienic process" was necessary against "our
ungrateful friends", meaning the Polish Government
which did not want to give Stalin one-third of
Polish territory or be signatory for depriving
Poland of its freedom and independence." [63]
The adverse attitude of the press was noticed not just by
the Poles. As the protest letters from the British public
flooded into the Foreign Office, Waterfield, one of the
clerks there, commented:
"Many are from the Kircaldy area of Scotland. In
general they are bitter and show an ignorance of the
facts which a reading of the daily papers would
prevent. There is no diminution in the am[oun]t of
the correspondence." 164]
The point Waterfield seemed to miss was that elements of
the British press appeared to have their own agenda in
dealing with Polish matters. "The News Chronicle", for
example, misquoted one of Chuter Ede's statements to the
Commons in March, 1947. He actually said that: "Isolated
individuals previously connected with the Polish Forces
have been actively associated with black market
operations in London." It was reported in the paper as:
"Many Poles have been actively engaged in the black
market in London." [65) A not very subtle change that
only added fuel to the flames.
The case of the "Polish Dachau" was one story that
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gained international notoriety. In June 1945 "Pravda"
reported that the Poles had set up a "concentration camp
at Inverkeithing" in Scotland. It was alleged that
hundreds of thousands of Poles were being held there,
many of them in chains. The next day the Poles opened the
camp to reporters. The War Office confirmed that there
were in fact only 53 prisoners in the camp all of whom
had been sentenced by Courts Martial and were not
political offenders. "The Daily Telegraph" reported that
although conditions were not good it was not a
concentration camp - the 'chains' were in fact British
issue restraints used for more "obstreporous prisoners".
"The Daily Sketch" was criticised by the FO for ignoring
the facts and concentrating on the more "lurid" aspects
of the story. "The Daily Worker", "as might be
expected", followed the "Pravda" line without question.
There was some concern that even the BBC released
the "Pravda" story without comment. This in turn led
to a complaint from Count Raczyñski and hurried
editorials from the World Service and some time later on
the Home Service. [66]
Some of the reports in the British press were
fanciful to say the least. One story, taken as fact by
"The Daily Herald" and "The Scotsman" as they originated
from a Reuters release, claimed that the Polish officers
murdered at Katyti were all former prisoners from
Sachsenhausen. According to Erik Johansen, a Norwegian
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ho had been in the concentration camp since 1941, the
bodies had been taken from the camp and put in Polish
uniforms. The Germans had a Jewish team forge and 'age'
the documents that were then planted on the bodies and to
remove witnesses the Jews were then liquidated. Even in
1945 the story seemed unlikely yet it was just what
people who wanted to believe the best of "our fine brave
ally" wanted to hear. [67]
As early as January 1943, Douglas Reed wrote in
"Time and Tide" that:
"The British people.. .ask each other, what is this
trend in the war that causes the Press suddenly to
attack all our friends, all those who bore the brunt
of the fight "against Nazi aggression.
Unhappily the people can only look to the Press
for their information, and this leads me to say (as
I hope you will allow me to say) that, in all my
experience I have never known (not even in Germany
or other dictatorship States) the picture of affairs
in foreign countries to be so falsified in
presentation to the reading public, as is the
picture of Poland, Yugoslavia and Greece in the
information laid before the British people by the
radio and the Press to-day. It is hypocrisy to
assert that any freedom of the Press exists in this
country to-day, while, in the matter of these three
countries, the future of which affects us as closely
and vitally as did that of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938,
some secret ban has quite clearly been laid on the
publication of authentic information." [68]
The notion of a conspiracy to gag the Press is not
strictly the case, at least once hostilities were over,
but questions about the unrepresentative nature of Press
coverage should be asked. The Foreign Office was
"seriously concerned" about the quality of correspondent'
in Poland:
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"ihe only good man is, I understand, the Sunday
Times man, Mr. Selby and he has been expelled.
Mr. Cang who represents The Times and Manchester
Guardian, is financed and housed in suspicious
circumstances apparently by the Polish Government
and cannot be relied upon to send independent
reports. Many of his reports are obviously inspired
by a desire to conciliate the present Communist
regime.	 The Reynolds News	 man is a	 [?-word
unclear] Indian of Communist tendencies. The
Economist representative is also a fellow traveller.
The Reuter string man is known to be a Communist.
This state of affairs is completely unworthy of the
British Press and even the B.B.C. now has to rely
partly on quotations from the American Press for its
Polish service." [69]
The Foreign Office was fully aware of the capacity for
those who "stank of fellow travellership a mile off" to
influence events as well as just reporting them. [70] The
1946 referendum, the results of which are covered in
chapter four, was reported in "The Times" in the
following manner:
"3 Times Yes
Polling here to-day in the referendum, in which the
Polish Government seeks approval on three main
points of policy, went quietly with every appearance
that the machinery of voting was being fairly
operated." [71]
More a question of hope over truth. Similarly in August
of 1945 there was a report in "The Times" about three
Poles who had been arrested by the Polish Forces in
Britain and put in Polkemmet Camp, West Lothian.
According to "The Times" they had been disarmed and put
into old German uniforms. Apparently the reason for their
arrest was that they had expressed a view to returning to
Poland. [72] 'Ihe article was recognised by the Foreign
Office	 as being untrue and part of a Communist
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anti-Polish agitation campaign, but the problem was how
to stop such clearly partial reporting. Such were the
joys of a 'free' Press.
Ihe biggest problem the Poles had in trying to
convince British public opinion was the fact that the
British wanted to believe the best about Moscow and its
intentions after the war. Since 1941, and the German
attack on the Soviet Union, the British propaganda
machine had been fostering happy thoughts about their
'gallant ally' and these feelings could not be switched
of f over night.
Michael Chariton conducted the following interview
with Lord Gladwyn, who was, in 1946, the Acting Secretary
General of the United Nations:
Chariton: "Do you agree that those who influenced our
policy (and perhaps yourself included) were on
the whole too optimistic?
Gladwyn: Possibly, yes. But I think in view of public
opinion, particularly in America, but also in
England, it was difficult to be anything else.
If you'd given the impression that you were not
trying to come to some kind of agreement of a
reasonable nature with the Russians there'd
have been a revolt in the House of Commons and
in the nation generally - certainly in the
army.
Charlton: Why do you say that: "...certainly in the
army?"
Gladwyn: Well the army, after all, was very left-wing on
the whole, as was shown by the elections in
1945. I think they thought that we were
fighting for democracy, and they had certain
illusions about the Russians - 'the gallant
allyt.
Chariton: But surely those illusions were fostered by
those who influenced our policy with the
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constant suppression, or covering up, of
information which might have led public opinion
to a different conclusion?
Gladwyn: It may have been. But, on the other hand, if we
hadn't done something to foster the idea of
'the gallant ally' some people would have said
that the Russians might have made a separate
deal with Hitler. You see, that was the idea."
[73]
As many popular misconceptions abounded with
regards to the new regime in Warsaw as about the nature
of the Soviet Union. It was believed by many that a
revolution had taken place with the support of the people
and that the stories emanating from the Poles in the iest
were the lies of expropriated landowners who had personal
or financial reasons for opposing the government of
'peasants and workers'. In a book, remarkable only in its
blind devotion to the Communist line, W.P. and Zelda
Coates wrote a history of Russo-Polish relations. The
book was published in 1948, just as Polish Stalinization
was moving up a gear, and with that in mind the ideas
expressed seem out of touch with reality:
"There can be little doubt that a Polish Government
whose power rests on the people and which considers
the interests of the latter paramount, a Government
which knows how to interest the masses of workers
and peasants in the economic and cultural
development of the country will not repeat the
mistakes still less the crimes of the old Polish
Pans, but will maintain the independence of the
country, promote the welfare of its people and lead
it from strength to strength." [74)
Nearly fifty years and the fall of the Communist regime
later, it is difficult to believe that someone once
believed in these words. Yet believed they were, and by
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more than a few people. As one Polish Officer in Italy
wrote, in 1944:
"I have made one observation analysing all events,
that an Englishman sees what he wants to see and
manages to close his eyes if it is more convenient
for him to do 50." [75]
It would be unfair to give the impression that
everyone in the field of influencing public opinion was
so blindly pro-Soviet and pro-Communist. Despite the
criticism of "The Economist's" arsaw correspondent,
quoted earlier, the Journal as a whole was no friend of
the Left. The following	 criticism of the Engineering
Union comes from February of 1949:
"The AEU's recent decision to reverse its policy of
refusing or expelling Polish refugee workers
deserves notice and welcome - even if couched only
in the phrase "And high time too!" The
dog-in-the-manger meanness of the original decision
may probably be attributed less to the natural
attitude of the AEU membership, who are doubtless no
more selfish or stupid than other people, than to
the vindictiveness of the Communist element among
them.	 The defeat of that element is certainly an
added reason for congratulation." [76]
Even more remarkable than this is "The Economist's"
criticism of the entire thrust of British post-war
foreign policy towards Poland. In reviewing Jan
Ciechanowski's "Defeat in Victory" "The Economist's"
reviewer wrote:
"The tale of the acts of British and American policy
towards Poland in the later years of the war adds up
to a record of gross treachery. Yet it was not, as
the policy of the Kremlin clearly was, a process
premeditated and calculated from the beginning.
First Mr Churchill, and later President Roosevelt
also, slid gradually down the slippery slope of
dishonour like the embezzler who starts by really
intending to pay back the money he takes." [77]
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Perhaps the above account has given a very negative
view of the public reaction to the Poles and certainly
not everyone in Britain opposed their arrival in the UK.
The Roman Catholic hierarchy welcomed the Polish Forces.
The Archbishop of Westminster, Dr Griffin, was quoted in
"The Daily Telegraph" in July, 1945:
"The overwhelming majority of Poles outside Poland
are unwilling to go back to Poland as it is now. e
understand and we assure those who stay that they
are altogether welcome among us." [78]
In June 1946 the "Joint Committee of Welcome for Polish
Forces" was set up with Lt.Gen. Sir Noel Mason Macfarlane
as its proposed chairman, but due to ill health the
Duchess of Atholl had to stand in. The vice-chairman was
Professor W.J.Rose of the University of London's School of
Slavonic and East European Studies. This body of public
figures and intellectuals distributed cards to arriving
troops welcoming them to Britain and wishing them well
for the future and luck in reconstructing Britain. [79]
It should also be pointed out that not all the Trades
Unions opposed helping the Poles into the labour market.
The Transport and General Workers Union did much to help
Poles. The TGU had a full-time organising Secretary of
All-Polish Union branches so that by 1949 there were
6,000 members of the Union plus many more who were in
local 'British' branches. The Union also organised Sunday
Schools to introduce Poles to British Unionism and to
highlight available means of language tuition and further
education for those who wanted it. As Mrs McKay, 'IGWU
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Secretary for branch 1333 wrote to "Ihe Polish Daily" in
April 1950:
"A Polish worker who helps in the task of social
reconstruction of Britain, serves his country as
well: he gains a valuable experience which he will
use to the best advantage of his country when the
hour of liberation strikes." [80]
However, as with most protests, the majority of letters
and articles came from people who had a particular 'axe
to grind'. Although the Foreign Office received a mass
of letters denouncing
	 the Poles as 'fascists', many
leading	 politicians voiced concern at this public
attitude. As
	 early as 1944 Ernest Bevin defended the
Poles at the Labour Party Conference:
"People have stood on the rostrum this week and said
that the Poles are fascists. Some are. I knew
General Sikorski, no one will tell me he was a
fascist. Neither is Mikolajczyk nor the Polish
Socialist Party. Hurling epithets at one another
will not do." [81]
Yet the popular idea that the Poles were fascists and
reactionaries remained. Despite the many letters of
protest it is difficult to generalise that most of
the British public objected to the Poles. MPs like
Mr. Gallacher, Communist member for Fife best, were in
favour of forced repatriation. He pronounced that a
revolution in Poland had taken place: "The days of
Tsardom have gone and the days of political and religious
persecution have gone" [82]. Gallacher declared that if
it were up to him he would ". . .be prepared to use that
power and authority to put these men back into their own
country." In other words he would force the Poles back at
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gun-point. It is fairly certain that this was very much a
minority view and went against the idea of 'fair play'.
H. Foster Anderson, on a 1946 trip to Poland, put
forward his notions of British public opinion:
"I think," I said, "I ought to tell you the views of
the ordinary man in England about the Poles. He
knows that there is some sort of domestic quarrel
between you here in Poland and the Poles outside. He
is not clear what it is all about and he is not
particularly interested. But he knows that when
England stood alone, Polish airmen fought by our
side in the Battle of Britain and throughout the ar
the soldiers, sailors and airmen of Poland fought
side by side with our men. He wants the Poles to go
back home but if they feel they cannot, he does not
kant them to be forced to go back to Poland." [83]
This probably sums up quite accurately what the
majority of the British public was thinking. It failed to
answer the question of where the Poles would live if they
would not return to Poland. Even the most well meaning of
Britons might think twice if he found a Polish Division
camping on his door-step. et by the time the Poles had
arrived from Italy and Germany much of the damage had
been done. Opinions had been forming for some time and if
the integration of the Poles was to work then it would
take hard work on both sides as an article in "The Polish
Daily" explained:
"It is a fact that the British public looks with
some anxiety on the arrival of the Second Corps and
it is also a fact that for the Polish Soldiers from
Italy this country represents only one stage in
their journey - and that a stage full of bitterness.
Much woric on both sides during the next weeks and
months will be required to overcome the fears of the
British public, to do away with the bitterness on
the Polish side and to secure that what is now
happening may be profitable to Polish British
friendship." [84]
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CHAPTER SEVEN
"An Honour To Have Such Faithful And Valiant
Warriors Dwelling Among Us.TM
The British Government Plans To Support The Poles.
"For Freedom... !"
General Sikorski Among His Tourists.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The realisation in the corridors of Whitehall that
Britain would be left with the responsibility of looking
after many thousands of Poles led to an air of
resignation that tempered the feeling of moral obligation
to which the British Government had originally
subscribed. The first problem the Foreign Office found
was the need to define who, from the hundreds of
thousands of Polish citizens across Europe, wearing Polish
uniform, were eligible for their help.
By the end of the Second World War, it has been
estimated that 38% of the overall foreign work-force in
the German Reich was made up of Poles. The Nazis had
incorporated some 92,000 Km 2 into Greater Germany and
despite mass population transfers out of these areas and
the hurried planting of 'Aryan' settlers from Germany,
there were around 2,500,000 Poles living in the Reich.
After 1939 the German Occupation forces held some
460,000 Polish POWs including 19,000 officers. When the
Germans occupied Romania and Hungary this number rose by
a further 8,000 as the Poles interned there were also
captured. By 1944 some of these Poles were allowed to go
home - most were not. 400,000 POWs had their status
changed to 'civilian labourers' so that they could fill
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up the slave labour camps that flourished across occupied
Europe. 57,000 Poles remained as POWs, including 17,000
officers and after the ill-fated Warsaw Rising this
number rose by another 20,000.
The system of Stalags [Mannschaftsstammlagerj for
NCOs and other ranks was spread across Europe; Polish
officers on the other hand were concentrated in six
Oflags [Offiziersiager]: Woldenburg lic, Grossborn lid,
Frie-Sack Ilib, Doessel VIb, Murnau Vila and Luebeck Xc.
Although Colditz IVc had not been used as a regular Oflag
for Poles since 1943, its position as a 'Special Camp' or
'Sonderlager' meant that many Polish "Prominente" were
held there, particularly after the Warsaw Rising when,
among others, General Komorowski was held there. [1]
Given the massive number of soldiers and former
soldiers who had a claim on being members of the "Polish
Armed Forces" an immediate problem presented itself to
the British Foreign Office who had the task of resettling
Polish troops who refused to return to Poland, namely,
who to count and who to exclude from these provisions.
The precept chosen was that only Polish troops who
had served under British command would be eligible for
help. This would exclude most of the POWs from 1939 in
Germany and it would also exclude most of the AK who had
been captured in 1944. However, the British authorities
quickly found out that the Poles were not playing by the
same rules as they were.
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Once the POW camps were liberated, there was very
little to stop Poles drifting to their nearest Polish
unit and enlisting into the very British commanded units
that they were supposed to have been excluded from, and
this is just what they did. The Polish High Command was
only too eager to accept this growth in its manpower,
particularly since it was the only way these soldiers
were going to get any help from the British Government.
Even during hostilities, the Foreign Office was
showing concern that the Polish military establishment
was growing beyond what was needed and that SHAEF
[Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) was
actively encouraging this growth:
"The Poles... seem to be making another back-
door attempt to expand their armed forces over and
above current operational needs, which we have
agreed form the only possible criteria so long as
the Polish political question is unsolved. The Shaef
paper in N895 is rather alarming. I suggest we
should be on our guard against Shaef's letting us in
for an increase in the Polish forces not justified
by current needs.
Shaef may seek to argue that they alone are the
judge of what they want. But it is we who will have
to carry the baby and as we are ½ of the CCS
[Combined Chiefs of Staff) who must approve Shaef's
schemes we can hold the situation.
SHAEF will disappear in due course and HMG in
the UK will be left with the problem of
repatriating or otherwise disposing of these
unfortunate Poles." [2]
The War Office issued a memo to the FO trying to
clarify an otherwise confused situation. If it was agreed
that a limit had to be placed on the Polish forces, then
a date would have to be given after which enlistment
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would not be considered. The War Office admitted that the
date should have been the 31st May, 1945 but in Italy
official enlistment had ended on the 2nd October. In
Germany it had been even later - the 12th, and in France
the situation had been so confused that there had been no
official date given. The Foreign Office decided that the
date for Germany should be accepted across the board but
as Hancock of the FO added:
"In doing this we must, however, realise that the
Poles have in effect bounced us. Nevertheless, I
think that it would be difficult and rather unfair
and unduly rigid to adopt either of the previous
dates suggested." [3)
This, of course, did not stop the Poles from continued
recruitment. According to the FO, General Anders and General
Morgan did not know what to do with the "steady trickle"
of Poles arriving at 2 Polcorps. It was reported that
even the pilot bringing ambassador Kot to Italy from
Poland defected on his arrival. The WO was told to:
"Instruct AFHQ to ensure that recruitment into two
Polish Corps does not continue, on however small a
scale." [41
Members of the former AK would not be allowed to join the
Resettlement Corps, yet there was still confusion over
the question of 'British command'. Some Poles had been
sent from Britain to join the AK as part of SOE
operations, some Poles from the AK were in Britain and
all the members of the AK were under the command of the
Polish Government that was in Britain and were considered
by the Poles as being part of the Polish Armed Forces.
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The FO reiterated that the only members of the AK who
would be allowed into the PRC would be ones who had been
in the UK prior to the 1st July, 1946 - and they admitted
that that was only because the WO had assured them that
the number involved would be less than 100. The FO did
make provision for that small number of civilians sent
abroad by SOE - on a discretionary basis - but it was
that very civilian nature of the Home Army that precluded
admission for most. Even General Komorowski was
"designedly" excluded as he was considered a civilian
"with no official status"	 despite being officially
appointed	 as the C-in-C Polish Armed Forces. [5]
The fact that so many Poles were left in Germany
after the war was viewed with unease by both Britain and
Poland. The British disapproved because they, along with
the US Government and to a lesser extent the French
Government, would have to foot the bill for the Poles in
their respective zones of occupation. The Polish
Government in Warsaw disapproved of the situation because
so many Poles concentrated in so small an area could
foment trouble for the new regime. Certainly, Warsaw
suspected the intentions of the Control Commission in
Germany and of UNRRA. As far as they were concerned, the
former POWs [PWX to use the War Office terminology] and
the DPs were a hotbed of counter-revolution. As one PUR
report stated:
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"With regards to the repatriation of Poles,
more or less up to the Middle of 1946, the Western
Occupation Authorities, with the tacit agreement of
UNRRA, were admitting the possibility of a change in
the Polish policy and so wanted to maintain a cadre
of people ho would take over the political life of
Poland. With the support of Polish military
formations stationed at that time in Germany they
used their newly formed watchmen companies to create
a military and political apparatus for Poland that
was dominated by right-wing elements. In the full
knowledge of the occupation authorities these units
- in particular the Swietokrzyska Brigade and the
Deuxime Bureau of the 1st Armd. Division -
supported the active operations of the Polish
Underground, supplying them with instructions,
money, arms and liaising abroad with foreign
intelligence services." [6]
Although somewhat overstated, the power of the
Polish 'Dwójka' should not be underestimated. Colonel
Gano's intelligence network had posts across Europe but
more importantly there was a large network in Poland
itself, with the largest going under the code-name of
'Pralnia II'. This network, like all the others working
for the Polish 0.11 were supposed to have been shut down
after the war but both the Warsaw authorities and the
British Government suspected otherwise. [7]
The Poles in the West had been in radio
communication with Poland throughout the war. From their
cipher and transmitter centre at Woldingham in Surrey
they were outdistancing the British Secret Service with
the electronic devices they produced and according to one
source, "...pushed all other existing devices to the
status of museum pieces." [8) Much to the chagrin of the
British, the Poles continued to broadcast their anti-
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Communist message to the old country, particularly from
secret bases in Italy. Most of the files covering this
aspect of Polish undercover work remain closed to the
public but from the little that is available it would
appear that Britain's M16 were monitoring Polish radio
broadcasts to Poland. When the Poles set up a "wireless
school" in Rome the move did not convince the Foreign
Office who obviously gave instructions to AFHQ to keep an
eye on what was going on. On the 16th October, 1945, AFHQ
ciphered this enigmatic message to the Foreign Office:
"My telegram No.1866
Station did not transmit yesterday
2. The mobile unit will continue to lie in wait.
Foreign Office please repeat to Warsaw as my
telegram No.10" [9]
This was passed to General Sugden, Director of Military
Operations and to "C" (the secretive General Stewart
Menzies, Head of M16). As well as two-way radio traffic,
the Poles also had Radio "Fighting Poland" that broadcast
the word according to the exiles. BBC Monitoring picked
up its broadcast on September 10th, 1947:
"Its entire tone was anti-Soviet and, to some
extent anti-Semitic. In a talk on "who rules
Poland?" most of the members of the Polish Politburo
were mentioned either as Soviet citizens or Jews, or
as having been Soviet-trained. Poland's rulers were
said to have been forced upon the country by the
USSR." [10]
The security aspects of this situation were not wasted in
London and Warsaw. The agents of a government no longer
recognised by HMG were inciting 'counter-revolution' in
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an allied state, the government of which was recognised
by 11MG. The implications here far reaching and it was for
this reason that the British security apparatus was
brought to bear on the Poles in the West.
Colonel Kuropieska questioned the Foreign Office in
October, 1946, about the Polish Ex-Combatant Society
[SPKJ that had recently formed in Britain, seeing it as a
new source of conflict between Warsaw and the British.
The FO was equally anxious to establish the true nature
of the SPK and planned to infiltrate its leadership but,
as this might prove difficult, they settled for an
investigation by M15. The Home Army Association was
investigated by Special Branch for much the same reasons.
The Polish Forces in the West would not be allowed to
become a nest of subversion. [11)
The security aspects of controlling the Poles became
more serious with the demobilisation of the military
structure that bound so many men together. Since the
Poles were no longer under the 1940 Allied Forces Act,
there was no legal sanction if a Pole chose to absent
himself from his unit. How could the British keep
control in the Resettlement Corps?
if the Poles were considered as possible subversives
this was nothing compared to British views of the
"Palestine Group", a group of 245 Jewish Poles expressing
a desire to go to Palestine. The War Office viewed this
new headache with unrestrained horror. Since the increase
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of Jewish terrorist activity, culminating in July, 1946,
in the King David Hotel massacre in Jerusalem, Britain
had been put on the alert for Jewish extremists in the
UK. Armed guards had been assigned to the homes of
ministers, and staff at Westminster were warned about
parcel bombs, so the prospect of bringing 245 highly
trained Jews to Britain was viewed with some
apprehension. Bombs and murders coloured many attitudes
in the War Office; Colonel Balfour of the WO wrote to
Crawford of the Control Office for Germany regarding
"...illegal Jewish immigrants and potential terrorists
however noisy	 and whatever	 their backing	 from
elsewhere" [12). hen the "Palestine Group" was to be
brought to the UK1 the Home Office advised keeping them as
far from London as possible. The War Office, keen to
comply, chose Thurso a mere 651 miles from London.
Although they were to be held there for security reasons
at a joint meeting:
"...it was also agreed that NO mention of Jewish
terrorist activities would be made, and that the
reason given for the separation of the "PALESTINE
GROUP", and their dispatch to THURSO, would be that
it was administratively convenient to have these
Poles in one camp and that the camp selected was at
THURSO." [13)
After the Foreign Office covered up the banishment of
these Polish Jews to the farthest corner of the island,
they decided that the group would have no leave for two
weeks in order to give M15 a chance to investigate them
and when leave did come through, then the Home Office, War
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Office, M15 and MIll [Directorate of Field Security] all
wanted to know about it.
The problems surrounding the Resettlement Corps did
not end with the question of who to admit. There seems to
have been some confusion over what to call the Corps. The
Foreign Office wanted to use the title: Polish Industrial
Settlement Corps to "...emphasise its essentially
civilian character". The Treasury preferred to use the
word Resettlement as the word "settlement" had ". . .a more
permanent ring". The Home Office was not keen on the use
of Polish but they let that go, their principle
objection was to the term Industrial given that most of
the Poles would end up working in agriculture - the
synthesis of the three views was the Polish Resettlement
Corps. [14]
The Polish name for the Corps did not come any
easier for the promoters of the idea. Kuropieska writes
of exiled President Raczkiewicz talking about the
Poiski Przemysowy Korpus Osiedleñczy - Bevin's idea of
the Polish Industrial Settlement Corps [15] - but the
Polish version was as short-lived as the English one. At
a meeting on the 25th June, 1946, some of the notables
concerned vith Polish issues met to muse over a Polish
name for the Corps. One suggestion put forward was to
call it the Korpus Przysposobienia Do Zawodw Cywilnych
[Training for Civilian Labour Corps] but the meeting
decided that this title was too long and although they
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tried to compromise with Przysposobienie Cywilne
[Civilian Training], it was decided that the phrase was
bad Polish and, in any case, the Ministry Of Labour was
against vocational training for the Poles and so wanted
the term for 'training' [przysposobienie] dropped.
As to the Resettlement part of the title the Korpus
Osiedlenczy [Settlement Corps] was suggested but rejected
by General Kopatiski as it implied that the Poles would
all be planted ". . .as a body in one place." Frank Savery
in his notes given to Hankey highlights the conclusion of
the meeting:
"Somebody - [Józef} Lipski, I think - then suggested
"Polski Korpus Przysposobienia i Rozmieszczenia".
[Polish Corps of Training and Distribution] This
seemed to me excellent and [Brigadier] Davy agreed
when I explained to him that "Rozmieszczenie"
connoted the dotting of people about in various
places, half a dozen here and nine there." [16]
The Polish initials P.K.P.R. were quickly twisted by
some cynical Poles to "Póki Król PXaci Regularnie" or
"While the King Pays Regularly" and it was in this spirit
most joined the Polish Resettlement Corps. [17] As Hankey
was the first to admit, many Poles considered the Corps
as an alternative to returning to Poland. "We must make
it clear this is not so. It's only an alternative to
chaos!" [18]
If the PRC was to work smoothly and efficiently,
then careful consideration would have to be given to the
quality of leadership and the structure the Corps
followed. The Polish generals would have to have some
- 345 -
input and nominally be in charge but there were limits to
how much control the Poles would be allowed. As Hankey
minuted:
"In general it will probably produce the best
results if we can give the Polish generals the
impression they are being consulted + invited to
advise + assist." [19]
This did not help to allay the fears of the Warsaw Poles,
already suspicious that the Corps was to be run along
military rather than civilian lines. As Colonel Sidor
noted:
"It is clear to us that the PRC is an organisation
created to prevent return to Poland, especially when
we consider that the leaders of this organisation
are officers favoured by Anders" [20]
As was often the case, Sidor overstated the situation.
Far from keeping the PRC to further Anders' control over
the Poles, the Foreign Office was endeavouring to find
some tactful way of removing the bothersome General from
any influence at all. Having come so close to relieving
him from command earlier, they were certainly not going
to have him as the officer commanding the Resettlement
Corps. The political advisor to SACMED put forward the
idea of giving Anders a "...Roving Commission where his
messianic qualities can be put to good use with the
minimum of embarrassment to HMG." [21] The Polish Forces
Committee on the 1st August, 1946, speculated that "we
should like to see him go to America" [22) There was
still the question of how to control Anders after his
demobilisation and to prevent him from making the
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political mischief that, in the eyes of the British, he
was apt to do. Brigadier Pyman of the WO thought
financial blackmail might do the trick:
"I can only suggest that before General Anders is
retired, he is given a warning that he is not to
take part in political activities which might
embarrass the policy of HM Government. If he is
found to be taking part in any undesirable political
activity we can always threaten to withdraw his
pension." [23]
As an alternative to Anders, the Polish Forces Committee
put forward the Polish Chief of Staff Stanisjaw Kopatiski
who was, in their view, a moderate man and a
"...straightforward non-political soldier (remarkably so,
for a Pole)." [24) As well as agreeing to the nomination
of Kopañski as GOC PRC it was also agreed that:
"The general feeling of the Committee was that
everything possible should be done to ensure that as
few Poles as possible remained in this country."[25]
What this meant in reality was that the British would
continue to encourage the emigration of the Poles; the
Foreign Office would be "unremitting" in its efforts to
find places abroad for them; the Ministry of Transport
would give favourable consideration to any request to
take the Poles abroad; the Foreign Office vould consider
the desirability of asking the US Government for help in
shipping.
Kopatiski, as the new Inspector-General of the PRC,
recommended the Poles to join the Resettlement Corps and
that the exile Government did not construe membership of
the PRC as membership of a foreign armed force. This, of
course, was a moot point and an argument can be made for
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another interpretation - and it was this very line arsaw
used to remove the citizenship of the most prominent
Polish generals. A secret letter from Colonel Komar, head
of Warsaw's 0.11 to Minister Olszewski at the Warsaw
Foreign Ministry in July, 1946, highlighted this very
military nature of the PRC insomuch as, although it was
under UK command, it would be run by Poles on military
lines, with military uniforms and ranks and in the same
military structures - brigades and divisions - and by the
same officers. [26] The London Polish Government's view
of the PRC was different in that:
"The creation of the Polish Resettlement Corps
enables the soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces to
survive abroad while the change in Poland's fortunes
does not allow them an honourable return to a free
and independent Republic." [27]
One of the principal anxieties in the minds of
Polish servicemen was a concern about the future of their
families and dependants, scattered as they were in War
Office camps across the globe. Many men adamantly refused
to join the PRC unless it was made clear what was to
become of them - a view to which the War Office was
largely sympathetic. In July, 1947, Lieutenant-Colonel
Fitzgeorge-Balfour wrote a paper for the Chairman of the
Sub-Committee of the Polish Forces Official Committee
regarding Operation "Polejump" by which Polish dependants
were to be brought to Britain:
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"It is unreasonable and useless to expect most men
to agree to move to the United Kingdom and join the
Polish Resettlement Corps if he does not know what
is to be the fate of his family and dependents.
Failure to obtain a quick decision will therefore
complicate and delay the move." [28]
Kuropieska estimates that in 1946 there were some 41,400
dependants of the Polish Armed Forces:
United Kingdom :
Italy
East Africa
South Africa
New Zealand
India
Palestine
Mexico
Western Germany
8,000
8,200
12,400
200
400
3,600
5,200
400
3,000
41,400	 [29]
To a great extent these Poles were the lucky ones as by
nature of their dependence to service personnel they
could rely on the provisions of the Polish Resettlement
Act to help them come to Britain and start new lives. For
the hundreds of thousands of Polish DP5 in Europe, the
future was a bleak one. Despite the rigours of slave
labour and concentration camps, the end of the war did
not bring an end to their misery. Many felt that the
threat of a sudden and brutal death at the hands of the
Nazis had been replaced by a slow and lingering death at
the hands of the Allies.
The exact number of DPs is difficult to determine
and it is even more difficult to record the figures by
nationality. Tannahill puts the figure for DPs under
British control as:
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NATIONALITY : BRITISH ZONE
(on 17/11/1946)
Estonian	 :	 13,309
Hungarian	 :	 3,808
Latvian	 :	 45,413
Lithuanian :	 23,882
Polish	 :	 151,664
Rornanian	 :	 3,243
Ukrainian	 :Not available.
(Polish)	 (In Poles/Others)
Ukrainian	 :	 ditto
(Russian)
Byelorussian:	 ditto
Russian	 260
Yugoslav	 :	 13,390
Others	 :	 3,324	 :
Undetermined:	 23,851
282,144
AUSTRIA
(on 23/11/46)
120
7,446
667
268
7,167
2,183
3,350
1,032
1,257
4,527
27,155
7,256
9,680
72,108
TOTAL
13,429
: 11,254
46,080
24,150
158,831
:	 5,426
3,350
1,032
:	 1,257
4,787
:	 40,545
10,580
33,531
354,252
[30]
In the British occupation zones of Germany and Austria
there were around 160,000 Polish DPs, but this figure
also included Jews, Ukrainians and Byelorussians who
declared themselves Poles for a variety of reasons.
Across Germany there were over 300,000 Poles. PUR
established the figure for November, 1946:
DPs in Germany, November, 1946.
US ZONE : BRITISH ZONE : FRENCH ZONE : TOTAL
POLES : 111,602 : 	 180,007	 :	 25,868	 : 317,477
All DPs: 220,695 :	 204,426	 :	 26,247	 : 451,368
[31]
These figures are confirmed by UNRRA who gave the figures
for DPs seeking assistance in Germany and Austria,
during September, 1946:
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Poles
Czechs
Soviet Citizens
Yugoslays
Estonians
La tv ian s
Lithuanian
GERMANY
315,110
1,143
9,600
14,216
31,362
93,170
56,647
AUSTRIA
15,621
486
519
7,103
350
1,169
779
[32]
The end of 1946 also saw the end of the mass DP
repatriations that typified the direct post-war years.
Anyone who had not returned to Poland by that time would
probably never return. The Head of the Consular Section,
Polish Military Mission, Berlin, wrote to the Foreign
Ministry in Warsaw in 1948 regarding the DP situation in
Germany. Between the end of the war and the 1st August,
1948, there had been some 1,200,000 repatriations from
Germany to Poland:
1945 - 409,881
1946 - 294,337
1947 - 75,304
Up to 1/8/1948 -
	 6,007
It was further estimated that around 400,000 Poles made
their own way to Poland through unofficial channels. It
was noted in the report that as late as 1948 there were
83,000 Poles still in DP camps in the British Zone and a
further 4,000 outside the camps. In the US Zone there
were still 49,759 Poles in camps and a further 77,868
Polish Jews and 24,000 Poles living outside camps. In the
French Zone there were still 11,000 Poles.
All three administrations in Germany came in for
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criticism from the Polish Mission for an apparently
negative approach to repatriation. The British, it was
alleged, did not take repatriation seriously and wanted
to keep the best Poles for themselves with only a desire
to be rid of troublemakers and convicts. In the spring of
1947, the British set up the Civilian Mixed Watchman
Service and then the Civilian Mixed Labour Organisation
to use Poles as an unofficial guard unit in Germany; the
idea was so popular that by July, 1948, there were 11,550
men in these organisations. The Americans set up a
similar organisation which employed around 11,000 Poles -
much to the suspicion of Warsaw.
It was the French Government's attitude that was
seen to be the most hostile by Warsaw's men although this
hostility was a1ays "masked in niceties and externally
seeming quite correct". [33] This was something that the
Polish Consul in Rastatt, Jerzy Krzeczowski, complained
of when he wrote a secret report to Dr. Marecki, the
Consul General in Berlin. He alleged that the French were
hostile to the idea of the Poles returning to Poland and
so actively encouraged recruitment by other countries to
ensure they did not go to Poland. French and Belgian
industry had been recruiting in the French Zone since
autumn of 1945, Canada had been allowed access in mid-.
1946, the British at the end of 1946 and Brazil at the
start of 1947. [34] A cynical interpretation of these
events might suggest that the Poles did not want to
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return to Poland and needed little encouragement from the
tri-zonal authorities not to go. On the other hand the
Warsaw Missions needed to blame someone - they could not
blame the situation in Poland and so chose to blame the
ill will of others. In reality, the complaints of
Warsaw's people present an unlikely scenario. Not only
did the occupation authorities not encourage DP5 to stay
in exile but they actively encouraged and on occasion
used force to return DPs to their respective countries.
UNRRA was well aware of the general feelings of the
DP5 in its charge. The report at Appendix 3 demonstrates
the feeling of Polish DPs and why they refused to return
to Poland and yet the US military was unsympathetic in
its dealing with these DPs - a problem that threatened
the stability in Germany as time went on. An UNRRA report
highlighted this deterioration:
"At this stage, the morale of the Displaced Persons
is at its lowest ebb. The change of attitude and
treatment by the U.S. Military leaves them utterly
bewildered. The incomprehensible moves of entire
populations from one camp to another, abruptly
destroying whatever meager [sic) roots they may have
established, fills them with dismay. The increase of
German authority over them and the announced
prospect of their being dumped into the German
community and left to their own resources, is
draining their very last hopes." [35)
SHAEF had stated that DP5 would be cared for at the
expense of the German population and that priority would
be given to DP requirements over the Germans. In practice
it did not work out that way. The same UNRRA report
continued that:
- 353 -
"Army directives have always stated that priority in
employment be given to DPs, yet consistent
discrimination has been practised against this group
by all Army echelons."
General Joseph T. McNarey, head of the Military
Government in the US Zone, tried at first to rid himself
of the Polish DPs by bribing them to leave. He offered
two months extra food to any DP who volunteered for
repatriation to Poland.
"I urge all Polish displaced persons in the US Zone
of Germany to take advantage of this new plan for a
60 day food ration, available to all who return to
Poland during the period October 1 to December 31,
1946. The U.S. Army and the American people firmly
believe that your future lies in Poland, helping to
rebuild your devastated country" [36]
This worked with some Poles - for most it did not. The
Americans then tried another approach to encourage the
Poles to go. The British Foreign Office had begun a
policy with regards to the Polish Armed Forces that can
be best described as the "lesser of two evils":
conditions in Britain would be made so bad that the Poles
would want to return to Poland. The US Military
Government carried out much the same policy with the DPs
in its charge but with a ferocity that the British could
never have envisaged using against the citizens of an
ally. The UNRRA report below deals with American
attitudes to the DP5:
"They [DPs] are held in the greatest contempt by the
Germans, who lose no opportunity to discredit them
in the eyes of the American Military authorities.
The effect of this derogatory influence has been
strong and widespread to the point where it has
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seeped up from the operating levels to even the
highest military echelons. The DP problem has always
been a nuisance to the Army. With redeployment and
the introduction of new, untrained and unoriented
military personnel, there is now an almost complete
lack of knowledge and understanding of the factors
which created the DP situation in the first place.
1...] The DP are generally considered by military
personnel as "lousy Poles" and "Goddam DP" who
should be sent back where they came from whether
they like it or not." [37)
Richard Lukas in his book "Bitter Legacy" lays the
problem at the feet of UNRRA itself. Although UNRRA
officials criticised the military, their own house needed
putting in order. Lukas highlights two policies from
UNRRA offices:
"Effective October 1st, 1946, all educational,
recreational and other cultural activities are to be
discontinued in all camps caring for one hundred or
more Polish Displaced Persons"
"Do not employ Poles - repatriate them as they must
go home... [there is) no such thing as an
unrepatriable Pole.... Hire Outsiders, even Germans,
to replace essential Poles, but fire Poles and get
them home." [38)
It was becoming clear that Germans were getting
preferential treatment to the DPs. The eagerness of US
troops to confiscate DP property had much to do with this
as UNRRA reported:
"Independent efforts by the DP to obtain
supplementary clothing are again attacked as black-
market activities; in fact, items of clothing
legitimately possessed by the DP are often
confiscated by U.S. troops or German Police during
shakedown raids. The German civilian is still
unusually well dressed and presents a neat
respectable appearance. In contrast the DP looks
like a burn, and this difference does not fail to
make its impression on the U.S. troops. The German
looks like a gentleman (or a lady) and the U.S.
soldier accept him as such; the DP man or woman
looks like a bum or a tramp and that is the way they
are regarded." [39)
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These events did not go unnoticed in arsaw. PUR
recognised that the DPs were particularly vulnerable. A
report from September, 1946, alleged that armed US troops
burst into a DP transport train at Freilassing in Bavaria
to "confiscate US Army property" but ended up stealing
cigarettes, chocolate and even the blankets given by
UNRRA. [40] This evident disregard for the welfare of
these poor unfortunates united Warsaw with the Polish
community in America. The Polish paper "Zycie Warszawy"
in January, 1946, cited 'Nowiny Polskie", a Polish
language paper published in New York, in which an article
under the title "Disgraceful attitude of UNRRA towards
Poles" complained that tJNRRA had a two tier system with
the 'vest Europeans refugees being in the upper tier while
the Poles and other East European DPs being in the
lower. "he are a second class nation" complained the
article. [41)
This did not escape the notice of the War Office
which compiled a file of protests from various PSX who
were still being held by the US 7th Army in the former
Oflag Murnau. One letter, written as early as July, .1945,
complains:
"Now we are free, but it is a pretence only. To tell
you the truth we have passed from German captivity
to the American one. I have to confess that I am
very disappointed with this apparent freedom. We are
in the same barracks, the same dirt and bugs. We
have repeatedly to endure the same humiliations as
before. The Germans have much more liberty than we
here."
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Another complained in September, 1945:
"What can we do. We are betrayed by the allies, we
are treated as before as prisoners of war, if we are
to perish let's perish in our country." [42]
It seems little wonder that many Poles chose to return to
Poland rather than rely on American aid but this was not
just an American problem. Although not as well documented
as the attitude of the US authorities, British policy
towards DPs appears also to have been questionable as
well - at least at ground level.
A report from the Political Division of the Control
Commission for Germany in January, 1946, emphasised that
this was a delicate matter and the military had to ". .go
carefully in the matter of putting pressure on DPs to go
home." It further added that 43rd Division ". . .appear to
have badly overstepped the mark". In DP camps in the
divisional area the military had let it be known that a
refusal to return would involve the removal of Red Cross
parcels, uncertain rations and a deterioration of living
condition. DP5 would be ". . .on the lowest priority for
what is available". Although the 51st Division was
"...more reasoned" in its approach, it was still telling
the DP5 to go. If a DP agreed to be repatriated and then
changed his mind, then the Division would not guarantee
to feed or house that DP or to make provision to
repatriate him later. This, according to the CCG, was not
government policy. Pressure should not be put on DPs and
they were at liberty to change their mind at any time
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without sanctions being applied. [43]
Another case brought to light by the CCG was a
leaflet hung up at Fallingbostel DP Camp which
threatened that if the DPs did not return to Poland they
would lose DP status and the Allies would wash their
hands of them. The leaflet concluded:
"There is no room in the world today for idlers. You
must face reality. You have only two alternatives.
To remain here and work for the Germans or to return
to Poland and work for your own salvation, and the
salvation of your country. There is no third course.
There is only one right decision. You must make it
now." [44]
The leaflet was signed by "Major J.W. Murray, Military
Government, 711 Det." and "H.E. Rendell, Director UNRRA
Team." Whoever first read the leaflet at the Allied
Liaison Branch scribbled "Good Heavens" in the margin and
the comment "If this doesn't shift them nothing will!":
such was the tone of the message.
The Prisoner of War and Displaced Persons Division
of the CCG [PW+DP Div CCG(BE)] went to great pains to
stress that the the document was unauthorised and would
be suppressed. However the Political Division did ask the
PW+DP Div. for a report on the effects of the document
and "...whether it in any way hastened repatriation".
One of the reasons for a change in attitude towards
DPs was a perceived growth of lawlessness. A Polish
report from March, 1946, listed the number of Polish
criminals in Germany in the previous quarter of a year:
- 358 -
Murder	 -	 8
Arms Offences	 - 209
Robbery	 - 14
Theft	 - 214
Curfew Offences -	 6
Burglary	 -	 7
War Crimes	 - 11
Black Market	 - 104
Petty Offences - 218
Other	 - 191
	
982	 [45]
What aggravated the situation from a Polish perspective
was that the justice system used in Germany appeared to
be geared against the DP. The case of the "Paderborn 4"
caused much official and unofficial protest from Poland
at the time and put a spotlight on the way the Allies
administered the law.
A band of Polish DP5 had been caught by German
security guards while in the act of theft and one of the
Poles was killed. In the resulting riot that ensued, as
Poles from the local DP camp visited the nearest German
village intent on vengeance, several Germans were killed.
Whereas the German security guard was exonerated as he
was found to have killed the original Pole in
self-defence the rioting Poles, on the other hand, were
given long prison sentences - 35 were sent to prison for
periods of from 3 to 20 years - and four were sentenced
to death. The Warsaw Foreign Ministry greeted the news
with outrage and warned it might affect Polish-British
relations. The British argued that it was necessary to
impose harsh penalties in Germany to maintain law and
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order; the Poles argued that they were a special case and
to them it looked - with some justice - that the German
were being better treated than the Poles. As it turned
out, the death sentences were commuted by the C-in-C
Germany, Field Marshal Montgomery on "solely legal
grounds". [46]
The case of Chaim Katz also raised questions in
London. Katz, a Polish Jew, had been found guilty of the
unlawful possession of a revolver and sentenced to 15
years imprisonment. On hearing of this harsh punishment
Sir Arthur Street (Permanent Secretary to the Control
Office for Germany and Austria, London) wrote to the
Deputy Military Governor of Germany, General Sir Brian
Robertson, that he was "disturbed" by the judgement,
especially since Katz as only 20 years old; he was "a
member of a persecuted class" and had spent five years
in Buchenwald concentration camp. Sir Arthur assumed the
court had passed such a severe sentence expecting it to
be reduced later but this went against natural justice.
"The court, no doubt, had in mind the increase of
crime among DP5 when imposing what, by our standards
here, was an immense sentence. I feel too that they
acted on a wrong principle in passing a sentence
which they expected to be reduced on review: and
that, within reason, sentences be based on the
principle of making the punishment fit the
crime." [47]
The options that were open to the Polish DPs were
limited. They could either return to Poland - an option
not welcomed by many Poles despite the privations
inflicted on them by others - or they could remain in
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Germany awaiting an altogether uncertain future. By 1947
there was a new lifeline being thrown to the DP5 in the
shape of the European Volunteer Worker scheme [EVW]. In
the case of the Poles the EVW scheme led to a certain
amount of confusion as to British policy, especially
since the DP5 had heard of Bevin's note suggesting to the
Polish Armed Forces, in the strongest possible terms,
that they should leave Britain, yet only months later
other Poles were being encouraged to come to Britain to
work. This hardly seemed a consistent policy.
From the British point of view, the Poles were not
the first choice as EVWs. The two main operations for
bringing these workers to Britain were operations
"Westward Ho" and "Balt Cygnet", the latter being for
Women primarily from the Baltic states. The total EVW
figures, according to the Ministry of Labour, were:
Ukrainian
Polish
Latvian
Yugoslav
Lithuanian
Estonian
Hungarian
Czech
Sudetans
Romanians
Bu 1 g a r S
Stateless
Others
20,930
14,018
11,832
10,192
5,732
4,114
2,474
1,336
1,319
800
91
1,137
536
74,511	 [48]
What is interesting about these figures is the
high proportion of Ukrainians and Balts, especially
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considering the overall proportions of the DP population
in Europe. The reason is explained in David Cesarani's
book "Justice Delayed - How Britain became a refuge for
Nazi war criminals", a study filled with moral
indignation at a secret British Government cover-up to
bring former SS men to work in Britain.
At the head of the list of potential workers who
could be allowed into Britain, men of the Baltic states
were deemed to be the most desirable. According to a
letter from the British Consulate in Baden-Baden to the
FO Refugee Department, Baits should be given preference
over Poles as they were ". . .a much better type than the
Poles, more intelligent, honest and reliable, with a
higher standard of education." [49]The plan was guided by
the principles of eugenics, if Britain was to have
foreign settlers then they should be of 'good stock';
they should be white - thus excluding most of the Empire;
Jews were to be excluded at all cost. Of the European
DPs, the Poles were not to be encouraged to join the
scheme. Although, technically, the EVW scheme was open to
all and no discrimination would be applied, the FO
announced: "There is no objection to your making clear
that Polish men except miners will not be invited to
volunteer for the present." Waterfield of the FO pointed
out that this was discrimination by anyone's definition.
Although discrimination against the Poles would continue,
the Foreign Office would not allow "open discrimination"
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and to emphasise this point Hankey minuted: "Let
discrimination against Poles be hidden so far as
possible, please. It will make much trouble for us." [50]
Because potential workers from the Baltic States
were considered to be better workers they were given
preferential treatment, even to the extent that men of
the 15th and 19th Waffen SS (Latvian) Divisions and the
20th Waffen SS (Estonian) Division were offered a life in
Britain. If the British could let in individual SS men,
then it became possible to rehabilitate an entire SS
Division. It was in this way that virtually the whole of
the 14th Waffen SS (Ukrainian) Division was transferred
to Britain - war criminals included. The Foreign Office
was "...not holding membership of the Waffen SS (which
was compulsory for non-German volunteers) a crime against
them" [51] and despite warnings from the War Office that
its screening process was hopelessly inadequate, Boothby
of the FO was still prepared to tell the Ministry of
Labour: "I think that there is little, if any,
possibility of any person with an undesirable wartime
record being brought to this country". [52] Despite being
so convinced that these SS men had clean records, it was
thought best to keep the vhole issue quite as the British
public might not understand the policy.
The case of the SS blood group tattoos that erupted
in October of 1947, was an occasion when the FO did its
best to keep its actions quiet. As the potential EVWs
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were arriving in Britain they had to undergo medical
examinations. One group in London were examined by a
Polish doctor who recognised the distinctive tattoos of
the SS and was justifiably horrified by what he saw. The
story leaked out to the press and public outrage ensued.
'Ihe Foreign Office was more concerned with the actions of
the Polish doctor - Boothby accused him of acting
"irresponsibly" and Brimelow of the FO noted that the
doctor should "confine attentions to the sick and NOT
meddle with blood groups". [53]
Charles Zarine of the Latvian Legation wrote to the
Foreign Office to try to clear up the confused situation.
It was certainly true that troops of the SS had their
blood groups tattooed on their bodies but, Zarine argued,
tattoos did not necessarily mean membership of the SS
since it was German policy to tattoo all the troops under
their command. They had started with the SS, they had
tattooed the foreign volunteers and had not had time to
tattoo the rest of the German Armed Forces. Despite
being a blatant untruth, Zarine's explanation was seized
upon by the Foreign Office as a cover story to use if the
news of these former SS men threatened their moves to
place these men on the labour market - particularly in
the mining industry. It was feared that British miners
might well see these tell-tale tattoos in the shirts-off
environment in which they worked and given the fact that
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they did not want any foreign workers in the mines they
would certainly not take kindly to SS men. The FO ruled
that any EVW with the relevant tattoo would not be
employed in mines but this too would be kept quiet so
that only the Coal Board medics would know. The man
concerned and the Baltic Legation would be told that the
man had been rejected on "suitability grounds". [54]
Despite Britains desire to import Baits, it was soon
realised that there were not enough of these people to
meet Britain's labour shortage. The EVW scheme was thus
expanded to take in Poles but this led to a contradiction
and a circle that was difficult to square.
Britain, with the hundreds of thousands of Poles in
its charge, had to encourage repatriation to Poland or
convince other countries to take them while at the same
time ensuring that they picked the best workers for their
own economy. Britain could not allow "...foreign
countries to skim the cream of possible settlers". [55]
Given Polish perceptions of hostility to their
presence, there was little enthusiasm towards the
prospect of life in Britain. As 1946 drew to a close the
FO complained that only 342 Poles had been placed in
civilian employment. It was, as Hancock minuted, "Pretty
rotten!". Hankey was even more open with his criticism:
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"This is going very badly. It is really ridiculous
that we can't even get agreement to take on Poles to
deal with Xmas parcels traffic! I am plotting with
.O. an onslaught on M[inistr]y/Labour who are
fumbling their local machinery." [56]
This, combined with Polish pessimism, did not bode well
for the future. The Poles had a fear that they would be
used to do Britain's dirty work abroad, just as Napoleon
had used his Polish Legions a century before. In 1802
Napoleon dispatched some 6,000 Poles to Santo Domingo
[Haiti) to clear up a rebellion there and only 300 ever
returned. Therefore, news that the British might want to
use the Poles in Asia was met with horror. As Frank
Savery told the Commons in March, 1947:
"The rumours are that those people who go into the
[Resettlement] Corps will be sent out to Burma where
they will be used to clear out swamps, and there
is.. ."
Mr Callaghan (Cardiff South) "Jolly good idea."
"That is the rumour that has been spread." [57]
It is little wonder that when other countries offered the
Poles work they took it. The Dutch put in a request to
the British for 5,300 Polish miners but the move was
vetoed by the Ministry of Labour which argued that
Britain needed miners, a view that did not please the
Dutch nor, for that matter, the Foreign Office. The FO
view was that it was better to get rid of 5,300 Poles out
of the country than "keep them hanging about on the off
chance of the Trades Unions agreeing to them working
here." [58]
The Poles, for their part, were quite keen to
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settle in the Netherlands. 1,200 men of General Maczek's
Armoured Division which had liberated part of southern
Holland were given the right of residence there and their
dependants added another 800 to that number. [59]
Although France had been trawling the DP centres for
workers, they did not want to take any Polish servicemen
other than those resident there before the war. This, in
fact, amounted to some 3,500 Poles who, in March of 1946,
were leaving at a rate of 200 men twice a week. [60]
A report by the Under-secretary of State, Hector
McNeil, in April 1946, outlined the potential for
dispersing Poles to third countries. The Dutch wanted
miners but France did not look promising, and neither did
Belgium - a country already holding 10,000 Polish
refugees and unwilling to accept any more. Scandinavia
had yet to come to a firm decision at that time and the
Italian Government had said it would take Poles with
"local obligations", that is Poles who were married to
Italian women, but would not go much further. If the 'Old
World' offered little scope for emigration the prospects
in the 'New World' seemed brighter and more open. The US
Government, it was believed, might be induced to allow
retrospective emigration within the unused quota for the
previous five years. Since few Poles had moved to the USA
during the war, it was hoped that the Poles in Britain
would be allowed to go to the States to make up the
figures. This would inevitably mean that no Poles from
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Poland would be allowed into the USA for the next five
years to keep the immigration numbers level - it was
doubted, however, that the Warsaw regime would allow mass
emigration anyway so this did not present too much of a
problem.
South America seemed to be even more fertile ground.
There was the prospect that Chile might take some 20,000
European families and the Dominican Republic was in need
of some 10 to 15,000 agricultural workers; Brazil wanted
immigrants but had yet to come to a firm decision;
Columbia, Mexico and Uruguay had given unfavourable
responses to British requests for mass settlement;
Bolivia had not given a concrete answer and while
Guatemala had shown some interest they had not been
definite in their answer. [61]
Argentina, a traditional exile for Poles, had given
a very positive reaction to the idea of accepting Polish
troops. Although the Argentine Government agreed to
agricultural and skilled workers, they certainly did not
want intellectuals, neither did they want Jews. The
reason for this was not racial, according to the
Foreign Office, but rather that experience had shown in
Argentina that Jews did not make good agricultural
workers and tended to drift into commerce in towns - this
was just the opposite of what the Argentine economy
needed. The Argentine Director General of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs said that the Polish troops would
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"...contribute to the raising of the efficiency of the
Argentine Armed Forces". [62] On the 13th April, 1946,
the "Highland Monarch" sailed for Argentina and Uruguay
with 191 Poles on Board.
Argentina	 Uruguay
Polish Army	 : 67	 53
Polish Navy	 : 19	 1
Polish Air Force : 46 	 5
Few of these men were front line troops, most being
service and medical personnel.
Just as the British had wanted to keep specialists
for themselves, so the Polish Government in Warsaw was
anxious for the return of its highly trained men and
women. An advert by the Labour Section of the Welfare
Department - Interim Treasury Committee for Polish
Questions, published in the "Polish Daily" led to a
protest from the Polish Embassy in London:
"Departure for Brazil: Chemical expert wanted for
metallurgical	 analyses,	 electricians,	 welders,
locksmiths,	 fitters,	 carpenters,	 blacksmiths,
moulders.
Civil	 Engineer or technical	 experts in
designing of mechanical parts.
Agricultural labourers and jobbing gardeners
for casual work; also all kinds of domestic
servants." [63]
Warsaw's protest was that the British should be putting
more effort into encouraging Polish soldiers to return
home rather than going to Brazil. Harikey, in his response
to the Embassy, agreed, in principle, to the Polish
protest but the fact still remained that these same
Polish specialists did not want to return to Poland and
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as such:
"We can in existing circumstances neglect no
opportunity of finding suitable employment and
places of settlement whether in this country or
abroad for those who remain here...."
Again this added fuel to the flames	 of	 Warsaw's
conspiracy theory that Britain was doing its best to
ensure Poles did not return to Poland. Warsaw's
Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo, Janusz Makarczyk, complained
to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs about General
Paget [GOC MEF] who was ". . .the main obstacle to the
return of Poles to Poland and has thrown his entire
authority behind keeping the 2nd Corps in existence."
According to Makarczyk, Paget's plan was to put his
charges into the Sudan or some other independent country
"...so that the British Government would no longer be
formally responsible for the existence of a Polish colony
run on paramilitary lines." [64] Although Warsaw's
concern was deeply felt, the Polish Armed Forces were not
all made up of peasants from beyond the River Bug. There
were nearly 10,000 highly qualified workers in the PRC:
165 University Professors/Lecturers
319 Secondary School Teachers
690 Primary School Teachers
131 Journalists
54 Professional Writers
617 Lawyers
400 Actors/Musicians/Artists
850 Members of the Judiciary
64 Architects
71 Members of the Clergy
Over 1,000 Qualified Engineers (All branches)
790 Doctors/Dentists
302 Qualified Chemists
2,500 Civil Servants (All grades)
1,800 Private Sector clerks/officials	 [65]
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The loss of this core of pre-war intelligentsia, combined
with the Nazi extermination of the same social strata in
Poland, was something the country could ill afford. For
the British, this wealth proved more of a nightmare than
a Godsend. Although many Poles spoke English to a certain
degree few spoke it well enough to carry on with their
Polish profession in the UK. Also many of these Poles
were of an advanced age and Zbyszewski states that the
average Polish trooper was older than a British Captain
or a Major in the US Army. There were, he goes on, men in
the Polish Armed Forces who were too old to be in the
British Home Guard. [66] The age factor was particularly
acute in the Officer Corps. The FO statisticians
calculated that there were over 2,500 Polish officers
over 50 years old.
Years: 58+ 56/57 54/55 52/53 	 50/51
General	 :	 51
Colonels	 :	 105
Lt-Colonels	 181
Majors	 420
Captains	 900
Lieutenants	 575
2nd Lieutenants:	 235
[67]
	
51	 105	 181	 420	 1,800 = 2,557
Although these older officers would be difficult to place
in employment, it would be even more difficult to find
work for the criminal element that was found in every
army. In July 1946, AFHQ Caserta wrote to the War
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Office seeking advice about what to do with these
undesirables which it separated into three groups:
1/ 1,200 Soldiers with multiple service entries on
conduct sheets.
2/	 727 Dependents:
Collaboration with Germans Proved
	 : 23
War Criminals ie Gestapo, SS, Volksdeutsche: 56
Strongly suspected of collaboration
	 : 10
Notorious criminals
	 : 164
Inveterate alcoholics or "dope fiends"
	 : 63
Notorious prostitutes 	 : 133
Suspected prostitutes 	 : 29
Persons hostile to Poles ie of Russian
extraction, Ukrainians etc. 	 : 114
Mental Cases
	 :	 7
Deserters from Cervinara Repatriation Camp : 128
3/ 2,300 Poles who had "disconnected themselves" from
Polcorps and settled in Italy (68)
The Foreign Office, which advised the War Office on
matters of policy, said that the third category in the
AFHQ list could be treated as DPs in Italy but the first
and second group - inveterate alcoholics, dope fiends and
notorious prostitutes among them - would have to come to
the UK for resettlement.
As time went on and more and more Poles began
arriving in Britain, so the realisation began to dawn on
the British that they were now stuck with these
undesirables. The following summary of a report on one of
the last dependent transports from Africa would have made
depressing reading for the National Assistance Board
[NAB] who would soon have to support the Poles:
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"The Commission is at Tengeru Camp in Tanganyika and
are in the process of examining 1,000 Poles.
The following is an analysis of the first 250:-
230 (92%) Accepted for residence in UK, or for
transit purposes prior to further emigration.
5 (2%) Rejected on Medical Grounds
6 (2%) Rejected on Immigration Grounds
6 (2%) To be queried on Immigration Grounds
3 (1½%) Local Resettlement in East Africa.
Analysis by Age:
0-5 Years - Male:16 (14%) Female:lO (8½%)
5-15 Years - Male:ll (9½%) Female:10 (8½%)
15-40 Years - Male:37 (32%) Female:43 (37%)
40-60 Years - Male:39 (34%) Female:44 (38%)
60+	 Years - Male:ll (9½%) Female: 9 (8%)
General Notes:
1/ The foregoing figures are possibly a fair picture
of the position in the camp.
2/ Camp living conditions are bad. The site is a
partly controlled malaria swamp. "If the Poles
survive here they will flourish in a NAB Hostel."
3/ Morale is low. The people contribute little and
are eager to sit back and accept.
4/ The Malaria rate is fairly high.
5/ The VD rate is said to be high.
6/ The Canadian Commission took the best of the
inhabitants when they visited the camp in 1948 and
the Australian Commission took the best of the
remainder when they visited in 1949. The British
Commission is now quite clearly scraping the bottom
of the barrel.
7/ "There is a good leavening among the residents of
crooks, criminals, 'smart boys', etc."
8/ "There is very little real infirmity or
disablement, that the special NAB hostels will
hardly be needed."
9/ Few of the younger people and hardly anybody over
the age of 40 speak English adequately.
10/ There is no marked enthusiasm to come to
England. Many want to go to the USA and Canada and
there is a great desire for the Argentine.
Dr. Boucher May 31st, 1950." 	 [69]
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It has to be said that if the British were reluctant to
accept certain Poles then the feeling was mutual among
certain Poles who wanted nothing to do with the British.
The so-called "recalcitrants" who refused to join the
Polish Resettlement Corps were another group who provided
the Foreign Office with yet another problem to sort out.
If a Pole refused to return to Poland and at the same
time refused to join the PRC - many were in just that
position - what could the British do with them? In
August, 1946, the Cabinet Polish Forces Committee
discussed how best to dispose of recalcitrant Poles. To
options that were mooted were either to send the
troublesome Poles to Tripolitania [Libya] or to Germany.
The former option was not one favoured by the Committee;
the future of the area was still not clear so to move the
Poles to North Africa would, at best, be a temporary move
and the logistics of supplying the Poles would be
difficult, not least since new camps would have to be
built to accommodate the Poles. The option of Germany was
favoured by the Committee although the FO's German
Department was not at all keen. According to the German
Department the British Occupation Zone was overcrowded -
the most crowded of all the zones - and there was not
enough food or accommodation to supply the Poles. [70]
The War Office also saw Germany as the most likely option
and they issued an order on the 2nd February, 1947:
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"Officers and men who have not signed on as members
of the Resettlement Corps will be given 7 days in
which to do so. If after this period they have not
signed, they will be taken to a camp near Hull,
then by ship to Cuxhaven near Osnabruck there
demobilised, given 400 Marks, a civilian outfit and
left to fend for themselves." [71]
The War Office and Foreign Office went through with their
threat to deport various recalcitrants, more as an
experiment to see how the deportation of a token few
would affect the remainder. On the 14th February, 1947,
there were 12,796 recalcitrants refusing to join the PRC.
The War Office threatened 189 Poles with deportation to
Germany. Of these 189 Poles: 39 decided to join the PRC;
86 decided to return to Poland; 64 chose to go to
Germany. The WO extrapolated that if 66% of this batch
ended up in Germany, some 4,700 of the total number
would end	 up	 in	 the	 British	 zone.	 Fortunately
for everyone concerned, this example seemed to help many
Poles to make up their minds and either join the PRC or
return to Poland. Therefore in March there were 10,720
recalcitrants - a drop of 2,000 in a month. [72]
At the Foreign Office the 'Polish Question' must
have indeed seemed hydra-headed; just as one problem was
resolved so a new one would arise to vex them.
One of the problems involved in allowing the Poles
to live in Britain was how to stop them waging a
propaganda war against the Warsaw Government. These
"White Poles" as they became known at Foreign Office - a
clear reference to the pejorative term used in Russia
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after the revolution - seemed to be "spiteful, malicious
and improper" towards the Communists. In London, Marjan
Hemar's newest play at the "White Eagle Club" in May
1947, drew particular criticism from Warsaw and its
apologists in Britain. Hankey, on the otherhand, was
having none of it; as he minuted:
"I don't see what we can do. And nothing Hemar says
is likely to be worse than what GomuXka says about
us. Only on May Day he let fly at us again. Charity
begins at home." [73)
There was also the Polish Government-in-Exile to
contend with. Although most countries had ceased to
recognise the Government in 1945, to the Polish Armed
Forces in the West it was widely considered as the only
legitimate Polish Government regardless of what London,
Washington or anyone else thought about it. One 	 issue
that again drew protest from Warsaw was how to stop
WadysJaw Raczkiewicz from calling himself "President"
which, to the Poles in Britain, he still was. According
to Hankey, there was very little that could be done. It
was not a criminal offence to call oneself "President"
or, for that matter, to organise a "government". One
option that Hankey offered was to send Raczkiewicz and
his group to the Irish Free State which still recognised
the exiles, but since Bevin had no intention of asking
the Irish for anything1 that option also seemed closed.
The only way out that Hankey could see was the simplest -
ask him to stop. As it turned out, only days after flankey
wrote these minutes Raczkiewicz died, thus solving that
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particular problem. [74] However, even in death
Raczkiewicz proved troublesome. At his funeral the
British Government was represented and the Poles provided
an armed honour guard. The Warsaw Ministry of Foreign
Affairs undertook the rather churlish step of protesting
to the new British ambassador, Sir Donald Gainer, that
since Raczkiewicz was a "private individual" the British
should not have attended. Warsaw also questioned the fact
that if the Resettlement Corps were supposed to be a
non-combatant unit, then how did it provide armed guards?
Again Hankey was having none of Warsaw's impudence and he
told Gainer to inform Warsaw that the funeral of
Raczkiewicz was totally in line with the courtesy
provided to an Allied wartime leader. [75]
As if it wasn't enough for the Poles in Warsaw
stirring up the waters, the Poles in the UK were doing
much the same. The Poles	 requested	 the War
Office to be allowed to fly Polish flags at PRC camps.
Although today it appears a reasonable enough request,
the Foreign Office looked at it with horror. As Roper of
the FO wrote to Major Roberts at the WO:
"Frankly we do not like this. The flying of Polish
flags would involve, no doubt, the usual ceremonies,
and the whole thing will draw public attention to
the foreignness of the men in the Polish
Resettlement Corps, which is just what we are trying
to get away from. They are a part of the British
Army which is going to be absorbed into civilian
life alongside British citizens.
If you agree, perhaps the British Advisory
Staff could intimate to General Kopanski that they
do not want to hear anymore of this proposal for the
reason I have given." [76]
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The terms of the Polish Resettlement Act provided
that a Polish soldier or sailor could join the Polish
Resettlement Corps for a period of two years - the Polish
Air Force had their own PRC wing. Once a man was in the
Corps he would carry out vocational training and take
English classes whilst at the same time look for civilian
employment. When he found work he would be put on the
"Class W(T) Reserve" list and continue to work out the
remaining days towards the two year mark when he would be
a fully fledged civilian. If, for some reason, he left
his job he would rejoin the 'active' list of the PRC
until he found another one. The whole process was to act
as a cushion for the Poles between the order of military
life and the freedom of being a civilian, albeit in a new
and very foreign country.
Despite many problems and the many hours given over
to Polish affairs, the Poles settled in Britain and
formed a successful part of the community in the UK.
During the debate on the winding down of the PRC in 1949,
the British Government expressed its satisfaction at what
it had done for the Poles. The Under-secretary of State
for War, Michael Stewart, told the Commons:
"My hon. friends will remember the propaganda which
was rife in certain sections of the Press in 1920 on
the subject of abuses of the Unemployment Insurance
Act and how it was common form in certain quarters,
by picking out particular abuses, to suggest that
the entire British working class was endeavouring to
live in idleness on public funds. I am sorry to say
that some of the Press comments that have been made
in some quarters on the Polish Resettlement Corps
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: 114,000
86,000
12,000
5,000
2,000
8,000
1,000
14,000
7,000
249,000	 [78]
bear an ugly resemblance to the propaganda of that
period. I believe that if we look at the story as a
whole, we shall see that those attacks are not
justified, and that although there must inevitably
have been some mistakes, we have carried out our
handling of this problem with due regard to our
obligation both to the Poles and the people of this
country." [77]
The total number of Poles who were demobilised from the
Polish Armed Forces were:
Polish Resettlement Corps
Returned to Poland from United Kingdom
from Italy
from Germany
from Middle East
Disbanded without joining PRC
"Recalcitrants" ineligible for PRC
Repatriated to countries other than Poland
Settled in France
From the nearly quarter of a million Polish Armed
Forces, 105,000 returned to Poland. The above figures do
not give a clear indication of how many Poles began new
lives in Britain. According to Zubrzycki, the peak of
Polish settlement in Britain was in December, 1949:
Polish Resettlement Corps	 91,400
Ex-Polish Forces not in PRC	 2,300
Dependants of the above brought
to UK by War Office	 31,800
'Distressed Relatives' brought
to UK (Poles married to UK Citizens) : 2,400
Polish 'European Volunteer Workers' : 29,400
157,300	 [79]
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In 1949, according to the Commissioner of the London
Metropolitan Police, Poles made up well over a quarter of
the aliens in the Police District: 37,819 or 27.2% of the
total. [801
After many years and many thousands of miles of
wandering "General Sikorski's tourists" had finally found
their home - even though it was not the one that they had
wanted in the first place.
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CONCLUS ION
At the end of November, 1946, the No.5 (Polish) Field
Hospital left Italy for the last time and was moved to
Britain where it reopened at Barns Farm Camp, Storrington,
West Sussex. In June, 1948, it was renamed the
"PRC General Hospital - Storrington" and remained open
until the complete demobilisation of the Polish Army.
Franciszek Ostrowski officially left the Polish Army
on the 1st April, 1947, to join up with the Polish
Resettlement Corps. He continued working at the hospital
until he began civilian work on the 10th September, 1948,
with the Redland Brick Company near Horsham in West
Sussex. Following the terms of the Resettlement Act he was
placed on the "Class W(T) Reserve" for the remainder of
his two year contract with the PRC before being discharged
on the 1st of April, 1949. It had indeed been a long war.
He, like every Polish soldier, sailor and airman had made
his decision about the future.
To return or not to return depended on three basic
considerations about Poland after the war. The first
consideration to be made was a moral one. To return to a
Poland under the Communists was viewed by many Poles as a
tacit vote of confidence for the new regime. This was an
unfair judgement on the intentions of most but it was a
view that indeed influenced many. Peer pressure and the
prejudice of superior officers led to an association of
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return to Poland with treason and betrayal of the cause of
an independent Poland.
The second consideration that was made was of a more
practical nature - how to survive in post-war Poland. The
most obvious manifestation of this fear was the security
situation. The rank and file of the Polish Armed Forces
had been subjected to many years of propaganda regarding
the Soviet Union from their officers, many of them had had
first-hand dealings with the Red Army from 1939 onwards,
so they were under no illusions as to what it meant to be
a 'class enemy' to Communism. Fear was a key element in
deciding whether to return or not. Even if some Poles did
not fear the new regime, they knew that life in Poland
would not be easy. The devastation of the war had left the
country a ruin. what the Germans had not destroyed during
their occupation had been demolished by the sweep of the
Red Army 'liberating' Poland. The chronic housing shortage
in Poland and the poor living and working conditions had
their impact on willingness to return and yet for some
even this was more preferable than living the life of an
exile in Britain with its post-war austerity and,
seemingly endless, rain.
The third consideration that should not be overlooked
was a geographical one. Despite the calls of many British
Labour Party supporters for the Poles to return "home",
many did not have homes to return to. Vast tracts of
Polish land had been lost to the Soviet Union and the
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Poles who had once lived in the eastern part of Poland
knew that if they returned to their homes east of the
Curzon Line they would become citizens of the Soviet Union
- a prospect that very few relished. The other option was
to start a new life in the land that had been 'recovered'
from Germany. Upper Silesia and East Prussia were now part
of Poland and the question arose of just where did the
Poles prefer to start a new life - in Britain with its
possibility of later moves to Canada or the USA, or in a
Poland dominated by the Red Army and slipping into a
dictatorship backed by the guns of the secret police.
The fact that so many Poles did not return to Poland
is not, given the situation at the time, so much of a
surprise. What is more striking is the large number who
did return. Over 42% of the Poles, some 105,000 in total,
returned to Poland. A small minority were prepared to
return to their homes in eastern Poland and live as Soviet
citizens - their ultimate fate has yet to be adequately
recorded. Some who had homes and families to return to
went back to Poland to help, as Bevin put it, in the
"arduous task of reconstructing the country and making
good the devastation caused by the war". Many who were
prepared to heed Bevin's words and risk the vengeance of
the Communists went to Poland to help populate the newly
acquired land in the west of Poland.
The dilemma that divided the Polish Armed Forces is
not an easy one to define. Although the criteria can be
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broadly categorized into groups, there were as many
reasons to return or not as there were soldiers. After
half a century it is as difficult as it is pointless to
argue over who made the right decision. The exiles quickly
settled into British life. According to John Keegan they
became the "most successful immigrant community ever
absorbed into British life" and, he continues, the fires
of exile have "sunk into embers" [1] yet the Poles were
foreigners - to many they were "bloody foreigners" - in a
country that remained largely alien to them. Bitterness
and cynicism have stood the test of time.
In Poland the Poles who had fought in the West had to
suffer at the hands of a regime that had no popular
legitimacy and abused its power to persecute its own
citizens. Nevertheless they could grow old in the
knowledge that they were in their own country and among
their own people. The reconstruction of Poland after the
devastation of war is an achievement of which Poles in
Poland can be justly proud - a pride now shared by the men
who fought at Cassino, in the Battle of Britain and the
Battle of the Atlantic.
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APPENDIX A
POLISH ARMED FORCES-1946
1st POLISH CORPS
1st Armoured Division :
10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade
1st Armoured Regiment.
2nd Armoured Regiment.
24th 'Hetman ZóXkiewski' Lancer Regt.
10th Dragoons Regiment.
3rd Rifle Brigade
'Podhalatiski' Highland Light Infantry Battn.
8th 'Brabancki' Light Infantry Battalion.
9th 'Flandryjski' Light Infantry Battalion.
1st Independent Heavy Machine Gun Squadron.
10th Mounted Rifle Reconnaissance Regiment.
1st Motorised Field Artillery Regiment.
2nd Motorised Field Artillery Regiment.
1st Anti-Tank Regiment.
1st Anti-Aircraft Regiment.
1st Signals Battalion.
4th INFANTRY DIVISION (80% Strength):
1st Grenadier Brigade
1st Grenadier Battalion.
2nd Grenadier Battalion.
3rd Grenadier Battalion.
2nd Rifle Brigade
4th 'Warszawski' Rifle Battalion.
5th 'Maopo1ski t Rifle Battalion.
6th 'Kresowy' Rifle Battalion.
8th Rifle Brigade
24th	 1ski' Infantry Battalion.
25th 'Pomorski' Infantry Battalion.
26th 'Pomorski' Infantry Battalion.
4th Independent Heavy Machine Gun Battalion
9th 'MaXopolski' Lancer Reconnaissance Regiment
3rd Motorised Artillery Regiment
13th Field Artillery Regiment
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14th Field Artillery Regiment
15th Field Artillery Regiment
4th Anti-Tank Regiment
4th Anti-Aircraft Regiment
4th Sapper Battalion
4th Signals Battalion
16th Independent Armoured Brigade
14th
3rd
5th
16th
16th
16th
16th
'JazXowiecki' Lancer Regiment
Armoured Regiment
Armoured Regiment
Dragoons Regiment
Signals Squadron
Supply Company
Engineering Company
1st Independent Parachute Brigade
1st Parachute Battalion
2nd Parachute Battalion
3rd Parachute Battalion
2ND POLISH CORPS
Head Quarters 2nd Corps
12th
7th
7th
7th
8th
1st
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
10th
20th
11th
11th
'Podolski' Lancer Regiment
Armoured Regiment
Anti-Tank Regiment
Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment
Medium Anti-Aircraft Regiment
Artillery Survey Regiment
Heavy Artillery Regiment
Heavy Artillery Regiment
Heavy Artillery Regiment
Heavy Artillery Regiment
Heavy Artillery Regiment
Sapper Battalion
Sapper Battalion
Railway Engineering Battalion
Signals Battalion
3rd Carpathian Rifle Division
1st Carpathian Rifle Brigade
1st Carpathian Rifle Battalion
2nd Carpathian Rifle Battalion
3rd Carpathian Rifle Battalion
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2nd Carpathian Rifle Brigade
4th Carpathian Rifle Battalion
5th Carpathian Rifle Battalion
6th Carpathian Rifle Battalion
3rd Carpathian Rifle Brigade
7th Carpathian Rifle Battalion
8th Carpathian Rifle Battalion
9th 'Boloeiski' Rifle Battalion
3rd Carpathian Heavy Machine Gun Battalion
7th 'Lubelski' Lancer Reconnaissance Regiment
1st Carpathian Field Artillery Regiment
2nd Carpathian Field Artillery Regiment
3rd Carpathian Field Artillery Regiment
3rd Carpathian Anti-Tank Regiment
3rd Carpathian Field Anti-Aircraft Regiment
3rd Carpathian Signals Battalion
5th 'Kresowa' Infantry Division :
4th 'WoZyñska' Infantry Brigade
10th 'WoXyñski' Rifle Battalion
11th 'Woytiski' Rifle Battalion
12th 'Wo,yfiski' Rifle Battalion
5th 'Wileñska' Infantry Brigade
13th 'Wiletiski' Rifle Battalion 'Rysiów'
14th 'Wiletiski' Rifle Battalion 'Zbików'
15th 'Wiletiski' Rifle Battalion 'Wilków'
6th 'Lwowska' Infantry Brigade
5th
25th
4th
5th
6th
5th
5th
5th
16th 'Lwowski' Rifle Battalion
17th 'San Angelo' Rifle Battalion
18th 'Lwowski' Rifle Battalion
'Kresowy' Heavy Machine Gun Battalion
'Wielkopolski' Lancer Reconnaissance Regiment
'Kresowy' Field Artillery Regiment
'Wiletiski' Field Artillery Regiment
'Lwowski' Field Artillery Regiment
'Kresowy' Anti-Tank Regiment
'Kresowy' Field Anti-Aircraft Regiment
'Kresowy' Signals Battalion
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2nd 'Warszaska' Armoured Division
2nd Armoured Brigade
4th 'Skorpion' Armoured Regiment
1st 'Krechowiecki' Lancer Regiment
6th 'Dzieci Lwowa' Armoured Regiment
2nd Motorised Commando Battalion
16th 'Pomorska' Infantry Brigade (Reserve)
64th 'Pomorski' Infantry Battalion
65th 'Pomorski' Infantry Battalion
66th 'Pomorski' Infantry Battalion
16th 'Pomorski' Support Company
7th Horse Artillery Regiment
16th 'Pomorski' Field Artillery Regiment (Reserve)
2nd Anti-Tank Regiment
2nd Field Anti-Aircraft Regiment
Carpathian Lancer Reconnaissance Regiment
9th Forward Tank Replacement Squadron
2nd 'arszawski' Signals Battalion
14th 'Wielkopolska' Armoured Brigade
3rd '.1ski' Lancer Regiment
15th 'Poznañski' Lancer Regiment
10th 'WoXytiski' Hussars Regiment
14th Forward Tank Replacement Squadron
14th 'Wielkopolska' Sapper Company
14th 'Wielkopoiski' Signal Squadron
7th Infantry Division (80% Strength):
17th Infantry Brigade
21st Infantry Battalion
22nd Infantry Battalion
23rd Infantry Battalion
17th Machine Gun Company	 17th Artillery Regiment
17th Sapper Company	 17th Signals Company
All Formations Included:
Provost Corps
	 Service Corps
Medical Corps
	 Ordnance Corps
Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
Geographic Corps	 Legal Corps
Pay Corps and other service units.
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POLISH AIR FORCE
300 (Polish) Bomber Squadron "Ziemi Mazowieckiej"
301 (Polish) Bomber Squadron "Ziemi Pomorskiej -
Obronców Warszawy" (Stood down in 1943 to
become 1586 'Special Duties Flight' Central
Med.)
302 (Polish) Fighter Squadron "Poznatiski"
303 (Polish) Fighter Squadron "Warszawski - Kociuszko"
304 (Polish) Bomber Squadron "Ziemi tlskiej -
Poniatowski"
305 (Polish) Bomber Squadron "Ziemi Wielkopolskiej -
PiXsudski"
306 (Polish) Fighter Squadron "Torutiski"
307 (Polish) Nightfighter Squadron "Lwowski"
308 (Polish) Fighter Squadron "Krakowski"
309 (Polish) Fighter/reconnaissance Squadron "Ziemi
Czerwitxskiej"
315 (Polish) Fighter Squadron "Dblitiski"
316 (Polish) Fighter Squadron "Warszawski"
317 (Polish) Fighter Squadron "Wiletiski"
318 (Polish) Fighter/reconnaissance Squadron "Gdañski"
In Italy
663 (Polish) Artillery Observation Squadron: 2 PolCorps
Also 145 Squadron (Polish Fighting Team) also known as
"Skaiski's Circus" in Africa.
112 'Shark' Fighter Squadron in Africa.
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POLISH NAVY
Polish Ships: Destroyer ORP-BZYSKAWICA
Destroyer ORP-BURZA
Destroyer ORP-GROM
Submarine ORP-ORZEZ
Submarine ORP-WILK
Training Ship ORP-ISKRA
Training Ship ORP-WILIA
To Poland
To Poland
Lost 1940
Lost 1940
To Poland
To Poland
Lost 1944
French and	 Destroyer ORP-OURAGAN	 To France 1941
Belgian ships:Patrol Boat ORP-MEDOC 	 Lost 1940
Patrol Boat ORP-POMEROL	 Retired 1940
12 Fast Patrol Boats ORP-Pl to P12
2 Submarine Hunters ORP-CH11 and CH15
Ships from	 Cruiser ORP-CONRAD (EMS Danae)
Royal Navy:
	
	
Returned to Fleet
Cruiser ORP-DRAGON (HMS Dragon)
Lost 1944
Destroyer ORP-GARLAND (HMS Garland)
To Fleet
Destroyer ORP-KRAKOWIAK (EMS Silverton)
Returned To Fleet
Destroyer ORP-KUJAWIAK (EMS Oakley)
Lost 1942
Destroyer ORP-ORKAN (EMS Myrmidon)
Lost 1943
Destroyer ORP-PIORUN (EMS Nerissa)
Returned To Fleet
Destroyer ORP-LZAK (EMS Bedale)
Returned To Fleet)
Submarine ORP-DZIK (Purpose built)
Returned To Fleet
Submarine ORP-JASTRZB (USS S-25)
Lost 1942
Submarine ORP-SOK	 (EMS Urchin)
Returned To Fleet
Armoured Patrol Boat ORP-CHART
Retired 1943
Armoured Patrol Boat ORP-WILCZUR
Retired 1944
Armoured Patrol Boat ORP-WYZEZ
Retired 1943
7 Motor Torpedo Boats ORP-S4 to Sil
2 Special Duty Patrol Boats ORP-SEAWOLF +
ORP-DOGFISH
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APPENDIX B
MESSAGE FROM THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY TO ALL
MEMBERS OF THE POLISH FORCES UNDER BRITISH COMMAND.
His Majesty's Government have many times made it
clear that it is their policy to assist the greatest
possible number of members of the Polish Armed Forces
under British Command to return to Poland of their own
free will and in conditions worthy of their great
services to the Allied cause. In accordance with this
policy they have in recent months been in negotiation
with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity,
which the British Government, like other Governments,
regard as the only authority entitled to speak on behalf
of Poland, regarding the conditions upon which returning
Polish soldiers, sailors and airmen will be received back
in their own country. As a result of these negotiations
the Provisional Government has furnished His Majesty's
Government with a statement setting forth its policy on
this question. The text of this statement is annexed.
The British Government regard this statement as
satisfactory. [They are satisfied that it represents the
firm policy of the Polish Provisional Government and that
that Government will abide by the detailed assurances it
contains.][l] In the light of these assurances they have
reviewed the position of the Polish Armed Forces under
British Command. They consider it to be the duty of all
members of these forces who possibly can do so to return
to their home country without further delay under the
conditions now offered them in order that they may make
their contribution to the restoration of the prosperity
of liberated Poland. Only thus can they serve their
country in a manner worthy of her great traditions.
Those who nevertheless feel compelled to remain
abroad in full knowledge of the present situation will be
treated as far as our resources permit with due
recognition of their gallant service. In execution of the
policy announced by Mr. Winston Churchill, the British
Government will give, in collaboration with other
Governments, such assistance as is in their power to
enable those who fought with us throughout the war to
start a new life outside Poland with their families and
dependents. But the British Government, after the most
careful examination of the whole problem, are bound to
make it plain that they can promise no more than this.
There is no question of the Polish Army, Navy or Air
Force at present under British Command being preserved by
the British Government as independent armed forces
abroad, and it is the intention of the British Government
to disband as soon as practicable those men who decide
not to return to Poland. Nor can the British Government
offer to the members of the Polish Armed Forces under
British Command any guarantee that they will all be
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enabled to settle in British territory at home or
overseas. [..or that special measures will be taken to
enable them to acquire British nationality.][2][On the
other hand all those who go back to Poland will return in
uniform and with full military honours and privileges
under the conditions which the British Government have
been formally authorised by the Polish Provisional
Government to make known on their behalf.][3]
I appeal on behalf of the British Government to
every individual member of the Polish Armed Forces to
consider carefully the alternatives which are here set
before him. I earnestly trust that the overwhelming
majority will decide to avail themselves of this
opportunity, especially as I am not in a position to
guarantee that there will be a further opportunity for
them to return to Poland.
Speaking on behalf of the British Government, I
declare that it is in the best interests of Poland that
you should return to her now, when she requires the help
of all her sons in the arduous task of reconstructing the
country and making good the devastation caused by the
war.
Ernest Bevin.
[Highlighted extracts removed at FO:
[1) F037l 56365 l042
[2] Ibid.
[3] F0371 56370 N3009]
STATEMENT BY POLISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
1. The treatment of the Polish Armed Forces returning
to Poland from abroad has already been demonstrated in
practice, in the case of those soldiers who have returned
from France and Italy. The same principle will also be
adopted towards those returning home from other
territories.
No punative measures or reprisals will be carried
out against returning officers and soldiers, except in
the following cases:
(a) Against persons who served in the German Forces.
It should be added here that all persons who served with
the German authorities were divided into four groups of
"Volksdeutsche." Groups 3 and 4 comprised those persons
who had been compulsorily inscribed on the list of
"Volksdeutsche." Group 2 comprised those persons whom
the German authorities considered as deserving their
confidence to a certain extent only. Group 1 comprised
those persons who were considered to be completely loyal
to the Hitler regime.
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As far as these persons are concerned the general
rules regarding the treatment of "Volksdeutsche" will
also be applied to members of the Polish Armed Forces
returning from abroad. Persons, previously domiciled in
territories which were incorporated into the German
Reich, and who had been classified into groups 3 and 4,
will be automatically rehabilitated, while persons whom
the German authorities classified as groups 1 and 2 will
have to obtain their rehabilitation before the ordinary
Law Courts.	 For persons previously domiciled in the
so-called "General gouvernment" rehabilitation before
the ordinary Law Courts will be obligatory because they
adopted German nationality voluntarily and without any
compulsion being exercised.
(b) Against persons who are guilty of High Treason -
as defined in the Polish Penal Code in force since the
1st September, 1932.
(c) Against persons guilty of common crimes as
defined in the Polish Penal Code in force since 1st
September, 1932. Returning members of the Polish Armed
Forces will not, however, be charged retrospectively with
offences under amendments to the penal code introduced by
the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity,
where the acts in question were committed before the said
amendments were introduced.
The Amnesty Decree of 21st August, 1945, will be
applied to all members of the Polish Armed Forces
returning from abroad.
2. The sacrifices of the Polish soldiers who fought on
many fronts under the colours of our Western Allies are
accorded equal recognition with the gallantry of the
Polish Army formed in the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. Consequently, these soldiers when returning
to Poland will be treated on an equal footing with all
soldiers of the re-born Polish Forces. This, of course,
covers also the right to pensions.
3. Soldiers liable to demobilisation will be
demobilised, and those expressing the wish to chose a
professional military career will be enabled to enter
officers' and NCOs. training schools and remain in the
Forces. Those demobilised may be liable for service in
the Reserve on the same basis as other demobilised
members of the Polish Forces.
Rank, length of service, decorations and military
awards won by officers and soldiers in the fight against
Germany - no matter on what battlefield - will be
recognised and taken into account.
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4. Those who are demobilised have the same right to the
grants of land, which is being distributed among
soldiers, as the demobilised soldiers of the re-born
Polish Forces.
5. War invalids will receive allowances and pensions in
accordance with existing laws.
All the points dealt with in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4
above have been covered in the public announcements which
the President of Poland's National Council, M. Bierut,
made at a press conference at the Ministry of Information
and Propaganda in Warsaw, as well as in an appeal of the
Government of National Unity issued to all Polish
officers, soldiers, sailors and airmen abroad.
These points have also been the subject of an expose
by the Minister of National Defence, Marshal Zymierski,
at a Meeting of the Polish National Council on 1st
January, 1945. Moreover, they were also included in the
Order of the Day issued by the Commander-in-Chief on the
occasion of the First of May, the National Day, 3ra May,
Independence Day, 22nd July, and the anniversary of the
Battle of Grunwald. Moreover, they have been mentioned
in a speech delivered on the first anniversary of the
First Division, and in an interview given by Marshal
Zymierski to the representative of the Polpress Agency on
2nd August, 1945.
6. The members of the Polish Armed Forces will be
allowed to bring their personal belongings into Poland
free of duty. They will be allowed to transfer their
sterling accounts in the United Kingdom to Poland. For
this purpose account-holders will have to make an
application to the British authorities for the transfer
of their sterling balances, or any part thereof, to an
account of the National Bank of Poland with the Bank of
England. On this basis an account will be opened for
them in Polish banks. The payments from these accounts
will be effected accordingly to the current exchange
rates as announced by the Polish authorities to members
of the Polish Armed Forces. (The Polish authorities
state that their present exchange rate for this purpose
is, together with subsidies, 420 zloty to the £
sterling.)
7. On their return to Poland members of the Polish
Armed Forces originating from the provinces east of the
Curzon Line will, automatically be regarded by the Polish
Government as Polish citizens if they are of Polish or
Jewish race and will not be required to perform any act
signifying that they wish to choose Polish citizenship.
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8. Families of members of the Polish Armed Forces who
are now scattered all over the world, for instance East
Africa, Iran, Palestine, South America, etc., are allowed
to join soldiers, members of their families, in Poland.
9. Telegraphic and postal communication with Poland has
been basically restored; it needs only technical
improvement.
Persons returning to Poland as demobilised soldiers
will be provided with assistance and information in the
Polish Repatriation Offices, which have been set up on
the frontier and in different Polish towns.
Hansard (Commons) Volume 420, P1880
20th March, 1946.
(See also PRO: F0371 56365 N1042)
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APPENDIX C
	 (PRO: F0371 56388 N8991)
2 POLCORPS ESTABLISHMENT IN U.K. 1946.
COMMAND	 COUNTY	 No. OF TROOPS
SCOTCO	 Berwickshire	 1,930
Roxburghshire	 1,880
Wigtownshire	 830
4 , 640
HQ Artillery
Group/Base Troops
NORCO	 Derbyshire	 580
Lincoinshire	 5,730
Northumberland	 5, 080
Yorkshire	 4,780
HQ 2nd Armd Div/
	
16,170	 2nd Armoured Div
SOUTCO	 Wiltshire	 6,540
Gloucestershire	 4 , 720
Berkshire	 1,200
Oxfordshire	 3,530
HQ 5th Inf Dlv!
	
15,990	 5th Infantry Div
EASTCO	 Buckinghamshire	 4,970
Hertfordshire	 860
Norfolk	 12,850
Suffolk	 650
Huntingdonshire	 200
Sussex	 3,760
23,290
WESCO	 Cumberland	 26,850
Lancashire	 6,790
Yorkshire	 170
Cheshire	 1,330
Anglesey	 3,560
Derby	 840
Merioneth	 490
Shropshire	 1,240
Stafford	 5,100
Montgomeryshire	 1, 730
Brecon	 1,450
Hereford	 7,260
Pembroke	 2,060
Glamorgan	 1,850
60,720
TOTAL 120,810
HQ 14th Armd Bde/
14th Armoured Bde
HQ 3rd Inf Div/
3rd Infantry Div
HQ 2 Polcorps/
Base Troops
- 396 -
16,000
2,000
18,000
11,950
16,010
15,940
3,870
8,010
55,780
12,800
3,430
3,096
17,180
36,506
6,700
APPENDIX E
POLISH ARMED FORCES, MAY 1945
POLISH LAND FORCES:
WESTERN FRONT :	 1st Armoured Division
Other Units, France
ITALIAN FRONT : 2nd Polish Corps (Corps Units)
3rd Carpathian Rifle Division
5th Kresowa Infantry Division
2nd Arrnoured Brigade
2nd Artillery Group
RESERVE FORCES : SCOTLAND
1st Polish Corps
4th Infantry Division
16th Independent Armoured Brig.
1st Parachute Brigade
Other Units
MIDDLE EAST
7th Infantry Division
16th Pomorska Infantry Brig.
14th Independent Armoured Brig. :
Other Units
Polish Woman's Auxiliary Service
8,391
12, 800
3,096
4,169
25,778
54,234
Total Reserve	 : 97,440
TOTAL POLISH LAND FORCES	 : 171,220
POLISH AIR FORCE : 15 Squadrons and Teaching Units: 19,400
POLISH NAVY	 :	 3,840
TOTAL POLISH ARMED FORCES
	 194,460
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CIVILIANS AND DEPENDENTS
FROM GERMANY
FROM ITALY
FROM MIDDLE EAST!
AND AFRICA
FROM INDIA
AIR FORCE FAMILIES
EUROPEAN VOLUNTEER
WORKERS
TOTAL
2,000
10,000
15,000
3,000
2,600
32,600
14 , 018
46,618
B.Czaykowski/B. Sulik
Polacy W W.Brytanii
Instytut Literacki
Pary±, 1961.
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APPENDIX F
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
I am directed by Mr. Secretary Bevin to refer to
your letter of the... regarding Mr. Bevin's statement in
the House of Commons on the 22nd May about the Polish
Armed forces.
2. The troops which are being brought to the
United Kingdom will be distributed throughout England and
Scotland, all but about 6,000 being stationed in England.
3. As regards your fear that their presence will
cause unemployment, there can be no doubt that, this
country is at present short of manpower to fulfil our
world wide commitments and to produce the exports by
which we live. Such unemployment as there is at present
is due to the peculiar conditions of the change over from
a war economy to peace-time conditions rather than to a
shortage of jobs. His Majesty's Government are satisfied
that it will be possible to employ the proposed Polish
Resettlement Corps in such a way that it will not compete
with British labour to the disadvantage of the latter.
This whole aspect of the matter has of course been
carefully considered, and care has been taken to proceed
in close consultation with the Trades Union Congress who
have promised their co-operation.
4. Further the Resettlement Corps is a purely
provisional and transitional expedient and it is probable
that a large proportion of its members will eventually,
if they do not return to Poland, decide to emigrate to
other countries willing to receive them. The majority
have nothing to tie them to this country and will
doubtless move on elsewhere if given the opportunity.
This would particularly be the case if on leaving the
Resettlement Corps they were to find the labour market
already saturated.
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5. The extra training given to Poles will be
confined to that necessary to enable them to do such work
as is allotted to them efficiently. One of its main
features will be instruction in the English language,
which is of course essential to them in civilian life and
of which the majority are ignorant.
6. As regards the housing question all the Polish
troops and their families now coming to the United
Kingdom will be accommodated in hutted camps which have
been occupied by our own troops and are now vacant as a
result of demobilisation.
7. As regards the question of the food of the
Polish troops, they have been largely fed from British
military sources while in Italy. Their removal to the
United Kingdom will simply entail a redirection of the
necessary foodstuffs.
8. The relative total increase in the food
consumption of this country will have no appreciable
effect on the food standards of the British population.
Supplementary;
Of the 109,500 Polish troops in Italy and the
Middle East over 80,000 neither fought for nor assisted
the enemy in any way. Of the remainder about 22,500 were
captured or deserted (often at great personal risk) from
the German forces into which they had been conscripted,
and have since fought in battle on the Allied side. The
other 6.000 were recruited into the Polish Armed Forces
between the end of hostilities in Italy and the end of
the war, many of them having been held as prisoners by
the Germans.
(PRO: F0371 56514 N8775)
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APPENDIX G
SOME OF THE CASES ILLUSTRATING POINTS RAISED IN
AGENDA FOR THE SECOND MEETING OF THE RESETTLEMEI.T
COMMITTEE / POLES I.
Part I. New Matters, Para I. General Problems concerning
employment of PRC soldiers.
1/. In Reading a builders firm / Wallingforth / offered
to employ 40 Polish soldiers, among them 11
draftsmen. The local Labour Exchange gave its consent
with the stipulation that no Pole in this firm is to be
paid more than standard wages for unskilled building
operatives.
At present all required number of Poles, including
craftsmen, are employed though the latter group had to
come to some private arrangement with their employer.
2/. BIELA Jan and CHAJEWSKI Jbzef, carpenters fully
qualified with British certificates for exams passed
in the United Kingdom, were employed by I.Laing & Co
Ltd., Building Contractors, Croydon. Local Labour
Exchange gave its consent for their employment as
craftsmen. After a certain time, however, they were
informed that owing to Labour Exchange objections they
could not continue to work as craftsmen and must be paid
off, unless they accept the pay of unskilled labourers.
As neither of them could afford to be unemployed
while looking for another job, they had to accept
degrading.
3/. Staff sgts SAJMAGA S., KOWALIK C., both carpenters
with 8 years experience, were employed by a big
building firm in Portsmouth / Taylor & Woodrow /. On
August 15th they were sent for by the manager of the firm
and Labour Exchange representative, and the former
informed them that he must sack them, owing to T.U.
/ Amalgamated Woodworkers Union ? / objections.
It should be stressed that the Labour Exchange
representative told them that they could continue to work
with the same firm as unskilled labourers only.
Alternatively, they could obtain work in another place as
carpenters but no guarantee could be given that the same
thing would not happen in the new place.
Is [sic) should be added that the firm is highly
satisfied with the work of these Poles and has vacancies
for 50 more. There are 8 more Polish carpenters in the
same firm, who share the lot of their mates.
Besides the carpenters, there are 80 Polish workers
employed by this firm among them some bricklayers who are
not at present affected by that decision.
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The above mentioned staff sergeants, both with good
military records, came with the 1 Armd Division from
Germany, and were among the first, despite their higher
NCO rank, to follow the advice of their superiors and
take up civilian jobs. Both are at present in great
distress and ask, either for return to their units or,
for the possibilities of emigration.
4/. Ministry of Labour and National Service Circular
58/23. In various local Labour Exchanges it has
become a general practice to interpret this in the
following way:
a! A member of the PRC whether he is skilled worker
or not, after an explanation that no other work
is available, is offered an unskilled work in
agriculture or in industry. Little effort is
being made / there have been many such cases in
London and Lowlands area / to obtain employment
for skilled craftsmen.
b/ A single refusal to accept such a job suffices
for the Labour Exchange to submit the case for
sanctions in accordance with the above mentioned
circular.
The results of this procedure greatly weakens arguments
of the PRC employment officers in favour of agricultural
work, as soldiers faced with such procedure get
impression that agricultural jobs must be bad ones if it
is found necessary to use such methods of pressure.
5/. 2nd/Lt U.Adler, a mechanical engineer, has been
employed be a firm / Deires / with a stipulation
made by Reading Labour Exchange that he could only
perform manual work.
In the meantime the employer satisfied with his work
intended to promote him to the status of an engineer but
failed to obtain the consent of the Labour Exchange.
6/. Cpl. J.Sagan from 105, Basic Unit found work as a
farm labourer in Echt, Aberdeenshire. After a few
weeks his employer / Mr watt / found a youngster / 18
years / whose wages were lower, so he sacked Sagan.
Another job has been found for Sagan by Labour Exchange
but when he expressed a wish to become a miner he was
refused on the grounds that he was already registered as
a farm labourer.
7/. A private from Johnston Camp, a smelter, has
obtained an offer of employment in London. Four
months have elapsed since he applied to the local Labour
Exchange for approval of this work without any definite
answer. Meanwhile he works as a farm labourer.
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8/. 105 B.U. Causeayhead nr Stirling
Staff Sgt A.Drozdowski,
Lc/cpl A. Wojciechowski,
Pte A. Erzezicki - all of them craftsmen; they
obtained permission of the Labour Exchange to work with
Ekuebech Estates Ltd., Bechwishhaw [sic], Sussex. The
notes were, however, inserted in their E.O.806 that they
were released as farm labourers.
It is feared that this will cause them trouble in
the event of another change of work.
Polish Institute and
Sikorski Museum
GSHI: A.XII. 66/3
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	"To mark the 25th anniversary of the Red Army, in
February 1943, there were celebrations in London,
Glasgow, and in other British cities. His Majesty
the King sent a telegram of congratulation to
M. Kalinin and ordered the presentation of a Sword
of Honour to Stalingrad. Above is Mr. Cowan Dobson's
impression of the great meeting in St. Andrew's Hall,
Glasgow, which was attended by representative units
of the Armed Forces and Civic Defence Services.
Mr. Duff Cooper is on the platform, which is decorated
with the flag of St. Andrew, and the national emblem
of the U.S.S.R. The painting was sent to Russia as a
tribute from the people of Glasgow." 	 [3]
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APPENDIX J
REPORT OF THE REPATRIATION POLL OF DISPLACED PERSONS
IN UNRRA ASSEMBLY CENTRES IN GERMANY FOR THE PERIOD
1-14 MAY 1946: ANALYSIS OF NEGATIVE VOTES.
Typical Negative Replies on the Ballots
of the Principal Nationality Groups. - Poles
1. "Poland is not free."
2. "The Russians are dominating the Polish Government."
3. "Quoting Mr.Churchill's speech: an 'iron curtain' is
hanging from Stettin to Trieste. Behind it an
ignorant slave state is hidden from the eyes of us
all, etc."-"I am a Democrat, not a Communist."
4. "Communist dictatorship.	 No freedom of personal
opinion.	 Russians annihilate everything that is
not Russian and communistic."
5. "Stalin annihilates people as well as Hitler."
6. "I don't trust Stalin and his government in Poland."
7. "Uncertain situation in Poland. The presence of the
Soviet Army is dangerous to the freedom of my
country.
8. "I don't agree with the policy of the Government and
the persecution of the church and the lack of
private property and freedom.
9. "I am afraid of Stalin, I am afraid of Siberia.
Poland is not free."
10. "After the election of a democratic government, I
shall return home."
11. "The Russians occupy that part of Poland where I
lived. My home and family are gone."
12. "I can't find my family."
13. "I am ill and tired after the hard work in Germany."
14. "If I go back I am sure they will kill me or send me
to Siberia."
15. "They sent part of my family to Siberia and
confiscated our farm."
16. "I have been persecuted by the Communists and
condemned for exile to Siberia. I don't want to
try to live under the Communists again."
17. "My husband is not going back home and so I don't
want to go."
18. "When I get a letter from my family saying that they
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XII/1944 2nd Vice-Minister of National Defence. Fran 111/1945 retired.
VII/l945 returned to Poland. 15/X/1945 In UK as head of Warsaw's
Repatriation Mission. Modelski eventually emigrated to the USA where he
died in 1962.
Morgan, General Sir William Duthie Born 1891. 1942-3 Chief of Staff,
Hane Forces. 1944 C-in-C Southern Camiand. 1945 Chief of Staff to Supreme
Allied Camiiander diterranean [SACMED 1. Replaced Field-Marshal Alexander
as SACNED fran 1945-7
Raczytiski, Count Edward Born 1891. Polish Diplomatic Service fran 1919
and posted to Polish Legation in Copenhagen. From 1922 Secretary in London
until 1926. Fran 1932 Minister to the League of Nations. From 1934 Polish
Ambassador in London until 1945. From 1941-43 Minister for Foreign Affairs
in Polish Government in Exile. Remained in UK after the war.
- 461 -
Retinger, Józef Hieronim Born 1888. Historian and politician. Studied
in Paris and London. After fall of Poland became one of General Sikorski's
closest advisors and friends but after Sikorski's death in 1943 relations
with MikoYajczyk were not so friendly. IV/1944 became one of the oldest
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wierczewski, General Karol Born 1897. Fran 1915 in Russia. Took part
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Fran 1943 in Polish Army under Soviet carinand. From VI/1944 CCX: Polish
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111/1947.
Zymierski, Field-Marshal Micha "Rola" Born 1890 as Micha ywiñski.
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CRONOLOGICAL TABLE
23 August 1939
25 August 1939
1 September 1939
3 September 1939
17 September 1939
5 August 1940
22 June 1944
14 August 1941
13 April 1943
25 April 1943
4 June 1943
18 November-
1 December 1943
December 1943
4 January 1944
18 May 1944
1 August 1944
8 August 1944
18 September 1944
2 Ctober 1944
4-11 February 1945
21 April 1945
7 May 1945
17 July-
2 August 1945
18 June 1945
5 July 1945
21 September 1945
15 Ctober 1945
14 February 1946
5 March 1946
20 March 1946
30 June 1946
28 September 1946
19 January 1947
31 January 1947
12 February 1947
4 March 1947
27 March 1947
7 September 1947
11 September 1947
Ribbentrop-1'43lotov pact signed.
Anglo-Polish treaty concluded.
Germany invades Poland.
Britain and France declare war on Germany
Red Army invades eastern Poland.
Agreement signed to create PAF under British Ccmriand.
Germany invades Soviet Union.
Sikorski-Maisky agreement signed in Moscow creating
Polish Army in USSR with General Anders as GOC.
German Radio announces the Katyñ graves discovery.
Moscow breaks off relations with Polish Government.
General Sikorski killed in Gibraltar plane crash.
Teheran Conference.
First units of 2nd Polish Corps arrive in Italy.
Red Army crosses the pre-war Polish border.
Polish Forces take Monte Cassino.
Warsaw Rising begins.
Polish 1st Arin Div. in action at Falaise.
Units of 1st Polish Parachute Brigade land near
Arnhem as part of Operation Market-Garden.
Warsaw capitulates.
Yalta Conference.
2nd Polish Corps liberates Bologna.
Germany surrenders.
Potsdam Conference.
Provisional Government of National Unity set up
in Warsaw.
France recognises the Warsaw Provisional Government.
Britain recognises the Warsaw Provisional Government.
Labour Party win British General Election.
"Plebiscite" for PAF repatriation organised by
British.
General &x1elski's Mission begins rk in London.
Warsaw refuses to recognise PAF under British
ccLrrnand.
churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, USA.
Operation Keynote. Distribution of Bevin's text.
"3 Times Yes" referendum in Poland.
Polish Government revokes citizenship of Generals
Anders, Maczek, Kopariski and dozens of other
officers.
Polish Elections
PRC Bill - First Reading.
PRC Bill - Second Reading.
PRC Bill - Third Reading.
PRC Act - Royal Assent.
Enlistment to PRC opens at PAF GHQ.
General enlistment to PRC begins.
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The quotes taken from PRO WO204/711, PRO WO204/732 and PRO
FO371/56374 N4382 are reproduced verbatim from their sources.
The materials in WO204 are probably translations made by
Captain Turowski, Chief Polish Base Censor, or they are
written by the soldiers themselves in English. In the case of
FO371/56374 N4382, the quotes have either been written by
Polish soldiers in English on the "Keynote" text, or they are
the Foreign Office translations of Polish comments.
Edited quotes should read:
PAGE LINE
80	 11 Down :"At a time when the whole world rejoices..
80	 13 Down :"for a further war, which will bring..."
80	 21 Down :"us! We are still soldiers and we are..."
113	 7 Down :"Prime Minister Churchill wants to give us
British citizenship...
115	 3 & 4 Down :"We can believe this time what German
Radio says that the NKVD arrests..."
115	 6 Down :"This is the truth of the Russian motto..."
116	 8 & 9 Down :"want to fight with the Allied troops
against the Jerries."
156	 5 & 6 Up	 :"the great disenchantment that the end of
the war brought them."
156	 3 Up	 :"friends, but we Polish Airmen who fought..."
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